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(i) 
INTRODUCTION 
Labour is the backbone of a Nation. Any work, whether manual or 
mental, undertaken for a monetary consideration is termed as 'Labour*. 
It is an illusion and myth that labour law exists in books. To be sure, 
books describe it. But it exists, realistically, not in books but in factories, in 
mines, on roads, in rails, in stores, in plantation and in offices where people 
labour. In books we find not the law of labour itself but merely pictures of 
that law. 
History bears testimony that there has always been a wide gap between 
rich and poor, and labour class has always been exploited by the elite class 
holding the reins of employment in their hands. Profit-making has been the 
guiding motive of economic enterprise. This was accentuated by the Industrial 
Revolution which widened considerably the opportunities and scope for 
profit-making. Subsistence wage, long working hours, women and child 
labour, were some of the devices adopted by entrepreneurs to derive maxi-
mum profit. Governments of the day did not interfere as they were guided by 
and wedded to the economic policy oflaissezfaire. Industrial relations were 
ordered by the concept of master and servant and the rule of employment was 
one of hire and fire. A few voices were raised in protest; but for a long time 
they were merely a cry in the wilderness, "^ose who controlled industry had 
a feeling of complacency until it was shattered by political and social 
upheavals in the begining of 20th century. The Governments, one by one, 
abandoned the doctrine of laissez faire and started intervening in the eco-
nomic and social order. Public opinion came to be mobilized and Government 
policies came to be guided more and more by social objectives. 
(ii) 
So long as the rights to private property exist in a society, some people 
will continue to own the means of production and distribution on the one hand 
and large number of persons will continue to seek work and remain at the 
mercy of their employers on the other. Such situation paves the way to 
exploitation of the workers by the employers. Since the State is pledged to the 
welfare of its citizens, it cannot remain a silent spectator. 
In India, the working class has a deplorable plight- low wages and 
weaker bargaining power. They are poorly organized. Without the protection 
of the State they may be subjected to victimization. The economic develop-
ment and national progress depend upon the Industrial peace. The State 
intervention on behalf of workers tends to reduce friction and develop the 
desired type of psychological cUmate for workers, wherein they feel that they 
are being looked after and their worth is recognized. Since industrial workers 
are more exposed to risks and hazards, the attention of the Government they 
get is more than that to other sections of the community. 
In order to protect the interests of workers, the Government of India 
has from time to time enacted suitable legislations. 
Prior to enforcement of the Indian Constitution various legislations, 
like the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, The Payment of Wages Act, 1936, 
Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, The Workmen's Compensation 
Act, 1923, The Factories Act, 1948 etc., were in operation for welfare of the 
workers and to manage the relations between the employer and Employees. 
But the firamers of the Constitution felt that, regarding the labour welfare and 
protection of workers from exploitation, these legislations are not sufficient, 
because they did not have any 'National Goal' to the coming progressive 
(iii) 
Indian Society. Keeping in view they incorported many provisions i.e. 
tf provisions relating to distribution of power, job security and the commitment 
to social evolution lies in Part-III (Fundamental Rights) and Part-IV (Directive 
Princiles of State Policy). As a result new juristic philosophy expounded by 
the court to solve the grass root problems and hardship of industrial workers 
with the objective to secure 'greatest good to the greatest number*. 
The Preamble of the Indian Constitution states that the people of India 
have solemnly resolved- to secure to all its citizens: Justice-social, Economic 
and Political-Equality of status and of opportunity'. Thus the concept of 
socio-economic justice which is enshrined in the Preamble reflects the 
aspirations of the people of India. 
The Indian Constitution through its preamble emphatically declares 
that the socialist Democratic Republic of India shall be a welfare State 
committed to the ideal of socio-economic justice. This message of socio-
economic justice has been translated into serveral Articles dealing with its 
different facets. 
The Preamble shows the general purpose behind the several provisions 
of the Constitution but, nevertheless, it is never regarded as a source of any 
substantive power or limitation'. 
But some confusion has been created by the observation of 
kesvananda's case ,^ a majority of the Full Bench that (unlike the Preamble in 
ordinary Statute) the Preamble to our Constitution should be interpreted as 
a part of the Constitution. 
1. Re Berubari Union. AIR. 1960 S.C. 845. 
2. Kesavananda Bharti Vs. State of Kerala. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
(iv) 
Various decisions of the Supreme Court show that the court is now 
inclined to take a larger cognizance of the Preamble as setting forth the goal 
of our political society, so that it may be invoked to determine the ambit of 
Fundamental Rights and the Directives, because it is the ideals of socialism, 
secularism and democracy which are elaborated by the enacting provisions\ 
In short, in the matter of interpretaton of the provisions of the Constitution 
as well as of a statute, the court is relying on the objects enshrined in the 
Preamble to the Constitution, wherever the language of the enacting provision 
permits. 
As under the Government of India Act, 1935, there was a three fold 
divison of legislative powers between the Union and States. Under the present 
Constitution of India, there are three legislative lists in the 7th Schedule of the 
Constitution: 
List I or the Union List includes 97 subjects over which the Union shall 
have exclusive powers of legislation. 
List II or the State List comprises 66 items or entries over which the 
state legislature shall have exclusive power of legislation. 
List III gives concurrent powers to the Union and State Legislatures 
over 47 items including welfare of labour, j^ he framers of the Constitution 
added this list to the Constitution with a view to secure uniformity in the main 
principles of law throughout the country .''They, having regard to the nature 
of the subject matter and different conditions prevailing in the various 
provinces thought it fit to provide a system whereby labour welfare legislation 
could provide adequate safeguards as against the strong capitalist groups. 
3. Chandra Bhawan Vs. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2042; State of Kerala Vs. 
Thomas, A.I.R. 1976. S.C. 490; Bhim Singhji Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 
S.C. 854. 
(V) 
They in their wisdom, decided that labour matters should be placed in the 
concurrent list so that both the centre and province could play their respective 
role successfully. 
Further labour being placed in the concurrent list provides a mecha-
nism to deal with Centre-State action or over reaction, as both are given the 
power to play an effective role within their own sphere. 
In case of repugnancy between a law of a State and a law of the Union 
in the concurrent sphere, the latter will prevail. The State legislature may, 
however, prevail notwithstanding such repugnancy, if the state law was 
reserved for the President and has received his assent. 
The Directive Principles of State Policy lay down certain social, 
economic and political principles, suitable to peculiar conditions prevailing in 
India. Articles 39,41, 42,43 and 43-A of the Constitution deal with the social 
and economic welfare of workers engaged in all sorts of labour- agricultural, 
industrial, or otherwise. 
In a developing coimtry like India, where majority of the workers live 
below poverty line, a planned economy wedded to ushering in a welfare state 
which aims at providing social justice to the poor workers, preservance of 
industrial peace and contentment is of vital importance for an ui^indered and 
accelarated growth of national economy. Wages play an important role in the 
whole labour-management relations, which can be maintained only if the 
labour is provided just share in the fruits of economic development. 
The importance of the wage aspect is clear from the provision laid 
down in the Indian Constitution. The most important Article enshrined in the 
Constitution of India is Article 43 which provdes: 
(vi) 
"The state shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic 
organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial 
or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work —" 
The concept of living wage has thus been incorporated in the Consti-
tution itself. Article 43 in a sense can be said to be the 'Magna Carta' of all 
workers and this Constitutional goal directly or indirectly emphasises the need 
to improve the wages and the conditions of the workers through legislative 
and other state actions or measures. 
Part III of the Constitution embodies the Fundamental Rights. The aim 
of having a declaration of Fundamental Rights is that certain elementary 
rights, such, as right to equality, right to life. Liberty, freedom of speech, 
freedom of faith and so on, should be regarded as inviolable under all 
conditions and that the shifting majority in legislature of the country should 
not have a free hand in interfering with these frindamental rights. These rights 
are ensured as effective guarantees against the state action. 
Debate on merits and demerits of equality and inequality is endless. It 
is a tussle between haves and have-nots and each side has its ablest advocates. 
The Indian Constitution establishes equality before law and equal 
protection of the laws, prohibits discrimination by the State on ground of 
religion, race, caste, sex or place ofbirth; and provides equality of opportunity 
in matters of employment. 
It is now settled that Article 14 is applicable to employment under the 
State so as to invalidate discriminatory rules and orders. A rule or order will 
be discriminatory if the classification made by it is not reasonable. It is also 
applicable on the arbitrary use of power. 
(vii) 
The framers of the Constitution of India had reason to fear, therefore, 
mspite of the prohibition in Article 14, discrimination on the basis of religion 
race, caste, sex or place of birth might be legitimised by the courts on the basis 
of reasonable classification. It was with a view to forestalling such an 
eventuality that the Constitution in clause (1) of Article 15 expressly provides 
that "the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them". 
Clause(2)'* of Article 15 is a specific application of the general prohi-
bition contained in Article 15(1). clause (2) prohibits both the State and 
private individuals fi-om making any discrimination. The object of Article 
15(2) is to eradicate the abuse of the Hindu social system. Clauses (3) and (4) 
of Article 15 are exceptions to the rules provided in clauses (1) and (2). 
Clause (3) says that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the state from 
making any special provision for women and children. They require special 
treatment on account of their nature. 
Clause (4) of Article 15 was added by the Constitution (1st Amend-
ment) Act, 1951, as a result of the decision in State of Madras Vs. Champakam 
Dorairajan' Under this clause the State is empowered to make special 
provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward 
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
4. Article IS (2): 'No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place 
of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or 
condition with regard to-
la) access to shops, public resturants, hotels, and place of public entertainment, or 
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and place of public resort maintained 
wholly or partly out of state fiinds or dedicated to the use of the general public. 
5. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226. 
(viii) 
Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity to all citizens in the 
matter of appointment to any office or any other employment under the state. 
The principle underlying Article 14 has accordingly, been applied to the 
interpretation of Article 16(1), namely that the equality of opportunity 
guaranteed by it means "equality as between members of the same class of 
employees, and not equality between members of separate, independent 
classes. 
The equality of opportunity 'in matters relating to employment or 
appointment' is wide enough to include all matters in relation to employment, 
both prior and subsequent such as initial appointment, pay, conditions of 
service, confirmation, seniority, promotion, termination, abolition of post, 
compulsory retirement, reversion, superannuation, pension, transfer, reser-
vation for back-ward classes, periodical increments, terms of leave, gratuity 
etc. 
Article 19 of the Constitution guarantees to the citizens of India the six 
fundamental freedom which are exerciseable by them throughout and in all 
parts of the territory of India. These are- freedom of speech and expression; 
freedom of movement, freedom of residence and settlement; freedom of 
profession, occupation, trade or business; freedom to assemble; freedom to 
form associations. 
The rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of 
association protect some of the vital interests of the workers, strenghtening 
their hands in forming trade unions, in staging demonstrations and in carrying 
on collective bargaining. The freedom of trade and occupation may, 
presumably, be of help principally to the employers. 
(ix) 
The provisions relating to services under the Union and States are laid 
down in Part XIV of the Constitution. The most important provisions are 
,those laid down in Articles 309, 310 and 311. 
•v~ 
With the independence of our country, the responsibilities of the 
services have become onerous. A country without an efficient civil service can 
not progress. Whatever democratic institutions exist, experience has shown, 
that it is essential to protect the public services as far as possible from political 
or personal influence. For this purpose the said provisions are incorporated 
in our Constitution. 
This thesis is concerned with the Constitutional rights, directives and 
remedies of workers against their exploitation. It proposes to examine the 
extent of constitutional protections and adequacy of laws derived from such 
Constitutional provisions with a view to suggest measures that should be 
incorporated for a fuller protection of workers. 
It seeks to examine, therefore, the Constitutional guarantees and 
directives as well as such other legislations which buttress the Constitutional 
measures. In examining such Constitutional provisions and legislations, cases 
decided by courts for giving efiTect to such provisions is also critically 
examined. This thesis also examines the Constitutional provisions pertaining 
to remedies against employer's action. 
The present work is conveniently divided into seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 deals with the Preamble of the Constitution, economic and social 
justice, and equality of opportunity. 
Chapter II examines the implications of "Labour" being on the "Concurrent 
List" of the Constitution. It deals with the respective powers of 
( X ) 
Centre and States in enacting legislations, affecting 'labour', the 
effect of inconsistent legislations and the method for reconciliation of 
inconsistent Acts made by the Centre and the State legislatures. 
Chapter III deals with Directive Principles of State Policy with special 
reference to living wage and the approach of the Courts to living 
wage. This chapter also deals with the directive concerning full 
employment and the constraints thereof in translating the ideal into 
reality. 
Chapter IV examines the Fundamental Rights concerning equality as they 
affect the workers. It further examines legislations such as Equal 
Remuneration Act, and cases decided thereunder. 
Chapter V deals with rights of speech, and expression, and association as 
they affect the rights of workers to picket, to form unions of their own 
choice to collective bargaining and to strike the restrictions on these 
rights by various enactments are also examined. 
Chapter VI examines the protections given by the Constitution for job 
security to workers and civil servants, and disciplinary action and 
judicial review thereof Procedure for enquiry, natural justice, 
disciplinary proceedings and punishments are also examined. 
Chapter VII deals with recapitulation of the subject and suggestions. 
Note: Present study deals with case law till November, 1997. • 
- ^ 
CHAPTER -1 
The Preamble 
In this Chapter an attempt has been made to discuss the importance of 
the Preamble of the Constitution in interpreting the various provisions of the 
Constitution in relation to workers. Various terms used in the Preamble are 
also discussed. The concepts of socio-economic justice, equality of opportunity. 
Directive Principles of State Policy, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental 
Duties in the light of the Preamble are also high lighted. 
A: The terms used: 
The preamble to our Constitution declares: "We 
The People of India . having solemnly resolved 
to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist 
Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to all 
its citizens: 
Justice, Social, economic and political; 
Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; 
Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote 
among them all 
Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the 
unity and integrity of the Nation; 
In Our Constituent Assembly this twenty-
sixth day of November, 1949, do Hereby Adopt. 
Enact And Give To Ourselves This Constitution". 
The Preamble to our Constitution serves two purposes: 
(a) It indicates the source from which the constitution derives its authority, 
(b) It also states the objects which the constitution seeks to establish and 
promote. 
(1) We The People Of India'-: The word "We the people of India" echo the 
opening words in the Preamble to the constitutions of the United States and 
of Eire' and emphasise the ultimate sovereignty of the people and that the 
constitution itself is founded on the authority of the people. In Scott Vs. 
Stanford^ it was held that the constitution itself is founded on the authority 
of the people who hold the power and conduct the government through their 
representatives. 
Our constitution has been made by men who can not be said to be fiilly 
representative of the nation and it has not been ratified by the direct vote of 
the people,Our constitution, like that of the United States professes that it is 
founded on the consent and acquiescence of the people. It is not imposed by 
any external authority as was the Government of India Act, 1935. In Union of 
India Vs Madan GopaP, the Supereme Court has, from this aspect of the 
Preamble, drawn the power of the legislatures set up by the constitution to 
enact laws with retrospective operation beyond the commencement of the 
constitution itself and observed : 
"Our constitution, as appears from the Preamble, derives its 
authority from the people of India, and learned counsel 
conceeded that it was open to the people to confer on the 
legislatures, established by the constitution, which they framed 
through their representatives, power to make laws having 
operation in relation to periods prior to the commencement of 
the constitution"'*. 
1. Eire : Ireland is called Eire (Pronounced AIRuh) in Gaelic, the ancient language of Ireland. 
Gaelic and English are the country's two official languages. Ireland also has longbeen known 
by the poetic name Erin- Erin go bragh is well known phrase of Gaelic that means- Ireland 
forever. (The world Book Encyclopedia. Vol. 10, Worl Book Inc. London, at 416.) 
2. Scott Vs. Stanford (1857) 19 How. 393. 
3. Union of India Vs. Madan Gopal, (1954) S.C.R. 541 . 
4. Id at 555. 
It is by authority derived from the people that the constitution blotted 
out in one magnificent sweep all vestiges of arbitrary and despotic power in 
the territories of India', and conferred upon the subjects of the autocratic 
Princes (of Indian States) the fullfledged Citizenship of India. The word 
people' indicates that the constitution is not created by the States or by the 
prople of the several States, but by the people of India in their aggregate 
capacity. Hence, it would not be open to any State or group of States either 
to put an end to our constitution or to secede from Union created by it'. 
(2)''Sovereignty':- Sovereign or Supreme Power is that which is absolute 
and uncontrolled within its own sphere. 
According to Davies and Holdcroft, Austin's sovereignty can be put 
into four propositions, as follows*: 
(a) A superior expresses a desire that an inferior does an act or forebears 
from doing that act. 
(b) Superior is capable of inflicting an evil, if the inferior does not obey the 
orders of the superior. 
(c) The inferior is a member of a society, the majority of which is in the habit 
of obeying the orders of the superior. 
(d) The superior is not in the habit of obeying orders of any determinate 
human superior. 
5. Durga Das Basu, "Commentary on the Constitution of India,141 (Sixth edition. 
Volume 'A'. 1973, S.C. Sarkar and Sons (P) Ltd, Calcutta). 
6. D and H.P. 23 cited from Prof. M.R. Zafar," Jurisprudence An Outline", Interna-
tional Law Book Services Kuala Lumpur, 1994, at 12. 
Austin's Sovereignty has got three characteristics: 
(a) Sovereignty is illimitable 
(b) Sovereignty is indivisible 
(c) Sovereignty is continuous 
Sovereignty is a concept and full sovereignty is the ultimate standard 
desired to be achieved by a country, people or State. Therefore it should 
always be kept in mind that though expressed in absolute terms, it is not always 
absolute in real terms. 
Sovereignty may be divided into two parts (a) External Sovereignty or 
Sovereignty in international law (b) Interal Sovereignty. 
(a) External Sovereignty:- External Sovereignty means the independence 
of a State of the will of other States. According to Schwarzenberger' 
Sovereign in its relation between States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise 
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the function of a State. 
Now by the passing of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, India ceased 
to be a 'Dependency of the British Empire*. Whatever, subjection or limitation 
was still implied has been abjured by India declaring herself a Republic in the 
Constitution. So, India is now as sovereign as the United States of America. 
Here it will be better to discuss the position of India as member of 
Commonwealth of Nations. At the Prime Ministers' Conference at London on 
April 27, 1949, India has made a declaration to the effect that notwithstanding 
her becoming a sovereign, independent Republic'; he will continue.-
7. Schwarzenberger, International Law, 1945, Vol. I. at 44 . 
"her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her 
acceptance of the king as the symbol of the free association of 
the independent nations and as such the Head of the 
Commonwealth"*. 
But it is to be noted that this declaration is extra legal and there is no 
mention of it in the constitution of India. It is a voluntary declaration and 
indicates a free association and no obligation. It accepts the King of England 
only as a symbolic head of the Commonwealth and there is no question of 
allegiance of the citizens of India to the King of England. As a member of the 
V'^conunonwealth, India has a right to be represented in Commonwealth 
Conferences, decisions at Commonwealth Conferences will not be binding on 
her and no treaty with a foreign power or declaration of war by any member 
of the Commonwealth will be binding on her, without her express consent. 
Hence, this voluntary association of India with the Commonwealth does not 
affect her sovereignty to any extent and it would be open to India to cut oflF 
that association as easily as it was declared. 
(b) Internal Sovereignty:- Internal Sovereignty refers to the relation 
between the State and the individuals within its territory. It means "the 
power to compel obedience and to punish for disobedience', or, the 
power to determine what rule shall have the force of law and to enforce 
them. 
If we collect the judicial opinions of the Courts from the United States 
about the nature of Sovereignty we will find that the Sovereignty is divided 
between the Union and the States, each being Sovereign as regards the 
subjects committed to it by the Consitution. Sometimes the two Sovereignties 
8. India has preferred to remain a member of the Commonwealth even after declaring 
herself a Republic. 
may operate within the same territory. Thus, the same act may constitute an 
offence against a federal law and another offence against a State law and each 
government may punish for the respective offences separately, in the exercise 
of their separate Sovereignty. 
In Ableman vs Booth,' the court observes : 
"The powers of the genera] government and the State, although 
both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are 
yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and 
independently of each other, within their respective sphares. And 
the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is a far 
beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State Judge or 
a State Court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and 
monuments visible to the eye"*°. 
The theory of divided sovereignty has also been expressed in several 
cases" in Australia. 
Thougji there is a division of powers between the Union and the States 
in the Indian aonstitution, there is a lesser scope for the divided soveriegnty. 
This division of power is honoured in the normal days but in the national 
interest and in emergencies the Union is empowered to override the division. 
Of course, in normal days and so long as the Union does not exercise any of 
these overriding powers, the Union and the States are autonomous within 
their respective spheres as outlined by the division of powers effected by the 
constitution, but the sovereignty of the State becomes illusory when its 
constitutional government is suspended and its functions assumed by the 
9. Ableman Vs. Both, (1859) 21 How. 506. 
10. Id at 516. 
11. D'Emden Vs. Pedder. (1904)1 C.L.R. 91 at 109; Municipal Council Vs. 
Commonwealth, (1904)1 C.L.R. 208. 
Union (under Articles. 356" and 365"). But the sovereignty can not be 
resided in the Union Parliament alone, because whether in the normal or in 
emergencies, the powers of the Union are limited by the constituion and its 
acts which transgress the constitution would be unconstitutional and invalid. 
Another example of such limitation is the power of amendment. Though the 
power of amendment is vested in the Union Parliment under Art. 368 (1), 
ratification by the State legislature is required for following changes in — 
(a) Articles 54,55,73,162 or 241; 
(b) Chapters IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI or Chapter I of 
Part XI ; 
(c) any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule ; 
(d) the representation of States in Parliament and 
(e) the provisions of Article 368 
(3) Socialist Secular-: These words were added by the Constitution 
(Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. 
12. Articles 356: (1) "If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governnor of a 
State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government 
of the State can not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution, the President may by Proclamation-
(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all 
or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governnor or any body or 
authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State;—" 
13. Article 365: Where any State has failed to comply with, or to give effect to , any 
directions given in the exercise of the executive power of the Union under any of 
the provisions of this Constitution, it shall be lawful for the President to hold that 
a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State can not be carried on 
in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
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The concept of socialist was already implicit in the constituion. The 
amendment merely spells out clearly this concept in the Preamble. The word 
'Socialism' is used in domocratic as well as socialistic constitution. It has no 
definite meaning. The degree of State control will determine whether it is a 
democratic State or socialist State. India has however, chosen its own brand 
e.g. mixed economy. 
The term secularism simply means a State which has no religion of its 
own as recognised religion of State. State treats all religions equally in all 
aspect. In a secular State the State regulates the relation between man and 
man. It is not concerned with the relation of man with God. 
This change in the Preamble is criticised by H.M. Seervai in the 
following words:-
"Whether the Preamble at all needed amendment is a question of 
policy. However, it may be observed that the word ' Socialist* would 
require to be defined. It is a word of many meanings, and its 
appropriation by the Soviet Union would seem to suggest that a 
socialist form of government can be a dictatorship, which is foreign 
to our constitution. In fact, an amendment to the Pfeamble moved by 
Maulana Hasrat Mohani which spoke if'we the people of India having 
soleminly resolved to constitute India into a Union of Indian Socialistic 
Republic to be called U.I.S.R. on the lines of the U.S.S.R.,' was 
rejected as inconsistent with our constitution. Secondly, the word 
'Secular' is not precise and would itself require to be defined. 'Secular' 
may be opposed to 'religious' in the sense that a secular State can be 
an anti-religious State. In this sense, the constitution of India is not 
secular, because the right to the fi^eedom of religion is a guaranteed 
Fundamental Right. The word secular' may mean that as far as the 
State is concerned, it does not support any religion out of public 
funds, nor does it penalise the profession and practice of any religion 
or the right to manage religious institutions as provided in Articles 25 
and 26. The secular nature of our constitution has to be gathered from 
these and other Articles of our Constitution, like the Articles relating 
to a common citizenship (Part-II) and Articles IS, 16 and 29(2). 
Good drafting would require that ambiguous words should not be put 
into a Preamble without a reason and as far as one can see, there is 
no reason for putting in the word 'Scialist' and the word 'Secular', for 
c —• " '7 
the content of those concepts theniselves would have to be found in 
the enacting parts of the constitution, and by themselves the two 
words have certain associations which are inconsistent with the 
enacting provisions of our Constitution—'"'*. 
(4)Democratic:- 'Democracy'is one of the most comprehensive terms used in 
Political Science. It may mean a political, social as well as economic condition. 
In Indian constitution, the term 'democratic' indicates that the Constitution 
has established a form of Government which gets its authority from the will 
of the people. The rulers are elected by the people and are responsible to them. 
(5)Republic:- In Political science, the word 'Republic' is used in the various 
senses. But in Indian Constitution the term 'Republic signifies that there shall 
be an elected head of the State who will be the Chief executive head. The 
President of India, unlike the British King, is not a hereditary monarch but an 
elected person chosen for a limited period. It is an essential ingredient of a 
Republic. 
(6)Social, economic and political justice:- The social and economic justice 
14. H.M. Seervai /Constitutional Law of India, A critical Commentary", 138,139( 
Third edition. Vol. I, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd. Bombay. 1983) . 
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is discussed in the Part B' of this chapter. In our Constitution, the political 
justice means the absence of any arbitrary distinction between man and man 
in the political sphere. The political justice is secured under Indian Constitution 
by adopting universal adult suffrage and the abolition of communal reservation, 
and by throwing open employment under the State to all citizens without 
distinction of race, caste, sex, decent, place of birth or religion. 
• 
(7)Liberty :- Liberties are, however, defined by the chapter on Fundamental 
Rights, but in case of doubt, it may be usefiil to refer to the ideal of liberty 
embodied in the Preamble. Our constitution respects the liberty of thought, 
belief, faith, and expression to be essential to the development of the 
individual and the nation. 
(8)Equality of opportunity :- It is discussed in the part C* of this chapter. 
(9)Fraternity :- Fraternity as an object is not reflected in any Article of the 
Constitution- no constitution and no law can produce brotherly feeling or 
concord. But democracy would indeed be hollow if it fails to generate a spirit 
of brotherhood among all sections of the people. Fraternity is essential for 
country like India where many races, religions, languages and cultures are 
existed. Article I of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 
adopted by the United Nations, says: 
"All human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards on 
another in a spirit of brotherhood." 
It is this spirit of brotherhood that the Preamble of our Constitution 
refers to. 
B: Importance of Preamble :- There is a great importance of the Preamble 
11 
of the constitution in interpreting the various provisions of the constitution in 
relation to labour. The Preamble of the Indian constitution is the pole star of 
our basic national objectives and goals which include among other things the 
dignity of individual, freedom of association and movement,the freedom of 
speech and exprassion and control of exploitation of workers within the 
parameters of law. There is Fundamental Right to form an association, to 
organise for formulating, maintaining and enforcing the rights of citizens. 
Their right to organise for callective bargaining for realizing the trade union 
objectives is not denied. 
It is interesting to note that there is a remarkable similarity between the 
Preamble of the Indian Constitution and the Declaration concerning the aims 
and purposes of the ILO adopted at the Twenty Sixth Session of the 
International Labour Conference at Philadelphia, popularly known as the 
Philadelphia Charter of 1944. For intance, the expression, 'Labour' is not a 
Commodity of the ILO Constitution can be equated to 'dignity of individual' 
in the Indian constitution; "freedon of expression and association 'of the ILO 
with' 'Liberty of thought, expressions" etc. Further the right of all human 
beings irrespective of race, creed and sex to pursue their material well-being 
of the ILO with equality of status and oppartunity' and liberty of belief, 
faith', of the Indian Constitution and so on. The similarity becomes even more 
striking when the Indian constituton lays down in greater details what it calls 
the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of state policy"''. Preamble 
to the constitution commits India to the ideal of political democracy, coupled 
with social and economic democracy within the frame work of the rule of law. 
The expressions, 'Justice', 'Liberty', 'equality' and 'fraternity' may not be 
susceptible to exact definition, yet they are not mere platitude. They are given 
IS. Ganga Sahai Sharnia , "Trade union Freedoms in India", 108 (Deep and Deep 
Publication Rajori Garden, New Delhi, 1990). 
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content by the enacting provisions of the constitution particularly by Part III 
, the Fundamental Rights and Part IV, the Directive Principles of State policy. 
Social justice is indispensable for the economic development of the 
country. So when we are going to interpret any provision of the constitution, 
the Preamble wUl give its colour to the provision because the proper function 
of a Preamble is to explain certain facts which are necessary to be explained 
before the enactments contained in the Act can be understood. In short, it 
contains a recital of the facts or state of the land for which it is proposed to 
legislate by the statute; the object and policy of legislation and the evils or 
inconveniences it seeks to remedy. 
The Preamble is a legitimate aid in the construction of the provisions 
of the constitution specially when these provisions are related to the workers. 
For the purposes of interpretation, the Preamble of the constitution stands in 
the same position as the Preamble of an Act. 
In Berubari Union case'* the Supreme Court observed that the 
declaration made by the people of India in exercise of their soverign will in 
the Preamble to the constitution is 'a key to open the mind of the makers' 
which may show the general purposes for which they made the several 
provisions in the constitution; but the Preamble is neither a part of the 
Constitution nor is it the source of any substantive power of the Government. 
Such powers embrace only those powers which are either expressly granted 
by the Constitution or which may be implied from those granted. What is true 
about the powers is equally true about the prohibitions and limitations. 
Besides, it is not easy to accept the assumption that the first part of the 
Preamble postulates a very serious limitation on one of the very important 
16. In re. Berubari Union (1960) SCR. 250.. 
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attributes of sovereignty itself. It is universally recognised that one of the 
attributes of soveriegnty is the power to cede parts of national territory if 
necessary. At the highest it may perhaps be arguable that if the terms used in 
any of the Articles in the constitution are ambiguous or are capable of two 
meanings, in interpreting them some assistance may be sought in the objectives 
enshrined in the Preamble. Therefore, it is not right in contending that the 
Preamble imports any limitation on the exercise of what is generally regarded 
as necessary and essential attribute of soveriegnty. 
Kesvananda Bharti's case'^ throws the light on the importance of the 
Preamble and the interpretation of provisions of the constitution. In this case 
the petition was heard by a Bench consisting of all the thirteen judges of the 
Supreme Court and it was held that basic structure of the constitution could 
not be amended. The Supreme Court did not define what is 'basic structure' 
but pointed out that rule of law, judicial review and separation of powers. 
Fundamental rights, except right to property are included in the basic 
structure. In this regard the opinions of Hon'ble Judges (Sikri, C.J., Shelat, 
Hegde and Mukherjee J.J.) given in the above case are as follows: 
(1) While interpreting the constitution one must not construe it as 
an ordinary statute. The constitution apart from setting up a 
machinery for government, has a noble and grand vision in the 
Preamble. 
(2) So far as the Preamble is concerned though in an ordinary 
statute we do not attach any importance to the Preamble, all 
importance has to be attached to the Preamble in a constitutional 
statute. The holding in In re Berubari Union'* followed by 
17. Kesvananda Bharti Vs. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225. 
18. In re. Berubari Union (1960) S.C.R. 250. 
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Wanchoo and Buchawat, J.J. in Golak Nath's" case that Preamble 
is not part of the constitt^oil is not correct. It was expressly voted 
to be part of the constitution. 
(3) The Constitution is an organic document which must grow and 
it must take place of the vast socio economic problems, particularly, 
of improving the lot of the common man consistent with his dignity 
and the unity of the nation. 
(4) The Preamble embodies the fundamentals underlyings the 
structure of the constitution. It was adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly after the entire constitution has been adopted. It hardly 
makes any substancial difference whether the Preamble is the part 
of the constitution or not. Ihe true function of the Preamble is to 
expound the nature and extent and not substantially to create 
them. 
(5) A constitution is not to be construed in any narrow and 
pedantic sense. A broad and liberal spirit should inspire those 
whose duty is to interpret it. 
(6) The true function of the Preamble is to express the nature and 
extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the 
constitution and not substantially to create them. If any provision 
of the constitution had to be interpreted and if the expressions used 
therein are ambiguous, the Preamble would certainly furnish 
valuable guidance in the matter. 
(7) Our constitution is not a mere political document. It is 
essentially a social document. It isbased on a social philosophy and 
19 Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643. 
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every social philosophy like every religion has two main features, 
namely, basic and circumstantial. The former remains constant but 
the latter is subject to change. The core of a relegion always 
remains constant but the practices associated with it may change 
Likewise a constitution like ours contains features which are so 
essential that they can not be changed or destroyed. 
(8) From the Preamble it is quite clear that the two primary 
objectives before the Constituent Assembly were- (a) to constitute 
India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and (b) to secure to its 
citizens the rights mentioned therein. It was a plan to build a 
welfare State and an egalitarian society. The statement in the 
Preamble that the people of this country conferred on themselves 
is not open to challenge before this court. Its factual correctness 
can not be gone into by this court which again is a creature of the 
constitution. The facts set out in the Preamble have to be accepted 
by this court as correct. 
In Atam Prakash's Case", the Court observed: 
"Whether it is the constitution that is expounded orthe Constitutional 
validity of a statute that is considered, a cardinal rule is to look to the 
Preamble to the constitution as the guiding light and to the Directive 
Principles of State Polices asthe Book of Interpretation. The Preamble 
embodies and expresses the hopes and aspirations of the people. The 
Directive Principles set out proximate goals. When we go about the 
task of examining statutes against the constitution, it is through these 
glasses that we must look, 'distant vision' or ' near vision'. The 
constitution being suigeneris,, w4ere constitutional issues are under 
consideration, narrrf^interperative rules which may have relevance 
when legislative enactments are interpreted may be misplaced. 
20. Atam Prakash Vs. State of Haryana and others, A.I.R.1986 S.C.859 
16 
Originally, the Preamble to the constitution proclaimed the resolution 
of the people of India to constitute India into a 'Sovereign Democratic 
Republic' and set forth 'Justice, liberty. Equality and Fraternity', the 
very rights mentioned in the French Declarations of the Rights of 
Man as our hopes and aspirations. That was in 1950 when we had just 
emerged from the colonial feudal rule. Time passed. The people's 
hopes and aspirations grew. In 1977 the 42nd amendment proclaimed 
India as a socialist Republic. The word 'Socialist' was introduced into 
the Preamble to the constitution. The implication of the introduction 
of the word 'socialist', which has now become the centre of the hopes 
and aspirations of the people- a beacon to guide and inspire aU that 
is enshrined in the Articles of the constitution, is clearly to set up a 
'vibrant throbbing socialist welfare society' in the place of a Feudal 
exploited society'. Whatever Article of the constitution it is that we 
seek to interpret, whatever, statute it is whose constitutional validity 
is sought to be questioned, we must strive to give such an interpretation 
as will promote the march and progress towards a Socialistic 
Democratic State^'. 
The mode of realisation of this ideal, namely, the establishment of an 
egalitarian society, permeated by social, economic and political justice, is 
carried out in detail by the various provisons of the Constitution". 
But the Preamble is not the source either of any power or of any 
limitation. It can not thus be argued that the power to cede any part of the 
territary, which belongs tc every State as an attribute of sovereignty, does not 
exist under the Indian Constitution because the Preamble says that ' the people 
of India' have solemnly resolved to constitute India a sovereign democratic 
republic". Nor is any appeal to the Preamble permisible to override the 
express provisions of the Constitution. 
21. Id at 860. 
22. Golak Nath Vs. State of Pubjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 at 1646. 
23. In re Berubari Union, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 845 at 855-6. 
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On the other hand, in Constituting the Fundamental Rights enumerated 
in Part III of the Constitution, the high purpose and spirit of the Preamble, 
namely, that it assured to the citizen the dignity of the individual and other 
cherished human values as a means to the full evalutioa and expression of his 
personality, should be bom in mind". The empi^asis of our Constitution, as 
expressed in the Preamble, is to establish a 'welfare State^'. 
C: Socio Economic Justice:- Social Scientists and political thinkers trace the 
origin of the idea of Social justice in the stoic^^ cenception of Natural equality 
and the christian conception of common brotherhood of all sons of God. Carl. 
J. Friedrich relates the idea of social justice with certain ancient and medieval 
doctrines. Thus he observed: 
"The idea of social justice has its roots in the old and new testament. 
In ancient Israel there was a provision for a kind of redistribution of 
wealth. Every so often aU debts were abolished—*^^. 
The early liberal thinkers, particularly the exponents of laissez-faire, 
individualism such as Adam Smith (1723-1790), David Recordo (1777-1823) 
and Thomas Robert Mathews (1766-1834) treated labour merely as a 
commodity subject to frequent fluctuations of values according to the market 
the forces of demand and supply like other commodities in the market. In fact 
by the eighteen century the stage was set for the victory of the capatalist class 
in Europe. The working class had not yet emerged as a force strong enough 
to make its voice felt. They continued to be exploited by the dominant 
24. Gopalan Vs. State of Madras, AIR. 1950 S.C. 27 at 72. 
25. Basheshar Vs. C.I.T., (1959) Supp. I S.C.R. 528, as per S.K. Das J. 
26. Stoic : Disciple of Greek philosopher Zeno. (Webster's Dictionary 1987, P.S.I, and 
Associates, Inc., 10481 S.W. 123rd Street Miami, Florida) at 367. 
27. Cart J. Friedrich, 'An Introduction to Political Therory' 30-31 (New York, Harper 
and Row Publishers 1967) . 
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capitalist class which projected freedom of contract as the essence of social 
justice because such freedom titled the balance in favour of this class. 
In ancient India the policies for the State were laid down by Dharam 
Shastra. The State used to undertake many frinctions which socialists, ancient 
and modem, are advocating, yet these went hand to hand with the enlargment 
of right and freedom. There is the illusion that the correct economic thought 
is only of recent growth and exclusively European origin " But the concept 
of a declaration of policy in regard to social and economic obligations of the 
State can not be said to be foreign to the genus of India Kautilya ordained in 
his Arthsastra that " the king shall provide the orphan, the dying, the infirm, 
the afOicted and the helpless with maintenance, he shall also provide subsistence 
to helpless expectant mothers and also the children they give birth to"^'. 
"Dharama is the supreme law of Laws, King of the Kings. It is Raja 
Dharama in which all living creatures take refiige", Yudhistra observed'". 
"Raja Dharama or the principles of the State can also , in a way, include 
Western concept ofNatural law"''. Till the British Rule, the society was feudal 
in nature and there was politico-economic administration of feudal land lords 
who were known asZamindars. The socially and economically backward class 
of the society was in their bondage and dependent as such on their whims and 
fancies . The Indian society was mainly agricultural society. On the one hand 
there were limited handicrafts and other small trades to meet out the day to 
day needs of the working people. There were very few cases of employment 
because the craftsmen, artisons and traders carried out the work either 
28. P.K. Tripathi. Spotlights on Constitutional Interpretation, 291, (1972). 
29. B.N. Rao, infers in hisaddress to the Indian Council of World Affairs, 10th August 
1949. 
30.U.N. Ghosal, A History of Indian Political Ideas, 189 (1959). 
31.Ibid. 
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themselves or with the help oftheir family members. It was only in case of land 
lords and Jagirdars that agricultural labour were engaged. They were either 
permanently under the socio-economic bondage of the land loards or they 
worked on the agricultural holdings owned by them. There was direct nexus 
of contract between the emiployer land lords, Jagirdars and the workers. These 
agricultural workers could not think oftheir rights, their unity, or organization 
to raise voice against the feudals. Land lords were so much powerful and 
strong that they could make vanish the total family or even race of a worker 
who dared to raise voice against them. On the other hand Indian agricultural 
society was dominated by the hierarchical caste system, extreme poverty and 
ignorance coupled with social customs. This complex structure of our society 
led to the widening of gap between the haves and have-nots. Thus, the poor 
and deprived were constrained by multiple social compulsions to take loans, 
advances in cash or kind from the dominant section of our society and 
consequently mortgaged their labour. This system mostly prevalent among 
agricultural sector, has now spread over to other areas like stone quarries, 
brick kilns, construction sites, forestry, carpet weaving, fishing, bidi making 
and the like. In this way, the age old in human system of labour has taken new 
dimentions in the present socio economic structure of our society. 
The concept of Social Justice discussed above, may be found in any 
religion whether it is Islam, Hinduism or Christainty. Here our purpose is to 
define the concept of social and economic justice in the light of laws made by 
men for men. The Supreme law made by man is the constitution. So before 
discussing the concept of social and economic justice in light of the Preamble 
and other provisions of the Indian constitution mainly Fundamental Rights 
and Directive Principles, it would be better to discuss the idea of social justice 
in historical perspective. 
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A reference to history may sometimes be permissible in interpreting the 
terms of the constitution. A Constitution is the heir of the past as well as the 
testator of the fixture. 
Inspired by the Declaration of Independence of America in 1776 and 
the Declaration of the Rights of man and of the citizen adopted in 1789 by the 
French Assembly, the emancipation of social and economic politics became a 
regular feature in the constitution framed in the post war period. 
Dr. Shanfiil Hasan has rightly formulated that: 
"The demand for right in India traces back to the 19th century and the 
patriotic flame resulted in the formation of the Indian National 
Congress in 1885. The Constitution of India Bill was introduced in 
1895. A series of congress resolutions reiterated that demand between 
1885 and 1919. The emergence of Mahatma Gandhi on the P^Mcal 
scene gave to the freedom a new dimension. It ceased to be merely 
anti-British, it became a movement for the acquisition of rights of 
liberty for the Indian community: Mrs. Besant's Commonwealth of 
India Bill, 1925 and Madras Congress Resolution of 1928 provided 
continuity for that movement"^^. 
All Parties Conference of 1928 recommended for incorporating a 
chapter on Fundamental Rights and also social and economic rights. The 
Congress Resolution 1929 also emphasised the same theme of the socio-
economic reconstruction when it declared: 
"The great poverty and misery of the Indian people are due, not only 
to foreign exploitation in India but also to the economic structure of 
32. Shariful Hasan, 'Supreme Court': Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles' .21 
(Deep and Deep publication. New Delhi, 1981). 
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society, which the alien rulers support so that their exploitation may 
continue. In order to remove this poverty and misery and to 
ameliorate the condition of the Indian masses, it is essential to make 
revolutionary changes in the present economic and social structure of 
society and to remove the gross inequalities"". 
The socio-economic rights embodies in the Directive Principles are as 
much a part of human rights as the Fundamental Rights"^ 
The Congress held its 45th session at Karachi in March 1931 which 
adopted the Rosolution on Fundamental Rights and Ecomomic and Social 
Change, which was both a declaration of rights and a humanitarian socialist 
manifesto. 
The Karachi resolution stated that in order to end the exploitation of 
the masses, political freedom must include the real economic freedom of the 
starving millions. The state was to safeguard the interest of industrial 
workers, ensuring that suitable legislation should secure them a living wage 
healthy conditions, limited hours of labour, and protection from the economic 
consequences of old age, sickness , and unemployment. Women and children 
were also to be protected in various ways and accorded special benefits. The 
State was to own or control key industries and services mineral resources, 
railways, waterways, shipping and other means of public transport. Another 
item called for the reform of the system of land tenure , revenue, and rent" 
The next major document on the rights of the pre-Assembly era was the 
SapruReport, published at the end of 1945. The report suggested constitutional 
scheme for India, and although the portions of the report dealing with 
33. Ibid, at 23. 
34. Ibid. 
35.Granville Austin, "The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of Nation", 56 (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1966). 
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Fundamental Rights contained overtones of the social revolution it addressed 
itself mainly to the problem of placating minority fears, which were again 
overshdowing the political scene. With independence likely in the not too 
distant future, the minorities had to face the responsibility of living together 
and of creating a State^". The Sapru Committee in its final report recommended 
for the declaration of Fundamental Rights and made a distinction between 
justiciable and non-justiciable rights. 
The social and economic objective was embodied in the Objective 
Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly on the 22nd January, 1947 
which fi^amed the constitution. 
(a)Socio- Economic Justice and the Indian Constitution:- The Constitution 
of India has promised to all citizens social and economic justice, equality of 
status and of opprotunity, liberty of thought, expression, and to promote 
among them all fraternity which ensures the dignity of the individual and the 
unity of the nation. The promise which is given by the constitution makers to 
all citizens of this country furnishes a key to the basic concept underlying the 
material provisions of the constitution. The dignity of the individual and the 
importance of his freedoms are recognised as essential parts of the democratic 
way of life which the constitution proclaimed. But the founding fathers of the 
constitution were also fully aware of about the problem posed by the ideal of 
the welfare state, and so the constitution has guranteed to its citizens social 
and economic justice. 
At the time of introducing the Bill to amend the constitution in the Lok 
Sabha on May 16,1951, Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru said: 
"The Directive Principle of State Policy represent a dynamic move 
36. Id. at 57. 
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towards a certain objective. The Fundamental Ri^ht represent 
something static ; their object ts to preserve certain f l ^ t s which 
already exist. Both again are rights. But sometime it might so happen 
that the dynamic movement and the static do not quite fit into each 
other. 
A dynamic movement towards a certain objective necessarily means 
certian changes; that is the essence of movement. Now, it may be that, 
in the process of dynamic movement, certain existing relationships 
are altered, varied or afiTected. In fact, it is meant to aflFect those 
settled relationship and yet if you come back to the Fundamental 
Rights they are meant to preserve, though not always indirectly, 
certain settled relationships. There is a certain conflict between the 
two approaches but I am sure it is not inherent one. However there 
is some difficulty and, naturally, when the Courts of the land have to 
consider these matters, they have to lay stress more on the Fundamental 
Rights than on Directive Principles of the State Policy. The result is 
that the whole purpose behind the constitution, which was meant to 
be a dynamic constitution, leading to a certain goal step by step, is 
some what hampered and hindered by the static element being 
emphasized a little more than the dynamic element ... in the process 
of protecting of individual liberty, if you also protect individual or 
group inequality, then you came into conflict with that Directive 
Principles. If, therefore, an appeal to individual liberty and freedom 
is construed to as an appeal for the continuation of the existing 
inequalities, then you come up against difficulties. You become static 
and unprogressive and connot change ; you can not realize the ideal 
of an egalitarian society ^\^T6h I hope, most of us want."" 
37.Supra note 32 at 44. 
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The Fundamental Rights are enforceable by the judiciary while the 
Directive Principles, though Fundamental in the governance of the Country, 
are not enforceable under Article 37. Article 37 says : "The provisions 
contained in this part (Part IV-Directive Principles of State Policy) shall not 
be enforceable by any court, but the Principles therein laid down are neverthless 
fundamental in the governance of the Country and it shall be the duty of the 
State to apply these Principles in making of law." But this does not mean any 
conflict between the two. Both constitute essential features of the constitution 
and thus are binding on all organs of the State. It is the responsibility and duty 
of the High Courts, Supreme Court and the lawyers to give reality to both 
these parts of the constitution while they are interpreting these parts of the 
constitution because the constitution is not only a legal but also a social and 
political document. 
The constitution of India has attempted to harmonize the 
apparently conflicting claims of socio-economic justice and individual 
liberty and Fundamental Rights of the citizens of this. Country. They are, 
the right 
(a) to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b) to assembly peaceably and without arms; 
(c) to form associations and unions; 
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; 
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India 
(f) ...'' 
38. Sub-clause (f) omitted by the Constitution (Forty Fourth) Amendment) Act, 1978, 
by S.2. w.e.f. 20.6.1979. 
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(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, 
trade or business. 
Articli: 19 makes it perfectly clear that these rights are not absolute and 
can not be treated as ends in themselves. They are co related to certain 
inevitable obligations imposed on all the citizens of India by reason of fact that 
Indian democracy has dedicated itself to the ideal of achieving socio-economic 
justice. This is the fact that while guaranteeing the citizens their respective 
Fundamental Rights prescreibed by Article 19(1), sub-clauses (a) to (g), the 
Constitution of India, has made it perfectly clear that these Fundamental 
Rihghts can be reasonably restricted, provided the restriction satisfy the test 
prescribed by sub-articles (2) to (6) to Article 19 respectively. It is thus clear 
that the scheme of Article 19 considered as a whole furnishes a very 
satisfactory and rational basis for adjusting the claims of individual rights of 
the freedom and the claims of Public good. 
Article 15 is specific application of the right to equality which is 
generally stated in Article 14. Art. 14 is available to the all persons, while 
Art IS is available to citizens only. Clause 1 of Artcle 15 prohibits the State 
to discriminate against citizen on the ground only of religion, sex, caste, 
place of birth or any of them. 
Clause 2 of Article 15 declares that no citizen shall, on the grounds only 
of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subjected to any 
disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, 
public restaurants, hotels and place of public entertainment, or (b) the use 
of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and place of public resort, maintained 
wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general 
public. This clause, on the other hand, is levelled not only against the State 
but also against private individuals, who, may be in control of the public places 
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mentioned in that clause, clause (3) embodies and exception to clause (1) and 
provides that notwithstanding clause (1), it would be permissible for the State 
to make "Special provision for women and children." This exception is not 
confined to beneficial provisions only and any special provision that the State 
considers necessary in the interest of women, whatever its nature may be, 
would be valid under this clause. There are various legislations which are 
made specially for women and children. For example provisions for the 
benefit of women in labour welfare legislations such as Factories Act,1948; 
Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 ; Indian Majority Act, 1875; Guarian 
and Wards Act, 1890; Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929; Children (Pledging 
ofLabour) Act, 1933; Employment of Children Act, 1938; Reformatory Schools 
Act,1897; Apprentice Act,1961; Maternity Benefit Act,1961; Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and special treatment of women and 
children, in the matter of granting bail under Cr. P.C. 
The object of clause (4) added in 1951, is to bring Article 15 and 29 in 
Une with 16(4) and 340, and to make it constitutional for the State to reserve 
seats for backward classes of citizens, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes 
in the Public educational institutions, as well as to make other special 
provisions as may be necessary for their advancement. 
Article 16 is an instance of the application of the general rule of 
equality before law laid down in Article 14 and the prohibition of discrimination 
guaranteed by Article 15(1) with special reference to the opportunity for the 
employment or appointment to any Office under the State. 
Articles 23 and 24 provide for Fundamental Rights against exploitation. 
Article 23 prohibits-(a) traffic in human beings, (b) begar; and (c) other similar 
forms of forced labour. Article 24, in particular, prohibits an employer from 
employing a child below the age of 14 years in any factory or mine or any other 
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hazardous employment. 
Part IV of the Constitution contains Directive Principles of State 
Policy. These Principles specify the goals and values to be secured. Some of 
these principles specify the goals and values to be secured by legislation for 
workmen. They are: 
(i) an adequate means of livlihoods (ii) prevention of concentration of 
wealth and means of production; (iii) equal pay for equal work (iv) protection 
and preservation of the workers' health (v) the right to work, the right to 
education, and the right to public assistance in cases of undeserved want; (vi) 
just and human conditions of work ,and maternity relief; (vii) a living wage and 
a decent standard of life. 
These principles are no doubt unjusticiable and can not be judicially 
enforced, but having regard to the place of pride accorded to them, it is 
obvious that the constitution makers expect the governments of different 
States as well as the Central Government to bear these Directive Principles in 
the mind and mould the policies from time to time so as to give effect to them. 
That is the importance of these directives. 
(b) Directive Principles and Fundmental Rights:-The Supreme Court in 
Champakam case^' held that the Fundamental Rights being sacrosant, the 
Directive Principles of State Policy can not over- ride them but must run as 
subsidiary to them. The opinion of the Court in this case is the result of the 
narrow legalism and the legal technicalities. In fact the Supreme Court did not 
pay attention towards the socio-economic aspect of these principles in the life 
of the Country. This judgement of the Court about the position of the 
Directive Principles of the State Policy has infact created controversy between 
39. State of Madras Vs. Champakam Dorairajan, A.I.R., 1951 S.C. 226. at 228. 
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the two and has led to a series of constitutional amendments. 
The Supreme Court in Mohd. Hanif Qureshi'*" and Kerala Education 
Bill cases'*', conceding importance and significance of the Directive Principles 
while reiterating its view given in Champakam case, had modified its earlier 
stand tilting towards the Directive Principles. 
In dealing with the Deirective Principles vis-a-vis the Fimdamental 
Rights, the Court's attitude has been purely legal and constitutional though the 
Supreme Court did not accept the Directive Principles as superior to the 
Fundamental Rights on account of Article 37 which expressly lays down their 
character, yet had always been in favour of their implementation. It exhorted 
the government to discharge its legal and consitutional obligations in^osed 
on it by Part IV of the constitution without touching the Fundamental Rights-
~ Even before the Kesvananda Bharti's case^^a considerable change started 
in the Court's attitude in dealing with these principles of State Policy. The 
Court has certainly made a shift by making liberal interpretaion so that the 
Principles of State Policy specified in Part IV of the constitution could be 
realised^\ 
I? Marwa Manghani's case^ the Punjab High Court observed: 
"These principles though not enforceable by Courts of law are 
neverthless a part of the Constitution which is one organic whole and 
are thus supreme. . The Courts while construing a statute, should 
thus consistently, with its express language, interpret it so that it 
40 Mohd Hanif Qureshi Vs State of Bihar, A 1 R 1958 S C 731 
41 In re-Kerala Education bill, A 1 R 1958 S C 1956 
42 Kesavananda Bharti Vs State of Kerala, AIR 1973 S C 1461 
43 Dr Shareful Hasan, "Supreme Court Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles",56 , (Deep and Deep Publication Rajouri Garden, New Delhi, 1981) 
44 Moarwa Manghani Vs Sanghram Sampat, A I R 1960 Punjab 35 
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implements the Directive Principles instead of reducing them to the 
level of mere theoretical ideals or illusions"^'. 
The constitutional importance of the Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles was discussed elaborately by the 13 Judges of the Supreme Court 
in Kesavananda Bharti's Case^. To understand the importance and the nature 
of the Fundamental rights and Directive Principles, it will be better to point 
out the opinions of these Judges:-
Sikri, C.J. observed: 
" It is impossible to quote the Directive Principles with Fundamental 
rights though it can not be denied that they are very important. But 
to say that the Directive Principles give a directive to take away 
Fundamental Rights in order to achieve what is directed by the 
Directive Principles seems to be a contradiction in terms'"'^. 
Shalet^nd Grover J.J. said : 
" while most cherished freedoms and rights have been guaranteed the 
Government has been laid under a solemn duty to give effect to the 
Directive Principles. Both parts III and IV which embody them have 
to be balanced and harmonised- then alone the dignity of the 
individual can be achieved. It was to give effect to the main objectives 
in the Preamble that Part-Ill and IV were enacted""*. 
Hegde and Mukher jee J.J. observed: 
" Part IV of the constitution is designed to bring about the social and 
45. Id at 40. 
46. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
47. Id. at 1510. 
48. Id. at 1582. 
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economic revolution that remained to be fulfilled after Independence. 
The aim of the constitution is not to guarantee certain liberties to only 
a few of the citizens but for aU — To ignore Part IV is to ignore the 
sustenance provided for in the constitution, the hopes held out to the 
Nation and the very ideals on which our constitution is built. Without 
faithfully implementing the Directive Principles, it is not possible to 
achieve the welfare State contemplated by the constitution. A society 
like ours steeped in poverty and ignorance can not realise the benefit 
of human rights without satisfying the minimum economic needs of 
every citizen of this country'"". 
A.N. Ray J. said:-
" Social Justice will determine the nature of the individual rights and 
also the restriction on such rights. Social justice will require 
modification or restriction of rights under part-Ill. The scheme of the 
constitution generally discloses that the Principles of justice are 
placed above individual rights and whenever or wherever it is 
considered necessary, individual rights have been subordinated or cut 
down to give effect to the principles of social justice. Social justice 
means various concepts which are evolved in the Directive Principles 
of the State"'". 
In this regard Jaganmoban Reddy J. said: 
"There can be no doubt that the object of the Fundamental Rights is 
to ensure the ideal of Political Democracy and prevent authoritarian 
rule, while the object of the Directive Principles of State Policy is to 
establish a welfare state where there is economic and social freedom 
49. Id. at 1641. 
50. Id. at 1715 
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without which Political democracy has no meaning. What is implicit 
in the constitution is that this is a duty of the courts to interpet the 
constitution and the laws to further the Directive Principles which 
under Article 37, are fundamental in the governance of the Country"". 
K.K.Mathew J. said : 
"As the preamble indicates, it was to secure the basic human rights 
like liberty and equality that the people gave unto themselves the 
constitution and these basic rights are an essential feature of the 
constitution, the constitution was also enacted by the people to 
secure justice, Political Social and economic. Therefore the moral 
rights in Part IV of the constitution are equally an essential feature of 
it, the only difiference being that the moral rights embodied in Part IV 
are not specifically enforceable as against the State by a citizen in a 
Court of law in case the State fails to implement its duty but, 
neverthless, they are fundamental in the governance of the country 
and all the organs of the state, including the judiciary, are bound to 
enforce these directives. The Fundamental Rights themselves have 
no fixed content, most of them are mere empty vessels into which each 
generation must pour its contents in the light of its experience. 
Whether at a particular moment in the history of the Nation, a 
particular Fundamental Right should have priority over the moral 
claim embodied in Part IV or must yield to them is a matter which 
must be left to be decided by the generation in the light of its 
experience and its values."" 
51. Id. at 1755. 
52. Id. at 1952-53. 
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,M.H. Beg J.: told that it would be more correct to describe the Directive 
Principles as laying down the path which was to be pursued by our Parliament 
and State legislatures in moving towards the objectives contained in the 
Preamble. Indeed from the point of view of the Preamble, both the Fundamental 
Rights and Directive Principles are means of attaning the objectives which 
were meant to be served both by the Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles". 
Chandrachud J. observed : 
"Our decision of this vexed question must depend upon the postulate 
of our ^onsitution which aims at bringiag about synthesis between 
Fundamental Rights' and 'Directive Principles of State Policy , by 
giving to the former a place of pride and to the latter a place of 
permanence. Together, not individually , they form the core of the 
constitution. Together, not individually, they constitute its true 
I consicience'*^^. 
After pointing out the views of the judges in Kesavananda Bharti's 
case we find that the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are 
meant to supplement one another. It can well be said that Directive 
Principles J!*rescribed goal to be attained and the Fundamental Rights 
lay down the means by which that goal is to be achieved. 
In N.M. Thomas's case" Fazal AH J pithily and pointedly observed: 
"It is clear that the Directive Principles form the fundamental features 
and the social conscience of the constitution and the constitution 
53. Id. at 1970 
54. Id. at 2021 
55. State of Kerala Vs. N.M. Thomas. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490 . 
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enjoins upon the State to implement these Directive Principles. The 
directives provide the policy, the guide lines and the end of socio-
economic freedoms and Articles 14 and 16 are the means to implement 
the policy to achieve the ends sought to be promoted by the Directive 
Principles so far as the Courts are concerned where their is no 
apparent inconsistency between the Directive Principles contained in 
Part IV and the Fundamental Rights mentioned in Part III, which in 
fact, supplement each other there is no difficulty in putting a 
harmonious construction which advances the object of the 
Constitution"". 
These judicial pronouncements mentioned above testify the great 
concern shown by the judges of the Supreme Court not merely for the 
fundamental Rights as such but also for the Directive Principles. Judges are 
the part of the society and they can easily feel the needs of the society at a given 
time. They realise that the social and economic justice is the need of the time. 
Realizing this they have attached the greatest possible importance to the 
Principles set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution. Due to the social and 
economic backwardness of our people, the Supreme Court has rightly shown 
special zeal, enthusiasm and alertness in emphasising the need of social and 
economic justice and defending the rights of the people in this regard. 
Before any discussion of the legislative and judicial efforts in this 
direction it will be beneficial to understand the nature of Directive Principles 
as provided in the Constitutional scheme. There are two types of objectives 
of Directive Principles of State Policy: 
(1) Objectives to be allowed for bringing about a welfare State e.g. 
social order based on justice, principles of Policy to be followed by 
56. Id at 548. 
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the State for securing economic justice, participation of workers 
in management of industries, just and human conditions of work, 
living wage for workers, free and compulsory education for 
children, duty to raise the standard of living and improvement of 
health, promotion of education and economic interest of weaker 
sections, equal justice and free legal aid to economically backward 
classes. 
(2) Others are of a different nature e.g. separation of judiciary from 
executive, promotion of International Peace and Security, 
protection of monuments and places and objects of national 
importance, uniform civil code. 
A misplaced emphasis of justiciability was given in regard to the nature 
of Directive Principles of State Policy. The very nature of the Directive 
Principles is such that they cannot form part of a justiciable Code. They are 
in fact incapable of being enforced by Courts. 
In the begining, the Supreme Court attitude was that matters of 
Directive Principles are the concern of the Government and not that of courts. 
Thus we find a hands off attitude of the courts in this era e.g. State of Madras 
Vs. Champakam Dorairajan". In this case it was held that in case of any 
conflict between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, the Fundamental 
Rights would prevail. But after one year when the court dealt with Zamindari 
Abolition cases its attitude was considerably modified. In State of Bihar Vs. 
Kameshwar Singh'* tht court relied on Article 39 in deciding that a certain 
Zamindari Abolition Acts had been passed for public purpose within the 
57. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 228. 
58. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 352. 
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meaning of Article 31. Similarly in Inre Kerala Education Bill'* the Supreme 
Court observed that though the Directive Principles cannot override the 
Fundamental Rights, nevertheless in determining the scope and ambit of 
Fundamental Rights the court may not entirely ignore the Directive Principles. 
It should adopt the principles of harmonious construction and should attempt 
to give effect to both as much as possible. Later in Mohd. Hanif Qureshi Vs. 
State of Bihar'" a State law which prohibits slaughter of cows and calves and 
other cattle capable of work has been up held by the court because it was 
meant to give effect to Article 48 of the constitution. 
In Kesavananda Bharti's case the court observed: 
"Our founding fathers were satisfied that there is no antithesis 
between the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. One 
supplements the other. The Directives lay down the end to be 
achieved and Part III prescribes the means through which the goal is 
to be reached"*'. 
In Unikrishnan Vs. State of A.P.", the Supreme Court has reiterated 
the same principle that the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are 
supplementary and complementory to each other and the provision in Part III 
should be interpreted having regard to the Preamble and Directive Principles 
of State Policy. 
59 AIR 1957 SC 957 
60 AIR 1958 SC 731 
61 Supra note 46 at 1641 
62 (1993) I S C C 625 
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Thus it is clear from the above pronouncements that in the earlier 
decisions the court paid less regard to the Directive Principles on the ground 
that they are not justiciable like the Fundamental Rights, but in its later 
decisions the courts has taken the view, that there is no conflict between the 
Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights and they supplement each other 
in aiming at the same goal bringing about a social revolution and the 
establishment of welfare State which is envisaged in the Preamble. 
Recently in Air India Statutory Corporation, case " the Sureme Court 
has held that the Directive Principles now stand elevated in inelienable 
fundamental human rights. Even they are justiciable by themselves. Social and 
economic democracy is the foundation for stable political democracy. To 
make them a way of life in the Indian polity, law as social engineer, is to create 
just social order, remove the inequalities in social economic life and socio-
economic disabilities with which people are languishing; and to require 
positive opportunities and facilities as individuals and groups of persons for 
development of human personality in our civilised democratic set up so that 
every individual would strive constantly to rise to higher levels. Therefore, for 
establishment of just social order in which social and economic democracy 
would be a way of life inequalities in income should be removed and every 
endeavour be made to eliminate inequalities in status through the rule of law. 
The Supreme Court*^ thus abandoned its earlier attitude reluctently 
and progressively towards a more active role of the courts in this area, also 
because of largely the failure of the Government in bringing about the desired 
changes as expressed m Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. 
63. Air India Statutory Corporation Vs. United Labour Union, AIR. 1997 S.C. 645 at 
647. 
64. Supra Note 57. 
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The result of the controversy of Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles and the attitude of the Supreme Court was the declaration of (Certain 
Fundamental Duties in Part IV-A of the Constitution. This new part consists 
only one Article i.e. Article 51-A. The firamers of the constitutiton declared 
the Fundamental Rights of the citizens and other persons, and also setforth 
certain directives and duties of the State. Directive Princiles of State Policy 
with a view to strengthen the institutions of national life, and with the object 
of ushering in a new social order, based on socio-economic and political 
justice, equality and liberty. They did not, however, declare any Fundamental 
Duties of the individual citizens. But proponents of 42nd Amendment, 1976 
thought it fit to remove this lacuna. They seem to have thought that non 
declaration of the citizens duties was a missing part of the social contract to 
which the citizens should be deemed to have submitted by the general will 
under the frame-work as established under the Constitution. They also seem 
to have thought that the declaration of Fundamental Rights would in accordance 
with sovereign will of the people, and would be required to ensure social 
solidarity and allegiance to the Republic, the community and the new established 
social order. They thought that the Fundamental Duties flow from the 
Fundamental rights and the idea that it was the citizens' duties on which the 
Fundamental Freedoms were based; and the Fundamental duties would 
Constitute the comer stone of the arch of the established socio-political order. 
They said that the citizens should accept certain responsibilities towards the 
State and the constitutional Government of the country, and practices and 
processes of constitutional institutions and the national State*'. 
In our country there is a balanced constitutional scheme of rights and 
65. M.G. Jain Kagzi, "Constitution of India," Vol II,517-518( Meteropolitan Book 
Co. (P) Ltd., New Delhi 1988). 
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duties of the citizens and the government. These rights and duties are 
contained in Parts III, IV and IV-A of the constitution. 
(c) Fundamental Duties: Article Sl-A of Part IV-Aof the constitution 
declared 10 fundamental duties (the ten comandments of the constitution) as 
follows: 
Firstly, the citizens should abide by and respect the basic ideals of the 
constitution. They should have respect for established democratic institutions. 
They should, further, respect the national flag, and national anthem; 
Secondly, they ought to cherish and follow the noble ideals which 
inspired the people in their national struggle for freedom and independence; 
Thirdly, they must be obliged to uphold and protect sovereignty, 
integrity and independence of the country; 
Fourthly, they should by obliged to defend the country by rendering 
national service whenever called upon to do so. They ought not to be 
conscientious objectors. 
Fifthly, the citizens should be obliged to promote harmony among all 
sections of the people, and to respect the dignity of women. They should 
promote the spirit of common brotherhood, transcending barriers of caste, 
creed, religion or language. 
Sixthly, they should preserve the values of the inherited common 
composite culture of India. 
Seventhly, they ought to protect and improve the natural environments, 
and ought to have compassion for living creatures. 
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Eightly, they should encourage and develop scientific temper, a spirit 
of humanism, and the habit of enquiry and reform; 
Ninthly, they should safeguard public property and to promote non-
violence. 
Tenthly, they should strive for excellence in all spheres of activity-
individual as also collective, and ought to endeavour to rise to higher levels 
of thought, action and achievement**. 
These traditional duties have given constitutional sanction. If one take 
care to see, he wiU discover in the constitution not only his rights but also his 
duties. A look at the constitution will also ansv^er the complaint of some 
persons that constitution has conferred rights on the individual but has not set 
out the duties of the individuals tov^ards society. 
Judicial activism or judicial attitude reminded the legislature of their 
duty and we find that a number of attempts have been made by the legislature 
to implement them. For example the Government has fixed minimum wages 
for the workers, modernised our labour laws and improved the labour 
conditions. For the Promotion of cottage industries the Government has 
established several Boards, viz. All India Khadi and village Industries Board, 
Small Scale Industries Boards, Silk Board, All India Handicraft Board, All 
India Handloom Board etc. A large number of laws have made to implement 
the directives contained in Article 40. The objectives laid down in Article 40 
have now been fiilfilledby enacting the constitution 73rd and 74th Amendment 
Acts, 1992 known as the Panchayati and Nagarpalika Constitution Amendment 
Act,1992. These Amendments provide constitutional sanction to democracy 
at the grass root level. 
66. Ibid PP. 518. 519. 
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The constitution was amended by the 25th Amendment Act, 1971, so 
as to enable the Government to implement more speedy socio-economic 
reforms. This Amendment added a new Article e.g. Article31-C to Article 31 
of the constitution. The new Article provides that no law which is intended to 
give effect to principles contained in Article 39 (b) and (c) shall be deemed to 
be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any 
of the rights conferred by Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution. The validity of 
the above amendment has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Fundamental 
Right Case*^ 
Further more some other laws for the betterment of the workers have 
been passed by the legislature i.e. Equal Remuneration Act, 1976; Beedi and 
Cigar Workers (conditions of Employment) Act, 1966; Child Labour 
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986; Dangerous Machines (Regulation) 
Act, 1983; Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment And 
Conditions of Service) Act, 1979, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; Motors 
Transport W orkers Act, 1961; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Sales Promotion 
Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 and Cine Workers and Cinema 
Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1981 and the like. 
Though much has been achieved still much more is to be achieved. The 
standard of living of the workers is yet to be raised. The economic position 
of our country is now very sound in comparision to the time when the 
constitution was framed. This is the most appropriate time to implement 
Directive Principles to raise the living standard of workers. It can be safely 
concluded that the efforts of Union Government and of the States are really 
very encouraging and subtantial in the implementation of these objectives. 
67. Kesavananda Bharti Vs. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973. S.C. 1961. 
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The recent statistic shows that while the poverty line some decades 
back was 27% it has increased and now 39.3% people" are living below 
poverty line. It definitely shows that there is some grave error in the country. 
It further shows that the attempts by legislature and the judiciary have not 
been very efifective in the long run. Therefore it is suggested that the policy 
of economic upliftment must undergo both legislative and administrative 
changes. Obviously the judiciary is not designed to play an effective role in this 
field in the absence of cooperation of the two other institutions. Judicial 
attempts have been like brilliant sparks in the dark of economic distress and 
failed to provide a reasonably lighted atmosphere. 
(D) Equality of opportunity :- Our Constitution craves for an egalitarian 
society, a society in which every body would prosper whatever may be his or 
her caste, creed, race, religion or region. Right to equality is guaranteed under 
Articles 14 to 18 of our constitution. 
Article 14 provides: "The State shall not deny to any person equality 
before law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India". 
Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth. It consists of clauses(l) to (4 ) , clause (4) having been added 
by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951" Clause (1) prohibits 
discrimination against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, 
68. Planning Commission Report of the Expert Group on Estimation of Proportion and 
Number of poor. July. 1993. Cited from RuddarDatt and K.P.M. Sundha Ram,"Indian 
Economy."32nd Edition, 320 ( S.Chand company Ltd., New Delhi,1995) . 
69. The immediate object of this amendment was to override the decision in State of 
Madras Vs. Champakan (1951). SCR. 525 to the effect that Article 29(2) was not 
controlled by Art. 46 and that the Constitution did not intend to protect the interest 
of the backward classes in the matter of admission to educational institutions. But 
though the amendment would validate reservation for the Backward Classes and 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, it would not support the distribution of seats according 
to communities so as to discriminate between classes who are not backward interse. 
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place of birth or any of them Clause (2) saves every citizen from being 
subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to 
matters covered by sub clause (a) and (b) on any of the grounds enumerated 
in clause (1) Clause (3) provides an exception to clause (I) and it enables the 
State to make any special provision for women and children. Similarly, clause 
(4) provides for an exception and enables the State to make any special 
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward 
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribes. Thus, 
it has been seen that, while providing for equality to all citizens, the 
constitution makers took the precaution of enabling the State to take suitable 
action, either legislative or executive, to help women and children and 
members of the communities mentioned in clause (4). 
On similar lines. Article 16 provides for equality of opportunity in 
matters of public employment. By clause (1) it is provided that there shall be 
equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or 
appointment to any Office under the State; and clause (2) prohibits 
discrimination against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, 
sex, decent, place of birth, residence or any of them in respect of any 
emloyment or OfiBce under the State. Clauses (3), (4) and (5) provide for 
exception to the principles enunciated by clauses (1) and (2). Clause (3) 
enables Parliament to make any law prescribing in regard to a class or classes 
of employment or appointment to an Office under the government or any local 
or other authority within, a state or Union territary, and requirement as to 
residence within the State or Union territary prior to such employment or 
appointment. It will be noticed that this clause confers power on Parliament 
to make a law by which special provision may be made for employment or 
apointment to the Offices mentioned in fbe clause in favour of persons 
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satisfying the specified test of residence with the State or Union terrritory. 
Clause (4) enables the State to make any provision for the reservation of 
appointment or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the 
opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the service under the 
State. Clause (5) excepts from the operation of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 
16 any law which provides that the incumbent of an OfBce in connection with 
the afiTairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the 
governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or 
belonging to a particular Denomination. Thus, Article 16, with the exceptions 
guarantees equality of opportunity to all the citizens in matters of public 
employment^" 
Article 17 abolishes untouchability. The complete abolition of 
untouchability was one of the visions of Mahatma Gandhi in his Ramrajya'. 
This Article adopts the Gandhian ideal without any qualifications. 
Article 18 deals with the abolition of titles and consists of four clauses 
. Here our purpose is to difine the equality of opportunity so Articles 17 and 
18 are not discussed in detail. 
Articles 14, 15 and 16 form part of a string of constitutionaly guaranteed 
rights. These rights supplement each other. Article 16 which ensures to all 
citizens equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment is an 
incident of guarantee of equality contained in Article 14. Article 16 (1) gives 
effect to Artilce 14. Both Articles Hand 16 (l)permit reasonable classification 
having a nexus to the objects to be achieved. Under Article 16 there can be a 
reasonable classification of the employees in matters relating to employment 
or appointment. 
70. P.B. Gajendragadkar, "The Indian Parliament and The Fundamental Rights", 45-
46(Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1972). 
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In State of Kerala Vs N.M. Thomas'' where it was brought to the 
notice of the government that large number of government servants belonging 
to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were unable to get their promotion 
because of want of test qualification. In order to give relief to the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes the government incorporated Rule 13 AA which 
enabled the government to grant exemption to members of Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes for a specified period. On 13 January, 1972 exemption 
fi-om passing the test was granted to members of Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes for two years. On 11 January, 1974 order was made under 
Rule 13 AA giving members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
exemption from passing the tests for the period of two tests to be conducted 
after the order dated 11 January, 1974". The contentions'^ on behalf of 
respondent were : 
(1) Article 16 is a specific application of Article 14 in matters relating to 
employment or appointment to any service in the state. Clauses (1) and 
(2) of Art. 16 give effect to equality before law guatanteed by Article 
14 and to prohibition against discrimination guaranteed by Article 15 
(1). In other words. Article 16 (1) is absolute in terms guaranteeing 
equality of opportunity to every individual citizen seeking employment 
or appointment. Emphasis is placed on similar opportunity and equal 
treatment for seeking employment or appointment. 
(2) matters relating to employment in Article 16( 1) include all matters in 
relation to employment both prior and subsequent to the employment 
and form part of the terms and conditions of service. Equal opportunity 
71. State of Kerala Vs. N.M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490. 
72. Id. at 496. 
73. Id. at 495-496. 
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is to be given for appointment, promotion, termination of employment 
and payment of pension and gratuity. 
(3) The abridgement of equality guaranteed by Article 16(1) is only to the 
extent curtailed by Article 16(4). Apart from Art. 16(4), the right 
guaranteed under Article 16(1) can not be curtailed. Art. 16(4) is, in 
substance, an exception to rights guaranteed by Art. 16(1) and ( 2 ) . 
(4) Article 16(4) does not cover the entire field occupied by Article 16(1) 
and (2) Some of the matters relating to employment in respect of which 
equality of opportunity has been guaranteed by Article 16(1) and (2) 
do not fall within the mischief of non obstante clause in Article 16(4). 
To illustrate, clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 16 do not prohibit the 
prescription of reasonable rules for selection to any employment or 
appointment in office. Any provision as to the qualification for 
employment or appointment in office reasonably fixed and applicable 
to all citizens would be consistent with the doctrine of equality of 
opportunity in Article 16(1). Reasonable qualification of employment 
for the purpose of efficiency of service is justified. 
(5) Rule 13 AA is violative of Article 16(1) and (2). The impeached 
Exhibits fall within the same mischief. There is no scope for dealing 
with Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes different fi^om other 
backword classes. Exemption fi-om qualification necessary for 
promotion is efficiency of administration and violates not only Article 
335 of the Constitution but also Article 16( 1). 
In reply to these contentions it was held by the Supreme Court that 
under Article 16 there can be reasonable classification of the employees in 
matters relating to employment or appointment. Article 16(1) does not 
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prohibit the prescription of reasonable rules for selection to any employment 
or appointment to any office. In regard to employment, like other terms and 
conditions associated with and incidental to it, the promotion to a selection 
post is also included in the matters relating to employment and even in regard 
to such promotion to a selection post all that Article 16( 1) guarantees equality 
of opportunity to all citizens. Article 16(1) and (2) give effect to equality 
before law guaranteed by Article 14 and the prohibition of discrimination 
guaranteed by Art. 15( 1). Promotion to selection post is covered by Article 
16( 1) and (2). The power to make reservation which is conferred on the State 
under Article 16(4) can be exercised by the State in a proper case not only by 
providing for reservation of appointments but also by providing for reservation 
of selection post. In providing for reservation of appointments or posts under 
Article 16(4) the State has to take into consideration the claims of the 
backward classes consistently with the maintenance of the efifeciency of the 
administration. Article 16(4) clarifies and explains that classification on the 
basis of backwardness does not fall within Article 16(2) and is legitimate for 
the purpose of Article 16(1) If preference shall be given to particular under-
represented community other than a backward class or under-represented 
State in an All India Services such a rule will contravene Article 16(2). A 
similar rule giving preference to under represented backward community is 
valid and will net contravene Articles 14, 16(1) and (2). The classification of 
employees belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for allowing 
them an extended period of two years for passing the special tests for 
promotion is a just and reasonable classification having rational nexus to the 
object of providing equal opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to 
employment or oppointment to public office. Article 335 of the constitution 
states that the claims of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes shall be taken into consideration in the making of appointment to the 
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services and posts in connection with affairs of the state consistent with the 
maintenance of efGciency of administration. Rule 13 AA and Orders dated 
13.1.1972 and 11.1.1974 are related to this Constitutional mandate- Rule 13 
AA and the orders are meant to implement not only the direction under Article 
335 but also the Directive Principle under Article 46. Rule 13 AA does not 
impair the test of efiQciency in administration in as much as members of 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are promoted have to acquire the 
qualification of passing the test. The only relaxation which is done in their case 
is that they are granted two years more time than others to acquire the 
qualification. From the point of view of time a differential treatment is given 
to members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes for the purpose of giving them 
equality consistent with the efficiency. Rule 13 AA and the two orders are 
therefore valid. 
In deciding the scope and ambit of the right to equality of opportunity 
it is necessary to bear in the mind that in construing the relevant Article i.e. 
Article 16 a technical or pedantic approach must be avoided. When we are 
doing the interpretation of the material words of such Article we must seek 
the intention of the makers of the Constitution. If the words used in the Article 
are wide m their import they must be liberally construed in all their amplitude. 
Thus construed it would be clear that matters relating to employment can not 
be confined only to initial matters prior to the act of employment. The narrow 
construction would confine the application of Article 16(1) to the initial 
employment and nothing else; but that clearly is only one of the matters. The 
other matters relating to employment would inevitably be the provision as to 
the salary and periodical increments therein, terms as to leave, to gratuity, to 
pension and to age of superannuation. These are all matters relating to 
employment and they are, and must be deemed to be included ia the ' expression 
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matters relating to employment' in Article 16(1). The equality of opportunity 
guaranteed by Art. 16( 1) need not be an absolute equality as such. Article 16 
(1) and (2) does not prohibit the prescription of reasonable rules for selection 
to any employment or appointment to any Office. If the narrow construction 
is accepted, it would make the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 16 
(1) illusory. In that case it will be open to the governments to comply strictly 
the provisions of Article 16 (1) in the matter of initial employment and then 
to defeat its very aim and object by introducing discriminatary provisions in 
respect of employees soon after their employment. Now a question arises 
here. Would it, for intance, be open to the State to prescribe different scales 
of salary for the same or similar posts, different terms of leave or superannuation 
of the same or similar posts ? On the narrow construction of Article 16(1), 
even if such a discriminatory course is adopted by the State in respect of its 
employees that would not be violative of the equality of opportunity guaranteed 
by Article 16(1). Such result could not obviously have been intended by the 
constitution. In this connection it maybe relevant to remember that Article 16 
(1) and (2) really give effect to the equality before law guaranteed by Article 
14 and to the prohibition of discrimination guaranteed by Art 15 (1). These 
provisions form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and 
supplement each other. If that be so, there would be no difficulty in holding 
that the matters in relatiag to employment must include all matters in relation 
to employment both prior, and subsequent, to the employment which are 
incidental to the employment and form part of the terms and conditions of such 
employment^". 
74. General Manager. S. Rly. Vs. Rangachari. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 36 at 40-41. 
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The right guaranteed by Article 16(1) includes the right to make an 
application for any post under the government and a right to be considered on 
merits for the post for which an application has been made. Article 16 does not 
mean that governments are not, like other employers, entitled to pick and 
choose from amongst a number of condidates offering themselves for 
employment under the government. It is also open to the appointing authority 
to lay down such pre-requisite conditions of service as would be conducive to 
proper discipline amongst government servants^'. 
But if the State lays down the conditions or qualifications for 
appointment to a post or to employment imder the State, in general, such 
conditions must be applicable to all the citizens. These conditions or requisites 
must have a reasonable relation to the suitability for the post or of employment 
in public service in general. If there will be no relevant connection between 
the test prescribed and the interests of the public, such condition will be 
violative of Article 16.^ * 
A person who complains of violation of Art. 16 (1) must show that he 
satisfies all such tests or conditions validly prescribed by the authority, and 
was yet denied equal opportunity. He cannot rely on erroneous orders of the 
authority,even though repeated, in other cases^^ Right guaranteed under 
Article 16 (1) also includes the promotion and termination of service. If 
equality of opportunity for promotion is denied to the government servant 
holding different post in the same grade, it will be infi-ingement of Art. 16(1). 
The Article is thus violated if an empoyee, belonging to the same class as those 
promoted, has not been considered at all. 
75. Banarsidas Vs. State of U.P. (1956) S.C.R. 357 at 361-362. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Bhate Vs. Union of India A.l.R. 1976 S.C. 363. 
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It does not prohibit the creation of di£ferent grades in the government 
service. It is competent for the State to classify the employees for purposes 
of promotion. In such cases, the Court can interfere only if the difference 
between the two groups of recruits are not sufficient to give any preference 
to one against the other, or , in other words, there is no reasonable nexus 
between such differences and the nature of the Office or Offices to which 
recruitment is being made". Nor does the Article prevent the government 
from laying down conditions of efficiency or other qualifications, for securing 
the best service, for being eligible for promotion, including general academic 
qualifications even where the post is to technical." 
The rule that employment imder the State is held at pleasure does not 
militate against the application of Art. 16 (1) to the matter of termination of 
such employment where there has been an arbitrary discriminations in 
terminating the services of a particular employee, say, on the ground that he 
has a particular colour or height, or that he belongs to another State or on the 
ground that he should make room for political sufferers- which are whoUy 
irrelevant to the requirements of the service*". 
The retrenchment of the employee on the ground that he has been 
detained under the law of preventive detention or is engaged in subversive 
activities can not be said arbitrary or discriminatory unless it is shown that 
those retained are similarly situated. There is nothing in the Article 16 to 
prohibit the classification of government servants into temporary and permanent 
servants and to provide for a different mode of termination of service, e.g., by 
service of notice. 
78. Govind Vs. Chief Controller. A.l.R. 1967 S,C. 839. 
79. State of Mysore Vs. Narasing Rao. A.l.R. 1968 S.C. 349. 
80. Durga Das Basu. "Constitutional Law of India", V. edition, 34 (Prentice- Hall of 
India (P) Ltd., New Delhi 1988). 
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A vexed question may sometimes arise whether the provisions of 
Article 16(4) are permissive as to leave the State free to make or not to make 
provision for reservation thereunder or they are mandatory so that the State 
would be bound to take action under that article. In the former case nobody 
can seek any remedy if the State does not make any reservation in public 
services, but in the latter case any member of a backward class of citizens, who 
may be affected by inaction on the part of the State may approach the court 
for appropriate remedy against the state. Clause (4) of Article 16 gives a 
power to the State to make provision for reservation of appointments or posts 
in favour of backward classes of citizens but no corresponding rights is 
conferred on the backward class of citizens. If the intention of the constitution 
makers had been to make the provisions of clause (4) of Article 16 binding on 
the State, the language of the clause would have been different. The provision 
of reseivation in favour of a backward class canbe made only if, in the opinion 
of the State, that class is not adequately represented in the services under the 
State. If the intention had been to confer a right on the backward classes of 
citizens and to impose a corresponding duty on the state, the question of 
adequacy of representation in public services could not have been left to the 
opinion or subjective satisfaction of the State, but would have been made to 
be decided objectively on the basis of certain specified data of facts and 
figures. Above all the State has also to take the question of efficiency into 
consideration while making provision for reservation of appointments or 
posts in favour of backward classes of citizens because Article 335 makes it 
abundantly clear that the paramount consideration in public services is that of 
efficiency and even the claims of the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled 
Tribes for such services are subject to the maintenance of efificiency in the 
administration. 
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In Som Raj V State of Haryana, the Supreme Court held that normally 
the order of appointment would be in order of merit of candidates from the 
select list". 
In Indra Sawhney's Case" the Supreme Court has given final judgement 
on reservation. In this reservation case, it has been held that reservation can 
not exceed 50%. Reservation in favour of backward classes on basis of caste 
criterion is valid. Reservation in cases of promotion posts is not permissible. 
Advanced sections in backward classes must not be given the benefit of 
reservation. 
81.(1990)2 S.C.C. 653. 
82. Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477. 
e'y^/^Tnsn-^'i 
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CHAPTER U 
Distribution of Powers 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to discuss the history of 
distribution of powers and to examine the implications of'Labour' being on the 
Concurrent List' of the Constitution and to deal with the respective powers of 
the Centre and the States in enacting legislations affecting labour. The effect 
of inconsistent legislations and the method of reconciliation of inconsistent 
Acts made by the Centre and State, is also discussed. 
1. Position before Commencement of the Constitution of India: 
The rise of factory system in India dates back from the latter half of the 
19th century. The first cotton mill in India was established in 1851 in Bombay 
and the first jute mill in 1855 in Bengal. This was the begining of the modem 
factory system in India. After 1851 and 1855 the number of factories began 
to increase both in Bombay and Bengal' . 
The factory system brought with many mal-labour practices regarding 
working conditions in factories. The workers were too poor and weak, the 
employers were very strong, the Government was unsympathetic, and the 
public was indifferent. During that period the workers were exploited by the 
etite class. 
However, that does not mean that no attention was paid towards their 
welfare during the early period of industrial development. But such efforts 
1. V.G. Goswami, "Labour and Industrial Law". 211 (Central Law Agency, 
Allahabad, 1996). 
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were largely dealt with by social workers, and their NGO, philanthrophists 
and other religious leaders mostly on humanitarian grounds. In 1872 Mr. P.C. 
Majumdar, a Bramho samaj preacher from Bengal, established eight night 
schools for the benefit of the workers and children in the city of Bombay. In 
Calcutta, under the auspices of the Bramho samaj, the 'working Men's 
Mission' was established in 1878, which preached practical religion and 
morality, and established night schools for workmen and depressed classes. 
Mr. Sasipada Banerjee also started the Baranagar Institute for promoting 
education and social welfare among the jute workers .^ 
It was in 1875, when a few philanthrophists under the leadership of Mr. 
Sorabjee Shapurjee Bengallee, started an agitation in order to draw the 
attention of the Government to the miserable condition of the workers, 
especially women and children, and to the need for some legislative protection. 
The Government passed the first Factory Act in 1881, but that was not 
sufGciant to protect the interest of workers and recieved protest ^ 
In order to remove its inherent weaknesses, shortcomings and to keep 
pace with changing needs of the working class the Act has been amended 
2. R.C. Saxena," Labour Problenu and Social Welfare, 99 (K. Nath and Co; Meerut, 1986). 
3. Ibid. 
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several times '*. The legislative power was vested solely in Governor-in-
Council under the Charter Act of 1833. The Governor General-in-Council was 
empowered to make laws and regulations for all persons, places and things 
within the territory of the Company. 
No further change was made in this regard until 1861. By the Indian 
Councils Act of 1861, the legislative system was remodelled. Authority was 
given to the Governor General-in-Council to establish similar Legislative 
Councils for Bengal, the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab. The 
Provincial Legislative Councils were empowered to make laws for the benefit 
of the Province. The Governor General's assent on every Bill passed by the 
Legislative Council was necessary and only then it could become an Act. In 
addition to this, the Governor General has the power to veto any Bill. He was 
also empowered to issue Ordiances. 
The Indian Council Act, 1861 was amended by the Indian Councils Act 
of 1892. The Act increased the number of additional members in the Central 
as well as provincial councils. But the official majority was maintained The 
powers of the legislative Councils were also increased. 
3a. In 1891. the Factory Act 1881 wasamendedandlndianFactohes Act. 1891 was passed. This 
Act of 1891 was again amended in 1911 and the Indian Factories Act of 1911 was passed. 
This Act was fiirther amended in 1923,1926 and 1931 (Acts Nos. IX of 192 3; XXVII of 1926 
and XII of 1931). The Act of 1931 was overhauled in 1934 and Factories Act of 1934 was 
passed. This Act was subsequently amended by-
(i) Factories Ammendment Act, 1935 
(ii) Factories Amendment Act, 1936 
(iii) Repealing and Amendmg Act. 1937 
{i\) Factories Amendment Act. 1940 
(v) Factories Amendment Act, 1941 
(vi) Factories Amendment Act, 1944 
(vii) Factories Amendment Act, 1945 
(viii) Factories Amendment Act, 1946 
(ix) Factories Amendment Act, 1947, and in 1948 The Factories Act. 1948 was passed. 
56 
The Government was of unitary nature wherein the Provinces were 
granted meager autonomy. Thus legislation whatever it was originated from 
the Central Government and applied to the various Provinces with some 
modifications so as to accomodate peculiar condition about labour obtaining 
in the Provinces. 
The Government of India (Amendment) Act, 1919, introduced 
Constitutional changes in the field of labour. The Central legislature was given 
powers to legislate in respect of practically all labour subjects, while the 
provincial legislatures had powers to legislate only in respect of those labour 
subjects which were classified as provincial and that too with the approval of 
the Governor General. 
The Government of India Act, 1935 introduced provincial autonomy. 
Section 100^ of the Act was related to the subject matter of Fedral and 
Provincial laws. This section provided for the distribution of powers between 
the Centre and the Units under three Lists, namely. Federal List, Provincial 
List and Concurrent List. As regards the Concurrent List, both the Federal 
Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures were given the power to pass laws 
4. Section 100 of the Government of India Act read as 
" (1) Notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding sub-sections, the Federal 
Legislature has, and a Provincial Legislature has not. the matters enumerated in List 
I in the Seventh Schedule to this Act (hereinafter called the Federal Legislature 
List') 
(2) Notwithstanding any thing in the next succeeding sub-section, a Provincial 
Legislature also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in List III in the said Schedule (hereinafter Called the 'Concurrent 
Legislative List') 
(3) Subject to the two preceeding sub-sections the Provincial Legislature has, and the 
Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof 
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Schedule 
(hereinafter called the 'Provincial Legislative List') 
(4) The Federal Legislature has power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated 
in the Provincial Legislative List except for a Province or any thereof. 
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on subjects as stated in the List, but the Federal Legislature was in a superior 
position. 
The Constitution of Republic of India has maintained the same 
distribution of legal authority. 
2. 'Labour' on the Concurrent List: 
The constitution makers having regard to the nature of the subject 
matter and different conditions obtaining in the various provinces thought it 
fit to provide a system whereby labour welfare legislation could provide 
adequate safeguards as against the strong capitalist groups. They in their 
wisdom decided that labour matters should be placed in the Concurrent list so 
that both the Centre and Provinces could play their respective role successfully. 
When any problem assumes of all India proportion then the Centre 
could provide the policy to be followed uniformly so as to provide a single 
solution to such problem with incidental minor modifications so as suit to the 
conditions obtaining in various States. In such a situation the States could 
adopt and apply the law so designed to meet their own need. 
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The basic principle which is to regulate Centre State action in this field 
is coordination and cooperation as amongst the Units. Such co-operation is 
to be preferred to the principle of subordination with regard to the 
administration of labour laws. Articles 256' and 257^ of the constitution 
authorise the Central Government to give necessary directions to the State 
Governments in order to ensure compliance with the laws enacted by Parliament. 
Article 258^ authorises the Central Government to confer powers and to 
5 Article 256 The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure 
compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in 
the State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such 
directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for 
that purpose 
6 Article 257 (i) The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as not to 
impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union, and the 
executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State 
as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose 
(2) The executive power of the Union shall also extend to the giving of directions to a 
State as to the construction and maintenance in the direction to be of national or 
military importance 
Provided that nothing in this clause with respect to naval, military and air 
force work 
(3) The executive power of the Union for the protection of the railways within the 
State 
(4) Where in carrying out any direction given to a State under clause (2) or under 
Clause (3) as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice 
of India, in respect of the extra Costs so incurred by the State 
7 Article 258 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the President may, 
with the consent of the Government of State, entrust either conditionally or 
unconditionally to the Government or to its officers functions in relation to any 
matter to which the executive power of the Union extends 
(2) A law made by Parliament which applies in any State may confer powers and 
impose duties or authorise the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, 
upon the State or officers and authorities thereof 
(3) Where by virtue of this Article powers and duties have been conferred or imposed 
upon a State as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief 
Justice of India, in respect of any extra costs of administration incurred by the State 
in connection with the exercise of those powers and duties 
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impose duties upon the State Governments or their ofiices in respect of laws 
made by Parliament. The latter may also, wholly or partially, assign its 
legislative powers in respect of concurrent list to the state governments. 
Further labour being placed in the Concurrent * list provides a mechanism 
to deal with Centre-State action or over reaction as both are given the power 
to play an effective role, within their own spheres. 
This has assumed anormous proportion because the State has taken 
over the role of the private employer in various fields. Thus we have a new 
phenomenon of State employer which in its consequences with regard to 
labour is quite dififerent firom private sector problems. This has resulted in a 
strong demand for welfare measures being made available to a large number 
of employees. 
So viewed the field is very vast wherein the Centre and the State have 
to make and execute provisions to secure a good life st^le to the employees. 
It may be noted that in the public sector profit is not the main objective and 
welfare of the people is the main criterion for undertakings of this nature. For 
this reason the problems of the labour are not the same in the Public and 
Private sectors. 
8 Concurrent List -
Entry 20- Economic and Social Planning 
Entry 22- Trade Unions, insdustrial and labour disputes 
Entry 23- Social security and social insurance, employment and unemployment 
Entry 24- Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' 
liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity 
benefits 
Entry 25- Vocational and technical training of Labour 
Entry 36- Factories 
Entry 45- Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters specified in List 
II or List III 
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In regard t o ' Labour' being on ' Concurrent' list the National Commision 
on Labour observed: 
"... the position emerging out of the inclusion of Labour' in the 
Concurrent List' in our constitution and the consequences thereof 
both in the framing of labour policy and in its administration. In the 
process, we propose to discover the basis, if any, for a common labour 
code. In the years since independence, various legislative measures 
have been enacted both by the Centre and the States. In cases where 
the beneficiaries are distinct and the benefits are new,no difficulties 
can arise. The State legislation merely supplements the Central Acts. 
However, if for the same class of beneficiaries, neighbouring States 
provide different benefits, avoidable difficulties can arise. The current 
dichotomy between laying down policy and its administration has not 
been without difficulties. Equally serious has been the States' desire 
to have new legislation. On occasions there have been debates over 
the responsiblities of administering specific pieces of legislation as 
between the Centre and States, as also over defining the appropriate 
govemment'for certain industries under the Industrial Disputes Act, 
1947. For a long time since Independence, questions of this type were 
sorted out in Labour Ministers' Conference or m the Tripartite. There 
have been instances when, on the advice of the Central Government, 
a State had stayed its proposed action in the field of labour legislation. 
In some other States, in the light of criticism or advice emerging out 
of the I.L.C ( Indian Labour Conference ) and S.L.C ( Standing 
Labour Committee ), the State law is more acceptable in the All India 
forum. Similar amity has prevaled in the matter of administration. 
This situation is likely to be affected by political developments 
leading to the formation of governments at the Centre and in the 
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States by different and even opposing political parties. Recently, 
when the Centre proposed in a particular instance in the matter of 
industrial relations in certain industries, the States showed resistance... 
What then is the way out? This was the point of our special inquiry 
during the course of seeking evidence we sought help from the parties 
appearing before us on the specific question whether they favoured 
a Common Labour Code. In seeking a response on this issue, we 
started from the premise that since labour legislation had emerged 
over a period, the concepts/definitions and standards, as indeed the 
basic philosophy in some of the piece of legislation, would have 
necessarily differed. Difficulties in administration consequent on it 
were to be considered as natural. In the new context, there is a 
possibility that such differences will be greater, bringing in their own 
administrative implications. In recognition of these difficulties, the 
response to the question on 'Common Labour Code' was affirmative 
wherever it was sought, though some discardant strains were also 
heard, some even raised the basic question of labour being in the 
' Concurrent List'. While the overwhelming argument was in favour of 
status-quo, a very small section preferred to see it transferred to the 
'Union List' and a still smaller section to the'State List'. In this 
matter, we are of the opinion that labour should continue to be on the 
Concurrent List.' This bring us back to the question of uniformity in 
definitions and standards'". 
In regard to labour being on Concurrent list, there were three main 
9. National Commission on Labour, 1969 at 315-316. 
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points before the National Commission on Labour-
(i) To discover the basis for Common Labour Code; or 
(ii) To transfer labour subject to the Union List or State List; or 
(iii) to maintain status-quo. 
The Commission recommended that labour should continue to be on 
the Concurrent list for the purpose of maintaining uniformity in definitions 
and standards. 
Further the placement of labour subjects on Concurrent List provides 
a mechanism to deal with Centre-State action and over reaction as both are 
given the powers to play an efiFective role within their spheres. 
Finally, it is a good scheme based upon the division of labour which also 
provides the necessary powers to meet specific situations which may be 
peculiar to particular field of activity. 
3. Legislative Powers of the Central and State Governments: 
Any consitution that envisages and establishes a polity in which a 
general and more than one regional government have to operate upon the same 
territory and with respect to the same set of people must clearly lay down the 
area of their operation to avoid any jurisdictional conflict between them. To 
that end the constitution must divide the totality of governmental powers 
between the Central and Regional Governments consisting of executive, 
legislative and judicial powers. Among them the legislative powers have 
acquired a place of primacy and predominance in constitutional democracies 
because most of the executive and almost all the judicial powers need be 
backed by legislation for their exercise unless the constitution itself makes 
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independent provisions for their exercise without legislative backing'". The 
question of division of powers between the Central and regional Governments 
is primarily the question of distribution of legislative powers. 
The distribution of powers is an essential feature of federalism. The 
object for which a federal State is formed involves a division of authority 
between the national government and the separate States". The tendency of 
federalism to limit on every side the action of government and to split up the 
strength of the State among co-ordinate and independent authorities is 
specially noticeable, because it forms the essential distinction between a 
federal system such as that of America or Switzerland, and a unitary system 
of government, such as that which exists in Enland. It is necessary to mention 
the English constitution as resting on a balance of powers, and as maintaining 
a division between the executive, the legislative, and the judicial bodies'^. 
Under the Indian constitution the scheme of distribution of legislative 
powers is embodied in Part XI, of Chapter I of the constitution together with 
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Article 246" deals with the 
10 Rao Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and others vs the State of Punjab, AIR 1955 S C 
549 
11 A V Djcey 'Introudction to the study of the law of the Constitution', 151, 1959 
12 Id at 155,156 
13 Article 246 (1) Notwithstanding anything in cluases (2) and (3) Paliament has 
exclusive power to make laws with respect any of the matters enumerated in List I 
in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Union List") 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the 
Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the 
matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred 
to as "Union List") 
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to 
make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in List 11 in the Seventh Schedule (in the Constitution, referred to as the 
"State List") 
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the 
territary of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter 
enumerated in the State List 
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distribution of legislative powers as between the Union and the State 
legislatures, with reference to the different Lists in the Seventh Schedule. 
In order to know the intention of the framers of Indian constitution 
behind the incorporation of Article 246, it would be better to go through the 
genesis of Article 246. 
The Constituent Assembly took up the consideration of the legislative 
lists on August 22, 1947. 
The Draft Constitution prepared by the constitutional Advisor (Sir. B. 
N. Rau) in October, 1947 contained seven clauses (179-185) prescribing the 
distribution of legislative powers. Some gave effect to specific recommendations 
made by the Union Powers and the Union Constitution Committees while 
others were new. 
Clause 180 provided, as recommended by both the Union powers and 
Union Constitution Committees, the distribution of legislative powers between 
the federation and the provinces. The federal Parliament would have exclusive 
power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the federal 
legislative list, and provincial legislature would have exclusive power with 
respect to matters enumerated in the provincial legislative list ; both the 
federal Parliament and provincial legislature could make laws with respect to 
matters specified in the Concurrent Legislative list'". Present Article 246 was 
then Article 217 in the Draft Constitution corresponded to clause 180 of the 
Sir B.N. Rao's Draft Constitution. Article 217 of Draft constitution was as 
follows :-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding clauses. Parliament 
14 B. Shiva Rao. " The Framing of Indian's Constitution- A study," Select Docu-
ments,614 (The Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi,1968) 
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has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in list I and in the Seventh Schedule (in this constitution 
referred to as the "Union List") 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the next succeeding clause. Parliament 
and, subject to the preceding clause, the legislature of any State for the 
time being specified in Part I of the First Schedule also, have power to 
make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in 
the Seventh Schedule (in this constitution referred to as the 'Concurrent 
List'. 
(3) Subject to the two preceding clauses, the legislature of any State for the 
time being specified in Part I of the First Schedule has exclusive power 
to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of 
the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this 
constitution referred to as the "State List"). 
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any 
part of the territory of India not included for the time being in part I or 
Part III of the First Schedule notwithstanding that such matter is a 
matter enumerated in the State List. 
Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, a member of the Drafting Committee, was 
against the scheme of draft Article 217. Since it had been decided to vest 
residuary powers in the Centre, the various items enumerated in the Union List 
became merely illustrative of the general residuary powers of the Centre; the 
proper plan of distribution of Legislative powers would be he thought, to 
define powers of the units in the first instance, then deal with concurrent 
powers and deal lastly with the powers of the Union Parliament. The view 
could not muster sufficient support in the committee. A majority of the 
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members were inclined to think that the question was merely one of form and 
it was, therefore, preferable not to disturb the "existing arrangement" i.e., the 
scheme followed in Section 100 of the 1935 Act and clause 180 of the 
Constitutional Advisor's Draft. Though this did not represent a difference in 
principle with his colleagues, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar considered it 
nevertheless necessary to submit to the Constituent Assembly a separate note 
explaining his views on the subject and proposing an alternative text". 
In the Constituent Assembly, Professor Shibban Lai Saksena moved an 
amendment in Article 217. in regard to his amendment he says: 
"I am very sorry that an attempt was made to get this amendment 
disallowed. I would like only to point out that this amendment is 
word for word what Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar has suggested 
in the Appendix to the Draft Constitution on pages 212-213. In fact 
in the Appendix Shri Alladi has stated that he differed from the 
majority of the Drafting Committee and he has stated that in his 
opinion the new scheme of division of powers between Parliament 
and the Legistature of the States should be as is given in this 
amendment... The suggestion made by Shri Alladi is very important 
one. In fact the Draft Constitution only reproduces word for word 
Section 100 of the Government of Indian Act, 1935. In the Appendix, 
Shri Alladi has given arguments to show why the change he has 
suggested is necessary. He has stated that at the time of Government 
of India Act was passed, it was not decided as to where the residuary 
powers should vest, whether they should be with provinces or with 
15. Drafting Committee Minutes, Feb. 5, 1948 and Draft Constitution, foot note to 
Article 217 and Appendix, quoted from B.Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's 
Constitution, 'A Study' 617 (The Indian Institute of Public Administration , New 
Delhi, 1968). 
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the Centre. Therefore, it was necessary to frame the section in the 
form in which it was framed ... He has also stated that as it has been 
decided finally that the residuary powers shall belong to the Centre, 
the Article should be redrafted in a different manner, in the manner he 
has suggested and as is given in my amendment. Firstly, we should not 
copy word for word, the Government of India Act, 1935, which was 
a deed of our slavery. Now that we are now framing a new 
constitution, we should not merely incorporate every thing word for 
word from the old constitution. One advantges of this is that we will 
not be reminded of our past slavery as we would be by copying word 
for word. Section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935. 
Secondly, Sir, this is a more logical from to say that the various States 
shall have exclusive power to make laws in relation to matters falling 
wdthin the classes of subjects, specified in List I, and that List II shall 
contain subjects in which both the States and the Union shall have 
concurrent power to make laws, and then to say that whatever 
remains shall belong to the Union. List I at present gives the powers 
to the Union Parliament. Shri AUadi suggested that whatever is 
contained in the Union list should be by way of illustration only and 
that whatever remains should belong to the Centre. The more logical 
form will be to say that such and such powers will belong to the 
States, such and such powers will belong both to the States and the 
Union and then to say that whatever remains shall belong to the 
Union. This kind of division given by Shri AUadi is a more logical 
division and much better division in every way"'*. 
16. C A D . Vol. VIII at 795-96. 
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The amendment moved by Prof. Shibban Lai Saksena was negatived. 
After going through genesis of Article 246 it is clear that constitution 
has given more powers to Centre to legislate on the matters enumerated in the 
list. In short, the theme of Article 246 is that the Union Parliament has full 
and exclusive power to legislate with respect to matters in List I and has also 
concurrent power to legislate with respect to matters in list III. The State 
legislature on the other hand, has exclusive power to legislate with respect 
matters in List II, minus matters falling in List I and III and has concurrent 
power with respect to matters included in List III. 
In the Seventh Schedule the Constitution of India gives three lists: the 
Union list (List I),the State List (List II), and the Concurrent List (List III). 
The union Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws with respect to 
matters enumerated in List I which is fairly long one including Defence of 
India, Naval, Military and Air Force, Atomic energy. Foreign Affairs, Foreign 
Jurisdiction, Citizenship and Naturalisation, Emigration and Extradition, 
Railways, Airways, Post and Telegraphs, Inter-State Trade and Commerce, 
Banking, Inter-State Migration, all total 97 specific items and one general 
head. The used of the term 'exclusive' is most categorical; and leaves no doubt 
that Parliament has the legislative power in respect of these enumerated 
matters to the entire exclusion of all the State legislatures. Parliament can, 
notwithstanding anything in list II and List III, legislate in respect of these 
subjects, and its authority to do so overrides that of the State legislatures in 
relation to both the State list and the Concurrent list. A State legislature has, 
similarly, an exclusive power with respect to any matter assigned to it in the 
State list,although this power is exercisable subject to the power of Parliament 
in relation to matters given in the Union List and the Concurrent list. The 
Legislative heads enumerated in the list II include Public order. Police, 
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Administration of Justice, constitution and reorganisation of Courts other 
than the High Courts and the Supreme Court, education (with certain 
reservations), Public Health, Agriculture, Forest, in all 66 items. Over this 
wide field the State legislatures exercise a plenary power of the same kind as 
that of Parliament over the Union list subjects. This power is not given to them 
by way of delegation, is clearly plenary and original. Besides the Union list and 
the State list there is Concurrent list. Here we would like to discuss the need 
of Concurrent list. 
4. Need of Concurrent List:- The object of a Concurrent list of various 
subjects, over which the Centre and the State have concurrent powers, is 
uniformity. It is earlier pointed out that the plan of three lists in the 
constitution has been adopted from the Government of India Act, 1935, it 
would be profitable to refer to the observations of the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on the point''. 
"Experience has shown, both in India and elsewhere, that there are 
certain matters which cannot be allocated exclusively either to a 
Central or to a Provincial legislature, and for which, though it is often 
desirable that Provincial legislation should make provision, it is 
equally necessary that the Central legislature should also have a 
legislative jurisdiction, to enable it in some cases to secure uniformity 
in the main principles of law throughout the country, in others to 
guide and encourage provincial efforts, and in others again to provide 
remedies for mischief arising in the provincial sphere but extending 
or liable to extend beyond the boundaries of a single province. 
Instances of the first are provided by the subject-matter of the great 
17. Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1934, para, 51. 
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Indian codes; of the second by such matters as labour legislation, and 
of the third by legislation for the prevention and control of epidemic 
disease. 
It would in our view be disastrous if the uniformity of law which the 
Indian Codes provide was destroyed or whittled away by the unco-
ordinated action of a Provincial legislature. On the other hand, local 
conditions necessarily vary from Province to Province, and Provincial 
legislatures ought to have the power of adopting general legislation 
of this kind to meet the particular circumstances of a Province." 
The Government of India (Amendment) Act, 1919, introduced 
Constitutional changes in the field of Labour. The Central legislature was 
given powers to legislate in respect of practically all labour subjects, while the 
provincial legislatures had powers to legislate only in respect of those labour 
subjects which were classified as provincial and that too with the approval of 
Governor-General. 
The Government of India Act, 1935, introduced provincial autonomy. 
The federal constitution created many difficulties so far as labour affairs were 
concerned. Labour was declared a provincial subject. This resulted that there 
could be no uniformity in and no total implementation of labour legislation in 
the country. Concurrent list was, therefore, devised to overcome this difficulty. 
The labour subjects are divided into three different lists. The division 
of labour subjects into three list is as indicated below:-
llnion List : Participation in international conferences, associations and 
other bodies and implementation of the decisions thereof. 
Regulation of Labour and safety in mines; oil fields, major 
ports, railways; post and telegraph and telephone; industrial 
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disputes concerning employees and interstate migration of 
labour. 
Concurrent List:- Trade unions, industrial and labour disputes, labour 
welfare, provident funds, workmen's compensation; 
employer's liability; invalidity and old age pensions; 
social security, vocational and technical guidance; 
training, economic and social planning and factories, 
enquiries and statistics. 
During the discussion in the Constituent Assembly on the labour 
subjects, a demand was made to incorporate some important labour subjects 
in the Union List in order to bring uniformity in the matters of labour 
legislation all over the country. Professor Shibban Lai Saksena moved an 
amendment in this regard. He suggested that a new Entry 59.A consisting 
'Labour Legislation' and Legislation for settlement of industrial disputes' ; 
Entry 59.B Consisting 'Coordination of machinery for settlement of industrial 
disputes in States and in Union and the provision of Supreme Industrial 
Appellate Tribunals and Entry 59.C consisting unemployment insurance, be 
added after Entry 59 of List I. 
He expressing his opinion on the said amendment says: 
"In know that in Concurrent List we have got items- (Item) 26- welfare 
of labour, conditions of labour, provident funds, employer's liability and 
workmen's compensation, health insurance including invalidity pensions, old 
age pensions; (Item) 27- unemployment and social insurance, (Item) 28-
Trade Union, industrial and labour disputes; which means that both the 
Provinces as well as the Centre can pass laws in that connection. In Entry No. 
59 it is said that industiral disputes concerning Union employees shall be a 
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Central subject, so that even though industrial disputes are in concurrent List, 
so far as Union employees are concerned, legislation to settle these disputes 
will be the province of the Union Government. What I want is this that these 
items in the concurrent List may remain as they are, but the items which I have 
proposed maybe added to the Union List. The main purpose of this amendment 
is to bring about uniformity in the matter of Labour Legislation all over the 
country. My second amendment relates to the co-ordination of machinery for 
the settlement of industiral disputes. Machinery for this no doubt exists in 
every Province, but there is no coordination of these activities of the various 
Provincial Governments. Again there is no appellate tribunal to which all can 
go. In consider it very important thing which must be provided for"". 
Professor Shibban Lai Sakena's amendment put into the vote of the 
House and motion was negatived. 
In regard to Entry 24 of List III which was the Entry 26 in the Draft 
Constitution, Dr. B.R. Ambedker" moved an amendment as follows:-
"That for entry 26 of list II the following entry be substituted:-
'26. Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, 
employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age 
pensions and maternity benefits". 
The amendment was adopted and Entry 26, as amended and added to 
the concurrent list. 
During the discussion on Entry 26 Shri R.K. Sidhva"^" (C.P. and Berar, 
General) wanted to know from Dr. B.R. Ambedker whether- in entry 26,' 
18. CAD. Vol. IX at 861. 
19. C.A.D. Vol. IX at 940. 
20. C.A.D. Vol. IX at 943. 
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welfare Labour,- whether "labour" includes agriculturists and peasants or 
only industrial labours. He said : 
"As I have understood the term 'Labour' means industrial labour and 
not agricultural— if you enact legislation for industrial labour, you 
can not exclude agricultural labour. Therefore, peasants and farmers 
must be included either in entry 26 or in a separate entry™". 
In response of the question of Shri R.K. Sidhva, Dr. B.R. Ambedker 
submitted that: 
"I came to the question raised by my Friend Mr. Sidhva which, I think 
is a very legitimate question. His question was what was the connotation 
of the word 'Labour' and he asked me a very definite question whether 
'Labour' meant both industrial as well as agricultural 'Labour'. I think 
that was his question. My answer is emphatically that it includes both 
kind of labour. The entry is not intended to limit itself to industrial 
labour. Any kind of welfare work relating to labour, whether the 
labour is industrial labour or agricultural labour, will be open to be 
undertaken either by the Centre or by the Province under entry 26."^' 
State List : Relief of disabled and unemployment. 
In relation to administration of labour laws. Articles 256 and 257 of the 
Constitution, authorise the Central Government to give necessary directions 
to State Governments in order to ensure compliance with the laws enacted by 
Parliament. Article 258 authorises the Central Government to confer powers 
and to impose duties upon the State Government, or their Officers in respect 
of Laws made by Parliament. The latter may also whoUy or partially assign its 
legislative powers in respect of Concurrent List to the State Governments. 
21.C.A.D. Vol. IXat945. 
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5. Expansion of the legislative powers of the Union- While the foregoing 
may be said to be an account of the nonnal distribution of the legislative 
powders, there are certain exceptional circumstances under which the above 
system of distribution is either suspended or the powers of the Union 
Parliament are extended over State subjects. These exceptional or extraordinary 
circumstances are:-
(a) In the National Interest:- Parliament shall have the power to make laws 
with respect to any matter included in the State list, for a temporary 
period, if the council of States declares by resolution of 2/3 of its 
member present and voting, that it is necessary in the national interest 
that Parliament shall have power to legislate over such matters. Each 
such resolution will give a lease of one year to the law in question. 
A law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the 
passing of such resolution have been competent to make shall, to the extent 
of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of period of six 
months after the resolution has ceased to be in force, except as respect s things 
done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period. The 
resolution of the Council of States may be renewed for a period of one year 
at a time (Article 249) ^\ 
22. Article 249(1): "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this 
chapter, if the Council of State has declared by resolution supported by not less than 
two-third of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the 
national interest that Parliament should make laws with respect to any matter 
enumerated in that State List specified in the resolution, it shall be lawful for 
parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India... to that 
matter whole the resolution remains in force. 
(2) A resolution passed under clause (1) shall remain in force for such period not 
exceeding one year as may be specified therein 
Provided that, if and ... date on which under this clause it would otherwise have 
ceased to be in force. 
(3) A law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the passing ... 
resolution has ceased to be in force, except as respects things done or omitted to be 
done before the expiration of the said period". 
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(b)Under a Proclamation of Emergency :- While a proclamation of 
'Emergency' made by the President is in operation. Parliament shall have 
similar power to legislate with respect to State subjects. 
A law made by Parliament, which Parliament would not but for the 
issue of such proclamation have been competent to make, shall, to the extent 
of incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six 
months after proclamation has ceased to operate, except as respects thing 
done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period (Art. 
250)". 
(c) By agreement between States:- If the legislatures of two or more States 
resolve that it shall be lawful for Parliament to make laws with respect 
to any matters included in the State List relating to those States, 
Parliament shall have such powers as regards such States. It shall also 
be open to any other State to adopt such Union legislation in relation to 
itself by a resolution passed in that behalf in the legislature of the State. 
In short, this is an extension of the jurisdication of the Union Parliament 
by consent of the State legislatures (Art. 252)^. 
23 Article 250(1) "Notwithstandinganything in this chapter. Parliament shall, while 
a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, have power to make laws for the whole 
or any part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matters enumerated 
in the State List 
(2) A law made by parliament cease to have effect on the expiration of period of six 
months of after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, except as respect things 
done or omitted to be done before the exiration of the said period 
24 Article 252(1) "If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be 
desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to 
make laws for the States except as provided in articles 249 and 250 should be 
regulated in such States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect are 
passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those States by each of the Houses 
of the Legislature of that State 
(2) Any Act so passed by Parliament may be amended or repealed by an Act of 
Parliament by an Act of the Legislature of the State " 
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(d) To implement Treaties :- Parliament shall have the power to legislate 
with respect to any subject for the purpose of implementing treaties or 
international agreements and conventions. In other words, under rule-
making powers, delegated by the Centre, the States have often been able 
to adopt Central Acts to local needs without President's assent. The 
Central legislations often give such powers. For example section 38 of 
the Industrial Disputes Act ,1947 delegates to the appropriate 
government, which in many cases in the State Government, a power to 
promulgate such rules as may be needed for making the Act effective. 
Similarly, sections 29 and 30 of Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and section 
26 of the Payment of Wages Act,1936 section 32 of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, 1923, section 30(2) of Consumer Protection Act, 
1986, section 96 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, section 
44 of Beedi and Cigar workers (Conditions of employment) Act, 1966, 
section 19 of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, 
Section 28 ofMatemity Benefit Act, 1961. The Factories Act 1948 too, 
contains similar provisions and they have been similarly availed of. 
There is yet another method by which a State can operate machinery 
created by Central Act, for instance, under Industrial Disputes Act, the 
"appropriate Government", which includes the State Government, is 
empowered to use the machinery created by the Industrial Disputes Act for the 
investigation and settlement of any industrial dispute coming within its 
jurisdiction. Normal distribution of powers will not stand m the way of 
Parliament to enact legislation for carrying out its international obligations, 
even though such legislation may be necessary in relation to a state subject 
[Art. 253]^'. 
25 Article 253 " Notwithstanding any thing in the foregoing provisions of this 
chapter. Parliament has power to make and law for the whole or any part of the 
territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any 
other country or countries or any decision made at any international Conference, 
association or other body" 
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(e) Under Proclamation of Failure of Constitutional Machinery in the 
State:- when such a Proclamation is made by the President, the President 
may declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be 
exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament [Art. 356 (1) (b)]". 
Though entries that concern labour matters occur in all three lists, the 
most important are in the Concurrent List. In most of these subjects, there are 
Central Acts only, e.g. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, The Minimum 
Wages Act, 1948, The Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. Neverthless, 
some States have enacted separate amending Acts adopting some of these 
Acts to local needs. They can do this in different ways; in some cases by 
amendment with the assent of the President; and in others by promulgating 
rules pursuant to a power delegated by the Central Act (in which cases the 
President assent is not needed). Thus the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has 
been amended by many States. For example, the Industrial Disputes (Uttar 
Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1951 with the President's assent, added a few 
additional qualifications to those required of any person serving as a labour 
Court. Similarly the Industrial Disputes (Mysore Amendement) Act, 1953, 
with the President's assent, added to the Central Act, a new clause of 
facilitating the transfer of industrial disputes from one State Tribunal to 
another. A few States have amended the Central Act in various other ways. 
There are various decisions in which the respective powers of the 
Centre and State in respect of Labour Legislation are discussed. 
For the first time in Niemla Textile Mills' case", the Vexed question 
came before the Supreme Court was-whether the definition of industry in 
26 Article 356(1) (b) " declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall 
be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament..." 
27. Niemla Textile FinishingMills Ltd. Vs. The IlndPubjab Tribunal, A.LR. 1957 S.C. 
329 at 339. 
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Industrial Disputes Act covered by the entries 29 and 27 of the 7th schedule 
to the constitution. The Supreme Court has held that it should be noted that, 
according to the Preamble,the Act was enacted not only for the settlement of 
industrial disputes but for other purposes also. It is open to the respondents 
also to justify the definition of the term industry' as contained in Section 2 (j) 
of the Act by having resort to entry 27 of the same list which refers to 'Welfare 
of Labour, conditions of labour, provident Fund, employers' liability and 
workmen's compensation, health, insurance, invalidity pensions, old age 
pensions'. The definition of the term industry including as it does any calling, 
service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of 
workmen, wouldtherefore, be justified under this entry even if the same is not 
covered by entry 29 above referred to. The entries in the Legislative Lists 
should not be given a narrow construction, they include within their scope and 
ambit all ancillary matters which legitimately come within the topics mentioned 
therein. 
In Milkhi Ram Vs State of Pundjab," the Payment of Wages Act of 
1936, Sec. 6 (as amended by Punjab Act 15 of 1962) was challenged on the 
ground that as under Section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act as stood 
originaly, all wages were to be paid in current coins or currency notes and as 
under the amendment made by the impugned Act part of the bonus, which is 
a kind of wages is not to be paid in current coins or currency notes but may 
be invested in the manner prescribed, the impugned Act cannot be deemed to 
be a piece of legislation for welfare of labour and as such is not covered by 
entry 24 of the Concurrent list. The Punjab High observed:-
" Section 6, Payment of Wages Act as amended by Punjab Act of 1962 
28. A I R . 1964 Punjab 513. 
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is intra vires the State legislature. The object of legislation providing 
in section 6 of the Payment of wages Act that all wages shall be paid 
in current coins or in currency notes was to ensure the payment of 
wages in cash and not in any other form. As a result of amendment 
made in Section 6 and element of compulsory saving has been 
introduced not in the monthly wages but in the bonus payable to an 
industrial worker should be deemed to be a piece of legislation which 
is covered by the words 'Welfare of Labour' in entry 24 of the 
concurrent List. There is also no warrant for the proposition that if 
a provision of law relates to the subject of 'Welfare of Labour' it 
should be held to be not falling within the ambit of the words 'Welfare 
of Labour' in entry 24 List III of the 7th schedule to the constitution 
because the provision is considered to be less favourable to the 
industrial workers compared to the previous law on the subject. The 
constitutionality of an enactment is to be judged by reference to its 
ovsTi provisions and not by comparison with those of the previous 
enactment"^'. 
In Jalan Trading Co. Vs. Mill Mazdoor Sabha'" the court observed 
"The power of Parliament to fix minimum bonus can not be questioned 
because it flows from jurisdiction over industrial and labour disputes, 
welfare of labour including conditions of work and wages. The 
legislation is, therefore, neither a fraud on the constitution nor 
colourable exercise of power. Under any of these powers, or all of 
them viewed together, the fixation of minimum bonus is legal and if 
these topics of legislation were found to be insufficient the residuary 
29. Id. at 514. 
30. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 691. 
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power of Parliament must lend validity to the enactment. 
By enacting the Act, the Parliament has not attempted to tresspass 
upon the province of the State Legislature. It is true that by the 
impunged legislation certain principles declared by Supreme Court in 
respect of grant of bonus were modified, but on that account it can 
not be said that the Legislation operates as fraud on the constitution 
or is a colourable exercise of Legislative power. Parliament has 
normally power within the frame-work of the constitution to enact 
legislation which modifies principles enunciated by Supreme Court 
as applicable to the determination of any dispute, and by exercising 
that power the Parliament doesnot perpetuate fraud on the constituion. 
An enactment may be charged as colourable, and not on that account 
valid, only if it be found that the legislature has by enacting it 
tresspassed upon a field out side its competence".'' 
In Malabar Tile Works Vs. Union of India", The court had considered 
the valdity of the legislative competency of the Parliament in regard to Section 
2 (13) of the Payment of Bonus Act, (1945). 
The court has interpreted the term 'employee' in following manner : 
"Employee means any person (other than an apprentice) employed on 
a salary or wage not exceeding one thousand and six hundred rupees per 
mansum in any industry to do any .skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, 
managerial, administrative, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, 
whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied". 
31. Id. at 692. 
32. (1968) Lab. l.C. 647 at 650. 
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The petitioner's learned council has argued that a person employed in 
a supervisory, managerial, or administrative work, and drawing a salary not 
exceeding Rs. 1600 per month is also an employee, and is entitted to get 
bonus, even though he is not a 'workman' as defined in the Industrial Disputes 
Act, 1947. He further contended that a law providing payment of bonus to a 
person other than the workman is beyond the legislative competence of the 
Parliament. 
The court held that this contention has no substence. Entries 23 and 24 
in List III in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution read as follows: 
"23. Social security and social insurance; employment and 
unemployment. 
"24. Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident 
funds, employer's liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity 
and old age pensions and maternity benefits". 
Inspite of that the word 'employment' or 'employee' or 'workman', is 
not defined in the Constitution. The court has given a libral interpretation and 
held that the definition employed in the Act and provision therein relating to 
the payment of bonus to all persons falling within the said definition is within 
the ambit of the aforesaid rule. 
Similarly in T.V S. Iyengar and Sons Vs. State" the Court observed:-
" The court must interpret the relevant words in the entry in a natural 
way and give the said words the widest interpretation. What the 
entries purport to do is to describe the area of legislative competence 
33(1970)Lab. I.e. 203. 
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of the different legislative bodies, and so, it would be unreasonable 
to aproach the task of interpretation in a narrow or restrictive 
manner. 
Giving the term 'industrial dispute' in Entry 22 of List 3 of Schedule 
7 as wide and natural meaning there is no reason for restricting it to 
disputes between a body of workmen and the management. A dispute 
between a single workman and the management would also come 
within the natural meaning of the term 'industrial dispute'. The Entry 
also includes labour disputes. There is no reason for excluding 
disputes between individual workman and the employer from the 
purview of the term 'labour disputes. In the Industrial Disputes Act 
provision is also made for determination of a dispute between an 
individual workman and the management, such as section 33-C (2) of 
the Act. The plea, therefore, that Parliament will have no power to 
legislate regarding disputes between an individual workman and the 
employer, has to be rejected""*. 
In M/S C.P. Patel Vs. State of Maharashtra^'' it was argued that a very 
artificial definition of an "employer" has been enacted and persons who have 
no direct contract or nexus with the principal manufacturer or employer has 
been artifically made an employer under the Bidi and Cigar workers (Conditions 
of Employment) Act, 1966 and is further made answerable for various things 
which might occur behind his back and without his knowledge. 
The court said that if this grievance has any substance it would be a 
relavant point to consider when reasonableness of the provisions is examined; 
but so far as legislative competence is concerned, it is open to the legislature 
33a Ibid. 
34, (1971) Lab. I.C. 1080 at 1086. 
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to make a deeming provision and to attribute a certain character to a person 
which the contract made by him does not attribute to him. But hardship or 
unreasonableness is a different concept from legislative competence. The 
court did not therefore, think that it is possible to countemance the challenge 
of the petitioners that parliament had no authority to enact the present Act. 
In Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Work Vs Union of India,^' where the 
constitutional validity of Beedi and Cigar workers (Conditions of Employment) 
Act, 1960 was challenged on the ground that Parliament has no legislative 
competence and Legislation falls under entry 24 in List II, it was held by the 
Supreme Court that the legislation in the present case does not fall within 
entry 24 in List II or entries 7 and 52 in List I. Entry 24 in List III speaks of 
labour including conditions of work, provident fund, workmen's compensation, 
old age pension and maternity benefits. The Act is for welfare of labour and 
it is not an Act for industries. The true nature and character of the legislation 
shows that it is for enforcing better conditions of labour amongst those 
engaged in the manufacture of beedies and cigars. The scheme of the Act 
relates to provisions regarding health and welfare conditons of the employment, 
leave with wages and extension of benefits by apply .ng other Acts to labour. 
By way of illustration, section 28 extends benefits of Payment of Wages Act 
to industrial premises. Section 31 provides security of service. Section 37 
extends the benefits of Industrial Standing Orders Act, 1946. Section 38(1) 
extends the safety provisions contained in chapter IV of the Factories Act. 
Section 39 makesthe Industrial Dispute Act applicable. The pith and substance 
of this Act is regulation of conditions of employment in the beedi and cigar 
industries. The Act deals with particular subject matter as regards the 
establishments and industrial premises. Entries 22 and 24 in List III are wide 
35. (1974) I. L.L.J. S.C. 367-368. 
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enough to cover this piece of labour welfare measures. The Act is valid and 
falls within entires 22, 23 and 24 of the List III. 
In Monogram Mills case^S where the State of Gujrat had issued a 
notification on 17th December, 1973 calling upon the textile mills in the State 
to constitute joint management councils as per the Bombay Industrial Relations 
Act, 1964. These mills filed vmt petition in the High Court challenging 
Sections 53 A and 53 B and the rules as well as the notification. Since the High 
Court rejected their contention, these mills have come on appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Although a number of contentions were raised in the High 
Court. In the Supreme Court, only the legislative competence was argued. On 
this question the Supreme Court held that there is no sufiBcient ground to 
interfere with finding of the High Court that the impugned statutory provisions 
fell under entries 22 and 24 in list III in the Seventh Schedule of the 
constitution and the State legislature were competent to enact the same. The 
impugned provisions are intended in pith and substance to forestall and 
prevent industrial and labour disputes. They also constitute in essence a 
measure for the welfare of the labour. It is contended that the joint management 
council may claim to exercise such fiinctions under the opening words of Sec. 
53 B, as can be discharged only by the Board of Directors. This contention 
is not well-founded. The impugned statutory provisions should be so construed 
and implemented as would sustain their constitutional validity. The functions 
which can be performed by the joint management council have to be of such 
a character as would pertain to welfare of labour or prevent industrial 
disputes. Such functions would be analogous to those specified in clauses (a) 
to (f) of Sections 53 B. If impugned legislation in pith and substance relates 
to subjects which are within the competence of the State legislature as it in fact 
36. Monogram Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Gujrat, (1976) II L.L.J. S.C. 274. 
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does the fact that there is an incidental encroachment on matters which are the 
subject matter of entries in List I would not affect the legislative competence 
of the State legislature to pass the impugned legislation. The impugned rules, 
likewise, relate to the subjects which are within the competence of the State 
legislature. The rules in the very nature of the things can operate only in that 
field in which the parent Act can operate. 
In the light of above discussion it is pointed out that there is no material 
change in the judicial attitude since 1957 in regard to the interpretation of 
Lists in relation to labour subjects. The judiciary has repeatedly emphasised 
that the Entries are not powers but are only fields of legislation, and that the 
widest import and significance must be given to the language used therein. 
None of them should be read in a narrow or restricted sense, that the 'widest 
possible' and most liberal construction be put on each entry, and that each 
general word in an Entry should beheld to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary 
matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. 
The liberalized industrial policy facinated and encouraged a large 
number of private investers, both national and foreign, to invest in the Indian 
economy on a large scale. The multinational companies are utilising this 
golden opportunity in a big way to share Indian markets ostensibly to have a 
dominance in the competitive environment in the near future'**. 
The Labour Legislation has now a great importance and relevance 
under the changed industrial scenario because more the industries are 
established the more labour force would be recruited and consequently more 
labour problems would crop up. 
36a Dr V G Goswami, 'Labour and Industrial Law,' P V, (Central Law Agency 
Allahabad 1996 Sixth Edition) 
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The liberal attitude of the judiciary in the interpretation of the Lists is 
a need of the time and it would be helpful in settling the labour-management 
conflicts. 
Our submission is that the Government has to plan and structure the 
system of education to cultivate talented and high calibers skills and value 
system keeping in view the constitutional commitments to ensure socio-
economic justice to weaker sections of the society. 
The most important labour subjects which are discussed above have 
been placed in the concurrent list so that a uniform texture and frame work of 
laws may be maintained throughout the country, and yet, if necessary, local 
variations may be taken care of by provisions made by the States. 
6. Repugnancy of Laws made by Parliament and State Legislatures:-
'Repugnant' literally means inconsistent with. Things are called 
inconsistent when they can not stand together at the same time, and one law 
is inconsistent with another law when the provision or power in the one law 
conflicts directly with the provision or power in the other law and when one 
legislature says "do" and the other says "do not". So, a State law is not 
inconsistent with a Union law if it is possible to obey the State without 
disobeying the Union law. This is called the test of obedience'. But the test 
of obedience is not an exhaustive one, for there may be inconsistency between 
two laws though both say 'do not' e.g. when both impose prohibitions against 
the same act, but one of them is more stringent than the other. 
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The question of repugnancy properly arises in connection with the 
Concurrent list. Under Article 246(2)", both the Union and the State legislatures 
have Concurrent powers to legislate with respect to the Concurrent list. 
Logically, therefore, an absurd situation would result if two inconsistent laws, 
each of equal validity, could exist side by side within the same territory. 
Article 254 of the constitution has been engrafted to obviate such an absurd 
situation. 
In Draft Constitution Art. 254^* was then Articles 231. During 
Constituent Assembly Debate when discussion took place on Article 231. 
Hon'ble member Shri A. Thanu Pillai (Travancore State) expressed his views 
as follows: 
"...I wish to bring to the notice of this House, the fact that there is a 
lot of differences between the laws in the State and in the rest of India. 
For instance I may say that in Travoncore, we have abolished the 
37. Article: 246(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and subject to 
clause (1) the Legislature of any State also have power to make laws with respect to any 
of the matters enumerated in List III, in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred 
to as the "Concurrent List"). 
38. Article: 254 (1): If any provision of law made by the legislature of a State is repugnent 
to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or 
to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the 
Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, 
whether passed before or after the law made by the legislature of such State, or as the case 
may be, the existing law shall prevail and the law made by the legis.ature of the State, to 
the extent of the repugnancy, be void. 
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters 
enumerated in the Concurrent list contains any provision repugnent to the provisions of 
an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the 
law made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration 
of the President and has received his assent, prevail in the State. 
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any 
time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying 
or repealing the law so made by the legislature of the State 
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death penalty for murder. Now, that subject would come in the 
Concurrent list, so also various other matters. How are you going to 
reconcile that fact with the provisions in Article 231, namely, that all 
existing laws, not only laws to be enacted by Parliament in future, but 
also existing laws enacted by the Central Legislature till now, will 
prevail, whenever there is conflict between the laws of the States and 
the Central Laws? It would be a tremendous task to bring into line 
these two sets of laws and to reconcile them. Until that is done the 
enforcement of Article 231 in respect of the States in Part III will be 
well nigh impossible. 1 only wanted to bring this to the notice of the 
House so that this serious difficulty may be got over and suitable 
provisions made in the constitution ". 
Dr. Ambedkar took the more rational views on the point raised by 
Shri.A. Thanu Pillai and replied: 
"I agree that Mr. Thanu Pillai's point requires explanation. Now the 
explanation is this. I am sure he will agree that the rule regarding 
repugnancy wich is mentioned in Article 231 must be observed so far 
as future laws made by Parliament are concerned. He will see that the 
wording in Article 231 is whether passed before or after'. Surely with 
regard to law made by Parliament after the commencement of this 
constitution, the rule of repugnancy must have universal application 
with regard to laws made both by the States in Part I and by the States 
mentioned in Part III with regard to question of repugnancy as to the 
laws made before the passing of this constitution, the position is this 
... It is no good that whenever you pass an Article you should have 
39. C.A.D. Vol. VIII at 813. 814. 
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added to that Article a proviso making some kind of saving in favour 
of States in Part III, although there is no doubt about it that some 
savings will have to be made with regard to laws made by States in 
Part III. That is proposed to be done, as I said, in a new Part or a new 
Schedule, where the reservation in respect of States in Part III will be 
enacted, so that so far as laws made before the constitution comes 
into existence are concerned, they would be saved by same provision 
enacted in that special form or special Schedule".*" 
Repugnancy between a law made by a State and by the Parliament may 
result from the following circumstances:-
(l)Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent 
list are fiiUy inconsistent and are absolutely irreconciable, the Central Act 
will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy. 
(2) Where however if law passed by the State comes into collision with a law 
passed by Parliament on an entry in the Concurrent list, the State Act shall 
prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central 
Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in 
accordance with clause (2) of Art. 254. 
(3) Where a law passed by the State legislature while being substantially 
within the scope of the entries in the State list entrenches upon any of the 
entries in the Central list the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by 
invoking the doctrine of pith and Substance if on an analysis of the 
provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the 
four corners of the State list and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental 
or inconsequential. 
40. C A D . Vol. VIII at 814. 
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(4) Where however, a law made by the State legislature on a subject covered 
by the Concurrent list is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law 
made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the 
assent of the President under Art. 254 (2) of the constitution. The result 
of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State 
Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and over rule the provisions 
of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a State of 
affairs will exists only untill Parliament may add any time make a law 
adding to , or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State 
legislature under the proviso to Art. 254. 
The plain reading of the provisions of Art. 254 suggests that it would 
apply to all cases of repugnancy between a Central law and a State law. It does 
not say that the State law and the Central law should belong to the Concurrent 
list only. The words in the Concurrent list' appear to qualify only the existing 
law which means that an existing law in relation to a matter in Concurrent list 
prevails over a State law in that area in case of repugnancy. So far as the post-
Constitution law are Concerned, the words are used "which Parliament is 
competent to enact" which are quite broad and would comprise laws made by 
the Centre both in the Central and Concurrent lists. This will mean that if there 
is repugnancy between a State law falling in the State list and a Central law 
falling in the Concurrent list, the latter should prevail over the former. It is 
said that while under Article 246(1), Parliament is competent to make laws 
with respect to the subjects in the Union List notwithstanding the powers of 
the State Legislature to legislate with respect to the subjects in the State and 
Concurrent lists, there is nothing to that effect with respect to laws of 
Parliament made under Article 248, Article 252 or Article 253 of the 
consittution. It is further supported by the fact that while Article 251 provides 
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a solution in case of conflict between a law of Parliament made under 
Articles249 and 250 and a law of State legislature, there is no provision about 
the inconsistency arising under Articles 248, 252 and 253. The solution to the 
inconsistencies arising under these provisions, it is suggested, lies in Article 
254 (1) in the words "which Parliament is competent to enact". 
In Tika Ramji Vs. State of U.P.'", where the Petitioners challenged the 
constitutional validity of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and 
Purchase) Act of 1953 and two notifications issued by the State Government. 
The notification dated 27th September, 1954, issued in exercise of the powers 
conferred by sub-section 1(a) read with sub-section 2 (b) of Section 16 the 
impugned Act, ordered that where not less than 3/4 of the cane growers of the 
area of operation of a Cane Growers Co. operative Society are members of the 
Society, the occupier of the factory for which the area is assigned shall not 
purchase, or enter into agreement to purchase cane grown by a cane grower 
except through such cane growers Co-oerative Scoiety. The notification 
dated 9th November, 1955 was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by 
section 15 of the impugned Act and reserved or assigned to the sugar factories 
the cane purchasing centres for the purpose of supply of sugarcane during the 
crushing season 1955-56. The Petitioners contended that the impugned Act 
was ultravires the State Legislature, the subject matter of legi.< l^ation being 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament and repugnant to the Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 and the essential Commidities Act, 
1955. 
41. (1956) S C R . 393. 
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The Supreme Court left the question open by observing: 
"We are concerned here with the repugnancy, if any arising by reason 
of both Parliament and the State legislature having operated in the 
same field inrespect of matter enumerated in the concurrent list... and 
we are therefore, not called upon to express any opinion on the 
controversy which was raised in regard to the exact scope and extent 
of Article 254 (1) in regard to a law made by Parliament which 
Parlaiment is competent to enact as to whether the legislative power 
of Parliament therein refers to list I, list III and the residuary powers 
of legislation vested in Parliament under Article 248 or is confined 
merely to the matters enumerated in the concurrent list""^. 
In a later Case^^ the Supreme Court has made its position clear 
interpreting clause (1) of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935 
which was. exactly in the same terms as clause (1) of Article 254 of the 
consitutiton. 
Vankatarama Ayyar, J. rightly observed: 
"For this Section to apply,two conditions must be fulfilled; (i) The 
provisions of the provincial law and those of the Ceatral legislation 
must both be in respect of a matter which is enumerated in the 
Concurrent list, and (ii) They must be repugnant to each other. It is 
only when both these requirements are satisfied that the provincial 
law will, to the extent of repugnancy, become void". *^' 
42 Id at 424 
43. A.S. Krishna Vs. State of Madras (1957) S.C.R. 399. 
43a. Id at 403-404. 
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The same opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court in Bar Council 
of U.P Vs State of U.P* where Court said : 
"The question of repugnancy can only arise in matters where both the 
Parliament and the State legislature have competence to pass laws. In 
other words when the legislative power is located in the Cocurrent list 
the question of repugnancy arises"/ ' 
Similarly in Kerala State Electricity Board Vs India Almunium Co.)'** 
the Supreme Court observed: 
"That the question of repugnancy can arise only with refemce to 
legislation falling under the Concurrent list is now well settled."*' 
Thus the Court has left no scope for any doubt that Article 254 (1) 
applied only to repugnancy arising between a Parliamentary and State legislation 
on Concurrenct list or between an existing law or State law on that list. The 
inconsistency arising between laws on other two lists have been taken care of 
by the opening words of Article 246 (1) of the constitution which gives 
supremacy to list I over list II. Laws made by Parliament in its residuary 
jurisdiction will be gov emed by the same provision because Article 248 is read 
along with entry 97. Same is the position under Article 252 of the constitution. 
Once Parliament has made a law under that Article on a matter in State list, 
the State legislatures of those States on whose resolution the law was passed 
or which subsequently adopt it cease to have a power to make a law relating 
to that matter and therefore, there is no question of retaining any legislative 
competence to make law on that matter**. Same should be the position under 
44 A.I.R 1973 S C 231 
45 Id at 232 
46 AI R 1976 S C 1031 
47 Id at 1032 
48 Union of India Vs Valluri Basawaiah Chaudhary A I R 1979. S.C. 1415. 
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Article 253 of.the constitution. The position under Articles 249 and 250 is 
different because they authorise only temporary measures and , therefore, 
Article 251 provides that in case of inconsistency between the Union and State 
law the former shall prevail and the latter will be only, inoperative', but not 
null and void': Under Articles- 252 and 253 the loss of legislative power of 
the States is compelete and , therefore, the States can not make any law any 
longer on a subject on which Parliament has made a law and, therefore, their 
existing laws and, any laws that they may venture make in future will be null 
and void and for that matter Article 254 (1) need not be invoked •*" 
Article 254 of the constitution does not incapacitate the State 
legislature to make laws on the Concurrent list. It simply says that in case of 
repugnancy between their laws and the law of Parliament or an existing law 
on matter in that list the law of the State shall become void If there is no 
repugnancy between the two,both may subsist and operate simultaneously 
Now the vexed question is what is the test of repugnancy*^ Dealing with this 
the Supreme Court referring to the Australian and other authorities attempted 
to lay down the test of repugnancy in Tika Ramji's case " Justice Subba Rao 
in Deep Chand case" summed up the test of reugnancy in the following words 
" Repugnancy between two statutes may thus be ascertained on the 
basis of the following three principles : 
(1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions, 
(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect 
of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State legislature, and 
49. M HidayatuUah "Constitutional law of India". Vol II at 279 (The Bar Council of 
India Trust-1986.). 
50 Supra Note 41. 
51. Deep Chand Vs. State of U.P. (1959) Sup. 2 SCR 8 
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(3) Whether the law made by parliament and the law made by the State 
legislature occupy the same field."" 
In M.A. ToUoch case", the Supreme Court has further elaborated the 
test of repugnancy where the Orissa Legislature enacted an Act levying a cess 
on all extracted minerals for the better development of mining areas. Latter, 
Parliament enacted the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957, requiring the Central 
Government to ensure conservation and devlopment of country, mineral 
resources. It was held that the State Act was superseded as a whole because 
Parliament had clearly evinced an intention to cover the entire field of 
minerals. The Supreme Court observed: 
"Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within the competency 
of the two legislatures collide and when the constitution expressly or 
by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one legislature 
has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the 
one supersedes the other. But two enactments may be repugnant to 
each other though obedience to each of them is possible without 
disobeying the other. The test of two legislations containing 
contradictory provisions is not, however, the only criterion of 
repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy 
expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover 
the whole field, the enactment of the legislature whether passed 
before or after would be overborne on the ground of repugnancy. 
Where such is the position, the inconsistency is demonstrated not by 
a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes but by the 
mere existence of the two pieces of legislation."" 
52 Id at 43 
53. State of Orissa Vs. M A. ToUoch and Company (1964) 4 S.C R 461 
54. Id. at 477. 
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Test of repugnancy further formulated, elaborated and slightly modified 
in M. Karunanidhi Vs. Union of India" in so far as the Court seems to be 
moving towards the direct conflict test relegating the occupied or intent to 
occupy field test to the background. In this case the Court observed: 
"On a carefiil consideration, therefore, the authorities referred above, 
the following prepositions emerge:-
(1 )That in order to decide the question of repugnancy it must be shown 
that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconciable 
provisions, so that they can not stand together or operate in the same 
field. 
(2)That there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency 
appears on the face of the two statutes. 
(3)That where the two statutes occupy particular field but there is 
room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field 
without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy 
results. 
(4)That where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the 
same field seeks to create distinct and separate offence, no 
question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to 
operate in the same field"". 
Applying this modified test the Supreme Court held that the Tamil 
Nadu Public men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973 as amended in 1974 (State 
Act) was not repugnant to any of the Provisions of the Indian Penal Code 
55. A I R . 1979 S.C. 898. 
56. Id. at 910. 
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(existing law) or the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Union Act) because 
there was no direct conflict between the State and Union Acts though they 
occupied the same field. It is further said the State Act does not contain any 
provision which is repugnant to the Central Act, but is sort of complementary 
Act which runs pari passu the Central Acts mentioned above. 
The shift in the Court approach will be more apparant after comparing 
two cases ie. M. Karunanidhi's case and Zaverbhai's case'^. In Zaverbhai case, 
where the appellant challenged the validity of his trial and conviction by a 
Magistrate on the ground that he could be tried only by a Session Judge 
because only the latter could try the offences where punishment provided was 
seven or more years imprisonment. The contention was based on the allegation 
that the Bombay Essential Supplies Act, 1947 under which the appellant was 
charged, had provided seven years imprisonment as punishment while the 
State alleged that the Bombay Act had been superseded by the Essential 
Supplies Act, 1950 which provided only three years imprisonment as punishment 
and, therefore, the trial of the accused by Magistrate was legal. Accepting 
State's contention, the Court held that since the subject matter of the State Act 
(hoarding of foodgrains) had been covered by the Union Act which was a 
comprehensive Act, the former had become inoperative and the latter prevailed. 
The Court agreed that to establish repugnancy it was not necessary that one 
legislation should say' do' and what the other legislation says'do nof and that 
repugnancy might result when both the legislations covered the same field. To 
make itself clearer it also agreed with Maxwell on interpretation of Statutes 
that if a latter Statute again describe an offence created by a previous one, and 
imposes a different punishment, or varies the procedure, earlier Statute is 
repeated by the later Statute. 
57. Zaverbhai Amaidas Vs. the State of Bombay , A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 752 at 757. 
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Had the Court followed this approach in M. Karunanidhi's case, it 
would have reached the conclusion that since both the State and Union Acts 
covered same field and provided different punishments and procedure, the 
former prevailed over the latter under Article 254 (2) of the constitution in 
view of having obtained the President's assent. The Court, however, as we 
have noted above, took a different stand and found the conclusive support in 
amended section 29 of the State Act, which provided that the provisions of the 
Act were in addition to and not io derogation of, any other law for the time 
being in force. From this provision, the other legislations including Union 
legislations could not operate in the same field simultaneously. This approach 
of the Court may be justified on the facts of the case where former Chief 
Minister was trying to circumvent his prosecution for definite charges of 
corruption on technical grounds but otherwise a provision in a State law can 
not have the effect of amending the constitution in so far as the constitution 
makes one of the two laws void in case of repugnancy " .The same ruling was 
given by the Supreme Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd. Vs Shri 
Kishan" where the question was about the repugnancy between Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947 and Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 
1958. It was observed: 
"It has to be borne in the mind that Section 2- A of the Act was 
amended to permit individual workman to ask for a reference in the 
case of individual dispute. This amendment was assented on 1st 
December, 1965. The Rajasthan Act received the assent of the 
President on 14th of July 1958. On 8th March, 1972 chapter 6-A 
including 28-A was inserted in the Rajasthan Act. Therefore, the 
58. M. Hidayatullah. 'Constitutional law of India', Vol. II 282-283 (The Bar Councial 
of India Trust, 1986, New Delhi). 
59. A.I.R. 1988, S.C. 329. 
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material provision of the Rajasthan Act is the subsequent Act. Under 
Article 254 (2) of the constitution if there was any law by the State 
which had been received the assent of the President, the State law 
would prevail in that State even if there is an earlier law by the 
Parliament on a subject in the Concurrent list. It appears that both of 
these Acts tread the same field and if there was any conflict with each 
other, then S28-A of Rajasthan law would apply being a latter law. 
We find, however, that there is no conflict". 
The Supreme Court fiirther observed: 
"It appears to us that it can not be said that these two Acts do not tread 
the same field. Both these Acts deal with the rights of workman or 
employee to get redressal and damages in case of dismissal or 
discharge, but there is no repugnancy because there is no conflict 
between these two Acts in Pith and Substance. There is no 
inconsistency between these two Acts. These two Acts, in our 
opinion, are supplemental to each other"*". 
After making the survey of the various decisions it is crystal clear that 
the Concurrent list is the most important one because Centre and State both 
are empowered to legislate in respect to those subjects mentioned in that list. 
In country like India where goegraphical and local conditions varied from 
State to State. The Central law may be ineffective due to such type of 
geographical diversities. So the framers of our Constitution intellegently 
inserted a third list in the Seventh Schedule and for the purpose to solve the 
repugnancy or inconsistency betwen Central laws and State laws. They 
inserted Article 254 in the Constitution of India, with the changing concept 
60 Id. at 333. 
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of State from 'Police State to 'Welfare state', it was considered necessary to 
make laws for the welfare of labour class. Consequently most of the subjects 
relating to labour inserted in the concurrent list. 
In this regard our submission is that the Constitutitonal Scheme of 
Legislation regarding the subject of labour shows that peculiar needs of region 
and the necessity of a Common Code for certain reasons has been reconciled 
while the makers of the constitution which provides the State list, a Concurrent 
list and the Union List where in both the State and the Union Government 
could play their respective roles effectively and strongly*'. 
The working of this system for five decades has shown that it adequately 
meets the demand of a Welfare State successfully. 
In the working of this system we have realised some difficulties or 
problems in certain matters i.e. matters relating to child labour, women 
labour, hazardous industries, problem of disposal of waste, welfare of labour, 
matter relating to drinking water, health care, and ecological balance etc. It 
is suggested that there should be a Common Labour Code to deal with such 
type of problems and uniformity in implementation of labour legislation in 
relation to above matters, be created because these matter have not only a 
National importance but they have International importance as well since the 
emergence of the concept of globalization all over the world and also the 
demand of W.T.O (World Trade Organisation). 
61. Article 246 
e'y^^Tnsi^-^'if 
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CHAPTER - m 
Directive Principles of State Policy and The Concept of Living Wage 
In the preceding chapter, an attempt was made to examine the 
implications o f labour' being on the 'Concurrent List' of the constitution and 
to deal with the respective powers of the Centre and States in enacting social 
labour legislations. The effect of inconsistent legislations and the method of 
reconciliation was also discussed. 
The constitution, besides empowering the Parliament, the State legis-
latures, the Union and State executive governments, local bodies and other 
authorities to make laws, rules, regulations affecting labour, also specifies the 
goals and values to be secured. Part IV of the constitution enumerates the 
most important of these. It explicitly states, however, that they are not 
judicially enforceable. By and large, industrial legislations have been directed 
towards the implementation of these directives. 
In this chapter an attempt is made to discuss the historical develoment 
and nature of these directives. An analytical study is also made. The judicial 
craftmanship of the Supreme Court is also discussed in threadbare. 
(1) Historical Background: 
One of the most important and novel features of modem constitutions, 
is the inclusion of a Chapter on Directive Principles of State or social policy 
as an rotegral part of the constitution. They are deliberately included by the 
framers of the constitution to bring about, primarily, a desired socio-economic 
pattern of society into existence consequent on the change in the relationship 
between the State and its subjects as also in the change in the concept of the 
State and its functions and ends. 
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In the days of autocratic Governments the monarch was the Head of the 
State and subjects were to obey implicitly his commands. The king ruled and 
not the law. But with the advent of democracy. Principles of governance 
became necessary to regulate the power of the State and thus the rule of law 
substituted the aristocratic rule of the king. Amongst the several factors that 
led to the supremacy of the law, which in turn paved the way for the 
declaration of Fundamental Rights, over the supermacy of the king may be 
listed Locke's conception of the social contract' wherein he excluded certain 
inalienable rights from the scope of rights relinquished in the social contract: 
John Milton's appeal in 'Aeropagatica' to the natural freedom of man as the 
basis of his claim to be ruled by law and not by the arbitrary whim of man, the 
insistence, in the course of the Puritan Revolution, on natural rights in support 
of Political freedom, social equality and universal suffrage: and Blackstone's, 
exposition of the laws of England the place of natural rights of man in it. Of 
these Locke's conception of the social contract based on his notion of human 
nature, exercised a powerful influence on the framers of the early American 
and French constitutions'. 
Constitutional enactments in respect of the inalienable rights of man 
first found its place in the Virginian Declaration of Rights of 1776 and similar 
enactments, in the same years, of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, New 
Jersey and North and South Carolina. This was follwed by New York and New 
Georgia in 1777 and Massachusetts in 1780; the Declaration of Rights of Man 
and of the citizen adopted in 1789 by the French National Assembly and 
prefixed to the French constitutions of 1793 and 1795^ 
1 K C Markandan. Directive Principles in the Indian consitution', 6-7, (Allied 
Publishers (P) Ltd, Bombay 1966). 
2 Ibid 
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In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the recognition of the 
Fundamental Rights of man in the Constitutions become a general principle 
of the Constitutional law of civilized States. It become a part of the law of 
nearly all European States. The adoption, of a chapter of Fundamental Rights 
in the body of the Constitution thus marks the first conscious attempt to 
substitute in the place of the power relation between the sovereign State and 
its subjects the legal relation between State as a political association and the 
subjects as the member thereof. Personal security and political freedom were 
thus ensured with the enunciation of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution. 
K.C. Markandan observed: 
"The inter-war experience, however, emphasised the truth that political 
institutions, notwithstanding the fact that they conformto an abstract 
democratic ideal, could not hope to survive for any substantial 
period, unless they were built upon political, economic and social 
realities in the country concerned, including its tradition and national 
character."^ 
A view got currency that personal and political freedom would be 
impaired if not rendered purely nominal unless enjoyment was made practicable 
by a reasonable guarantee of social and economic freedom. It was felt that the 
precious rights of personal liberty and political freedom might become a share 
if not a mockery for those whom the existing social and economic order leaves 
starving, insecure in their livelihood, illiterate and deprived of their just share 
in the progress and well being of the society as a whole. As a result, in the new 
constitutional arrangements made after World War I, specific declaration of 
Constitutional principles regarding social and economic policy were made in 
the Constitutions of the various countries. 
3. Id at 9. 
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In the post War period the incorporation of social and economic 
policies thus became a regular characteristic of the Constitutions recognising 
thereby that justice was to be secured not only in the political field for the 
individuals alone but also in the social and economic spheres for the social as 
a whole. Consequently the functions of the State increased and became 
positive in character. In the ninteenth century the creed of liberalism, political 
fi'eedom and civil liberty of men was carried further by utilitarians like Mill, 
Spencer and Bentham through the individualistic doctrine of Laissez-faire. In 
the era of laissez-faire the functions of a democratic State was conceived of 
to be negative; it was a mere police State and its duties were to provide for 
security fi-om internal disturbances and external aggression, to collect revenue 
and to dispense justice to the citizens. Given this security the subjects were 
left to evolve a suitable social and economic order for themselves. But this 
system while it promoted the interest if individuals, was detrimental to the 
welfare ofthe society as a whole. The State was, therefore, called upon to play 
a more positive role and assumed the role of a refree to resolve disputes 
between the individuals and the groups in almost every walk of life. 
This task was not easy for the State. It was difGcult indeed for not only 
was it difficult to define the form and substance of social and economic rights 
that need be guaranteed for a particular country but also there was the 
difficulty of ensuring them to the people of that country. The practice with 
regard to the enumeration of social and economic policies within the frame-
work ofthe Constitution has thus not been uniform. It has varied fi^om country 
to country depending upon its social and economic progress. In some 
countries the social and economic rights were mixed up with Fundamental 
Rights and in others they were kept separate, either as a separate chapter or 
as a separate section. 
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In India, before Independence, India was a British dependency. It 
neither had a Constitution nor any declaration of Fundamental Rights for her 
people. Since political freedom precedes economic and social freedom, the 
question of enunciation of economic and social objectives did not arise at all 
in the absence of declared Fundamental Rights. The Indian freedom fighters 
made some attempts since 1925 to persuade Britain to ensure and declare in 
some form or other a set of Fundamental Rights primarily and essentially with 
the objective of safe-guarding the interest of Indian people. The Commonwealth 
of India Bill, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on December 
17,1925 (The Commonwealth of India Bill was prepared by Members and ex-
members of Indian Legislatures of all political parties, by the elected Council 
of National Home Rule League, and two co-opted officers of the Women's 
Indian Association, and adopted at the National Convention) and presented 
to the House of Commons by Mr. Lansbury, purporting to confer upon Indian 
the status of self-governing Dominion except for certain reservations as 
regards Defence and Foreign Affairs, embodied for the first time an Article 
relating to the grant of Fundamental Rights to the people of India. Article 8 
of the Bill, the substance of which approved by the Indian National Convention, 
enumerated some Fundamental Rights. 
Recommendation for incorporating a chapter on Fundamental Rights 
ensuring not only personal and political rights but also social and economic 
rights for the people of India, was, however, made for the first time, by the All 
Parties Conference of 1928. A Committee was appointed by the Conference 
on 22nd February, 1928. to determine the principles of the constitution for 
India, under the chairmanship of Pandit Moti Lai Nehru which included an 
Article on Fundamental Rights in its report. This Article i.e.. Article 4, in its 
XIX clauses, enumerated as many rights, but the ones relating to economic 
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and social matters and included in the suplementary Report were: 
"Article 4 (V) All citizens in the Commonwealth of India have the 
right to free elementary education without any distinction of caste or 
creed in the matter of admission into any educational institutions, 
maintained or aided by the State, and such right shall be enforceable 
as soon as due arrangments shall have been made by the competent 
authority. 
Provided that adequate provision shall be made by the State for 
importing public instruction in primary schools to the children of members of 
minorities of considerable strength in the population through the medium of 
their own language and in such script as is in vogue among them. 
Explanation:- This provision will not prevent the State from making 
the teaching of the language of the Commonwealth obligatory in the said 
schools. 
(XV) Freedom of combination and association for the maintenance and 
improvement of labour and ecomomic conditions is guaranteed to every one 
of all occupation. All agreements and measures tending to restrict or obstruct 
such freedom are illegal. 
(XVII) Parliament shall make suitable laws for maintenance of health 
and fitness for work of all citizens, securing a living wage for every worker, 
the protection of motherhood, informative and unemployment and Parliament 
shall also make laws to ensure fair rent and fixity and permanence of tenure 
to agricultural tenents"^. 
4. K.C. Markandan, 'Directive Principles' in the Indian Constitution,' 30-31 (Allied 
Publishers (P) Ltd., Bombay, 1966). 
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As the time advanced the demand for a declaration of Fundamental 
Rights in the future Constitution of India had gained force at the hands of 
political leaders, several individuals, organisations and Provincial 
Governments. They, in their memoranda and reports presented to the Indian 
Statutory Commission favoured inclusion of certain Fundamental Rights to 
the minorities in India. The Report of the Indian Central Committee (1928-29) 
also supported the inclusion of a declaration of Fundamental Rights in the 
proposed Government of India Act. These recommendations were however, 
rejected by the Indian Statutory Commission. In thier opinion such provisions 
had been inserted in many Constitutions, notably in those of the European 
States which were formed after the world War I and experience had shown that 
there was no practical utility of these abstract declarations which were useless 
unless there existed the will and the means to make them effective.' 
Subsequently in all the three sessions of the Indian Round Table 
Conference* held in London, the subject of Fundamental Rights, designed to 
secure either to the community in general or to specified sections of the people 
of India, rights and immunities, was discussed at length and memoranda were 
also submitted by individuals and groups for the provision of a chapter on 
Fundamental Rights in the proposed Constitution of India. At the first session 
of the Indian Roimd Table Conference the subject of the grant of economic 
rights, independent of political rights, was put forward by the representatives 
of the Indian Labour Organisation to the Conference. Shri N.M. Joshi on 
behalf of the Indian Labour Organisation desired a declaration of Fundamental 
5 Indian Statutory Commission Report, Vol. II (Part I), 1930, at 23. 
6 The First Session of the Indian Round Table Conference was held at London during 
the period from Nov 12, 1930 to January 19, 1931 ; the Second Session was held 
from September 7,1931 to December 1.1931 while the Third Session was held from 
Nov. 17, 1932 to December 24, 1932. 
108 
Rights for workers. He argued that though such a declaration would not have 
the force of legislation, nevertheless, it will serve a very useful moral purpose. 
Later on the subject of Fundamental Rights was discussed at length at 
the meeting of Sub. Committee on Minorities. At the first meeting of the Sub. 
Committee on 23rd December 1930 Raja Narendra Nath pointed out the need 
to discuss the question of declaration of rights unassailable by the majority in 
the constitution of India. In the same meeting K.T. Paul along with Lt Col. 
Gidney spoke for the protection of the minority communities in India. ^  
But a comprehensive and precise anunciation of a draft declaration of 
Fundamental Rights, social and economic in character, was presented by Shri 
B. Shiva Rao, another representative of the Labour Organisation of India,to 
the Round Table Conference at the Minorities Sub. Committee meeting of 
23rd December 1930.* Presenting the draft he said . 
"We want to see in the new consititution a declaration of rights for 
labour and we have prepared here a draft declaration which in our 
opinion, would be usefiil to introduce into the new constitution"' 
The declaration which catalogued ten rights, primarily for labour 
community of India, and read out by Shri Shiva Rao was as follows : 
"Recognising that well-being, physical, moral and intellectual, of the 
workers of India is of supreme importance in assuring the peace. 
7 Indian Round Table Conference Proceedings Report (Second session), 00. 92-93, 
quoted from N.V. Paranjape, 'The Role of Directive Principles under the Indian 
Constitution, 11 (Central Law Agency ,Allahabad, 1995). 
8 I R T C Proceedings, sub-Committee-Part 2- Sub-Committee-III. Minorities at 81-
82 Quoted from K C Markandan," Directive Princiles in the Indian Constitution, 
33 (Allied Publishers (P) Ltd. Bombay, 1966) 
9. Ibid 
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progress and prosperity of the country and recalling the solemn 
obligations of India as a Member of the League of Nations, and of the 
International Labour Organisation to endeavour to secure maintain 
fair and humane condition of labour for men, women and children,and 
collaborate in the international establishment of social justice, the 
Commonwealth declares the following principles to be adopted as 
fundamental principles of the constitution, as regulating the exercise 
of the legislative, executive and judicial powers within the Common-
wealth."'" 
Shri B. Shiva Rao, presenting a comprehensive and precise draft of 
declaration of Fundamental Rights which catalogued ten rights, primarily for 
labour community of India, had emphasised the need of introduction of a 
declaration of such Fundamental Rights in the new constitution of India. 
The Commenwealth recognising that the physical, moral and intellectual 
well-being of Indian workers is of supreme importance in assuring the peace, 
progress and prosperity, and recalling the obligations of India being a member 
of League of Nations and International Labour Organization to endeavour to 
secure, maintain fair and human conditions for labour, for men and women 
and to provide social justice, declares the following principles to be adopted 
as Fundamental Principles of the Constitution. These Fundamental Principles 
are to be adopted as regulating the legislative, executive and judicial powers: 
(1) It is the duty of every citizen so to use his mental and bodily powers 
as to contribute to the welfare of the community, and correspondingly 
by it is the duty of the community to secure, so far as lies in its power, 
that every citizen shall be given the training and opportunities 
10. Ibid. 
no 
necessary,to enable him to maintain by his work a decent standard of 
living; 
(2) The Indian Parliament, shall make suitable laws for the maintenance 
of health and fitness of work of all citizens, the securing of a living 
wage for every worker and provision against the economic consequence 
of old age, infirmity and unemployment; 
(3) The protection of motherhood and the rearing of the rising generation 
to physical, mental and social efiBciency are of special concern to 
Commonwealth. Women, young persons and children, shall therefore, 
be protected against moral, spiritual or bodily injury and neglectand 
against exploitation and excessive unsuitable employment; 
(4) The welfare of those who labour shall be under the protection of the 
Commonwealth and conditions of labour should be regulated, from 
time to time as may be necessary, with a view to their progressive 
improvement; 
(5) The right of workers to express their opinions fireely by speech, 
writing or other means, and to meet in peaceful assembly and to form 
associations for the consideration and furtherence of their interest, 
shall be granted by the Commonwealth. Laws regulating the exercise 
of this right shall not discriminate against any individual or class of 
citizens on the grounds religious faith, political opinion or social 
position; 
(6) No breach of contract of service or abetment thereby shall be made a 
criminal offence; 
I l l 
(7) The Commonwealth shall co-operate with other nations in action to 
secure the realisation of the principle of social justice throughout the 
world; 
(8) All citizens in the Commonwealth have the right to free elementary 
education without any distinction of caste or creed in the matter of 
admission into any educational institutions maintained or aided by the 
State and such right shall be enforceable as soon as due arrangements 
shall have been made by competent authority; 
(9) All citizens are equal before law and possess equal civic rights; 
(lO)All citizens have an equal right of access to and the use of public 
roads, public wells and all other places of public resort"" 
Suggesting the inclusion of the above rights in the new constitution 
Shri B. Shiva Rao said: 
"Sir, we are aware that a Declaration of Rights may not have any legal 
binding authority, but it seems to us to possess such moral force that 
would be very useful in the interests of labour to have such a 
Declaration of Rights in the new Constitution. I should like to point 
out that many of these provisions have been taken from the Nehru 
Report, and some of the others are from some of the new Constituions 
of Post-War Europe,'^ 
Shri N.M. Joshi, while moving an amendment for the addition of the 
word, 'economic' after the word 'religious' and in para 3 of the Report on 
Minorities, said on January 16, 1931 that the rights that he had advocated 
11. Ibid, at 34 
12. K.C. Markanda, 'Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution', 34 (Allied 
Publishers (p) Ltd. Bombay, 1966.). 
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were meant for safeguarding the economic life of the community, not the 
individual but the labour community. Shri N.M. Joshi's, plea could not, 
however, find support either with the other members of the Indian delegation 
or the British mind, unused to a declaration of rights more especially for the 
safeguarding of economic rights of a community. Dr. Ambedkar also called 
attention to the necessity of including in the constitution sanctions for the 
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, including a right of redress when they 
were violated. 
Despite these efforts of the Indian delegates the attitude of British 
Govemement towards the grant of Fundamental Rights to the people of India 
remained unchanged and the demand was finally rejected in the first session 
of the Round Table conference. 
During the second session of Indian Round Table Conference, the 
necessity of ensuring certain Fundamental Rights to different Indian 
communities in the future Constitution of India was again discussed. Several 
memoranda were submitted on behalf of different Indian communities and 
interest. A joint statement was circulated by Shri N.M. Joshi, Shri B. Shiva 
Rao and Shri V.V. Giri to the members of the Conference. 
The subject of the Fundamental Rights came up for discussion once 
again at the third Round Table conference held during November-December, 
1932. A separate memorundum was submitted by Sir Tej Banadur Sapru and 
Mr. M. R. Jayakar on December 27, 1932. The British Government admitted 
the importance of such rights but expressed doubts about their fessibility". 
Dr. Ambedkar advocated the inclusion in the instrument of instructions to the 
Governor General and Governors of any propositions relating to Fundamental 
13. Indian Round Table Conference proceedings Report (Third Session ) at 66 . 
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Rigths which could not be enacted in the Constitution Act itself'''. 
AAer the concluding session of the Indian Round Table conference a 
Report was presented by the Secretary of State for India to Parliament. The 
idea of enumerating such of those Fundamental Rights which could not be 
embodied in the Constitution Act itself in the instrument of instructions also 
found support in a memorandum submitted by Khan Bhadur Hafiz Hidayat 
Husain and Dr. Shafaat Ahamd Khan on December 27,1932. The memorandum 
stressed the need for embodying Fundamental Rights in the constitution". 
Finally, however, in the White Paper relating to the proposals for 
Indian Constitutional Reforms, no detailed declaration of Fundamental Rights 
was made. The White Paper which did not contain any mention of Fundamental 
Rights, more especially the economic and social ones, was the subject of 
criticisim in a number of resolutions adopted on the White Paper and the 
witnesses before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform not 
only insisted upon the declaration of Fundamental Rights in the future 
constitution of India but also presented a number of memoranda on the 
subject. 
The Indian National Congress moved a comprehensive resolution on 
the decleration of Fundamental Rights at its 45th Session held at Karachi on 
March 29, 1931. This was subsequently modified in the All India Congress 
Committee meeting held at Bombay on August 6, 1931. The,modified version 
ofthe resolution was fmally adopted under the title 'Fundamental Rights and 
Duties And Economic Programme' at the 47th session ofthe Indian National 
Congress held at Calcutta on April 1,1933. 
14.I.R.T.C.. proceedings Report (Third Session) at 66. 
15. l.R.T.C. (Third Session)-Appendix Memorandum submitted on 27th Decem-
ber,1932 at 195-196. 
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The special session of the National Trades Union Federation at its 
Calcutta session in April 1938 adopted the resolution. In this resolution it was 
said that the Constitution Act should contain a declaration of Fundamental 
rights guaranteeing the workers, inter alia, the freedom of speech, freedom of 
press, freedom of association, the right to strike, the right to work and 
provision against old age, etc. 
Subsequently Shri Shiva Rao giving evidence before the Sub. 
Committeee of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform handed 
over a memorandum on behalf of the National Trades Union Federation, 
containing among the other things, a reiteration of the above demand. The 
Bengal Trades Union Federation in its memorandum handed in the Sub. 
Committee by Shri K.C. Roy Chowdhury also insisted on the same demand as 
discussed above. 
Despite these resolutions, discussions and deleberations adopted by 
the Indian labour, political parties, the British attitude towards the grant of 
Fundamental Rights to Indian massess remained hostile. They considered 
these rights as nothing more than mere 'expresssions of political ideal' mainly 
because of their non-justiciability. Amongst the memoranda submitted by 
individuals Prof M. Venkatarangaiah's memorandum requires attention here. 
He wanted the incorporation of the two sets of rights in the consititution ie 
Civil rights on the one hand and Social and Economic rights on the other, the 
former being enforceable in the Courts of law and the latter not. He also gave 
reasons for the distinction between the two sets of rights, the difficulties 
envolved in respect of non-justiciable rights and the utility of social and 
economic rights in the constitutional set up. This distinction of Prof 
Venkatarangaiah thus anticipated the inclusion of non-justiciable economic 
and social rights in the framework of the constitution of India. 
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During 1940's there was a radical change in Indian politics. The Indian 
National Movement gathered momentum in the years 1941-42 and the British 
Government kept on negotiation with the Indian leaders on the issue of 
handing over political power to them. The plans for the future consitutional 
set up of free India were eventually being worked out vigorously. The Sapru 
Committee appointed for this purpose, issued a questionnair in 1945 to 
various associations, groups and individuals inviting their views on the 
desirability of inclusion of Fundamental Rights in the future constitution of 
India. Several organisations and individuals responded to the questionnair and 
some of them worked out the details of Fundamental Rights. The Sapru 
Committee in 1945 cosidered the suggestions received from various quarters 
on the subject of inclusion of Fundamental Rights and finally recommended 
that the declaration of Fundamental Rights was absolutely necessary for India 
for not only giving assurance and guarantees to the minorities but also for 
prescribing a standard of conduct for the legislatures, government and the 
Court. The Fundamental Rights Committee envisaged was to be of two 
classes, one jusiticiable and the other non-Justiciable-the former being 
enforceable in a Court of law but the latter not. The proposals of the Sapru 
Committee was a significant advancement on earlier proposals in atleast on 
particular respect and that was the distinction that it made in Fundamental 
Rights as justiciable and non-justiciable and recommending the inclusion of 
the latter also in the body of the constitution. But the object of the division 
and incorporation into the body of the constitution was not so much for paving 
the way for achieving economic and social democracy as for ensuring 
adequate protection for the minorities.The credit, therefore , in this regard 
goes to Late Sir B.N. Rau, who as the Constitutional Advisor to the 
government of India, suggestedthatthebest way of embodying the assurances 
contained in paras (5), (6) and (8) of the resolution regarding aims and objects 
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moved by Pandit Jawabar Lai Nehru on December 13, 1946 was to split the 
two sets of assurances as Fundamental Principles of State Policy, the former 
relating to personal and political rights and enforceable in the Courts of law 
and the latter relating to social, economic and other matters and un-
enforceable in the Courts'*. 
Sir B.N.Rau made an elaborate study of the Fundamental Rights 
embodied in the constitutions of the more important countries of the world. 
In the constitution of the U.S.S.R. and the Weimer constitution of the German 
Reich, both classes of rights were mentioned together under the 
head Fundamental Rights' possibly because, using his own words, ' neither 
was intended to be enforced by legal action' but in the Irish constitution he 
found the distinction was clearly recognised though not, as he said, uniformly 
pursued. 
Apart from the Irish constitution wherein the distincition between 
rights justiciable and non-justiciable was made. Sir B.N. Rau also found a 
similar distinction recognised by Dr. Lauterpacht in his International Bill of 
the Rights of Man'. The substantial provisions of the Bill were in two parts; 
Part I dealt with rights meant to be enforced by the ordinary Courts and Part 
II dealt with rights incapable of or unsuitable for such enforcement". 
Sir B.N. Rau was much impressed by the distinction in Fundamental 
Rights as justiciable and non-justiciable in the Irish consitution and reinforced 
by Dr. Lauterpacht'srecongition of the same. He (Sir B.N. Rau) suggested for 
adopting in the Indian constitution the Irish plan and separate the two classes 
of rights: Part A dealing with Fundamental Principles of State Policy and 
16 K.C Markanda, ' Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution, 49. (Allied 
Publishers (p) Ltd. Bombay 1966). 
17. Ibid, at51. 
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Part B with Fundamental Rights strictly so called. Illustrative of the scheme 
proposed ,Sir. B.N. Rau also placed before the members of the Constituent 
Assembly drafts of provisions, which by no means were exhaustive, to be 
included in parts A and B of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. 
In commending the above draft for the consideration of members of the 
Constituent Assembly and adoption in Indian Consitution, Sir B.N. Rau 
observed: 
"It is obvious that none of the above provisions is suitable for 
enforcement by the Courts. They are really in the nature of moral 
precepts for the authorities of the State. Although it maybe contended 
that the constitution is not the proper place for moral precepts, 
nevertheless constitutional declarations of policy of this kind are now 
becoming increasingly frequent. They have at least an educative 
value. '* 
Sir B.N. Rao also indicated the various sources from which he had 
drawn for drafting the provisions in Part A". 
The real difficulty before the Constituent Assembly was to implement 
the draft scheme of Sir B.N. Rau in the Constitution of India. This difficulty 
was very well expressed by Shri Somnath Lahiri (Bengal: General) a member 
of the Constituent Assembly, in the following manner. 
He said: 
"It is rather difficult to make a fine distinction between what are 
justiciable rights and what are not. For instance, when we make a 
18. Constitutional Precedents (Third Series) 1947, Fundamental Rights (II) at 22 
19. Ibid. 
118 
provision that people should have the right to work, that is 
unemployment should not be allowed to exist in our country, it would 
be a social right. If you make it an inalienable provision of our 
Fundamental Rights, naturally it will have to be justiciable. Similarly, 
take the question of nationalization of land. If we want to say that 
land belongs to the people and to nobody else, that would be a social 
and Fundamental Right no doubt. But, nevertheless, it will also be 
justiciable right, if that is to be given effect to. Therefore, it is rather 
arbitrary to make any fine distinction between what are justiciable 
rights and what are social and economic rights".^" 
The Sapru Committee had also expressed similar view on this point. 
Another difficulty that laid before the Constituent Assembly was to define 
these rights with precision and correct interpretation. 
Finding it difficult to come to a definite conclusion with regard to the 
inclusion of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution, Late Pandit Gov ind 
Vallabh Pant moved a resolution in the Constituent Assembly on January 24, 
1947, for the appointment of an Advisory Committee of 72 members to 
workout a practical solution to the problem.^' The Advisory Committee was 
authorised to form Sub-Committee to facilitate its work. This resolution was 
adopted by the Constitutent Assembly and initially fifty members were elected 
to the Advisory Committee. The first meeting of the Advisory Conmiittee was 
held on February 27, 1947. On proposal by Shri Jaipal Singh and seconded 
by Sardar Harnam Singh, Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel was unanimously elected 
chairman of the Advisory Committee. Subsequently five Sub-Committees 
were set up, one of which was the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee. The 
20 C A D Vol III, at 403. 404 
21 C A D Vol II at 328 
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Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee consisted initially often members, namely 
Acharya Kripalani, Shri M.R. Masani, Prof. K.T. Shah, Raj Kumari Amrit 
Kaur, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, Shri K.M. Munshi, Sardar Hamam Singh, 
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Jairamdas Daulatram. On 
a suggestion by Jairamdas Daulatram, it was agreed that the President of the 
Constituent Assembly could nominate additional members to the di£ferent 
communities, from time to time. The first meeting of the Sub-Conamittees on 
Fundamental Rights was held on February 27, 1947 at 4.30 p.m. and on being 
proposed by Shri K.M. Munshi and seconded by Sardar Hamam Singh, 
Acharya Kripalani was elected Chairman of the Committee. Due to divergent 
views of the members the Sub-Committees on the Fundamental Rights failed, 
to reach a final conclusion in this regard in its first meeting. 
The second meeting of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights was 
held on March 24, 1947, to consider the proposals, suggestions and memoranda 
on Fundamental Rights which were received from various public bodies, 
individuals and the members of the Sub-Committee itself. These included the 
notes on Fundamental Rights prepared by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, 
Shri K M . Munshi, Prof K.T. Shah, Dr. B.B. Ambedkar and Sardar Harnam 
Singh which contained proposals for the inclusion of such rights in the body 
of the consititution. 
After examining the various draft on Fundamental Rightsplaced before 
it, the Sub-Committee finally resolved that a distinction between the rights 
which were enforceable m the courts of law and the rights which were in the 
nature of principles of social policy for guidance of the governments to 
regulate their legislative and excutive ftinctions was necesssary before the 
Fundamental Rights were included in the fiiture constitution of free India. The 
Sub-Committee first directed its attention towards the rights which were to 
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be justiciable and thereafter set to examine the Directive Principles of Social 
Policy on March 30,1947. 
Thus the very first set of Directive Principles of Social Policy as firamed 
by the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights on 30th March 1947 was as 
follows -- : 
"The Principles of Social Policy set forth in this part are intended for 
the general guidance of the appropriate legislatures and Governments 
in India (hereinafter called collectively as the State). The application 
of these principles in legislation and administration shall be the care 
of the State and shall not be cognizeable by any Court." 
(1) The Union and every Unit thereof shall strive to promote the welfare 
of the whole people by securing and protecting as effectively a sit may 
a social order in which justice, social economic and political shall 
inform all the institutiions of the national life. 
(2) The Union and every unit thereof shall, in particular, direct their 
policy towards securing: 
(i) that the citizens, men and women equally have the right to an adequate 
means of livelihood; 
(ii) that the ownership and the control of the material resources of the 
community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; 
(iii) that the operation of free competition shall not be allowed so to 
develop as to result in the connection of the ownership and control of 
essential commodities in a few individual to the common deteriment. 
22. Minutes of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee Meeting of March 30,1947, 
President's collection. 
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(iv) that there shall be equal pay for equal work for both men and women. 
(v) that the strength and health of workers men and women, and the tender 
age of children shall not be abused and that the citizens shall not be 
forced by economic necessity to enter the avocations unsuited to their 
age and strength; 
(vi) That childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and 
against moral and material abandonment. 
(3) The Union and every Unit thereof shall, within limits of their economic 
capacity and development, make effective provisions for securing the 
right to work, to education and to public assistance in case of 
unemployment, sickness, disablement, and other cases of undeserved 
want (Lauterpacht's Article 13). 
(4) The union and every unit thereof shall make provision for securing just 
and human conditions of work and for maternity relief for workers 
(Lauterpacht's Articles 14) with the addition of provision relating to 
maternity relief for workers. 
(5) The Union and every unit thereof shall endeavour to secure, by 
suitable legislation, economic organisation and in other ways, to all 
workers, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of 
work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure 
and social and cultural opportunities (Article VII, clause (i) of Shri 
Munshi's draft. The substance of clause (2) of Shri Munshi's draft was 
included ia item 3 above). 
(6) The union and every unit thereof shall endeavour to secure for the 
citizens a uiform civil code. 
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(7) Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and 
it shall be maintained through mutual co-operation with equal rights 
of husband and wife as a basis (Japanese Constitution, Article XXIV). 
Motherhood has a claim upon the protection and care of the State. 
(Weimer Constitition)". 
On the next day, 31 March, 1947, the Fundamental Rights Sub 
Committee converted the preliminary portion of the above draft into Preamble 
to the Directive Principles of Social Policy with certain modifications. 
Sir. B.N. Rau, on the basis of recommendation of the Sub Committee 
on Fundamental Rights prepared a draft of the report on April 3, 1947 which 
was to be submitted by the Sub-Committee to the Advisory Committee. The 
Annexure to the Draft Report Contained two chapters. The first chapter 
contained justiciable rights while the second, principles of Policy which 
formed the nonjusticiable rights. This draft was then sent to the members of 
the Sub Committee for their comments. 
The Fundamental Rights Sub Committee considered the Draft Report 
prepared by Sir. B.N. Rau in its three consecutive meetings held on April 14, 
15 and 16,1947. 
Most of the members of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights 
were agreed on main principles incorporated in the Report. The Report of the 
Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights was also sent to Minorities Sub-
Committee for comments and suggestions if any addition to the list of 
Fundamental Rights, was desired. The Minority, Sub-Committee submitted an 
Interim Report to the Advisory Cortunittee in which some suggestions were 
made. The Advisory Committee considered the report of the Sub-Committee 
on Fundamental Rights and the Report of Minorities Sub-Committee on April 
123 
21, and 22, 1947 and finally submitted its Interim Report to the President of 
Constituent Assembly on the next day. The Committee mainly directed its 
attention on justiciable Fundamental Rights and did not go into detailed 
discussions on non-enforceable rights. 
The Advisory Committee in its subsequent meetings took for 
consideration of the recommendations the Sub-Committee on Fundamental 
Rights which were in relation to non justiciable rights entitled 'Fundamental 
Principles of Governance'. The Advisory Committee finally submitted its 
supplementary Report on Fundamental Rights to the President of the 
Constituent Assembly on August 25,1947 in which it supported the inclusion 
of certain directives in the body of the constitution along with the justiceable 
rights. The Constituent Assembly adopted the supplementary Report of the 
Advisory Committee on August 30, 1947 and sent it to the Constitutional 
Advisor Sir B.N. Rau for being adopted in the Draf\ Constitution. 
The 'Fundamental Rights including the Directive Principles of State 
Policy were finally drafted as Part III in Sir B.N. Rau's Draft Constitution of 
October 7,1947. This Part was divided into three Chapters, The first chapter 
Consisted the 'Preamble'.of Fundamental Principles of Governance' and the 
second chapter consisted 'Fundamental Rights' while chapter III contained the 
Directive Principles of State Policy. 
Although Sir B.N. Rau, in his Draft Constitution of October 7,1947 
had incorporated the provisions relating to Fundamental Rights and Directive 
Principles of State Policy in a single part i.e. Part III yet he wanted these 
Directives to be retained merely as a 'guidance' for State action. In transforming 
these 'Directives' into Fundamental Principles of Governance of the Country, 
he foresaw the possibility of a conflict between the Directive Principles and 
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the Fundamental Rights." The latter, being justiciable under the Constitution, 
will, in effect, prevail over the former which are not justiciable. That is to say 
the private right will over ride the public weal. 
As a result of his discussion in Washington with Justices Frankfurter 
and Hand of the U.S. Supreme Court and with Mr. John Heame, the High 
Commissioner for Ireland in Ottawa, Sir B.N. Rau wrote a letter to the 
President of Constituent Assembly on 11th November, 1947 suggesting 
certain amendments. The object ofthese amendments was to make it clear that 
in a conflict between Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles; the 
latter being general in nature should prevail over former; the individual right. 
On November 18, 1947 Sir B. N. Rao submitted a report to the President of 
the Constituent Assembly. But the proposal of Sir B.N. Rau, however, did not 
find its way into the body of the constitution although it was realised that in 
case of conflict between III and Part IV latter was to prevail over the former. 
The Draft Constitution as prepared by te Drafting Committee was 
published on the 26th February 1948. Subsequently a number of criticism and 
suggestions were received and the Drafting Committee sitting again on the 
23rd, 24th and 27th March 1948 considered these suggestions and 
recommended that certain amendments be made in the original draft. The 
original draft together with the amendments recommended by the Drafting 
Committee and certain other amendments received thereafter were considered 
on the 10th and 11th April by a Special Committee consisting for the most part 
of certain members of the Union Constitution Committee, the Union Powers 
Committee and the Provincial Constitution Committee and the final Draft of 
the Constitution was prepared. 
23. N.V. Paranjape, The Role of Directive Principles under the Indian Constitution, 
20 (Central Law Agency Allahabad, 1975). 
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The Indian Nation, therefore, marched to personal freedom and 
economic freedom and incorporated in two separate parts. This could be made 
possible on account of the ceaseless and relentless efforts and invaluable 
sacrifices made by the brave Indian masses under bold, courageous and 
selfless leadership of our national leaders like Moti Lai Nehru, Mahatma 
Gandhi and Tilak etc. The seeds sown in the 19th century saw their fruits in 
1950 under the leadership of Jawahar Lai Nehru, Maulana Azad, Maulana 
Hasrat Mohani, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Patel and a host of others with 
the help of a team of well British Trained Lav^ers like Dr. Ambedkar, Alladi 
Krishana Swamy Ayyar, K.M. Munshi, Ananthasyaman Ayyangar and a highly 
intelligent, eflQcient constitutional Advisar Sir B.N. Rau. 
The sixteen Directive Principles of State Policy assumed the form in 
which they appear as Articles 36 to 51 of the Constitution. 
(2) Nature .-
Directive Principles embody the philosophy of Indian Constitution and 
contain a system of values. Some principles are borrowed from the liberal 
humanitarian traditions of the West and some are peculiar to and have grown 
out of the Indian environment. Some others represent an attempt to fuse the 
traditional and modem modes of life and thought. 
These Principles are placed in Part IV of the Indian Constitution. 
Through these 'Directives' the framers of the Indian Constitution sought to 
incorporate certain basic principles which they considered essential to be 
followed by a Welfare State for its social and econnomic progress. Truly 
speaking, these directives are guide lines to the Parliament, the State 
legislatures, the union and the State executive Governments as also to local 
bodies and other authorities to formulate their legislative and administrative 
policies in such a manner that the social and economic interests of Indian 
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people are well protected. Although these directives are mostly in the nature 
of moral precepts and economic maxims without any binding force, yet the 
State is directed to give effect to these Principles through legislative measures. 
As evident, the provisions of Article 38 clearly define the obligation of the 
State to strive to promote a social and economic order in which social, 
economic and political justice prevail. This, in other words means that the 
State is to secure the Welfare of the citizens. It is noteworthy that the fi'amers 
of the constitution were not satisfied with merely laying down these ideals but 
they enjoined a duty upon the State to direct itspolicy towards securing to the 
citizens, equality, the right of adequate means of livelihood, the equitable 
distribution of owTiership and control of material resources of the Country so 
as to subserve the common good '^*. 
The constitutiual validity and usefulness of the Directive Principles has 
always remained a controversial issue and opinions have often differed on this 
point. Some critics regard these directives an unnecessary appendages to a 
written constitution like ours because they are nothing more than mere 
political manifesto devoid of any constitutional value. Similar views were 
expressed by certain members of the Constituent Assembly while the dirctives 
were being considered in the House. These members were Mr. Naziruddin 
Ahmad, Mohboob Ali Baig Saheb Bahadur, Mr. Husain Imam, Mr. Karimuddin, 
Sarvshri Promtha Rjan Thakur, Biswanath Das, Som Nath Lahri and others. 
Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad, a Muslim member from West Bengal characterised 
these principles as a set of resolutions made on new year's day which are 
broken at the end of January.^' Mahboob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadur says: 
24 G.N Joshi," Aspects of Indian Constitution", 28 (Setalvad Lectures, Bombay, 1964). 
25. C.A.D., Vol. II at 475-76. 
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... my submission is that these Principles are out of place and 
contrary to the principles of Parliamentary democracy... They do not 
fined a place in the constitution and on account of the fact that they 
cannot be enforced they are useless and they had better be deleted ^ ^." 
Some of the members like Mr. Husain Imam, Dr. .S. 
Deshmukh and Shri Bishwanath Das expressed a doubt that in the 
absence of any specific provision making it obligatory for the State 
to give effect to these Principles, it was quite possible that none of 
these provisions might ever be realised. 
Mr. Husain Imam observed: 
"These directive principles , as they have been laid down are 
singulary inoperative. They merely say that if the people and the 
Government are good they will observe these directives. I do not 
think there is any need for having any ineffectual directives at all. It 
is'only when you provide a law or fix a certain standard that you have 
to provide for those who are not up to that standard ... All the 
directive principles can be ignored by the State Governments and 
there is no remedy for it. Even the President of Union can not do 
anything to see that the directive principles are observed"". 
He further observed; 
" ...these principles have been brought in just to silence criticism and 
to have a good sign-board that we have good intentions, without 
having any intention of following those directions" " 
26. C A D Vol VII 19th Nov. 1948 at 488-489. 
27. C.A.D. Vol VII 19th Nov. at 490-491. 
28. I bid. at 492. 
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Dr. P.S. Deshmukh opposed the borrowing of these provisions from 
the Irish Constitution and incorporating them in Part IV of the Indian 
Constitution as they were vaguely worded, nonjusticiable and devoid of any 
binding force. He was of the opinion that Indian conditions were altogether 
different from those of Ireland and as such there was no point in adopting their 
fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution. He further argued that there 
was nothing comparable between the two countries. Ireland, after all, was a 
very small country with the population of only twenty nine lakhs while there 
were millions of people living in India. As such the Indian society needed to 
be governed by definite principles. The directives only provide absolute 
minimum that every modern government must avow. They are, therefore, 
hollow avowal of the minimum. In view of the enormous problems of this 
country there wasno point in going to hold out some distant and indirect hopes 
without providing any effective means to realise them in practice." 
Those who supported the inclusion of Directives Principles in the 
Constitution of India were rof Shibban Lai Saksena, Dr. Ambedkar, Sir Alladi 
Krishnaswami Ayyar, Sir Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, Pandit Jawher Lai 
Nehru and others. They pleaded that far from being mere platitude and pious 
wishes, these directives served a very useful purpose. Prof Shibbanlal Saxena 
Said: 
"I, therefore, think that this chapter is not merely a chapter of pious 
whishes, but a chapter containing great principles ... This a very 
important chapter which lays down the principles which will govern 
the policy of the State and which, therefore, will ensure to the people 
of the country the realization of the great ideals laid down in the 
preamble".^" 
29. C.A.D. Vol. V at 369-70 
30. C.A.D. Vol. VII at 482. 
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Dr. Ambedkar described the nature of the Directive Principles in these 
words: 
"The Directive Principles are like the Instruments of Instructions 
which were issued to the Governor General and to the Governors of 
the colonies and to those of India by the British Government under 
1935 Act...What are called Directive Principles is merely another 
name for Instrument of Instructions. The only difference is that they 
are instruction to the legislature and the executive ... Whoever 
captures powers will not be free to do what he likes with it. In the 
exercise it, he will have to respect these instrument of instructions 
which are called Directive Principles. He can not ignore them. He 
may not have to answer for their breach in a court of law. But he will 
certainly have to answer for them before the electorate at election 
time".^' 
In regard to the policies contained in Parts III and IV of the Indian 
Constitution, Granville Austin says: 
"The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document. The 
majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the 
goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by 
establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement. ... the care 
of the commitment to the soical revolution lies in Parts III and IV in 
the Fundamental Rights and in the Directive Principles of State 
Policy. These are the conscience of the Constitution"." 
31. CAD. Vol. VII at 41. 
32. Granville Austin, "The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation",50( Clorendon 
Press, Oxford 1966 ). 
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Justifying the inclusion of the Directive Principles in the Indian 
Constitution Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar observed: 
"The constitution, while it does not commit the country to any 
particular form of economic structure or social adjustment, gives 
ample scope for future legislatures and the future parliament to 
evolve any economic order and undertake any legislation they choose 
in public interests. In this connection, the various Articles which are 
Directive Principles of Social Policy are not without significance and 
importance, while from the very nature they can not be justiciable or 
enforciable legal rights in a court of law, they are none the less, in the 
language of Article 29, fundamental in governance of the country and 
it is the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. It 
is ideal to suggest that any responsible Government or any legislature 
elected on the basis of universal suf&age can or will ignore these 
principles."" 
Sir Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, however, rightly guessed that the main 
cause of discontent and misundertanding about the provisions contained in 
Part IV regarding the Directive Principles centred round the fact that the 
Fundamental Rights were categorised under two different heads- one justiciable 
while the other non-justiciable rights. The critics who were against the 
inclusion of Directive Principles in the constitution strongly argued that the 
distinction was arbitrary and therefore the use of the word 'directive' needed 
to be substituted by the word fundamental. (The members of the Constitutent 
Assembly who shared this views were Mr. Karimuddin, Sarvshri Promtha 
Rajan Thakur, Biswanath Das, Somnath Lahri and others. Ansewering those 
critics Sir Ananthasayanam Ayyangar observed that it was necessary to 
33. C A D Vol. VII at 336. 
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distinguish unjusticiable rights from those of justiciable ones. Illustrating the 
point further he argued that Article 36 of the Draft Constitution contained the 
provisions that the State shall introduce free and compulsory education within 
a period often years. Now supposing the State does not do so, could any court 
of law enforce it ? Was it open to the courts to charge such government? Could 
the Ministry be dissolved on this ground and a new ministry installed? 
Therefore, 'in the nature of things, these are only directives, and can not be 
justiciable rights at all'. Under the circumstances there was no purpose in 
removing the word 'directive'. In his views these were the principles which the 
Government must keep in mind, whatever Government may be in power and 
they must be carried out." To quote in his own words: 
"We have incorporated them in the constitution itself because we 
attach importance to them... It is not a court that can enforce these provisions 
or rights. It is the public opinion and the strength of public opinion that is 
behin d a demand that can enforce these provision s. Once in four years election 
wUl take place, and then it is open to the electorate not to send the very same 
persons who are indifferent to public opinion. That is the real sanction, and 
not the sanction of any court of law." 
Dr. Ambedkar in his address before the Constituent Assembly on 
Nov. 19, 1948 once again tried to resolve the misunderstanding among the 
members of the Constituent Assembly as regards the nature, significance of 
the Directive Principles in the following words: 
"As I stated, our Constitution as a piece of mechanism lays down what 
is called parliamentary democracy. By Parliamentary democracy we 
34.Dr N.V. Paranjape, "Directive Principles under the Indian Constitution", 27 
(Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 1975). 
35. CAD. Vol. VII at 475 
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meao 'one man one vote'. We also mean that every Government shall 
be on the anvil, both in its daily affairs and also at the end of a certain 
period when the voters and the electorate will be given an opportunity 
to assess the work done by the Government. The reason why we have 
established in this constitution a political democracy is because we do 
not want to instal by any means whatsoever a perpetual dictatorship 
of any particular body of people. While we have established political 
domocracy, it is also the desire that we should lay down as our ideal 
economic democracy. We do not want merely to lay down a mechanism 
to enable people to come and capture power. The Constitution also 
wishes to lay down an ideal before those who would be forming the 
Government. That ideal is economic democracy, whereby, so far as 
I am concerned, I understand to mean, 'one man one vote'. ... Having 
regard to the fact that there are various ways by which economic 
democracy may be brought about, we have deliberately introduced in 
the language that we have used, in the directive principles, something 
which is not fixed or rigid. We have left enough room for people of 
different ways of thinking, with regard to reaching of the ideal of 
economic democracy, to strive in their own way, to persuade the 
electorate that it is the best way of reaching economic democracy, the 
fiiUest opportunity to act in the way in which they want to act"^*. 
"The whole conception of the Fundamental Rights is the protection 
of individual liberty and freedom. That is a basic conception and to 
know where fi-om it was derived you have to go back to European 
history from the latter days, of the 18th century; roughly speaking you 
may say from the days of the French Revolution which spread on to 
36. C A D . Vol. Vll at 494 
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the 19th century. That might be said to be the dominating idea of the 
19th century and it was continued and it is a matter of fundamental 
importance. Nevertheless, as the 19th century marched into the 20th 
century and as the 20th century went ahead, other additional ideas 
come into the field which are represented by our Directive Principles 
of State Policy"". 
He fiirther said: 
"The Constitution lays down certain Directive Principles of State 
Policy and after long discussion we agreed to them and they point out 
the way we have got to travel. The Constitution also lays down 
certain Fundamental Rights. Both are important. The Directive 
Principles of State Policy represent a dynamic move towards a certain 
objective. The Fundamental Rights represent something static, to 
preserve certain rights which exists. Both again are right"". 
The critics who were against the inclusion of Directive Principles of 
State Policy said that these directives are non justiciable, non obligatory on 
the State and there is no remedy for it. Even the President of India can not do 
any thing to see the directive Principles are not observed and implemented. 
They opposed the borrowing of these provisions from the Irish 
Constitution and incorporating them in the Indian Constitution because the 
Indian conditions were different from those of Ireland. They argued that 
Indian society needed to be governed by definite principles. The directives 
only provide absolute minimum that every modern government must avow. 
37 Observation made by Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru while moving for consideration 
Constitution (First Amendment) Bill in the Lok Sabha on 16th May, 1951(Parlia-
mentary Debates), Part 11. 
38 Constitution (First Amendment) Bill movedby the Prime Minister on May 16,1957 
in the Lok Sabha . Lok Sabha Debates Part II, May 16, 1951 Col. 8820. 
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They are. therefore hollow avowal of the minimum and the social and 
economic objectives can not be achieved due to their non binding nature, the 
inclusion of these directives was undemocratic and also against the principle 
of Parliamentary democracy and as such needed to be deleted. 
To sum up, the criticism against the inclusion of Directive Principles 
in the Constitution mainly ensued from the fact that such declarations would 
tend to remain a dead letter unless the Legislatures initiate effective measures 
for transformation of the social and economic structure of the country in 
accordance with them. 
Those who were in favour of inclusion of Directive Principles in the 
Constitution of India pleaded that far from being mere platitudes and pious 
wishes, these directives served a very useful purpose. These directives are 
also useful in as much as they define a tendency and indicate the principles of 
new process of guarantee of social and economic rights which will be effective 
in fixture. They argued that the framers of the Constitution declared socio-
economic justice as the goal in the Preamble of the Constitution and enumerated 
social and economic precepts under Directive Principles of State Policy to be 
implemented by the State to attain this end. 
It is crystal clear that there was a mixed reaction as to the significance 
and utility of the Directive Principles in the Constituent Assembly. Some 
members favoured the incorporation of these principles in the body of the 
constitution while the others discarded them as useless precepts on account 
of their non-enforceability. A few of them, however, suggested that if at all 
these principles were to be incorporated in the constitution they could be 
Fundamental Principles. They contended that infact there was no difference 
between the rights contained in the chapter on 'Directives' and those included 
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in Part III as Fundamental Rights' except for justiciability. 
From the foregoing discussion of the Constituent Assembly Debate the 
following points emerge in respect of the various facets of the Directive 
Principles of State Policy:" 
(i) That the Directives are like Instruments of Instructions to the 
legislatures and the Executive and as such could be justified for 
inclusion in the Constitution on two grounds, namely, (a) wherever 
there was a grant of power and general terms for peace, order and 
good government, it was necessary that it should be accompanied 
by instructions regulating its exercise and (b) since the Draft 
Constitution as framed only provided a machinery for the 
government of the country and not a contrivance to instal any 
particular party in power it was necessary to see that whosoever 
captured power would not be fi-ee to do what be liked with it but 
followed certain instructions. 
(ii) That the Directives cannot or will not be ignored by any responsible 
government or any legislature elected on the basis of universal 
suffrage for the sanction behind them is not the Courts but the 
electorates. 
(iii) That the Directives lay down the ideal of economic democracy 
which as a concept has no fixed or rigid form, varies fi-om country 
to country depending upon its economic progress and even within 
a country changes from time to time on alteration in circumstances. 
In other words, the Directives wedded as it is to the ideal of 
economic and social democracy is dynamic in concept, a term, as 
pointed out earlier, was used by the Prime Minister in describing 
the nature of the Directive Principles. 
(iv) That the language of the Directives laying down the economic 
democracy in turn should be in the form it was: otherwise it would 
39. K.C. Markandan, "Directive Principles in the Indian Contitution", 142 (Allied 
Publishers (P) Ltd., Bombay, 1966). 
136 
be lending rigidity to a thing which by nature was not fixed or rigid. 
The whole scheme of Directive Principles of State Policy as placed in 
Part IV of the Constitution of India, indicate that the leaders of the fi'eedom 
movement wanted not only political fi'eedom but economic and social 
regeneration of the country for providing maximum social and economic 
justice to labour class. They wanted to remove poverty, economic disparity, 
ignorance, inequality of opportunity and to wipe every tear from every eye, 
and believe in maximum pleasure and minimum pain doctrine. 
At this stage it is pertinent to evaluate the concept of wage and the 
changing concept of living wages. 
3. Wage: 
In determination of wages, Government, employers and workers have 
got specific and distinct roles in every industrial society. They may all have a 
common interest in increasing the total quantity of goods and services 
produced, from which wages, profits and revenues are obtained. 
The labour class of the society has always been the victim of exploitation 
of the rich and elite class holding the reins of employment in their hands. Profit 
making has been the guiding motive of economic enterprise. This was 
accentuated by the Industrial Revolution which widened considerably the 
apportunities and scope for profit-making. In such context, naturally, there 
was much exploitation of wage earning classes. Subsistence, long working 
hours, employment of women and children were some of the devices adopted 
by enterpreneurs to derive maximum profit. Government of the day did not 
interfere as they were guided by and wedded to the economic policy of laissez-
faire. This doctrine ruled the mind of the people and governed the economic 
policies of nation for a long time. It was believed that free play of self interest 
was conducive to maximum individual benefit. People believing in laissez-
faire held that in economic matters the State had only to keep out of the ring 
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in order to ensure the best results. Private enterprise would do all that was 
needed. 
The doctrine of laissez-faire was always enssentially capitalist in out 
look. It was conceived in the terms of a number of private employers, each 
possessing certain instruments of production and a certain capacity to employ 
labour. 
In nineteenth century, the relation between employers and employees 
were usually governed by the economic principles of supply and demand and 
the employers thought that they were entitled to hire labour on their terms and 
to discuss the same at their choice. Subject to the specific terms of contract 
between them. The theory 'hire and fire' as well as the theory of 'suply and 
demand' was allowed free. In those circumstances there was no question of 
fixation even a minimum amount of wages. The working class was too weak 
to fight for the better labour candition and wages. Those who controlled 
industry had a feeling of camplacency unitl it was shattered by political and 
social upheavals early in the century and two World Wars. The government 
one by one, abandoned laissez-faire and started intervening in the economic 
and social order. Public opinion came to be mobalised and government 
policies came to be guided by more and more by social objectives and a 
doctrine of a welfare State came in the light. The social conscience of the 
general community becomes more alive and active, as the welfare policy of 
the State takes a more dynamic form as the national economy progeresses 
from stage to stage and as under the growing strength of Trade Union 
Movement, Collective bargaining enters in Labour arena and wage structure 
ceases to be purely an arithematical problem. 
In a developing country like India where the majority of the workers 
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live below the poverty line, have low wages, weak bargaining power, a 
planned economy in a welfare State which aims at providing social justice to 
the poor, dipressed, helpless workers, preservance of industrial peace and 
contentment is of vital importance for an uninterrupted and accelerated 
growth of national economy. Wages form an important part in the whole 
labour- management relations, which can be maintained only if the labour is 
provided just share in the fruits of economic development. 
Definiton of wages: Etymalogically the term 'wages' means an amount 
paid periodically, especially by the date, or week or the month or time during 
which the workman or servant is at employer's disposal. The New Encyclopaedia 
Britannica defines wages as "income derived fi^om human labour including 
payments ot workers on the basis of hours worked and the salaries of 
supervisory and professional workers, as well as the implicity wages earned 
by the self-employed (realised in the form of revenue fi-om business or 
profession. The term wages may refer to a rate of pay per hour, day, week, 
month or price'"*". The Lexicon Webster Dictionary defines wages as" money 
paid for labour or services usually according to specified intervals of work, 
as by the hour, day, week ... the share of national product received by labour 
for its work, as distinct from the share going to capital ^^ In the language of 
law, 'wage' is the consideration for the work done by an employee for his 
employer paid periodically. The term 'wage' has been defined under the 
different statutes in different ways to achieve different objectives. Under 
Section 2 (rr)^^ the definiton of 'wages' is divided into three parts. The first 
part defines wages to mean" all remuneration capable of being expressed 'm 
40 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol X, 15th Edition, (Encycloaedia Bntannica, 
Inc London) 
41 The Lexicon Webster Dictionary , Vol II , (The English Language Institute of 
America Inc) 
42 Secition 2 (rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 
139 
terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, expressed or 
implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment 
or work done in such employment". This is the denotation of the term 'wages' 
or what it denotes. The second part is designed to include somethiag more in 
what the term primarily denotes. The third part of the definition exclude 
certain payments such as bonus; contribution towards pension or provident 
funds or for any other benefit; gratuity payable on the termination of the 
service of a workman. The definitions of'wages' which are given in the various 
other statutes are also divided into three parts. 
The first part of the definitions of wages defined in the statutes"^ 
almost is same in nature as defined under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 except 
in the Workmen's Compensation Act,1923. The fiirst part of the definition 
43. (I) Section 2 (rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines 'wages' as "all 
remuneration capable of being exressed in terms of money, which would 
if the terms of employment express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable 
to a workman in respect of his employment, or of work done in such 
employment, and includes-
(i) such allowances (including dearness allowance) as the workman is for the time 
being entitled to; 
(ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical 
attendance or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional supply of 
foodgrains or other articles; 
(iii) any travelling concession; 
(iv)any commission paybale on the promotion of sales or business or both: 
but does not include-
(a) any bonus; 
(b) any contribution paid or payable by the emloyer to any pension fund or provident 
fund or for the benefit of the workman under any law for the time being in force; 
(c) any gratuity payable on the termination of his service:" 
(II) Section 2 (s) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 defines 'wages' as " all 
emoluments which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave 
in accordance with the terms and conditions of his employment and which 
are paid or are payable to him in cash and includes dearness allowance but 
does not include any bonus, commission, house rent allowance, overtime 
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defined under section 2 (m) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is 
comprehensive and includes a privilege or benefit which is capable of being 
estimated in money. The amount of over time can be estimated in money. 
wages and any other allowance " 
(III) According to section 2 (m) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 wages 
includes any privilege or benefit which is capable of being estimated in 
money, other than a travelling allowance or the value of any travelling 
concession or a contribution paid by the employer a workman towards any 
pension or provident fund or a sum paid to a workman to cover any special 
expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment 
(IV) According to section 2(21) of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, salary or wage 
means all remuneration (other than remuneration in respect of overtime 
work) capable of being exressed m terms of money, which would, if the 
terms of employment, exress or implied, were fulfilled, be aybale to an 
employee in respect of his employment or of work done in such employ-
ment and includes dearness allowance (that is to say, all cash payments, 
by whatever name called, paid to an employee on account of a rise m the 
cost of living), but does not include-
(i) any other allowance which the employee is for the time being entitled to, 
(ii)the value of any house accommodation or of supply of light, water, medical 
attendnace or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional suply of 
foodgrains or other articles, 
(ni) any travelling concession, 
(iv) any bonus (including incentive, production and attendance bonus, 
(V) any contribution paid or payable by the emloyer to any pension fund or provi-
dent fund or for the benefit of the emloyee under any law for the time being in 
force, 
(vi)any retrenchment compensation or any gratuity or other retirement benefit 
payable to the employee or any ex gratia payment made to him, 
(vii) any commission payable to the emloyee. 
Explanation Where an employee is given in lieu of the whole or part of 
the salary or wage payable to him, free food allowance or free food by his 
employer, such foood allowance or the value of such food shall, for the 
purpose of this clause, be deemed to form part of the salary or wage of such 
employee. 
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There is slight difference in the second part of the definitions. This part of the 
definitons gives extended connotation by including certain payments, 
allowances and amenities. The deamess allowance is included in all the 
defmitions, but the money value of the concessions is not included in all the 
(V) Section 2 (h) of the Minumum Wages Act. 1948 defines 'wages' as "AH 
remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which 
would, if the terms of the contract of employment, expressed or implied 
were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his emloyment 
or of work done in such employment, and includes house rent allowance, 
but does not include-
(i) the value of-
(a) any house-accommodation, suply of light, water, medical attendance, or 
(b) any other amenity or any service excluded by general or special order of the 
appropriate Government; 
(ii) any controbution paid by the employer to any Pension Fund or Provident Fund 
or under any scheme of social insurance; 
(iii)any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession; 
(iv) any sum paid to the person emloyed to defray special expenses en tailed on him by 
the nature of his employment; or 
(v) any gratuity payable on discharge." 
(VI) Section 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 defines 'wages' as "all 
remuneration (whether by way of salary, allowances or otherwise) 
expressed in terms of money or capable of being so exressed which would, 
if the terms of employment, exress or implied, were fulfilled, be payable 
to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such 
employment, and includes-
(a) any remuneration payable under any award or settlement between the parties or 
order of a court, 
(b) any remuneration to which the person employed is entitled in respect of overtime 
work or holidays or any leave period; 
(c) any additional remuneration payable under the terms of employment (whether 
called a bonus or by any other name); 
(d) any sum which by reason of the termination of emloyment of the person employed 
is payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment 
of such sum, whether with or without deductions, but does not provide for the time 
within which the payment is to be made; 
(e) any sum to which the person employed is entitled under any scheme framed under 
any law for the time being in force. 
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definitions. It is included only in two definitions which are given under section 
2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act and under section 2(m) of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The bonus is included in the definitions given under 
Workmen's Compensation Act, The Minimum Wages Act and the Emloyees 
State Insurance Act. The travelling allowance is included only in one definition 
given under Industrial Disputes Act. The arrears are included in three 
defmitions given under the Payment of the wages Act, 1936 Industrial Disutes 
Act, and the Employees State Insurance Act. 
But does not include-
(i) any bonus (whether under a scheme of profit sharing or otherwise) which does not 
form part of the remuneration payable under the terms of employment or which is 
not payable under any award or settlement between the parties or order of a court; 
(2) the value of any house accommodation, or of the supply of light, water, medical 
attendance or other amenity or of any service excluded from the computation of 
wages by a general or special order of the State Government; 
(3) any contribution paid by the employer to any pension or provident fund, and the 
interest which may have accured thereon; 
(4) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession; 
(5) any sum paid to the employed person to defray special expenses entailed on him 
by the nature of his employment; or 
(6) any gratuity payable on the termination of employment in cases other than those 
specified in sub-clause (d). 
(VII) According to Section 2 (b) of the Employees' Provident Funds and 
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 "Basic wages" means all emoluments 
which are earned by an employee while on duty or on leave or on holidays 
with wages in either case in accordance with the terms of the contract of 
employment and which are paid or payable in cash to him, but does not 
include-
(i) the cash value of any food concession; 
(ii)any dearness allowance (that is to say, all cash payments by whatever name 
called paid to an employee on account of a rise in the cost of living), house-rent 
allowance, overtime allowance, bonus, commission or any other similar allowance 
payable to the employee in respect of his employment or of work done in such 
employment; 
(iii) any presents made by the employer; 
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The third part of the definitions excludes certain type of payments 
made by the employer in favour of employees. The gratuity is excluded in aU 
the definitions. The arrears are excluded in the definitions given under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, The Minumum Wages Act, The Employees 
Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions. The travelling allowance is 
also excluded in all the defmitions except the definition given under Industrial 
Disputes Act. The bonus is excluded in all the definitions except the definition 
under the workmen's Compensation Act; The Minimum Wages Act; and the 
Employees State Insurance Act. The money value of the concessions is 
excluded in all the definitions except the workmen's Compensation Act and 
Industrial Disputes Act. (see table-I). 
IVIII) Section 2 (22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 defines "wages" 
" all remuneration paid or payable, in cash to an employee, if the terms of 
the contract of employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled and 
includes any payment of an employee in respect of any period of authorised 
leave, lock out, strike which is not illlegal or lay-off and other additional 
remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding two months, but does 
not include-
(a) any contribution paid by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund under 
this Act. 
(b) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession, 
(c) any sum paid to the person employed to defray special expenses 
entailed on him by the nature of his employment, or 
(d) any gratuity payable on discharge. 
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After analysing the definitions of'wages' discussed above, it may be 
pointed that the definition of 'wages' given in a particular Act is given 
according to the purposes and objects of that Act. It is quite clear that there 
is no uniformity in the definitions. Only the first part of the definitions shows 
similarity. The second and third parts of the definitions are different in nature. 
This is so because different Acts are passed to achieve different aims objects. 
But nothing have done so far in this regard to laying down a uniform definition 
of the term 'wages'. 
Since 1948 several terms referring to the wage levels has received the 
attention of the renowned economists, legislatures and courts. Among those 
terms some important terms are: 
(i) Statutory minimum wage; (ii) the bare or basic wage; (iii) the 
minimum wage; (iv) the fair wage; (v) the living wage; (vi) the need based 
minimum wages etc. 
The National Commission on Labour (1969) observed^: 
"The definition of 'wage' is quite exhaustive. The question 
whether a particular type of remuneration could form part of 
'wages' as defined in the Act is primarily a question of fact as it 
would depend upon the circumstances of the case. For instance, 
free food and tiffin supplied to hotel workers by their emloyers 
has been held to be part of wages within the meaning of the 
definition. Whereas the term 'wage occurs in the Industrial 
Disputes Act, under the Payment of Bonus Act, the term used 
is salary or wages'. The term 'wages' is differently defined in 
various enactments like the Payment of Bonus Act, the 
44. National Commission on Labour (1969) at 484 
145 
Workmen's Compensation Act, and the Payment of Wages Act. 
It has been suggested in the evidence before us that the definition 
of'wages' under the Industrial Disputes Act should include the 
items now excluded" 
The ConomissioQ recommended that items like bonus, contribution to 
Provident Fund and other benefits and gratuity on termination of service 
where gratuity has become a term of service under an award or settlement, 
have all become regular elements of worker's remuneration and should, 
therefore, be included as part of a worker's wages."' 
Wages may be classified into three categories i.e. minimum wage, fair 
wage and living wage. In the ever expanding economy it would be difficult to 
define precisely as to which wage is mininum or fair or living wage. A wage 
which may be deemed to be a living wage today may only remian a fiar wage 
tomorrow and just a minimum wage the day after. 
In the present study the discussion is confimed only to the concept of 
living wage. 
4. Concept of Living wage: Article 43"** of the Constitution of India is 
concerned with the welfare of the workers in so far as it directs the State to 
secure living wage and suitable conditions of work to the workers, and to 
ensure them a decent standard of living and fiiU enjoyment of leisure and social 
45 Ibid 
46 Article 43 "The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic 
organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or other-
wise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and 
full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in particular, the 
State shall endeavour to -promate cottage industries on an individual or co-
operative basis in rural areas". 
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and cultural opportunities. The Article also contains a mandate for the 
promotion of the cottage industries in rural areas on an individual or co-
operative basis. 
The Article in respect of living wage to workers has also found place 
in the constitution of many other coimtries"^. It is true that the directive 
autlined in Article 43 of the Constitution contains an elaborate scheme for the 
attainment of the welfare of the workers. The framers of the Indian Constitution, 
however preferred to frame this Article in general terms leaving it to the 
discretion of the Government to adopt adequate measures for the fulfilment 
of this objective. 
The phraseology in the Indian Constitution is different. It directs the 
State to secure for its workers a 'living wage' and not the 'minimum wage' as 
provided in corresonding provisions of the other Constitutions. The reason 
for this deviation is perhaps the present economic conditions of India which 
hardly admit of securing for its workers a 'minimum wage' which implies a 
wage sufficient for the subsistence of the worker and his family. The framers 
were, therefore, rightly contented with the provision that the State should 
secure a 'living wage' which strictly connnotes an adequate wage for the 
subsistence of workers alone. This is also in conformity with the objective set 
47. Article 51 of the Constitution of Germany 
Articles 118 and 119 of the Constitution of USSR 
Article 136 of the Constitution of Brazil. 
Articles 60 and 61 of the Constitution of Republic of Cuba. 
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out in Article 39(3)"* of the Constitution which in respect of State's policy 
directed towards securing to the citizen, men and women the right to an 
adequate means of livelihood. 
It may, however, be pointed out that the concept of living wage is 
impossible to determine because the concept is exanding with the development 
and growth of national economy. 
In our country, for certain reasons there is no statutory definition of 
living wage. The Committee on Fair Wages also recognised that the concepts 
laid down by it could not be viewed in any static sense; they would vary from 
time to time, depending on the economic and social develoment in the country. 
The principle that luxuries of today, become necessity of tomorrow was 
implicit in this recognition. These recommendations have exerted considerable 
influence on wage fixing authorities in formulating wage structures in various 
industries and industrial units. 
In the absence of the precise and perfect definiton of the living wage, 
the judiciary fi^om time to time has given comprehensive definitions of living 
wages. In 1958, The supreme Court in Express News Paper Limited Vs Union 
of India^'' where the main issue was the validity of action taken by a Wage 
Board established imder the Working Journalists (Condition of Service) and 
Miscellaneaus Provisions Act, 1955,held that section 5(l)(a)(ii i) ofthat Act 
was invalid as in conflict with Article 19 (1) (g) of the constitution. The Court 
also held that the decision of the Wage Board was , under several provisions 
of the Act, ultra vires largely for procedural reasons. The Sureme Court at the 
outset examined the principles of wage fixation. In this context the court went 
48. Article 39 (a); The State shall in particular , direct its policy towards securing-
(a) that the citizen, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of 
livelihood; 
49. (1961) I L.L.J. Supreme Court 339 at 360. 
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deeply into the cancept of living wage, as developed through years and 
developed by various authorities'" at the national and international levels and 
held that the living wage should enable the male earner to provide for himself 
and his family not merely the bare essential of food, clothing and shelter but 
a measure of frugal comfort including education for children, protection 
against ill-health, requirements of essential social needs and measure of 
insurance against the more important misfortunes including old age. 
50 (I) Justice Higgins of the Australian Commonwealth Court of Conciliation in 
the Harvester case defined the living wage as "one appropriate for the 
normal needs of the average employee, regarded as human being living in 
a civilized community The living wage must provide not merely for 
absolute essentials such as food, shelter and clothing, but for a condition 
of frugal comfort estimated by current human standards It was a wage 
sufficient to ensure the workmen, food, shelter, clothing, frugal comfort, 
provision for evil days etc, as well as regard for special skill of an artisan 
if he IS one" 
(11) According to the South Australian Act of 1922, the living wage means a sum 
sufficient for the normal and reasonable needs of the average employee living 
in a locality where work under consideration is done or is to be done 
(HI) The Queensland Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act provides that the 
basic wage paid to an adult male employee shall not be less than 'sufficient to 
maintain a well conducted employee of average health, strength and compe-
tence and his wife and family of three children in a fair and average standard 
of comfort, having regard to the conditions of living — shall not be taken into 
account' 
(IV) The Commission of the Bureau of Labour Statistic ( U S A 1919) analysed the 
budget with reference to three concepts, viz , (a) the pauper and poverty level, 
(b) the minimum of subsistence level, and (c) the minimum of health and 
comfort level and adopted the last for the determination of living wage 
(v) The United Provinces Labour Enquiry Committee classified levels of living 
standard in (a) the poverty level, (b) the minimum subsistence level, (c) the 
subsistence plus level and (d) the comfort level and chose the subsistence plus 
level as the basis of what it called the 'minimum living wage' 
(VI) The Bombay Textile Labour Enquiry Committee (193 7) observed, "what we have 
to attempt is not an exact measurement of a well defined concept — can be 
attached to term like the living wage standard' and it has necessarily to be 
judged in the light of the circumstances of the particular time and country" 
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In Crown Aluminium works Vs. Their workemen" owing to financial 
difficulties the employer was permitted by the Industrial Tribunal to lower 
some wages, hours of work, and amount of production bonus and to retrench 
some personnel. Tribunal fixed a basic wage, but gave the employer liberty to 
abolish two hours consessions and facility bonus. This change reduced basic 
wages below the subsistence level. On appeal the Labour Appellate Tribunal 
found that these concessions and the bonus had been enjoyed by the workmen 
for a long time, as of right and as part of their basic wages. Therefore they had 
become a term of the conditions of service. The Appellate Tribunal revised the 
wage structure for existing workmen by incorporating the concessions and 
bonus into their basic wages. By special leave the Supreme Court took the 
appeal from this Judgement of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Supreme 
Court while considering the vires of award given by an Industrial Tribunal 
even compared the wage position of Indian labour with that of English wage 
earners and Justified the fixing of wage structure in different industries in 
India so as to attain the principle objective of a welfare state to secure,"to all 
(vii)The views of I L O , as expressed in its publication, 'The Minimum wage 
Fixing Machinery', were as follows " different Countries estimates have been 
made of living wage, but the estimates vary according to the point of view of 
the investigator Estimates may be classified into atleast three groups. (1) the 
amount necessary for mere subsistence, (2) the amount necessary for health 
and decency and (3) the amount necessary to provide a standard of comfort 
(viii)The Committee on Fair Wages (1947-49) at pp 5-7 paras 6 and 7 observ ed that 
there is a general agreement that the living wage should enable the male earner 
to provide for himself and his family not merely the bare essentials of food, 
clothing and shelter but a measure of frugal comfort including education for 
the children, protection against the more important misfortunes including old 
age 
51 AIR 1958 SC 30 
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citizens justice social and economic". The Court observed : 
"To the attainment of this ideal the Indian constitution has given it 
place of pride and that is the basis of the new guiding principles of 
social welfare and common good"". 
In Standard Vacuum Refining Co. of India Ltd Vs. Its workmen" the 
workmen claimed a bonus for the year 1956, equivalent to nine months, total 
earnings, on the ground that the employers had admitted their capacity to pay 
and that the wage actually received was less than the living wage. The 
employers contended that they were paying a living wage and that no bonus 
was due. The employers replying mainly on the report of the Textile Committee, 
1940 contended that if the living wage there found for 1940, i.e, Rs. 55/= was 
multiplied by 3.5 (due to a 35 percent rise in prices between 1940-1946) it 
gave Rs. 192.25 as the living wage for 1956, and they were paying their 
workmen more than that. The workmen relied on the recommendation of the 
Indian Labour Conferance, 1957, to show that Rs. 209.70 approximated the 
need- based minimum wage, and that the average wage paid by the employers 
was less than that. The tribunal held that the wages paid were fair, but that 
there was still a gap between the actual wage and the living wage.It awarded 
a bonus equivalent to five months, basic wages. Both parties challenged this 
award. Their cross appeals came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court observed: 
"— the concept of a living wage is not a static concept; it is expanding 
and the number of its constituents and their respective contents are 
52 Ibid 
53 (1961)1 LL J S C 227 
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bound to expand and wider with the development and growth of the 
national economy. That is why it will be impossible to attempt the task 
of determining the extent of the requirement of the said concept in 
the context of today in terms of rupees,aimas and pies on the scanty 
material placed before us in the present proceeding. We apprehend 
that it would be unexpedient and unwise to make an effort to 
concretize the said concept in monetary terms with any degree of 
definitness or precision even if a fuller enquiry is held. In need, it may 
be true to say that in an under-developed country it would be idle to 
describe any wage structure as containing the ideal of the living wage 
though in some cases wage paid by certain employers may appear to 
be higher than those paid by others —Therefore, looking at the 
problem of industrial wage as a whole, it would not be possible to 
predicate that our wage- structure has reached even the level of fair 
wage. It is possible that even so some employers may be paying a very 
high wage to their workmen and in such a case it would be necessary 
to examine whether the wages paid approximate to the standard of the 
living wage but in deciding this question the proper approach to adopt 
would be to consider whether the wage-structure in question even 
approximately meets the legitimate requirements of the components 
constituting the concept of living wage—"" The Supreme Court 
upheld the Tribunal Award. 
In Hindustan Times. Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen" the Supreme Court 
observed that the fixation of wage structure is among the most difficult task 
that industrial adjudication has to tackle. On the one hand, not only the 
demands social justice but also the claims of national economy require that 
54. Id at 228 
55. (1963)1. L.L J. S.C. 108 
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attempt should be made to secure to workmen a fair share of the national 
income which they help produce. On the other hand, care has to be taken that 
the attempt at a fair distribution does not tend to dry up the sources of the 
national income itself. On the one hand, better living conditions for workmen 
that can only be posssible by giving them a 'Living Wage' will tend to increase 
the nation's wealth and income. On the other hand, unreasonable inroads on 
the profits of the capitalists might have a tendency to derive capital away from 
fruitful employment and even to effect prejudicially capital formation itself. 
The rise in the prices that often results from the rise of workmen's wages may 
in its turn afreet other members of the community and may even afreet 
prejudicially the living conditions of the workmen themselves. The effect of 
such a rise in price on the country's international trade cannot also be always 
ignored. Thus numerous complex factors, some spring from social philosophy, 
give rise to conflicting considerations that have to be borne in mind. Nor does 
the process of valuation of numerous factors remain static. While international 
movements in the cause of labour have for many years influenced thinking and 
sometimes even judicial thinking in such mattters, in this Country, the 
emergence of an independent democratic India has influenced the matter even 
more profoundly. In trying to keep true to the two points of social philosophy 
and economic necessities which vie for consideration industrial adjudication 
has set for itself certain standard in the matter of wage fixation. As the bottom 
of the ladder' there is the minimum basic wage which the employer of any 
industrial labour must pay in order to be allowed to continue an industry. 
Above this is the fair wage which may roughly be said to approximately to the 
need based minimum in the sense of a wage which is adequate to cover the 
normal needs of the average employee regarded as a human being in a civilized 
society. Above the fair wage is the living wage' which will maintain the 
workmen in the highest state of industrial efficiency, which will enable him to 
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provide his family with all material things which are needed for their health and 
physical well being enough to enable him to qualify to discharge his duties as 
a citizen. 
In All India Reserve Bank Employees Association Vs. Reserve Bank of 
India'* the Supreme Court observed: 
"The Uving wage concept is one or more step higher than fair wage. 
It has now been generally accepted that living wage means that every 
male earner should be able to provide for his family not only the 
essential but a fair measure of frugal comfort and an ability to provide 
for old age or evil days. Fair wage lies between the concept of 
minimum wage and the concept of living wage. It may be taken that 
our political aim is "living wage" though in actual practice living wage 
has been an ideal which has eluded our efforts like an ever-receding 
horizon and will so remain for some time to come. Our general wage 
structure has at best reached the lower levels of fair wage though 
some employers are paying much higher wages than the general 
average. There can be no doubt that in our march toward a truly fair 
wage in the first instance and ultimately the living wage we must first 
achieve the need base minimum..."" 
56.(1965)11 L.L.J S C. 175 
57. Id at 177 
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5. Judicial trends: 
Article 43 has been invoked in several cases," particularly in the 
context of'living wage'. The Supreme Court has made significant contribution 
in elaborating the concept (even though it might be incapable of precise 
description), particularly through the judgements of N.H. Bhagwati, 
Gajendragadkar and Hidayatullah J.J. in the various cases. The following 
"principles emerge fi-om these cases: 
(i) Securing of living wages to workers which ensure not only 
bare physical subsistence but also the maintenance of health and 
decency, is conducive to the general interest of the public, a 
directive addressed to the State through Article 43. 
(ii) Industrial adjudication, therefore, takes into account all 
relevant considerations and arrives at different categories of 
wage structures. These categories of wage structure are 
described as living wage, fair wage and minimum wage. 'Living 
wage' should enable the male earner to provide for himself and 
his family not merely the bare essentials of food, clothing and 
shelter but a measure of fiiigal comfort including education for 
children, protection against Ul-health, requirments of essential 
social needs, and a measure of insurance against the more 
imortant misfortunes including old age. 
58 Express Newspaper Ltd Vs Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578, Crown 
Aluminium works Vs Their Workmen AIR 1958 S C 30, Standard vacuum 
Refining Co Vs Its workmen, AIR 1961 S C 895, R B Employees' Association 
Vs Reserve Bank, A 1 R 1966SC 305, Hindustan Times Ltd . Vs Theirworkmen 
(1963) ILL J S.C 108 
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(iii) It is the statutory minimum wage which the State should 
strive to achieve having regard to the Directive Principles of 
State policy. The enactment of the Minimum wages Act, 1948, 
is such an attempt. 
(iv) The employer cannot complain if they are compelled to pay 
minimum wages to their labourers even though the labourers, on 
account of their poverty and helplessness, are willing to work 
on lesser wages. 
(v) In the cantext of expanding national economy the content of 
living wage, fair wage and minumum wage are also apt to 
expand and vary, from industry to industry, region to region and 
from time to time. 
In some cases the validity of certain provisions of the Minimum Wages 
Act, 1948 and the implementation of Directive Principles was disscused. In 
Bijoy Cotton Mills Vs. State of Ajmer" where the Court had to consider the 
validity of sections 3,4,25 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, it was 
contended on behalf of the petitioner that these provisions interfered with the 
freedom of trade or business guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) of the 
constitution and were unreasonable and even oppressive with regard to one 
particular class of employees. Rejecting this contention of the petitioners the 
Court upheld the validity of the said provisions of the Act. Mukherjee J. 
speaking for the Court observed : 
"It can scarcely be disputed that securing of living wages to labourers 
which ensure not only bare physical susbsistence but also the 
maintenance of health and decency, is conclusive to the general 
59. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 33. 
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interest of the Public. This is one of the Directive Principles of State 
Policy embodied in Article 43 of our constitution". 
The Supreme Court reiterated this view again in Edward Mills Vs. 
State of Ajmer*" and also in Unichoyi's Case". 
Again in National Carbon Campany (India) Ltd. Vs. M. N. Gar " when 
it was argued on behalf of the company that the Tribunals in attempting to 
ensure living wages to workers were virtually enforcing the non-enforceable 
provision of Directive Principles (ie. Article 43) which being beyond their 
powers, was void. The High Court of Calcutta, however, rejected the 
argument of the Company and observed that it had no substance. The 
Tribunals were ordering the payment of'living wage'to industrial workers not 
because they wanted to make the unenforceable provisions of Article 43 as 
enforceable but with a view to maintain Industrial harmony which is the object 
of the statute dealing with industrial cases. 
In Y.A Mamarde Vs. Authority under Minimum wages Act." an 
interesting argument is given by the learned counsel of the respondent 
(Employer). He contended that the Act. (Minimum wages Act, 1948) is only 
concerned with providing for minimim wages and if an employee is being paid 
more than minimum wages so provided, the Act does not operate and 
employer cannot be compeUed to pay higher wages. The employees of the 
corporation are already being paid much higher wages than those fixed under 
the Act as minimum wages and therefore, there is no legal obligation on the 
employer to pay higher wages. The point strenuously convassed on behalf of 
60. A I R . 1955 S.C. 25. 
61 U. Unichoyi and others Vs. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1962 S.C at 12. 
62. A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 500 
63. 1972 Lab. l.C. S.C. 894 at 897-98. 
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appellants relates to construction to be placed on Rule 25** of the M.P. 
Mmimum wages Rules, 1951 made under section 30 of the Act. The Supreme 
Court observed that the Act which was enacted in 1948 has its roots in the 
recommendation adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1928. 
The object of the Act as stated in the preamble is to provide for fixing minimum 
rates of wages in certain employments and this seems to us to be clearly 
directed against exploitation of the ignorant, less organised and less privileged 
members of the society by the capitalist class. This anxiety on the part of the 
society for improving the general economic condition of some of its less 
favoured members appears to be in supersession of the old principle of 
absolute fi-eedom of contract and the doctrine of laissez-faire and in recognition 
of the new principles of social welfare and common good. Prior to our 
constitution this principles was advocated by the movement for liberal 
employment in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-constitution 
measure was the offspring of that movement. Under our present constitution 
to endeavour to secure to all workers(whether agricultural, industrial or 
otherwise) not only bare physical subsistence but a living wage and condition 
of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure. This 
Directive Principles of State Policy being conducive to the general interest of 
the Public and, therefore, to the healthy progress of the nation as a whole 
merely lays down the foundation for appropriate social structure in which the 
64 Rule 25. "Extra wages for overtime When a worker works in an employment for 
more than nine hours on any day or for more than fifty four hours in any week, he shall, 
in respect of overtime work, be entitled to wage-
la) in the case of employment in agriculture, at one and a half time the ordinary rate 
of wages, 
(b) in the case of any other scheduled employment, at double the ordinary rate of wages. 
Explanation- The expression 'ordinary rate of wages' means the basic wage plus such 
allowances including the cash equivalent of the advantages occruing through the 
concessional sale to the person employed of foodgrains and other articles as the person 
employed is for the time being entitled to but does not include bonus ..." 
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labour will find its place of dignity legitimately due to it in lieu of its 
contribution to the progress of national economic prosperity. The Act has 
since its enactment been amended on several occasions apparently to make it 
more and more effective in achieving its object which has since secured more 
firm support from the constitution. The present Rules under section 30 of the 
Act it may be pointed out, were made in October, 1950 when State was under 
a duty to apply the Directive Principles in making laws. A Preamble though 
a key to open the mind of legislature, can not be used to control or qualify the 
precise and unambiguous language of the enactment. It is only in case of doubt 
or ambiguity that recourse may be had to the Preamble to ascertain the reason 
for the enactment in order to discover the true legislative intendment. By using 
the phrase double the ordinary rate of wages the rule-making authority have 
intended that the worker should be the recipient of double the remuneration 
which he, infact, ordinarily receives and not double the rate of minimum wages 
fixed for him under the Act. 
From the cases referred above, it can be concluded that the meaning of 
the word living wage' in context with Article 43 the constitution is stretched 
too far by the law-courts. It is respectively submitted that in view of the 
conditions obtaining in India it is hardly convincing that the framers of the 
constitution during 1940's could really think of interpreting the word living 
wage' to mean family wage' which includes a wage sufficient to the living of 
the worker and also his family. However, taking into consideration the 
industrial progress made by the country during the last two decades the courts 
are obviously justified in giving a liberal interpretation to the term 'living 
wage' so as to bring about the welfare of the labour and industrial workers. 
The judicial interpretation of expression, 'living wage' in Article 43 by 
the Supreme Court in successive judgements has certainly given a content to 
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the concept. It is firstly clarified that the 'wage' has relation not only with the 
individual worker but also with his family; secondly, that it comprehands some 
decent and humane existence for the worker and his family, not mere 
subsistence; and thirdly that it is an elastic concept depending upon the state 
of economy of a particular region. There is suggestion by K.C. Markandan" 
that the Constitution framers considered a 'living wage', as something lower 
than a 'minimum wage', and so in the context of the poor economic condition 
of India the use of the expression 'living wage' was deliberate as compared to 
the expression 'minimum wage' used in other constitutions and probably the 
wage for an individual worker alone was comprehended and not for his family. 
It is submitted that in the context of the prolonged discussion of the concept 
in several committee reports in pre-constitution India, such an inference is 
unwarranted. In any case, the Supreme Court has set our sight by judicial 
activism. It has been again remarked by the Supreme Court in Workmen Vs. 
Reptakos Brett and Co. Ltd.** that a living wage has been promised to the 
workers under the constitution. A socialists framework to enable working 
people a decent standard of life , has further been promised by the 42nd 
Amendment. The workers are hopefully looking forward to achieve the said 
ideal. The promises are piling up but the day of fulfilment is nowhere in sight. 
Industrial wage-looked as a whole-has not yet risen higher than the level of 
minimum wage. 
65. K C. Markandan, 'Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution' 187. (Allied 
Publishers P.Ltd , New Delhi 1906). 
66. A.l.R. 1992 S.C. 505. 
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If the scientific and technological development in India, increase the 
national income, there can be no reason why the workmen should not be 
provided with the living wages which in turn will lead to increase in efficiency, 
production and improvement in national per capita income. Moreover, the 
State owe a duty towards them to enact legislation in terms of Directive 
Principles of State Policy assuring them the living wage. 
e'»/47nsi^-'in/ 
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CHAPTER - IV 
CONCEPT OF EQUALITY 
In the last chapter an attempt was made to discuss the history and 
nature of Directive Principles of State Policy in relation to living wage. In the 
present chapter an attempt is being made to discuss the concept of equality as 
provided in Articles 14, 15 and 16. The Constitutitonal right to equality of 
opportunity in matters of employment, the policy of reservation, remuneration 
for men and women has been discussed The judicial attitude with regard to 
these matters has also been high lighted. 
Analysis of the concept of Equality begins by confrontation with 
defence of Inequality Debate on merits and demerits of Inequality is endless 
It is a tussle between 'Haves' and 'Have-nots ' and each side has its ablest 
advocates . ' The main lines of defence are: Inequality is ordained by nature 
1 Plato, Aristotle, Burke, Adam Smith, James Stephen and Nietzsche are well known 
admirers of Inequality Plato argued that society, by nature, is divided into classes 
Hence, the social order should be based upon ranking of people according to their 
functions Society would be happy if the ruler rules, the worker works and slave 
slaves Aristotle went further and framed a formula Equality'for equals, inequality 
for unequals' Eversince, Aristotle's formula has been a standard objection to 
egalitarianism Equality would be welcome if men are equal but they are not equal 
and can not be made equal Burke thought that all men have equal right but not to 
equal things He did not realise that 'formal equality of rights becomes the decorous 
drapery for a practical relationship of mastery and subordination Adam Smith and 
James Stephen were convinced that real reason behind the indictment of inequality 
was envy' Adam Smith asserted The affluence ofthe rich excites the indignation 
of the poor, who are prompted by envy to invade their possessions' And Stephen said 
equality is nothing more than a vague expression of envy on the part of those who 
have not against those who have "Both conveniently ignored that inequality could 
be a cover for greed' ofthe rich Because the rich are greedy, the poor are envious 
Envy seems to be a natural consequence of greed Niethzsche hated equality as 
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itself. Civilization and culture depend upon it. The innate inequality between 
persons creates inequality of ranks, conditions and fortunes in the society. 
The advocates of equality are of the view that inequality creates a 
jungle of vested interests and hence is an eternal source of conflicts. The main 
critiques are^: Protagoras, Rousseau, Kant, Mathew Aronld, John Stuart Mill 
and Marx 
fabled dog noted his shadow To him, the order of castes and the order of rank 
merely formulates the supreme law of life itself (M J Audi, "The Concept of 
Equality and its Operation in India Today," Journal of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary Studies , The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary studies. 
New Delhi, 1988 PP 41-42) 
2 Protagoras says that man IS the measure of all things He rejects inequality Rousseau 
pointed out that natural obstacles are not insurmountable, that natural differences 
could be removed by enforcing natural similarity He argued that it is not nature but 
society that makes man unequal All distinctions are purely conventional and 
therefore alterable Kant, in a very simple manner advised that'no man should 
consider himself more valuable than any other person Mathew Aronld observed that 
'on the one side, inequality harms by pampering, on the other by vulgarising and 
depressing A system founded on it is against nature and our short comings m 
civilization are due to our inequality John Stuart Mill realised that equality is one 
of ends of good social arrangements . and that a system of institutions which does 
not make the scale turn in favour of equality, is essentially a bad government a 
government for the few, to the injury of the many' Karl Marx aimed at a classless 
soceity in which the free development of each will be the condition of the free 
development of all (M J Audi, "The Concept of Equality and its Operation in India 
Today, "Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary studies. The Institute of 
Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, 1988 P 43) 
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Equality rejects all distinctions based upon birth, wealth and office. It 
means abolition of all privileges. Naturally, it involves a certain levelling 
process. It is such an ordering of social forces where a share in the tail is 
balanced with share in the fruits of tail^ Men are not equals but their basic 
needs are identical. Demand for equality means basic needs of all must be 
satisfied irrespective of their abilities. It means equal opportunity. That is to 
say, that all should have an equal start in the race for success. 
Mankind's experience convinces that the worst tyranny is economic 
tyranny; that the roots of social tensions and political conflicts are always to 
be found in economic relationship. Consequently, without economic equality, 
there cannot be equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity must be in 
form as well as in fact. 
(1) Constitutional Provisions in India:- We know the agony that India 
suffered to win her freedom. Patriots, known and unknown, who sacrificed 
their lives, dreamt of a better India after independence. They aspired for a new 
and just order. Our constitution craves for an egalitarian society, a society in 
which every body would prosper whatever may be his or her caste, creed, race, 
religion or region"*. 
In regard to equality Article 14 says : The State shall not deny to any 
person equality before law or the equal protection of the laws within the 
territory of India. 
3. H.J Laski,' A Grammer of Politcs, London, Allen and Union, Fifth edition second 
Impression, 1970 at 153 
4. M.J Audi The concept of Equality and its operation in India Today'.Journal of 
Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, The Institute of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary Studies-New Delhi, 1983, at 51. 
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Article 15 says : 
(l)The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them. 
(2) No citizen shall on grounds only religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth 
or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or 
condition with regard to-
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, places of public 
entertainment; or 
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public 
resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated 
to the use of the general public. 
(3)Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special 
provision for women and children. 
(4)Nothingin this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State 
from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially 
and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes.' 
Article 16 says : 
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating 
to employment or appointment to any oflBce under the State. 
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, 
place ofbirth, residence, or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated 
against in respect of, any employment or office under the State. 
5. Clause (4) of Arcle 15 added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. 
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(3)Nothing in this Article shall prevent Parliament from making any law 
prescribing, in regard to class or classes of employment or appointment 
to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority, 
within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within 
the State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment. 
(4)Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any provision 
for the reservation of appointment or posts in favour of any backward 
class of citizen which in the opinion of the State,is not adequatly 
presented in the service under the State. 
(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any 
provision for reservation in matters of promotion of any class or classes 
ofpostsinthe services under the State in favour of Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State are not adequately 
represented in the services under the State *. 
(5)Nothing in this Article shall afiTect the operation of any law which 
provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the afifairs 
of any religious or any denominational institution or any member of the 
governing body there of shall be a person professing a particular religion 
or belonging to a particular denomination. 
It has been discussed in chapter I that the Preamble to our constitution 
promises 'equalty of status and opportunity' to all citizens and that this ideal 
of equality embraces both social and political equality. 
So for as the ideal of social equality is concerned, it is embodied in a 
series of Articles, of which Article 14 is the genus,and the succeeding Articles 
15-18 contain particular applications thereof 
6. Clause (4A) inserted by the Constitution (77the Amendment) Act, 1995, w.e.f. 17.6.1995 
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M. Hidayatullah observed: 
"Article 14 guarantees the equal protection of all persons ( not only 
citizen ) by the State in accordance with two principle: Equality 
before law; and (2) Equal protection of the laws. What is the meaning 
of these expressions. Different views are possible and have expressed 
as to their meaning. The expression to equality before law' is well 
known in the English Constitutional Law and to the readers of Diecy-
though Article 14 takes it from the constitution of the Irish Free State. 
The expression equal protection of the law' is taken from the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the American Constitution. One view 
(expressed by P.K. Tripathi in 'some Insight into Fundamental 
Rights' pp. 47-51) is that both these expressions mean the same 
thing. The distinction drawn by Subba Rao J. in the State of U.P. vs. 
Deoman, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1125, Laxman Das vs.the state of Punjab 
A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 75 that equality before law is negative concept and 
equal protection of the laws is positive one has been criticised by 
Tripathi who is unable to find such a distinction in this language.Basing 
himself on the relevent American decisions, Patanjali Shastri C.J. in 
State ofWest Bengal vs Anwar AliSarkar, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 75.gave 
a slight different meaning to the expression' equal protection of laws. 
Thereunder it was necessary for the State to ensure not only the 
equality before the law but also equal protection of the laws by so 
framing the laws so that the benefit thereunder is enjoyed equally by 
all. Government has to deal with the variety of relations. Inequality 
of operation may thus lead to equality of protection. The duties and 
burdens cast on different persons are different and therefore law has 
to adjust itselftogivingthem equal protection. Theidea ofreasonable 
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classification is mooted in this meaning".^ 
Article 14 being a general provision, is to be read subject to the special 
provisions which engraft exceptions to the general rule of equality as well as 
those Articles which explicitly override Article 14 to the specified extent. 
Thus the special provisions for women and children in Article 15(3) or for the 
backward classes in Articles 15(4) and 16(4) can not be challenged on the 
ground that they violate the rule of equality enunciated in Article 14. Rightly 
viewed aU these three Articles are different facets of the same principle 
enunciated in Article 14. Therefore, the judicial decisions by the Supreme 
Court have generally agreed that the these three Articles are to be read 
together. But the view had developed in response to the changing conditions. 
In the very begining when the constitution was viewed as more democratic 
than socialist, merit or the liberty of the individual was given the pride of 
place. Reservation in favour of backward classes for admissions to a Medical 
College was challanged in Champakan Vs. The State of Madras*. In this case 
the State of Madras had reserved seats in Medical and Engineering institutions 
in favour of candidates coming fi'om backward classes, in pursuance of Article 
46 of the constitution. It was contended on behalf of the affected students that 
Article 46 is a Directive Principle and Directive Principles can not override the 
Fundamental Rights and thus demanded that government order be declared 
invalid. It was held that even though the reservations were made with a view 
to promote the educational interest of Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes 
and other weaker sections of the public a duty placed upon the State by Article 
46 ofthe constitution, the Directive Principles cannot override the Fimdamental 
Rights but have to remain and run as subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights. 
7 M Hidayatullah 'Constitutional Law of lndia,'258( The Bar Council of India Trust, 
Vol. I. 1984), 
8. A.I.R. 1951 S.C 226 
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The Fundamental Rights to admissions to educational institutions without 
discrimination guaranteed by Article 29 (2) cannot be abridged by trying to 
implement Article 46. This decision was contrary to the spirit of the 
overwhelming provisions of th constitution which are to be used for bringing 
about equality in place of the existing inequality in the Indian society. This 
decision therefore, led to the amendent of Article 15 by the insertion of clause 
(4) in 1951 statingthat Article 29(2) shall not prevent the State from making 
any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
in admissions to educational institutions is being upheld by the Courts. 
(a) The basis of classification : 
The principle of equality and the basis of rules of classification have 
been considered by the Supreme Court on several occasions in the light of 
circumstances and facts of the cases and according to the changed social 
conditons. In Moti Ram Vs. N.E. Frontier Railway' the validity of Rules 148 
(3) and 149 (3) which authorise the Railway Administration to terminate the 
services of all the permanent servants to whom the Rules apply merely on 
giving notice for the specified period, as on payment of salary in lieu thereof, 
was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court observed: 
"Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) do not lay down any priQciple or policy for 
guiding the exercise of discretion by the authority who will terminate 
the service in the matter of selection or classification. Arbitrary and 
uncontrolled power is left in the authority to select at its will any 
person against whom action will be taken. The Rules thus enable the 
authority concerned to discriminate between two railway servants to 
9. A.I.R. 1964 S.C 600 
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both of whom the Rules equally applied by taking action in one case 
and not taking it in the other. In the absence of any guiding principle 
in the exercise of the discretion by the authority the Rules have 
therefore to be struck down as contravening the requirements of 
Article 14 of the Constitution"'". 
In State of Kerala Vs. N.M. Thomas". Roy, C.J. Observed :-
"The rule of parity is the equal treatment of equals in equal 
circumstances. The rule of differentiation is enacting laws 
differentiating between different persons or things in differnt 
circumstances. The circumstances which govern one set of persons or 
objects may not necessarily be the same as those governing another 
set of persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment 
does not really arise between persons governed by different conditions 
and different sets of circumstances. The principle of equality does not 
mean that every law must have universal application for all persons 
who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same 
position and the varying needs of different classes of persons require 
special treatment. The legislature understands and appreciates the 
need of its own people , that its laws directed to problems made 
manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon 
adequate grounds. The rule of classification is not a natural and 
logical corollary of the rule of equality, but the rule of differentiation 
is inherent in the concept of equality. Equality means parity of 
treatment under parity of conditions. Equality does not connote 
absolute equality. A classification in order to be constitutional must 
10. Id. at 602 
l l .A . I.R. 1976 SC. 490 
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rest upon distinctions that are substantial and not merely illusory. The 
test is whether it has a reasonable basis free from artificiality and 
arbitrariness embracing all and omitting none naturally falling into 
that category" ". 
Justice Mathew observed: 
" It is no doubt a paradox that though in one sence classification 
brings about inequality, it is promotive of equality of its object is to 
bring those who share a common characteristic under a class for 
differential treatment for sufGcient and justifiable reasons". 
He fiirther observed: 
"It is a mistake to assume a priori that there can be no classification 
vdthin a class... If there are intelligible differentia which separate a 
group within that class from the rest and that differentia have nexus 
with the object of classification, . I see no objection to a fiirther 
classification within the class""*. 
In State of Mysore Vs. P. Narasinga Rao", the apex Court observed : 
" It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it 
does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. 
When any impugned rule or statutory provisions is assailed on the 
ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if 
two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which 
it is founded must be based on an intelligeble differentia which 
12. Id. at 499 
13 Id. at 520 
14. Id. at 519-20 
15. A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 349. 
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distinguish persons or things grouped together from others left out of 
the group, and the second test is that the differentia in question must 
have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the 
rule or statutory provisions in question. In other words, there must 
be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the 
object intended to be achieved by the statute or rule."'* 
Further in State of J and K Vs T.N. Khosa'^- The Supreme Court said 
that judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the consideration whether 
the classification rests on a reasonable basis and whether it bears nexus with 
the object in view. It cannot extend to embarking upon a nice or mathematical 
evaluation of the basis of classification, for were such an inquiry permissible 
it would be open to the courts to substitute their own judgement for that of 
the legislature or the rule making authority on the need to classify or the 
desirability of achieving a particular object. 
It is submitted that Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be 
uniform and must universally be applicable. It only prohibits improper and 
invidious distinctions created by conferring rights or privileges upon a 
particular group to the exclusion of other group without any valid reason. 
Thus under this Article, there cannot be unfair descrimination between one 
group of citizens and another in relation to the same matter or between 
citizens and foreigners and arbitrary use of the power in favour of one group 
or another group or in favour of an individual. Since all persons are not by 
nature, attainment or circumstances equal and the varying needs of different 
classes of persons often require separate treatment. For this separate treatment 
16 Id. at 351. 
17. A.I.R. 1974 S.C, l a t l l . 
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or classification for the purpose of legislation two conditons must be fulfilled, 
namely : 
(i)That the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia 
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from 
others left out the group ; and 
(ii)That differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be 
achieved by the statute or rule in question. 
The constitution of India in its Article 16 provides that there shall be 
equality of opportunity for all citizen in matters relating to employment or 
appointment to any Office under the State but at the same time, keeping in 
view the condition of the backward classes, it provided in clause (4) that 
nothing in this Article shall prevent the State for making any provision for the 
reservation of appointment or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens 
which, in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the services 
under the State. 
In All India Station Masters' and Assistant Station Master's Association. Vs. 
General Manager Central Railways," theSupreme Court Observed > 
"Equality of opportunity in matters of employment can be predicated 
only between persons who are cithers seeking the same employment, 
or have obtained the same employment. Equality of opportunity in 
matters of promotion, must mean equality as between members of the 
same class of employee and not equality between members of separate, 
independent classes. The fact that the qualifications necessary for 
recruitment of one post and another are approximatly or even wholy 
18(1960)2S.C.R. 311.. 
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the same can in no way affect the question whether they form one and 
the same class, or form different classes."" 
In C.A. Rajendran Vs Union of India,^" it was held that Article 16 of 
the constitution is only an incident of the application of the concept of 
equalityt enshrined in Article 14 thereof It gives effect to the doctrine of 
equality in the matter of appointment and promotion. It follows therefore that 
there can be a reasonable classification of the employees for the purpose of 
appointment and promotion. To put it differently, the equality opportunity 
guaranteed by Article 16(1) means equality as between members of the same 
class of employees, and not equality between members of separate, independent 
classes. 
In Ganga Ram Vs Union of India^' Supreme Court has given wide interpretation 
to Art 16 and says: 
"The equality of opportunity in the matter of service undoubtedly 
takes v\athin its fold all stages of service from initial appointment to 
its termination including promotion but does not prohibit the 
prescription of reasonable rules for selection and promotion applicable 
to all members of a classified group. Mere production of inequality is 
not enough to attract the Constitutional inhibition because every 
classification is likely to some degree to produce some inequality. 
The State is legitimately empowered to frame rules of classification 
for securing the requisite standard of efficiency in services and the 
classification need not be scientifically perfect or logically 
complete... "^ ^ 
19. Ibid. 
20 A.I.R 1968 S C 507 
21. A.I.R. 1970 S C 2178 at 2179. 
22. Id at 2179. 
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A class must be a homogeneous social section of the people with 
common trails and identifiable by some common attributes." 
Further more in State of Kerala Vs. N.M Thomas" the Supreme Court 
laid down three principles about Article 16 as follows : 
(i) That Article 16 is merely an incident of Article 14 and both these 
Articles form a part of the common system seeking to achieve 
the same end. 
(ii)Article 16 applies to all classes of appointment including 
promotions and selection posts, and 
(iii) Article 16 permits a valid classification. 
One thing which is very clear from the various judgements of court is 
that in deciding the scope and ambit of the Fundamental Right of equality of 
opportunity guaranteed by Article 16 it is necessary to bear in the mind that 
in construing the relevant Article a technical or pedantic approach must be 
avoided. Thus construed it would be clear that matters relating to employment 
can not be confined only to the initial matters prior to the act of employment. 
The narrow construction would confine that application of Article 16 (1) to 
the initial employment and nothing else; but that clearly is only one of the 
matters relating to employment. The other matters relating to employment 
would inevitably be the provision as to the salary and increments therein, 
terms as to leave, gratuity, pension, compulsory retirement, age of 
superannuation, termination, promotion, abolition of post, as to 
canfirmation, seniority, transfer, and reservation etc. These are all matters 
relating to employment and they are, and must be deemed to be included in the 
23 Janki Prasad Parimoo Vs State of J and K 1973 Lab I C 565 at 576 
24 State of Kerala VsN M Thomas A I R 1976 S C 490 
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expression "matters relating to employment" in Article 16. 
This equality of opportunity need not be confused with absolute 
equality as such. What is guaranteed is the equality of opportunity and nothing 
more. Article 16 does not prohibit the prescription of reasonable rules for 
selection to any employment or oppointment to any office. Any provision as 
to the qualification for the employment or the appointment to ofBce reasonably 
fixed and applicable to all citizens would certainly be consistent with doctrine 
of the equality of opportunity. 
(b) Comparison of Articles 14, 15 and 16: 
In N.M. Thomas" case, the Supreme Court compared Articles 14, 15 
and 16 of the Constitution. The Court says that Articles 14, 15 and 16 form 
part of a string of constitutionally guaranteed rights. These rights supplement 
each other. Article 16 which ensures to all citizens equality of opportunity in 
matters relating to employment is an incident of guarantee of equality 
contained in Article 14. Article 16(1) gives effect to Article 14. Both Articles 
14 and 16( 1) permit reasonable classification having a nexus to the objects to 
be achieved. Under Article 16 there can be a reasonable classification of the 
employees in matters relating to employment and appointment. Article 16 is 
affirmative where as Article 14 is negative in language. 16(4) indicates one 
ofthe methods of achieving equality embodied in Article 16(1). Article 16(1) 
is only a part of a comprehensive scheme to ensure equality in all spheres. It 
is an instance ofthe application ofthe larger concept of equality under the law 
embodied in Articles 14. and 15. Article 16(1) permits classification just as 
Article 14 does. But, by the classification, there can be no discrimination on 
the ground only of race, caste and other factors mentioned in Article 16(2). 
25. Ibid. 
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The accent m Article 14 is OQ the injunction that the State shall not deny to 
any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws, that is, 
on the negative character of the duty of the State. The emphasis in Article 
16(1) is on the mandatary aspect, namely that there shall be equality of 
opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment 
to any o£Bce under the State implying thereby that affirmative action by 
Government would be consistent with the Article if it is calculated to achieve 
it. 
However, it is platitudinous law that Articles 14 to 16 are common 
code of guaranteed equality, the first laying down the broad doctrine, the 
other two applying it to sensitive areas historically important and politically 
polemical in a climate of communalism and jobbery. The genius of Articles 14 
and 16 consists not in literal equality but in progressive elimination of 
pronounced inequality. Indeed, to treat sharply dissimilar persons equally is 
subtle injustice. Equal opportunity is a hope, not a menace. Article 16 is 
merely an incident of Article 14, Article 14 being the genus is of universal 
application where as Article 16 is the species and seeks to obtain equality of 
opportunity in the services under the State. What Article 14 or Article 16 
forbid is hostile discrimination and not reasonable classification. Article 16 
represents one facet of the guarantee of equality. Articles 14, 15 and 16 
underline the importance which framers of our constitution attached to 
ensuring equality of treatment. Such equality has special significance in the 
matter of public employment. It was with a view to prevent any discrimination 
in the field that an express provision was made to guarantee equality of 
opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or oppointment 
to any office under the State. 
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In E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, *^ the Supreme Court said 
that Article 16 is only an instance of application of the concept of equality 
enshrined in Article 14. In other words Article 14 is the genus while Article 
16 is a species. Article 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters 
relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs 
both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. These 
Articles strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality 
of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant 
principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by 
any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of 
equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from 
motive inducing from the antechamber of mind, is not legitimate and relevant 
but is extraneous and outside of area of permissible considerations, it would 
amount to malafide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. 
Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations 
emanating fi-om the same vice: in fact the letter comprehends the former. Both 
are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16. 
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are not limited to cases where 
a servant has a right to the post. Even if a public servant is in an officiating 
position, he can complain of violation of Articles 14 and 16 if he has been 
arbitrarily or unfairly treated or subjected to a mala fide exercise of power by 
the State machine. 
(2) Equality : Service conditions and Labour. 
It is now settled that Article 14 is applicable to employment under the 
State so as to invalidate discriminatory Rules or Orders. A Rule or Order will 
26. 1974Lab. I.e. 427at456. 
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be discriminatory if the classification made by it is not reasonable. The power 
of the State as an employer is more limited than that of a private employer 
inasmuch as it is subject to Constitutional limitations and can not be exercised 
arbitrarily. A government servant does not waive his protection by the 
Constitutional guarantees while entering into a contract of employment with 
the State. Article 16 guarantees equality of apportunity to all citizens in the 
matter of appointment to any office or any other employment, under the State. 
The principle underlying Article 14 has, accordingly, been applied to the 
interpretation of Article 16(1), namely that the equality of opportunity 
guaranteed by it means equality as between members of the same class of 
employees, and not equality between members of separate, independent 
classes. 
The words 'employment and appointment' connote two different 
conceptions, while 'appointment' refers' to appointment to an 'office' and 
therefore, implies the conception of tenure, duration, emoluments, and duties 
and obligations, fixed by law or some rules having the force of law. The word 
'employment' refers the engagement of labourers or professional expert by 
bilateral contracts for temporary purpose. 
It is submitted that the equality of opportunity, in matters relating to 
employment or appointment' is wide enough to include all matters in relation 
to employment, both prior and subsequent such as Initial oppointment. Pay, 
Conditions of service, Confirmation, Seniority,Promotion, Termination, 
Abolition of post,Compulsory retirement. Reversion, Superannuation, 
Pension, Transfer, Reservation of backward classes. Periodical increments. 
Terms of leave. Gratuity etc. 
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If. in laying down the qualifications for an appointment, the State lays 
down qualifications which have no nexus with the object to be achieved, the 
Rule or Order in question shall be invalid. This, with a view to secure fair and 
efficient administration of justice, it would be competent for a State to 
prescribe knowledge of local laws, knowledge of the regional language or 
adequate experience at the Bar as qualifications for appointment to the 
judicial service, but it can not be provided that only Advocates practising in 
that State High Courts shall be eligible, so as to disqualify Advocates 
practising in other High Courts though they belong to the same class, without 
any rational basis for such disqualification.^'' 
In C Channa basavaiah Vs. state of Mysore", after holding viva voce 
examination for direct recruitment to class I and class II posts relating to 
certain Administrative Services, the Mysore Public Service Commission 
published a list of 98 condidates who were selected and appoiated. Subsequent 
to this announcement, the State Government sent, for the consideration of the 
Commission, a list of twenty-four, candidates and as the Commission approved 
of them, they were also appointed. In giving their concurrence the Commission 
purported to take power from the foot-note to sub-rule (3) of rule 4 of the 
Mysore Public Service Commission (Functions) Rule, 1957. The foot-note is 
as follows.-
"Nothing contained herein shall preclude the Commission from 
considering the case of any candidate possessing the prescribed 
qualifications brought to its notice by Government, even if such a 
candidate has not applied in response to the advertisement of the 
Commission" 
27 Pandurangorao Vs A D D S C , A I R 1963 S C 268 
28 1965 I SCR 360 
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Sixteen condidates, out of those who were not selected, filed petitions 
in th High Court alleging violations of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of constitution. 
In the course of these proceedings, a compromise was effected and as a result 
of an undertaking given by the government before the High Court, the sixteen 
petitioners were also appointed. 
Thereafter, the candidates who were not selected, instituted sunilar 
proceedings in the High Court, but their petitions were summarily dismissed. 
They thereupon, filed the petitions in the Supreme Court. 
Upon a direction of Court to the Mysore State Govenment, mark-lists 
prepared by the Public Servie Commission after the viva voce tests were 
produced and these showed that all the candidates except two who belonged 
to the Scheduled Castes in the first list of 98 candidates had secured marks 
higher than 56%. Some of the candidates who were appointed on the 
recommendation of the Government and those appointed by compromise in 
the High Court (excluding three who were not interviewed at all)received 
lower marks and it was admitted that many of the petitioners who were 
rejected, had obtained higher than some of the selected candidates. 
It was held by the Court that (i) discrimination and unequal treatment 
was established in the case of the 16 candidates selected as a result compromise 
before the Higher Court. Their appointment could not be sustained since most 
of these candidates had obtained fewer marks than some of the rejected 
candidates. Three candidates had not attended the viva-voce test at all and 
there was nothing before the High Court for comparing the remaining thirteen 
candidates with those who had failed in the selection. In such a case the Court 
should be slow to accept compromises unless it was made clear that what was 
being done did not prejudice anybody. 
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(ii) The foot-note to sub-rule (3) of rule 4 of the Mysore Public 
(Functions) Rules, 1957, on which reliance was placed to justify the 
appointments of the 24 candidates selected at the suggestion of the 
government, was not intended to bypass the selection based on merit but to 
cover a case of exceptional merit. These candidates had also obtained lower 
marks than some rejected candidates and their appointments could not 
therefore be upheld since this amounted to discrimination and unequal 
treatment. 
In Govind Dattatray Vs. Ch. Controller of Imports and Exports" the 
question which was before the Court was in relaion to the constitutional 
validity of the appointment of Assistant Controller of Imports and Exports by 
direct recruitment. 
The import and Exports Organisation came into existence during the 
Second World War. It was expected to be a temporary organisation and 
therefore, appointments to the various categories in the said organisation 
were made on an adhoc basis. In the year 1949 it comprised the following 
posts : Chief Controller, joint Chief Controller, Deputy Chief Controller, 
Assistant Chide Controller of Imports and Exports, Executive Officers, 
Licensing Officers and Junior licensing officers. In the year 1949 the 
appointment of the said Officers and their promotions were governed by the 
principles enunciated in the memorandum No.30/44-48 Appts, dated June 22, 
1949 issued by the Government of India. But as no rules were prescribed and 
the appointment were made on an adhoc basis, the Union Public Servie 
Commission raised objections, and after protracted correspondence it was 
agreed in 195 5 that the appointments made by the Ministry during 1947-1951 
should be regularised on the basis of the record of work and that in regard to 
29. A.I.R. 1967.S.C.840 
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subsequent appointmeuts there should be a ratio of 25% for the departmental 
promotees and 75%for the direct recruits. Ultimately, on June 13, 1962, the 
said agreement was embodied in the recruitment rules made by the Government 
of India under Article 309 of the constitution. There were three main 
categories of employees in the said department, namely, (i) those appointed 
prior to January 1, 1952 ; (ii) Those appointed between January 1,1952 and 
Nov. 30, 1955, and (iii) Those appointed after Nov. 30, 1955. 
Here the question before the Court is in relation with those Officers 
who were appointed after Nov. 30, 1955. 
The petitioners raised following points before the Court : 
(i) The rules of 1962 were not retrospective in operation and therefore, the 
seniority list dated November. 30, 1961 based on the decision of the 2nd 
respondant. Union of India, dated July 29, 1961, was without any 
authority of law and was violative of Article 14, and 16 of the constitution. 
(ii) Prior to Nov. 1955 there was only one source of recruitment to the 
cadre of Assistant Contoller and therefore, the decision to relate back 
the seniority of the direct recruits to the period between January 1, 1952 
and Nov. 30, 1952 being based on reservations to those who were then 
not in existence amounted to carry forward of vacancies. 
(iii) The ratio of 75% and 25% between direct recruits and promotees was 
violative of Article 14 of the constitution, and 
(iv) The appointment of the Offices of the Ministry of Rehabilitation to the 
posts reserved for direct recruits through the Union Public Serviece 
Commission violative of Article 14 of the constitution. 
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The Court Observed : 
"The relevant law on the subject is well settled and does not require 
further elucidation. Under Article 16 of the constitution, there shall 
be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to 
employment or appointment to any OfBce under the State or to 
promotion from one Office to a higher OfBce thereunder. Article 16 
of the constitution is only an incident of application of the concept 
of equality enshrined in Article 14 thereof. It gives effect to the 
doctrine of equality in the matter of appointment and promotion. The 
concept of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only 
when the promotees are drawn from the same source. If the preferential 
treatment of one source in relation to the other is based on the 
differences between the said two sources, and the said differences 
have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office or offices to 
which recuritmet is made, the said recruitment can legitimately be 
sustained on the basis of valid classification. There can be cases where 
the difference between the two groups of recruits may not be 
sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one against the other 
in the matter of promotions, and in that event a Court may hold that 
there is no reasonable nexus between the differences and recruitment. 
In short, whether there is a reasonable classificaion or not depends 
upon the facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining at the 
time the recuritment is made. Further,when a State makes a 
classification between two sources of recruitment, unless the 
classification is unjust on the on the face of it, the onus lies upon the 
party attacking the classification to show by placing the necessary 
material before the Court that the said classification is unreasonable 
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and violative of Article 16 of the constitution"'". 
Similarly in Jaisinghani Vs. Union of India" where the appellant, S.G. 
Jaisinghani, challenged the constitutional validity what has been described as 
t he ' seniority rule' in regard to Income Tax Service, class I grade II alongwith 
the improper implementaion of the 'quota' recruitment to that Services as 
infringing the guarantee of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the constitution. 
The first question which was to be considered was whether Rule 1 (f) 
(iii) of the seniority rule as frame in 1952 violates the guaranteed imder 
Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. It was contended on behalf of the 
appellant that the impugned rule was based upon on unjustifiable classification 
between direct recruits and promotees after they had entered into calss I, 
grade II service and on the basis of that classification promotees are given 
seniority with weightage over direct recruits of the same year and three 
previous years It was contented that there was discrimination between 
Officers of class I, grade II Service after their recruitment and the actual 
working of the rule kept on pushing down the direct recruits and postponing 
their chances of promotion to higher posts in class I Service. It was fiirther 
contended that the promotees and direct recruit became one class'immediatly 
on entry and thereafter there can not be any class within that class. 
In reply of these contentions the Court held that it is not right to 
approach this problem as if it is a case of classification of one Service into two 
classes for the purpose of promotion and as the promotion rule operating to 
the disadvantage of one of the two classes. It is really a case of recruitment 
to the service firom two different sources and then adjustment of seniority 
30. Id at 841-42 
31. A. I. R.1967S C 1427 
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between the recruits coming from the two sources. So for as Article 16 (1) is 
concerned, it connot be said that the rule of seniority proceeds on an 
unreasobable basis. The reason for the classification is the objective of filling 
the higher echelons of the Income Tax Service by experienced Officers 
possessing not only a high degree of ability but also first rate experience. 
Having regard to the particular circumstances of this case the seniority rule 
is not unreasonable when read with the quota rule which provides for a special 
reservation of a small percentage of posts for the promotees who are selected 
by a special conunittee, which determines the fitness of the candidates for 
promotion after they have put in at least three years of service as Income Tax 
Officers. A rule which gives seniority to outstanding officers with considerable 
experience, and selected on merit and limiting the promotion to a percentage 
not exceeding the prescribed limit, cannot per se be regarded as unreasonable. 
In C. A. Rajendran Vs Union of India", where petitioners was a 
permanent Assistant in Grade IV (Class III, non-gazatted ministerial)of the 
Railway Board Secretariate Service. He was initially appointed, as Accounts 
clerk on February 6, 1953 in Southern Railway. He was appointed as an 
Assistant on October 22, 1956 in the Railway Board and confirmed as 
Assistant on April 1, 1960. The Railway Board Secretariate Service 
(Reorganisation and Reinforcement) scheme was drawn up in consultation 
with the Ministry of Home Affairs and introduced with effect from December 
1, 1954 with the approval of the Union Public Service Commission. According 
to the new scheme the Railway Board Secretariate Service consists of the 
following grades: 
"Grade IV-Assistant in the Scale of Rs 210-530/= (Class II non-
gazatted) (to which petitioner belongs) Grade III- Section Officers in 
32. A. I. R. 1968 S C. 507. 
186 
the scale of Rs. 350-900 (Class II gazatted) with efifect from 1st July, 
1959 (Section Officers grade) Grade II-Amalgamated with effect from 
1st July, 1959 as section OflBcer grade. 
Grade I-Assistant Directors/Under Secretariate in the of Rs. 900- 1, 
250/=. 
In 1963 Central Government issued a memorandum dated 8, Nov. 1963 
which reads as folows: 
"In posts filled by promotion through Competitive Examination 
limited to departmental candidates, reservation at 12!4percentand5>4 
percent ofvacancies were provided for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes respectively... In regard to promotions on the basis of seniority 
subject to fitness, and those by selection no reservations were 
provided, but certaio concessions were allowed to persons belonging 
to Scheduled Castes and scheduled Tribes..." 
The contention of petitioner was that there is discrimination between 
the employees belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the 
Railway Service and similar employees in the Central Secretariate Service. It 
was said that the competive departmental examination for promotion to the 
grade of Section Officers was not held by the Railway Board for the years 
1955-63. On the contrary such examinations were held for the Central 
Secretariate Service and 74 employees belonging to Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes secured the benefit of the reservation. 
It was held by the Court that there is no substance in this contention. 
The petitioner being an employee of the Railway Board is governed by the 
rules applicable to the Officers in the Service to which he belongs. The 
employees of the Central Secretariate Service belong to a different class and 
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it is not possible to adopt the argument that there is any discrimination. 
The arbitrary use of power by the Government was again discussed in 
State of Mysore Vs. S. R. Jayaram ", where Mysore Recruitment of Gazatted 
Probationers' Rule (1959), Rule 9 (2) was challenged under Articles 14 and 
16(1) of the constitution. 
The last part of Rule 9 (2) reserve to the Government the right of 
appointing to any particular cadre any candidate whom it considers more 
suitable for such cadre. The Rules are silient on the question as to how the 
government is to find out the suitability of candidate for particular cadre. The 
Rules do not give the Public Service Commissions the power to test the 
suitability of a candidate for a particular cadre or to recommend that he is 
more suitable for it. Nor is there any provision in the Rules under which the 
Government can test the suitability of a candidate for any cadre after the result 
of the examination is published. It follows that under the last part of Rule 9 
(2) it is open to the government to say at its sweet will that a candidate is more 
suitable for a particular cadre and to deprive him of his opportunity to join the 
cadre for which he indicated his preference. 
It was observed by the Court that the principle of recruitment by open 
competition aims at ensuring equality of opportunity in matter of employment 
and obtaining the services of the most meritorious candidates. Rule 1 -8, 9( 1) 
and the first part of Rule 9 (2) seek to achieve this aim. The last part of Rule 
9 (2) subverts and destroys the basic objectives of the preceeding Rules. It 
vests in the government an arbitrary power of patronage. Though R. 9 (1) 
requires the appointment of successful candidates to class I posts in the order 
of merit and thereafter to class II posts in the order of merit. Rule 9( (1) is 
33 A I. R. 1968. S. C. 346. 
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subject to Rule 9 (2) and under the cover of Rule 9 (2) the government can 
even arrogate to itself the power of assigning a class I post to a less 
meritorious and class II post to a more meritorious candidate. The last part 
of Rule 9 (2) gives the government an arbitrary power of ignoring the just 
claims of successful)' candidates for recruitment to Offices under the State. 
It is violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the constitution and must be 
struckdown. 
Where there are different modes prescribed for promotion ,not to 
consider other who were eligible, on the ground that the respondent was ' the 
only eligible candidate' would be violative of Art. 14 ". 
The ban imposed by govenment should have a reasonable basis and 
must have relation to his suitability for employment or appointment to an 
Office. But an arbitrary imposition of a ban against the employment of a 
certain person under the government would certainly amount to denial of right 
of equal opportunity of employment, guaranteed under Article 16 (1)^'. 
In Ramesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar *^ the appellant who passed the 
final examination of Bachelor of Science (Engineering) in Tele-Communication 
of the Ranchi University held in August, 1962 was appointed by the Bihar 
State Electricity Board as Assistant Engineer (Tele Communication) in 
September 1963. A few weeks after his recruitment, the appellant was sent by 
the Board to Switzerland for six months' specialized training in powei line 
carrier, tele metering and tele-control equipment in the modem power system. 
On his return he was deputed to look after the entire tele-communication 
system of the Board. The Board in June 1968 reorganized the tele 
34 R.N. Nanjudappa Vs T Thimmtah (1972) 2 S.C. R 799. 
35 Krishan Chandra Nayar Vs. Central Tractor Organisation, (1962) 3 S.C.R.187 
36 A.I.R 1978 S.C 327. 
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communication system and a temporary post of Executive Engineer (Tele 
Communication) was sanctioned. Acting on the recommendation of its Expert 
Selection Committee to the effect that the appellant was fit to be promoted to 
the rank of the Executive Engineer (Tele Communication) in view of the fact 
that he had a consistently good record of service possessed the degree in Tele-
Communication Engineering had undergone special training in Switzerland in 
Tele-Communication, had ever since his return from Switzerland been 
satisfactorily performing the onerous and complex duties assigned to him and 
had been looking after the entire Tele-Communication system of the Board 
and had thus acquired a valuable practical experience in that field which is 
necessary to man the post of executive Engineer (Tele-Communication). The 
Board issued the aforesaid notification temporarily promoting the appellant 
to the post of Executive Engineer (Tele-Communication. In this case the 
validity of the executive order which created the temporary post and laid dawn 
the qualifications was challenged. 
The Court held that on the facts and circumstances of the case that 
creation of a temporary post. Executive Engineer (Tele-Communication),was 
absolutely essential for ensuring reliability and continuity in power supply and 
the maintenance ofthe sophisticated equipments and selection ofthe appellant 
who was specially trained experienced and qualified, did not offend the 
provisions of Articles 14 and 16 ofthe constitution, when other persons who 
were not so qualified and trained were not considered while filling up the post. 
In Air India Vs. Nargesh Meerza ^^  where Air Corporations Act, 1953 
section 45 (2) (b), regulations 46 and 47 made under b> Air India International 
and Regulation 12, Para 3 made under by Indian Air lines Corporation were 
challenged as violative of Article 14 ofthe constitution. 
37. A.1,R.1981. S.C. 1829. 
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The Court observed that so far as the restriction on marriage within the 
first four years of service is concerned, the provisions do not sufer from 
unreasonableness or arbitrariness. But the provision according to which the 
service of Air-Hostess would stand terminated on first pregnancy is not only 
manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary but contains the quality of unfairness 
and exhibits naked despotism and is, therefore, clearly violative of Article 14 
of the constitution. It amounts to compelling the Hostesses not to have any 
child and thus interfere with and divert the ordinary course of human nature. 
By making pregnancy a bar to continuance in service of an Air Hostesses the 
corporation seems to have made an individualised approach to a women's 
physical capacity to continue her employment even after pregnancy which 
undoubtly is a most unreasonable approach. The termination of the services 
of an Hostesses under such circumstances is not only a callous and cruel act 
but an open insult to Indian woman hood. It is extremely destable, abhorrent 
to the notions of civilized society and grossly unethical in disregard of all 
human values. Pregnancy is not a disability but one of the natural consequences 
of marriage and is an immutable characteristic of married life. Thus the 
impugned provisions in A.I. Regulation 4 6 ( l ) ( c ) appear to be a clear case of 
Official arbitrariness. As it is severable from the rest of the regulation, it is not 
necessary to strike down the entire Regulation. It will, however, be open to 
the corporation to make suitable amendments so as to soften the rigrous of 
provision and make it just and reasonable and the similar provision regarding 
pregnancy contained in para 3 of India Airlines Corporation Regulation 12 
must also be struck down. 
Recently in A.M Shaila Vs. Chairman Cochin Port Trust ^^ where the 
policy of the Cochin Port Trust to exclude woman from emloymeut as shed 
38 19951 L L J (Kerala) 1193 
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clerk was challenged as violative of Articles 14 and 15 ofthe constitution. The 
Court observed : 
"Thepetitioner'sright under Articles 14 and 15, considered together, 
may be perceived from two angles-
(i) Is the grouping of women in a separate class based on their physical 
structure, capacity for work and the conditions in which they may be 
required to work, valid ? 
(ii) Is the exclusion of woman from specified jobs valid if it is designed 
to promote their well being and to protect them from hazardous work 
and social and moral risks"" ? 
Further after examiniiig various judical decisions^" the Court introduced 
the following principles-
(i)Women can not be excluded from employment by stipulating irrelevant 
and unnecessary qualification. 
(u)The denial of promotion to women on the score that job requires them 
to tour with men is discrimination on the ground only of sex and 
therefore unconstitutional. 
(iii)The differences of physical structure the effect of long hours of work, 
and the natural fiinctiou of motherhood place women in a separate class 
in the matter of employment 
3Q, Id at IIQS 
40 RajanimaVs State of Kerala, 1983 Lab I C 1388, Vijayamma Vs. State of Kerala 
( 1 9 7 8 ) I I L L J 323 (Ker), Curt MullerVs The State of Oregon, (1908) 208 U.S. 
412' Joseph RadiceVs People of N. York (1923) 264 U S. 292, Volentine Goesaert 
Vs Owen J Cleary (1948) 335 U.S 464. 
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(iv)The grouping of women as a separate class based on the conditions in 
which they may be required to work, is valid. 
(v)A law which seeks to protect women from moral and social hazards, by 
denying bartending licence or denying employment at right does not 
offend equality and equal protection of the law. 
(vi)The well being of women is an object of public interest. A law meant to 
protect women from the greed as well as passion of man is not 
discriminatory. 
Considering the above principles the Court held that no doubt women 
shed clerks are not required to lift the huge packages each weighing about 30 
tonnes. But they will have to tally them, move them around and read what is 
printed on them, all this may have to be done standing for the whole night or 
day, all alone. Secondly the movement a midst moving cargo and in the midst 
of huge cranes, forklifts etc ; demanding quick movment of feet, exposes them 
to accident. Thirdly presence at isolated spots particularly between 6.00 pm. 
and 6.00 am exposes them to what may be called risks peculiar to their sex. 
while women can not be excluded from employment only on the ground of sex, 
their right may be restricted, if the conditions in which they are required to 
work, are hazardous to their health and well being. The policy of the Port 
Trust indeed protects women from the hazardaus effect of such work on their 
well being. Therefore the policy is not based only on sex and does not violate 
Articles 14 and 15 of the constitution. 
Again in the same year, there was a question before the Allahabad High 
Court in regard to the appointment on the compassionate grounds. In this case 
the father of the petitioner, was a confirmed Asstt. Teacher in Baba Raghavdas 
Krishak Inter College, Bhatpur Rani, Distt. Deoria, which is a recognised a 
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ducational Institution, receiving grant, in aid from the State of U.P. He died 
in harness. Pursuant to a direction given by the Distt. Inspector of Schools 
Deoria, the principal of the College appointed the petitioner against a class-
4 post in the College. The said appointment was admittedly made on 
compassionate ground in view of the provisions contained in Regulation 103 
of chapter III of the Regulations made under the U.P Intermediate Education 
Act. The petitioner joined his duties in the college as class-4 employee 
pursuant to his appointment and is admittedly working there. The instant 
petition has been filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus 
directing the respondents to appoint the petioner as class-3 empolyee in the 
college. The basis of the claim of appointment to class post on compassionate 
ground is that the petioner is highly qualified, being M. Com., B. Ed. It was 
urged for the petitioner that he was entitled to be appointd on a clerical post 
commmeusurate with his qualification in the minimum and the respondents 
(State Government) were not justified in giving appointment on a class. 4 post 
in utter disregard of his educational qualification. The Court observed that the 
language employed in Regulation, 103, does not lead to a conclusion that the 
one member of the family of a deceased teacher who is above 18 years of age 
should as a matter of course and as a matter of right be appointed on a non-
teaching post, befitting his educational qualification. The object of the rule 
being to give relief against destitution and to see the family through the 
economic calamity, the dependant of the deceased cannot claim, as of right 
to be appointed on a non-teaching post befitting his qualification. Further it 
is implicit in the Rules that the dependant of a teacher dying in harness cannot 
claim appointment on campassionate ground as a matter of right irrespective 
of the financial position of the family of the deceased. Any other view of the 
Regulation would render it ultrea-vires and violative of Article 16. The 
petitioners having accepted the appointment to class 4 post on compassionate 
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ground, is not entitled now to claim appointment on compassionate ground to 
a clerical post on the basis of his educational qualifications "*'. 
In General Manager . S. RJy. Vs. Rangachari '^^ the question before the 
Court was whether the term employment' includes Promotion to selection 
post or not. In other words does Article 16 apply to all matters relating to 
employment including promotion to selection post ? The Supreme Court 
observed that in deciding the scope and ambit of the Fundamental Right of 
equality of opportunity guaranteed by this Aarticle it is necessary to bear in 
the mind that in construing the relevant Article to technical or pedantic 
approach must be avoided. Thus construed it would be clear that matters 
relating to employment can not be confined only to intial matters prior to the 
act of employment. The narrow construction would confine the application of 
Article 16 (1) to the initial employment and nothing else; but that clearly is 
only one of the matters relating to emloyment. The other matters relating to 
employment would inevitably be the provision as to the salary and periodical 
increments therein, term as to leave, to gratuity, to pension and to the age 
of super annuation. These are all matters relating to employment and they are, 
and must be deemed to be included in the expression "matters relating to 
employment" in Artcle 16 (1). This equality of opportunity need not be 
confiised with absolute equality as such. What is guaranteed is the equality of 
opportunity and nothing more. Article 16 (1) or (2) does not prohibit the 
prescription of reasonable rules for section to any employment or the 
appointment to office. Any provision asto the qualifications for the employment 
or the appointment to office reasonably fixed and applicable to all citizens 
would certainly be consistent with the doctrine of the equality of opportunity, 
41 PankajKumarSrivastava Vs. State of U.P( 1995) Lab I C . Allahabad High Court. 
P 1900 
42. A. I. R. 1962 S C 36 
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but in regard to employment, like other terms and conditions associated with 
and incidental to it, the promotion to a selection post is also tDcluded in the 
matters relating to employment, and even in regard to such a promotion to a 
selection post all that Article 16(1) guarantees is equality of opportunity to 
all citizens who enter service. Therefore, promotion to selection post is 
covered by Article 16(1) and (2). 
In All India Station Masters' Association Vs. General Manager, Central 
Railway*^ the question arose about the rights of promotion of the Roadside 
Station Masters and guards already employed in the Railway Service. The 
Roadside Station Masters claimed equality of opportunity for promotion qua 
the guards on the ground that they were entitled to equality of oportunity in 
the matter of employment or appointment to any office of the State under 
Article 16 (1) of the constitution. 
The Court observed: 
"It is clear that, as between the members of the same class, the 
question whether conditions of service are the same or not may well 
arise. If they are not, the question of denial of equal opportunity will 
require serious consideration in such cases. Does the concept of equal 
opportunity in matters of employment apply, however, to variations 
in provisions as between members of different classes of employees 
under the State ? In our opinion, the answer must be in the negative. 
The concept of equality can have no existance except with reference 
to matters which are common as between individuals, between whom 
equality is predicated Equality of opportunity in matters of 
employment can be predicated only as between persons, who are 
43. (1960)2S.C.R 311 
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either seeking the same employment ,or have obtained the same 
employmen.... There is, in our opinion, no scape from the conclusion 
that equality of opportunity in matters of promotion, must mean 
equality as between members of the same class of employees, and not 
equality between members of separate, independent classes.""*^ 
In U.S. Menon Vs State of Rajasthan"'. Thequestion which was before 
the Court was related to different pay-scales of two persons on same post of 
Deputy Secretary under the same Government i.e. Rajasthan Secretariate 
Sevice and Rajasthan Administrative Service under Rajasthan Civil Service 
(Rationalisation of Pay Scales) Rules and Schedules, 1956.The Court observed 
that the rules, on the face of them, show that, in the case of members of R. S. S. 
(Rajasthan Secretariate Service) appointed as Deputy Secretaries, no special 
pay is admissible , while special pay is admissible to members of the R.A.S 
(Rajasthan Administrative Service) when holding similar posts. 
But the methods of recruitment, qualifications etc., of the two services 
are not identical. In their ordinary time-scale, the two services do not carry 
the same grades. Even the post, for which recruitment in the two services is 
made, are to a major extent, different. The members of the R.A.S. are mostly 
meant for posts which are out side the Secretariate though some posts in the 
Secretariate can be filled by members of the R. A. S. 
In such a case, where appointment is made to the posts of Deputy 
Secretaries of Government servants belonging to two different and separate 
sevices, there can arise uo question of a claim that all of them, when working 
as Deputy Secretaries, must receive identical salaries, or must necessarily 
both be given special pay. It is entirely wrong to think that everyone, 
44. Id 315,316. 
45. A I. R. 1968S. C. 81 
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appointed to the same post, is entitled to claim that he must be paid identical 
emoluments as any other person appointed to the same post, disregarding the 
method of recruitment, or the source from which the Officer is drawn for 
appointment to that post. No such equality is required either by Article 14 or 
Article 16 of the consitution. 
The rules, as framed,are thus, based on well-recognised principles for 
granting salary of members to different Services even when they are appointed 
to the same post. In these circumstances, no question arises of any discimination 
under Article 14 of the constitution, or of any denial of equality of opportunity 
under Article 16 of the constitution. 
In State of J and K Vs. Triloki Nath Khosa"*, the classification of 
Assistant Enginners into Degree holders and Diploma-holders for the purpose 
of promotion under J. and K. Engineering (Gazetted) Service Recruitment 
Rules (1970), was challenged. 
The question before the Court was- if persons drawn from different 
sources are integrated into one class, can they be classified for purposes of 
promotion on the basis of their educational qualifications? 
The Court held that though persons appointed directly and by promotion 
were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for 
the purpose of promotion to the cadre of executive Engineers, be classified on 
the basis of educational qualifications. The rule providing that graduates shall 
be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders does not 
violate Articles 14 and 16 and must be upheld. The Court fiirther held that 
classification on the basis of educational qualifications made with a view to 
achieving administrative efficiency in the Engmeering services. If this be the 
46 A. I. R. 1974 S C. 1. 
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object, the classification is clearly correlated to it for higher educational 
qualifications are at least presumptive evidence of higher mental equipment. 
Recently in State of Punjab Vs. Dharam Paul ^', the stepping up of pay 
in favour of Instructor belonging to 8 Trades by way of revising the pay-scale 
by the order of Government was challenged by the Instructor belonging to 
other trades as violative of Article 14 of the constitution. In this case the Court 
held that it is undisputed that the instructors originally were getting one scale 
of pay namely 80-200 prior to 1961, by the virtue of the Government's order 
dated February 23, 1962 the said pay scale of Rs. 80-200 was revised to Rs. 
160-330 only in respect of the instructors in the 8 trades. The aforesaid pay 
revision in respect of the instructors belonging to the 8 trades was challangd 
unsuccessfully by the rest of the instructors belonging to other trades and the 
writ petition and the letters patent appe-1 ~J^:: January 24, 1972. 
While the State Government in September 1970 put all the instructors in one 
pay scale of Rs. 160-400 but so far as 181 instructors who had got a higher 
scale of pay in pursuance to the Government order were allowed to enjoy their 
scale as personal to them. This being the admitted position, in 1976, the pay 
scale was fiirther revised to Rs. 225-500 in respect of all instructors but while 
fixing the pay in the revised scale necessarily the higher pay drawn by those 
181 instructors belonging to the 8 trades was taken into account and they got 
a higher sum. In these circumstances the question of stepping up of the pay 
of Instructors does not arise. These 181 instructors originally may have been 
junior to these instructors but by virtue of the Government order dated 
February 23, 1962, they ha>'e been given higher scale of pay and the same 
benefit having been continued as a personal pay to them in the subsequent 
revision of the pay scale and the persons similarly placed ha\ing challenged 
47. (1996) II L, L. J. S. C 26 
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and lost ui the earlier writ petition, it is not open to them to reopen the matter. 
Therefore, the stepping up of pay on the ground that the qualification to the 
post of instructors being the same and they being governed by same service 
conditions a junior person can not get a higher sum is unsustainable. 
In Bhanu Prakash Singh's, case^* where 28 appellants while working as 
Lecturers in Haryana Agricultural University were selected to undergo Ph. D. 
Course in the year 1978. They joined in July and November, 1978. They were 
permitted as in service candidates to undergo the course according to the 
leave of the kind due to them. They pursued the course of study upto 1980-
81. They were not paid the leave salary and that, therefore, they filed the writ 
petition. The Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by its 
order dated May 10, 1992 dismissed the writ petition holding that during the 
relevant period due to financial stringency the University had prohibited the 
in service candidates to pursue their course of study and they are not in a 
position to pay the full pay etc,, to them. Thereafter, the said condition was 
withdrawn on January 10, 1979. Since the appellants had joined during the 
period of prohibition they are not eligible to get their fiiU pay except in 
accordance with the leave of the kind due to them. The Court held that the 
appellants were allowed to undergo Ph. D. course and it was clearly mentioned 
in the order that they would entitled to leave of the kind due to them. When 
the appellants were permitted to undergo the course subject to condition, then 
they can not have any right higher than what they were permitted to avail of 
The appellants are not entitled to any salary and allowances though other 
teachers, after lifting the prohibiton were permitted to undergo the course of 
study with full pay and allowances. Under these circumstances, there is no 
invidious discrimination or arbitar>' or unjust action violating equality enshrined 
4S. Dr Bhanu Prakasb Singh's Vs The Haryana Agricultural University, 1995 11 L. 
L. J. S C.654 
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ill Article 14 of the constitution. 
In Parimal Chandra Case's"', the canteen workers in Life Insurance 
Corporation's offices claimed that they are employees of corporation. They 
should be absorbed as regular employees and minimum salary of class IV 
employees should be paid. Two question arise before the Court: (1) whether 
the workers are or should be deemed to be regular employees of the Life 
Insurance Corporation and if the answer in affirmative (2) what pay-scales and 
other service conditions should be made available to them 
The court considers the statute law and judicial pronouncements'" and 
the following points emerge :-
(i) where, as under the provisions of the Factories Act, it is statutorily 
obligatory on the employer to provide and maintain canteen for the use 
of his employees, the canteen becomes a part of the establishment and, 
therefore, the workers employed in such canteen are the employees of 
the management. 
(ii)where, although it is not statutorily obligatory to provide a canteen, it 
is otherwise an obligation on the employer to provide a canteen, the 
canteen becomes a part of the establishment and the workers working in 
the canteen, the employees of the management. The obligation to 
provide a canteen has to be distinguished from the obligation to provide 
49 Panmal Chandra Raha Vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India (1995) II L L J S C 339 
50 Saraspur Mills Co Ltd Vs Ramanlal Chimanla) (1973) II LLJ 130, Dharangadliara 
Chemical Works Ltd Vs Stateof Saurashtra(1957) I L L J 477, Basti Sugar Mills Ltd Vs 
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s e c 191, All India Railway Institute Employees' Association \ s Union ofIiidia( 1991)11 
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facilities to run canteen. The canteen run pursuant to the latter obligation, 
does not become a part of the establishment. 
(iii)The obligation to provide canteen maybe explicit or implicit. Where the 
obligation is no explicity accepted by or cast upon the employer either 
by an agreement or an award etc., it may be inferred from the 
circumstances, and the provision of the canteen may be held to have 
become a part of the service conditions of the employees. Whether the 
provision for canteen services has become a part of the servie conditions 
or not, is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circumstances 
in each case. 
Where to provide canteen services has become a part of the 
service conditions of the employees, the canteen becomes a part of the 
establishment and the workers in such canteen become the employees of 
the management. 
(iv)Whether a particular facility or service has become implicitly a part of 
service conditions of the employees or not, will depend, among others, 
on the nature of the service/faciUty, the contribution the service in 
question makes to the efficiency of the employees and the establishment, 
whether the service is available as matter of right to all the employees 
in their capacity as employees and nothing more, the number of employees 
employed in the establishirent and the number of employees who avail 
of the service, the length of time for which the service has been 
continuously available, the hours during which it is available, the nature 
and character of management, the interest taken by the employer in 
providing, maintaining, supervising and controlling the service, the 
contribution made by the management in the form of infra structure and 
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funds for making the service available etc. 
It was held by the Court that from the facts and circumstances, it has 
to be held that the canteen has become a part of the establishment of the Life 
Insurance Corporation. The Canteen Committees, the Co-operative society of 
the employees and the contractors engaged from time to time are, in reality, 
the agencies of the Corporation and are, only avail between the Corporation 
and the canteen workers in fact are the employees of the Corporation. The 
Corporation is directed to prescribe different service conditions to different 
kinds of appellants. Pending prescription of such service conditions, the 
corporation should pay to all the appellants the minimum of the salary 
presently paid to class IV employees together with allowances and special 
facilities,if any other benefits available to class IV employees shall also be 
given. 
There was another case" where an employee (respondent) was 
employed as a mistry in a telephone workshop belonging to the appellant, the 
Union of India. There appears to have been a strike in the workshop and 
thereafter on July 9,1949, for what reason it does not appears from the record, 
the respondent was put under detention under the Bombay Public Security 
Measures Act. On July 21, 1949, the manager of the workshop suspended the 
respondent from duty with effect from the date of his detention. The order of 
suspension stated that the respondent was not entitled to any subsistence 
allowance during the period of suspension. On March 29, 1950, the manager 
passed an order terminating the service of the respondent with effect from July 
9, 1949, the date on which he was suspended He was given one month's pay 
in lieu of notice. The respondent was released from detention on October 25, 
1950, by an order made by the High Court at Bombay He had been in 
51 Union of India Vs PR More A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 630 
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detention from July *^. 1949, till October 25, 1950, during which period the 
orders, suspending him and terminating his service, were passed. After his 
release the respondent started proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act 
for arrears of his dues from the appellant, as a result of which he obtained 
payment of subsistence allowonce for the period during which he had been 
suspended. The respondent had also made a representation to the manager for 
reinstatement was rejected. He there upon filed a suit in the Bombay City Civil 
Court. In that suit he contended that the orders of his suspension and 
termination of service were void for various reasons but only two of them are 
relevent for the purpose of this appeal. He first said that the orders were in 
violation of Article 311 of the constitution as he had not been given proper 
opportunity to show cause why they should not be made. He also said that the 
order terminating his service violated Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution 
as he had been'arbitrarily picked up and sacked.' He claimed that the orders 
should be declared void and illegal. The trial Court held that he was a 
temporary employee and the termination of his ser\'ice being in terms of the 
contract of his employment, no question as to a violation of the Article 311 
of the constitution arose. It appears to have been conceded in the trial Court 
that if Article 311 ' is not made applicable to this case. The respondent 
appealed to the High Court at Bombay. The High Court affirmed the findings 
of the trial Court. This Court found nothing to support the conclusion that 
there hasbeen any discrimination. All that appears from the evidence led in the 
case, is that many employees junior to the respondent had been retained in 
service while his service had been terminated. It is earlier stated that the 
respondent had been detained under the Bombay Public Security Measures 
Act. It does not appear whether the employees junior to the respondent had 
been similarly detained As a person detained legally under a statute, the 
respondent might legitimately have been put m a separate clsss and treated 
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differently from others not so detained. Further, as a result of the detention, 
the appellant was deprived of the benefit of the respondent's service for a 
considerable period. That also put him in a separate class. The evidence does 
not show that the junior employees referred to were otherwise in the same 
class as the respondent. In these circumstances, the fact that the service of the 
respondent was terminated while employees junior to him were retained in 
service does not by itself prove unequal treatment and there is nothing else on 
which the respondent has relied to establish discrimination. 
The validity of Delhi judicial Service Rules (1970). R. 9 (a)and R. 11 
which were in relation to the seniority of Judicial Officers, was challenged in 
Joginder Nath Vs. Union of India ". In this case Supreme Court observed that 
the source of the initial recruitment to the service under clause (a) of Rule 9 
was subordinate Judges who necessarily belonged to the Judicial Cadre of a 
State and law graduate Judical Magistrate ( not merely Judicial Magistrates) 
working in the Union Territary of Delhi. The creation the ser\'ice being only 
in two grades, grade 2 and grade 1 (Selection grade) and there being no 
provision for appointment in the selection grade at the stage of the initial 
recruitment of the serx'ice all those who fiilfiUed the qualification laid down 
in clause (a) of Rule 9 and who were found suitable' by the Selection 
Committee could be initially recruited to Delhi Judicial Service Rule was not 
invalid. For the purpose of initial recruitment to the service Officers of the 
Judicial Cadre of a State and Officers although not belonging to the Judicial 
Cadre but by and large performing the Judicial functions could be put 
together. There was no infraction of Articles 14 and 16. The Court fiither said 
that once the Selection Committee found persons belonging to clause (a) of 
Rule 9 suitable for appointment to the service it was under a duty and 
52 A. I. R 1075 S, C 511. 
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obligation to arrange the list of suitable persons by placing them in proper 
places in the matter of seniority. They were all being initially appointed to the 
Delhi Judicial Service where in there was no separate gradation of posts. The 
assignment of duties was to follow on the basis of seniority list. Arranging the 
seniority of the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee in 
accordance with the length of service rendered by them in the Judicial Cadre 
to which they belonged at the time of their initial recruitment to the service 
was performed good. Taking the length of service rendered by the candidates 
in their respective cadres for the Delhi Judicial Service Rules was justified, 
legal and valid. Had it been otherwise it would have been discriminatary. It 
was not equating unequals with equals. It was merely placing two classes at 
par for the purpose of seniority when it became a single class in the integrated 
Judicial Service of Delhi. For the purpose of fixation of seniority it would 
have been highly unjust and unreasonable to take the date of their intial 
recruitment to the service as their first appointment. Nor was it possible to 
take any other date in between the period of their service in their parent cadre. 
It would have been wholly arbitrary. It was not possible or practical to 
measure their respective merits for the purpose ofseniority with mathematical 
precision by a barometer. The only reasonable and workable formula which 
could be evolve was the one engrafted in Rule 11. The object of the Delhi 
Judicial Service Rules was to create a service by integration of different 
classes of persons already working as judicial officers. The fixation of 
seniority on the basis of length of service in their respective parent cadres had 
a rational nexus to the object intended to be achieved, treating the two classes 
as one for the purpose of initial recruitment and fixation of seniority was 
reasonable as the classification was one which included all persons who were 
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. Rule 11 was not bad 
as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. 
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Recently Delhi High Court decided a case" where the petitioner was 
commissioned in the Military Nursing Services as Lieutenant from June 1, 
1988 and kept on probation for a period of two years. During the probation 
she got married in December 1988. Such marriage being in violation of clause 
A of criteria dated March 6, 1987, her services were terminated on this 
"Marriage ground". The petioners challenged the termination as being 
discriminatary on ground of sex. The Court held that clause A and termination 
of the petitioner's service based thereon were held to be nothing but a basis 
on account of sex. It was clearly in violation of Articles 15 &16 of the 
constitution. The petitioner's service could not be terminated on the mere 
ground of marrriage. The Court observed it found no difference between a 
total ban on marriage of women while in service and the present ban on 
marriage during probation period. The impugned order was set aside. 
In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ex-Employees' Association Vs 
Bharat Petroleum Corporation '•*. The question before the Court was relattu 
to discrimination in of the payment of pension. The Court held that the 
appellants had specifically raised the demand for increasing the pension on the 
basis of D. A. merger with basic pay and the demand that 50% of the total 
wages should be the foundation for calculation of the pension. In the industrial 
dispute adjudication this demand was expressly negatived and the same was 
allowed to become fmal. That apart, it seen that in the industrial adjudication 
other demands also had been raised and while granting the benefits on the 
demands the parties the management and the workmen entered into a 
compromise in the High Court, agreeing to pay to the employees retired prior 
to January 1, 1989 higher amount of Rs. 50,000/= and the working employees 
53. Balwinder Kaur Vs Union of India, (1996) I. L. L J. Delhi High Court 1012. 
54. (1995) II L. L. J. S. C. 843. 
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the benefit of Rs. 25000/=. Thus having consented to the adjudication made 
by the Tribunal and having allowed the Industrial Tribunal award to become 
final, it is not open to the appellant to go behind the award and claim pension 
on parity with others on the anvil of Articles 14 and 21. That apart the 
difference of payment of the pension had arisen on account of the revision of 
the wages etc,only in the industrial adjudication and demands by the Union on 
behalf of the workmen. The discimination was due to the acts of the respondents. 
It is no longer, therefore, open to the workmen to contend that they are 
entitled to parity in the payment of pension with the employees in other 
regions. The retired employees in other regions are getting higher pension that 
the retired employees of Bombay region but it is only due to judicial 
adjudication. 
In Ganga Ram Vs. Union of India ". The procedure of determination 
of seniority of grade I Accounts clerks ofthe Railway Establishment, contained 
in the provisions of Indian Railways Establishment Manual was challenged as 
violative of Articles 14 and 16 ofthe constitution. 
The Court said that the procedure for determining seniority of Grade 
I Accounts Clerks as contained in Indian Railways Establishment Manual, by 
which seniority of direct recruits to Grade I is determined on the basis of their 
appointment where as seniority of promotees from Grade II is determined with 
reference to their substantive or basic seniority in grade II irrespective ofthe 
dates they qualify for promotion by passing the examination prescribed for the 
purpose does not violate Artices 14 and 16. The Court fiirther said that the 
direct recruits and the promotees from grade 11 clearly constitute different 
classes and this classification is sustainable on intelligible differentia which 
has a reasonable connection with the object of efficiency sought to be 
55. A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 2178. 
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achieved. Promotion to grade I is guided by the consideration of seniority-
cum-merit. Hence, no fauh can be found with the provisions which place in 
one group all those grade II clerks who have qualified by passing the 
qualifying examination. The fact that the promotees from grade II who have 
officiated for some time are not given the credit of this period when a 
permanent vacancy arise also does not attract the prohibition contained in 
Arties 14 And 16. It does not constitute any hostile discrimination and is 
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. It applies uniformity to all members of 
grade II clerks who have qualified and become eligible. 
In V. N. Sharraa's case'* the question before Court was whether there 
can be different age of retirement to different kinds of employees in the same 
organisation. The Court held that disparity between the age of retirement of 
different classes of employees under one employer does not per se amount to 
discrimination. If the discrimination between the two groups of employees is 
based upon reasonable differentia. Article 14 is not violated. Therefore, in an 
organisation there could be different ages of retirement for different sets of 
employees and lack of uniformity in the age of retiiement does not fall foul of 
Article 14 of the constitution, unless it is shown that the classification is not 
based upon reasonable differentia or is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and 
unfair. The petitoners in the present case cannot claim violation of Article 14 
as they have not been able to establish that the disparity between the ages of 
superannuation of'workmen' and safai Karamcharis on the one hand and other 
employees on the other, is not grounded on intelligible differentia, or the same 
suffers from the vice of unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness. 
Therefore, their claim of violation of Article 14 because of lack of uniformity 
in the ages of retirement of employees of the corporation is not tenable. 
56. V. N. Sharnia Vs. Lt. Governor (1996) II L. L. J. Delhi High Court. 94. 
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111 E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu", the matter before the court 
was related to the transfer of employee from one post to another where the 
posts are of equal status and responsibility. The Court observed: 
"The posts of Deputy Chairmen, Planning Commission and Officer on 
special Duty are equal in status and responsibility. The service of 
cadre Officers are utilised in different posts of equal status and 
responsiblity because of administration and employing the best 
available telent in the suitable post. There is no hostile discrimination 
in transfers from one post to another when the post are of equal status 
and responsibility'*. 
In P. B. Roy Vs. Union of India" the appellant was holding a temporary 
post of Editor in the Publication Division of the Department of Information 
and Broadcasting. The temporary post was sactioned upto 28.2.1957. On 
16.2.1959, the President of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by the 
provisou to Article 309 of the constitution, promulgated the Central 
Information Service Rules, 1959. These Rules were meant for the creation of 
a Central Information service with prescribed grades and strengths, and entry 
into the service was open to departmental condidates according to rule 5 for 
initial constitution of the service. The appellant was chosen by the Selection 
Committee and was posted as and Assistant Editor. He challenged the said 
order and it was contended that the impugned order violated Articles 14 and 
16 of the constitution in as much as it places an employee who was serving as 
an Editor in post of lower grade with less emoluments whereas no such result 
had followed in the case of any other employee in the Information and 
Broadcasting Department. The Court observed: 
57 (1974) Lab 1 C 427 
58 Id at 438 
59 (1972)S C R 449 
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"We are unable to see how an order which has the effect of terminating 
an officiating appointment, in which the petitioner had no right to 
continue, and which gives him a fresh appointment, with a different 
designation but permanent tenure and propects, constitutes as violation 
of either Article 14 or 16 of the constitution simply because the 
process which resulted in such an order did not have a similar effect 
upon the position or rights of any other servant in the Department. 
Indeed, the Selection Committee had, apparently after taking into 
account the special features of the petitioner's individual case, 
recommended the maximum pay, in the class and grade of the post 
given to him and the petitioner got this exceptional pay. Even his 
prospects improved to the extent that from the precarious position of 
a termporary servant he had moved into a permanent service. It could 
not be definitely stated that his position had worsened on the whole. 
He was at least no longer subject to the hazards of temporary 
employment which could be terminated by a month's notice at any 
time."*" 
In Sughar Singh's case" the question before the Court was in relation 
to reservation of one out of several officers from officiating post to substantive 
post. The Court observed: 
Where the petitioner alone is reverted from his officiating post to his 
substantive post allowing others who were juniors to him to retain 
their officiating posts and the basis for such reversion is admitted to 
be an adverse entry in his character roll, the order of reversion is by 
way of punishment and amounts to reduction in rank. The order is also 
violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution". 
60 Id. at 456. 
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In Balaji Vs. State of Mysore," the Court held that the sub-classification 
made by the order between backward classes' and 'more backward classes' 
was notjustified under Article 15 (4). 'Backwardness'as envisaged by Article 
15 (4), must be both social and educational and not either social or educational. 
Though caste may be relevant factor but it cannot be the sole test for 
assertaining whether a particular class is backward class or not. Poverty, 
occupation place of habitation may all be relevant factors to be taken into 
consideation. Article 15 (4) does not speak of castes', but only speak 
classes'and caste' and class' are not synonymous. The impunged order, 
however, proceeds only on tbe basis of caste without regard to other relevant 
factors and that is sufiBcient to render the order invalid. 
There are some other cases where the arbitrariness, unreasonableness 
and unfairness in the State action and the Constitutional validity of various 
labour legislations was tested on the basis of provisions of Articlel4 of the 
Constitution. 
In. E.P. Royappa Vs State of Tamil Nadu,*^ the Supreme Court 
observed: 
"Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and 
it can not be 'cribbed, cabined and confined, within traditional and 
doctrinaire limits. From a positive point of view, equality is antithetic 
to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrainess are sworn anemies; 
one belong to the rule of la w in a republic while the other, to the whim 
and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is 
implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and 
Constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14"*'. 
63 Al R 1963 S C 649 
64 AI R 1974 S C 427 
65 Id at 556 
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In Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India *'' ,the Court observed: 
"Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness 
and equality of treatment. The Principle of reasonableness, which 
legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality 
or non arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding 
omnipresence..."" 
Recently in Satya Deo Mishra Vs State of U.P.**, where the petitioner 
was appointed temporarily on 1-8-1970 on the post of Agriculture Teacher 
and joined his post on 14.8.1970 after having selected by the department. 
Since then he has been continuously working on the said post with an 
unblemished record of service. He was thereafter transferred from place to 
place but was not regularised and juniors to him had been regularised, he made 
representations in 1985 and 1987 to the Additional Director (Basic) to 
confirm him but no action was taken. His service was terminated by the order 
dated 16.3.1988. The only reason given in the impugned order is that the 
petitioner's services are no longer required, the Court observed: 
"In my opinion the concept that a temporary employee has no right to 
the post has to be modified in the light of the new interpretation of 
Article 14 of the constitution given by the Supreme Court in Maneka 
Gandhi's Case, which is a 7- Judge constitution Bench decision 
followed by sevral subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. The 
concept that a temporary employee has no right to the post can not 
be treated as an absolute concept. It has to be treated as subject to 
Article 14of the constitution. The constitution is the supreme law of 
66. A.IR 1978 S C 591 
67 Id at 624. 
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the land. If the Supreme Court gives as new interpretation to a 
constitutional provision then it is necessary to revise the earlier 
concepts in the light of the new interpretation given by the Supreme 
Court. To tell a person who has put in 18 years of service that his 
service is no longer required, in my opinion is wholly arbitrary and 
unreasonable... But it is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable to keep a 
damocles sword hanging over the head of the employee and not to 
confirm him for a longer period of time. No one can work properly if 
he does not get job security. Hence the concept that a temporary 
employee has no right to the post must be held to be subject to Article 
14 of the consttitution according to which the State can not act 
arbitrarily"*'. 
In Jalan Trading Co. Vs., Mill Mazdoor Sabha ''", The consitutional 
validity of section 36 of the Payment of Bonus Act (1965) was challenged. 
Under section 36 power conferred on appropriate govenment to exempt an 
establishments from operation of Act provided government is of opinion that 
having regard to financial position and other relevant circumstances, it would 
not be in public interest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act. The 
Court held that condition for exercise of that power (under section 36) is that 
the government holds the opinion that it is not in the public intrest to apply 
all or any of the provisions of the Act to an establishment or class of 
establishment, and that opinion is founded on a consideration of the financial 
position and other relevant circumstance. Parliament has clearly laid down 
principles and has given adequate guidance to the appropriate government in 
implementing the provisions of section 36. The power so conferred does not 
amount to delegation of legislative authority. Section 36 amounts to conditional 
69 Id at 444 
70 A.I.R. 1967 SC 691 at 703 
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legislation, and is not void. Whether in a given case, power has been properly 
exercised by the appropriate government would have to be considered when 
that occasion arises. 
In M/s Bhikus Yama Kshatrya (P) Ltd. Vs., Union of India " , it was 
held that section 85 of Factories Act, 1948, which authorises the State 
government to issue a notification applying all or any of the provisions of the 
Factories Act, to any place in which a manufacturing process is carried on and 
which involves the consequence that place is deemed a factory and persons 
working therein are deemed workers, is not by itself disciminatary so as to 
infringe Article 14 of the constitution. 
In Mangalore Ganesh Beedi works Vs., Union of India,^ sectionsS and 
4 of Bidi and Cigar workers (Condition of Employment) Act, 1966 were 
challenged as violative Article 14. 
Sections 3 and 4 require the licence in respect of industrial premises 
and authority granting licences will have to consider certain matters mentioned 
in section 4. The licencing authority is required to communicate the reasons 
in writing if it refuses to grant licence. Section 5 provides an appeal to the 
appellate authority. The Court held that it shows that grant of licence is to be 
determined on objective considerations.The provisions are neither unfair nor 
unreasonable. 
In Manager, Vidarbha Tobacco Products (P) Ltd. Vs. Fulwantabai 
Ishwardas" the workers in the Bidi industry upon termination of their services 
by their employer sought relief by initiating proceedings before the prescribed 
authority, that is, before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, under section 
71 (1964)1 S C R . 860. 
72. (1974)4 S.C.C. 43. 
73. 1996 1 L.L.J. Delhi High Court, 101. 
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31 (2) oftheBidi and Cigar workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966. 
The Asst. Labour Commissioner held the termination as bad and set then 
aside. Six writ petitions were filed by the emplooyees against the orders of 
the Asst. Labour Commissioner challenging interlia the cosntitutional validity 
of section 31 (2) (a) of the Beedi worker. Act, 1966. The Court held that 
merely because the authority to whom an appeal under section 31 (2) (a) 
challenging the dismissal, discharge or retrenchment by an employer has not 
been specified, it can not be said that the said provision confered unbridled and 
uncontrolled power for appointment for such authority hearing the appeals. 
Vasting of the discretion in the State Government to make the rule interalia 
concening the authority to impose the time within which such an appeal may 
be filed dos not invalidate section 31 (2) (a) on ground of contravention of 
Article 14 of the constitution. The Court further said that since the constitutional 
validity of entire Beedi workers Act, 1966 has been upheld by the Apex Court 
in Mangalore, Ganesh Beedi Workers Vs., Union of India, the fact that certain 
aspects were not specifically raised or certain provisions of the Act were not 
specifically challenged therein can not permit the re-opening the issue with 
different pleas at diffeent times. The constitutionality of section 31 (2) (a) 
would thus be presumed to have been upheld by the Apex Court in Mangolare 
Ganesh Beedi Works Case. 
In M/s Murugan Talkies Vs., Union of India^^section 24 and 25 of Cine 
Workers and Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation and Employment) Act, 
1981, making applicability of Provisions of employees Provident Funds and 
Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952 and Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, were 
challenged as violative of Article 14 of the constitution. The Court held that 
section 25 carves out only a special class of employment unlike section 1 (3) 
74. (1995) II L.L.J. Madras High Court. 1129. 
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(b) of Gratuity Act and hence not violative of Article 14. The Court fiirther 
says: 
"The constitutionality of a statute is always presumed and Courts 
must always endeavour to uphold the validity of a satutary provision. 
It should also be the endeavour of the Court to interpret the legislation 
in such a manner that it is easily workable. The maxim'ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat' will apply"". 
In Express News papers Vs., Union of India^\ The constitutional 
validity of various provisions of the Working Journalists (Conditions of 
Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955 was challenged on the 
ground that the Act violated the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the 
petitioners (employers) under Articles 14,or 19(1) (a) or 19(1) (g) or 32 of 
the constitution. In this case, the Court in regard to the violation of Article 
14 of the constitution, observed : 
"The working Journalists are a group by themselves and could be 
classified as such apart from the other employees of newspaper 
establishments and if the legislature embarked upon a legislation for 
the purpose of ameliorating their conditions of service there were 
nothing discriminatary about it. They could be singled out thus for 
preferential treatment against the other employees of newspaper 
establishments. A classification of this type could not come within the 
ban of Article 14. The only thing which is prohibited under this Article 
is that persons belonging to a particular group or class should not be 
treated differently as amongst themselves and no such charge could 
be levelled against this piece of legislation. If this group of working 
75. Id. at 1133. 
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of jounialists was specially treated in this manner, there is scope for 
the objection that group had a special legislation enacted for its 
benefit or that a special machinery was created, for fixing the rate of 
its wages different from the machinery employed for other workmen 
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947..."" 
The Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of contract 
Labour (Regulation andAbolitions) Act, 1970 and of the Central Rules the 
Rajasthan Rules and the Maharashtra Rules made there under in Gammon 
India Ltd. Vs., Union of India *^, and found that there is unreasonableness in 
the measure. 
The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that the provisions of 
the Act are unconstitutional and unreasonable because of impracticability of 
implementation. The Canteens, rest rooms, supply of drinking water, latrines, 
urinals,first aid facilities are amenities for the dignity of human labour and are 
not in exes of the object of the Act. There is no violation of Article 14. The 
classificaion is not arbitrary. The legislature has made uniform laws for all 
contractors. 
It is submitted that equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies, one 
belongs to the rule of law in republic while the other to the whim and caprice 
of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is 
unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is, 
therefore, violative of Article 14. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in 
state action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment in matters relating 
to employment and appointment. The term employment and appointment' is 
wide enough to include all matters in relation to employment, both prior and 
77. Id. at 341. 
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subsequent such as initial appointment, pay, conditions of service, confirmation, 
abolition of post, compulsary retirement, reversion, superannuation pension, 
transfer, reservation, periodical increments, and gratuity etc. It is attracted 
where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. The 
principle underlying the guarantee is that all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. 
Equal laws, rules, and regulations must be applied equally and there should be 
no discrimination between one person and another if as regard the subject 
matter of either administrative action or of legislation, their position is 
substantially the same. Article 14 forbides class legislation but permits 
reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation or administrative 
mandate. The classification must, however, be founded on an intalligible basis 
which distinguishes persons or things that are group together jfrom those that 
are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus with 
the object to be achieved by the differentiation made in the statute order, rules 
or regulations in question. In othe words, there ought to be casual connection 
between the basis of classification and the object of the classification. 
Supreme Court has been assigned with the duty as the guardian and 
interpreter of the India constitution. So the interpretation given by the 
Supreme Court in respect of labour legislations is to be viewed from the stand 
point of its responsibility to preserve the sanctity of the constitution. 
This is fact that the judicial aproach towards the Fundamental Rights 
i.e.. Articles 14,15 and 16 in the area ofemployment and appointment has been 
more liberal than in the case of other economic reforms. In the cases discussed 
above,the Courts have shown greater enthusiasm in guaranteeing the equality 
of opportunit> m the matters relating to employment and appointment 
contained in Article 16. 
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Article 16 (4) empowers the State to make special provision for the 
reservation of appointments of posts in favour of any backward class of 
citizens which in the opinion of the State are not adequately represented in the 
services under the State. 
Article 16 (4) must be interpreted in the light of Article 335 which says 
that the claims of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into 
consideration consistently with maintenance of efficiency of administration. 
The reservation for backward classes should not be unreasonable. The scope 
of Article 16(4) was considered by the Supreme Court in Devadasan Vs. 
Union of India ' ' . In this case the constitutional validity of the Government's 
instructions in regard to reservations for members of Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes for recruitment to posts and services was challenged. The Supreme 
Court observed that it must be held that the carry-forward provisions of the 
reservation in favour of candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes contaioed in the resolution of Government of India, Ministry 
of Home Affairs, dated 13,September 1950, as clarified by the supplementary 
instructions dated 28, January 1952 and 7 May 1955 (resulting in reservation 
of more than 50 percent of the vacancies to be from candidates belonging to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) are unconstitutional as infi-inging the 
provisions of Article 16(1) of the constitution of India. 
Mere educational backwardness or the social backwardness does not 
by itself make a class of citizen backward. In order to be identified as 
belonging to such a class, one must be both educationally and socially 
backward. Backward classes must be comparable to Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribes*". 
79 1965 II L.L.J. S C 560 
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In State of Kerala Vs. N. M. Thomas *', the important questionwhich 
came up for consideration of the Court was whether it was permissible to give 
preferential treatment to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under 
clause (1) of Article 16, that is, out side the exception clause (4)of Article 16. 
The Keral Govenment framed rules for promotion of employees working in 
the Registration Department from the lower division clerks to the higher posts 
of upper division clerks. According to Rule 13 AA the promotion depended on 
passing departmental tests whithin two years. Rule 133AA. however, 
empowered the State Government to further exempt for a sepecified period 
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from passing the test. 
Pursuant to Rule 13AA the Government passed the impugned order granting 
exemption for two years more to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
candidates to pass the test. This exemption was challenged as discriminatary 
under Article 16 (1). A seven member Bench of the Supreme Court by a 
majority 5:2 held that the classification of employees belonging to Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes for allowing them an extended period of two 
years for passing tests for promotion from other classes of employees was just 
and reasonable classification having rational nexus to the object of providing 
equal opportunities for all citizens in matters relating to employment or 
appointment to the Public Office: The temporary relaxation of test qualification 
made in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was warranted in 
the services in view of their overall backwardness. The above Rules do not 
impair the test of efficiency in administration in as much as members of 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are promoted will have to 
acquire the qualification of passing the test ultimately. The only relexation is 
that they are granted two years more time to aquire the qualification. Thus 
according to the majority reserxation for backward classes may made even 
81. A.I.R. 1976 S.C 490. 
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outside the scope of clause ( 4) of Article 16. The Rules and Order were, 
therefore not violative of Articles 14, 16 (2) and valid. This is a new 
interpretation of Article 16 (1) of the constitution. 
In Akhil Bhartiya Shoshit Karamchari Sangh Vs, Union of India *^ , the 
Supreme Court, following Thomas case, upheld the validity of the Railway 
Board Circular under which reservations were made in selection posts of the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates. The Court held that under 
Article 16 (1) itself the State might classify groups or classes based on 
substantial differentia. So the Fundamental Right to equality of opportunity 
has to be read as justifiying the categories of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes separately firom rest of the community for the purpose of adequate 
representation in the services under the State. Thus the classification between 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates from the rest of 
communities for the purpose of reservations is just and reasonable because 
they constitute a class by themselves beause of their social backwardness. The 
Court also upheld the carry forward rule under which 17% posts are reserved 
for those categories. The carry forward rule was extended from 2 to 3 years. 
As a result of this rule the reservation quota came to about 64.4% but the 
Court held that this was not excessive as mathematical precision could not be 
applied in dealing with human problems. Some excess will not affect the 
reservation, but substantial excess will void the selection. 
This attitude of the judiciary creates lot of resentment amongst people 
who are denied promotions and thereby affects efficiency in the administration. 
Besides, politicians can take undue advantage of the rulings in the above case 
and create disharmony and dissensions amongst members of different classes 
of society. 
82. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 298. 
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(a) Mandal Commission and Reservation:- On January 1, 1979 the 
government headed by the Prime Minister Sri Morarji Desai appointed the 
second Backward Classes Commission under Article 340 of the constitution 
under the chairmanship of Sri B. P. Mandal. to investigate the socially and 
educationally backward classes within the territory of India and recommend 
steps to be taken for their advancement including desirability for making 
provisions for reservation of seats for them in Government Jobs. The 
Commission submitted its report in December 1980. The government has 
placed the report on the Table of the Parliament in 1982 but has not indicated 
its reaction to the said report. Though the Commission had been asked to 
recommend the criteria of backward classes, the Commission has not 
grappled with this problem. Instead of suggesting norms and guide lines for 
determining what class of persons should be regarded as backward, the 
Commission has selected certain castes which are in their opinion backward 
and therefore backward classes. Apparently the Conmiission is of the view 
that the castes as a whole are backward and they form backward classes. "The 
Commission identified as many as 3743 castes as socially and educationally 
backward classes and recommended for resevation of 27 percent Government's 
Jobs for them"". 
M. HidayatuUah observed: 
"It is somewhat disappointing for such a commission to run away 
from the task imposed upon it. If the reality is that certain castes as 
a whole form backward classes why was it that the framers of the 
constitution prohibited discrimination on the ground of caste but 
allowed it on the ground of backward classes. The obvious intention 
wasto discourage casteism and to deal with socially and educationally 
backward classes rather than caste. But the caste feelings are so 
strong and the castes are so united in pressing their claims as castes 
83. Dr. J.N. Pandey, "Constitutional Law of India" 120 (Thirty First Edition 1997, Central Law 
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that even the Mandal Commission abandoned the attempt to 
formulate any criteria for detemination of backward classes and 
contented itself by equating the backward classes with certain castes. 
The unfortunate effect of such and attitude is to encourage casteism 
and to enable discrimination on the ground of caste, though this is 
expressly contrary to its terms of reference in so far as they require 
the Commission to determine the criteria for distinguishing socially 
and educationally backward classes. The making of reservations was 
to be only in favour of socially and educationally backward classes 
and not in favour of castes on this ground alone therefore the report 
is liable to be rejected and cannot form the basis of Governmental 
action"**. 
In the meantime the Janta government collapsed due to internal 
dissensions and the Congress Party headed by the Prime Minister Smt. Indira 
Gandhi came to power at the Centre. The Congress Government did not 
implement the Mandal Commission report till 1989. In 1989 the Congress 
Party was defeated in the Parliamentary elections and the Janta Dal again came 
to power and decided to implement the Commission's report as it had 
promised to the electorate Accordingly, the government of India, headed by 
Prime Minister Sri V. P. Singh issued the Office Memoranda (Called O.M) on 
August 13, 1990reserving 27 percent seat forbackward classes in Government 
services on the basis ofthe recommendations of the Mandal Commission. The 
acceptance ofthe report ofthe Mandal Commission threw the Nation into 
turmoil and voilent anti-reservation movement rocked the Nation for nearly 
three months resulting in huge loss of persons and property. A writ petition 
on behalf of the Supreme Court Bar Associationwas filed in a famous case of 
Indira Sawhney Vs. Union of India*', (Popularly known as Mandal Case,), 
84 M Hidayatullah. " Constitutional Law of India" 279 (Vol I. the Bar Council of 
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challenging the validity of the O.M. and for staying its operation. The five 
Judges Bench of the Court stayed the operation of the O.M. till the final 
disposal of the case on October 1, 1990. Unfortunately the Janta government 
again collapsed due to defections and in 1991 in Parliamentary elections the 
Congress Party again came to power at the Centre. 
The Congress Party government headed by Sri P.V. Narsimha Rao 
issued another Office Memoranda on September 25, 1991: (i) by introducing 
the economic criterion in granting reservation by giving preference to the 
poorer sections of Socially and Educationally Backward classes in the 27 
percent quota, and (ii) reserved another 10 percent of vacancies for the other 
socially and educationally backward classes economically backward section 
of higher castes. The economic critierion was to be specified separately. The 
five Judges Bench referred the matter to a special Constitution Bench of 9 
Judges in view of the importance of matter fmally settle the legal position 
relating to reservation as in several earlier judgements the Supreme Court 
have not spoken in the same voice on this issue. Despite several adjourments 
the Union Government failed to submit the economic criterion as mentioned 
in Official Memoranda September 25, 1991. The Supreme Court held that the 
decision of the Union Government to reserve 27 percent Government jobs for 
backward classes provided socially advanced persons-creamy layer among 
them-are eliminated, it is only confined to initial appointments and not 
promotions and total reservation shall not exceed 50 percent. The Court 
accordingly partially held the two impugned notifications (O.M.) dated 
August 13, 1990 and September 25, 1991 as valid and enforceable but subject 
to the conditions indicated in the decision that socially advanced persons-
creamy layer-amongst backward classes as excluded. However, the court 
struck down the Congress Government's O.M reserving 10 percent Government 
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jobs for economically backward classes among higher classes. The majority 
also held that the reservation should not exceed 50 percent. While 50 percent 
shall be the rule but it is necessary not put out of consideration certain 
extraordinary situations inherent in the great diversity of this country and 
people. In view of this the majority did not express any opinion on the 
correctness or adequacy of the Mandal Commission Report. The minority 
struck down the two OMs issued by the Union Government as unconstitutional. 
It held also that Mandal Report is unconstitutional and recommended for the 
appointment of another Commission for identifying the socially and 
educationally back ward classes of citizens. 
Position after Indra Sawhney's Case:- The decision of Indra Sawhney 
case has laid down a workable and reasonable solution to the problem of 
reservation. But the politician are still trying to dilute the effect of this 
decision in order to make their vote bank intact. The Court has laid down that 
there shall be no reservation in promotions in Government jobs. But the 
government has enacted the Constitution 77th Amendment. Act, 1995 in 
order to bypass the Court's ruling on this point. This amendment has added a 
new clause (4-A) to Article 16 of the Constitution. This clause provides: 
"Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any 
provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or 
classes of posts in the services of the State in favour of the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes which in the opinion of the State, are not 
adequately represented in the service under the State". 
This means that reservation in promotion in government will be 
continued for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes even after Indra 
Sawhney's case if the government wants to do so. The haste in which the 
government had brought this amendment clearly shows that it was passed for 
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political cousiderations. It caused a lot of bitterness and disappointment 
among employees of the same category where were bypassed by their 
colleagues having less merits. It has its own dangers. 
The Supreme Court has to intervene again. In Union of India Vs. Virpal 
Singh ** the Supreme Court has tried to mitigate to some extent the inequity 
that reservation in general has to represent by holding that caste criterion for 
promotion is violative of Article 16(4) of the Constitution. The Sureme Court 
rightly held that seniority between reserved category candidates and general 
candidates shall continue to be governed by their panel position prepared at 
the time of selection. 
The Constitution Bench in R.K. Sabharwal Vs. State of Punjab*^ has 
said in clear and unambiguous terms that after the quota is over and roster 
points are full, then the "running account" of roster shall stop and there is no 
question of promoting beyond the posts which had been reserved. In the said 
judgement it has been said in respect of members of Scheduled Castes that if 
they are appointed/promoted on their own merit, then such candidates shall 
not be counted towards the percentage of reservation fixed for them. On the 
basis of the same logic, whenever members of the Scheduled Castes are to be 
considered for promotion against posts which are not reserved for them, then 
they have to be selected on merit only. They cannot claim that as they had been 
promoted earlier from Grade 'C to Grade 'B' on the basis of reservation and 
roster, in this process they have superseded the candidates belonging to the 
general category and even for promotion against general category post in 
Grade 'A' the only requirement shall be satisfactory record of service. 
86 (1995)6 s e c 684 
87 J T 1995 (2) S C 351 
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In Ajit Singh Januja Vs. State of Punjab** the Supreme Court relying 
and following the judgements of Indra Sawhney, Virpal Singh and Sabharwal 
cases, observed: 
"The roster comes to an end once the quota fixed for reservation is full. 
If Scheduled Caste or Backward class candidates appointed/promoted by 
roster are considered against posts meant for general category candidates 
merely because they have become senior on basis of accelerated promotions 
then, it would mean that for all practical purposes the promotions of such 
candidates are being continued like running account although the percentage 
of reservation provided for them has been reached and achieved. Once such 
reserved percentage has been achieved and even the operation of the roster 
has stopped, then how it will be permissible to consider such candidates for 
being promoted against the general catogory post on the basis of their 
accelerated promotion which has been achieved by reservation and roster. 
Once is full and roster has stopped for members of Scheduled Castes and 
Backward classes in respect of whom reservation has been made and roster 
has been prescribed, their case for promotion to still higher grade against 
general category post have to be considered not treating them as member of 
Scheduled Castes or Backward Classes "on any crutch". They cannot be 
promoted only on basis of their 'accelerated seniority' against the general 
category post**'". 
In a recent case in Jadhish Lai Vs. State of Haryana*', the Supreme 
Court has held that the seniority gained by Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes candidates because of his accelerated promotion as per rule of 
reservation cannot be wiped out on promotion of general candidates on a later 
88.A.I.R 1996 S.C 1189 
88a Id. at 1190. 
89 AIR. 1997 S.C. 2366. 
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date. The reserved candidates will become senior to the general candidates in 
each successive promotion. The court further said that on promotion to the 
higher cadre the reserved candidates steal march over general candidates and 
become member of the service in the higher cadre grade earlier to the general 
candiates. Under Rule 11 of Haryana Education Department (State Service 
Group B) Rules (1980), the inter se seniority of the members shall be 
determined by the length of continuous service in a post in the service. 
Therefore, their seniority cannot be reopened, after the general candidates get 
promotion to the higher cadre or grade, though he was erstwhile senior in the 
feeder cadre/grade. 
The ruling of the Supreme Court in these cases puts a question mark 
on the validity of the recent Constitution amendment permitting reservation 
in promotions to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
It is submitted that at the initial stage reservation can be made for them 
but once they enter the service, efiBciency demands, that these members too 
compete with others and earn promotions like all others. 
(b) Equal Remuneration for Men and Women : 
The main desire has been for social security since the origin of 
mankind. All human beings want minimum requirement of food, shelter and 
clothing. There have been historical revolutions in China, Russia and other 
Countries to have economic security an emancipation from exploiter's yoke. 
In human society there can not be mathematical equality nor it is physically 
and humanly possible. There has been endeavour to reduce it to the minimum 
gap and efforts will continue till the survival of the human beings'". 
90, R.K. Mahajan, "Doctrine of Equal Pay for Equal Work: Judicial Activism", 65 (Supreme 
Court Journal, 1991). 
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Equal pay for men and women for equal work is a vital subject of great 
concern to society in general and employees in particular; a disparity in wage 
payment leads to unrest and discontent". 
During last few years flood of litigation all over India has cropped up 
in Supreme Court, High Court, and Tribunals on the part of the workers to 
seek equal pay for equal work. The case law has been developed on the 
interpretation of Article 39 (d) read with Article 14 of the Indian constitution. 
International Concern ;- It is one of the significant Human Rights set out in 
the Universal Decleration of Human Rights, which the General Assembly of 
United Nations adopted and proclaimed on 10th December, 1948 (with not a 
single Country voting against it), as "a common standard of achievement of 
all people and all nations". It stipulates that "Every one without discrimination, 
has a right to equal pay for equal work". Further Article 7 of the International 
Convenant on Economic and Cultural Rights of 1966, inter alia, provides: 
"The States parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work 
which ensure, in particular....the equal remuneration for work of equal 
value without distinction of any kind in particular women being 
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, 
with equal pay for equal work...." 
Earlier in February 1957, at its 11th Session, the General Assembly of 
the United Nations Third Committee adopted the text of Article 7 of the draft 
International Covenant on economic, social and cultural right, which recognised 
as follows: 
91. S.C. Srivastava,"Eual Remuneration for Men and Women", P. 83. (Journal of the 
Indian Law Institute, 1990). 
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"The right of everyone to enjoyment of just and favourable conditions 
of work including fair wage and equal remuneration for work of equal value 
wdthout distinction of any kind, in particular, women being guaranteed... 
equal pay for equal work. Furthermore, Article 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) provides that all persons are 
equal before the law and have the right to equal protection by the law without 
discrimination'^. 
In the United Nations the Commission on the Status of women , a 
functional Commission of Economic and Social Council, has recognised the 
need for providing "equal pay for equal work" for men and women workers. 
It has also taken several steps to promote the principles of equal pay. For 
instance, in 1947, at its first session, it set forth as one of its aims that women 
should enjoy the same right as men with regard to wages. In 1948, at its second 
session, it adopted a resolution afBrming its support of the principle of equal 
pay and recommended that the Economic and Social Council call on member 
States to encourage application of the principles by all posssible means. 
A significant milestone in acceptance and promotion of the principles 
of equal pay for equal work'was earlier reached with the establishment of the 
Intemation of Labour Organisation (I.L.O). While the preamble to the I.L.O 
constitution of 1919 stressed the urgency of, inter alia, recognition of the 
principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value', the preamble to the 
constitution as amended in 1948 re-afiBrmed the urgency in improvement of 
the conditions of Labour a s regards the principle o f equal pay for equal work'. 
In May 1944, the Philadelphia Declaration, which set down the aims and 
objectives of I.L.O. and principles of social policy that were to inspire 
member States, had affirmed among the principles basic to social justice that 
92. Ibid 
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"all human beings regardless of race, creed or sex have the right to pursue their 
material progress and spiritual development in liberty and dignity, in economic 
security and with equal changes". In its 34th session I.L.O. adopted a 
convention concening equal remuneration for men and women workers for 
work of equal value, known as Equal Remuneration Covention 1951. This was 
complemented by Recommendation No. 90. I. L. O. 1951. The latter 
underlined that the achievement of equality of remuneration should be 
accompanied by more extensive measures than mere fixing of pay rates. In 
1958 I. L. O. concluded Convention N o . l l l against discrimination in matters 
of employment and profession. In September 1958, India ratified ILO 
convention No. 111 which requires a member State ratifying it to promote as 
well as ensure application of the principle of equal remuneration to all workers 
through national laws or regulations,legally established or recognised 
machinery for wages determination, collective agreements between employers 
and workers or a combination of these means ". 
(c) Status of Women: 
The Preamble of the Indian Constitution sets out the main objectives 
which the framers of the constitution intended to achieve. It seeks to secure 
to citizens including women, justice social, economic and political; liberty of 
thought, expression, faith and worship; equality of status and opportunity and 
to promote among the people of India fraternity, assuring dignity for individual 
and the unity of the nation. Although the expressions, Justice' 'Liberty' 
Equality ; and Fraternity, stated in the Preamble, may not be susceptible to 
exact definitions, yet they are not mere platitudes for they are given content 
by the enacting provisions of the constitution particularly by Part III, dealing 
with the Fundamental Rights and Part IV, dealing with the Directive Principles 
93. Ibid. 
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of State Policy. 
The 'Directive Princiie' contained in Article 38 envisages a social order 
in which social, economic and political justice is assured to the people of 
India. Thus the object of this Article is to promote the welfare of India 
masses. 
Article 39 of the constitution relating to the Directive Principles is 
more specific and comprehensive in nature. This Article with six sub-clauses 
is analogous to the one contained in Article 45 (2) of the Irish constitution. 
This Article specifically requires the State to strive for securing equal pay for 
equal work of both men and women. [Article 39(d)]^^ 
Among the Fundamental Rights Article 14 guarantees' equality before 
law and equal protection of laws within the territory of India'. Article 15 
prohibits discrimination on grounds, inter alia, of sex. Article 15 (3) empowers 
the State to make, any special provision in favour of women. Article 16 
guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. While 
Article 16(1) ensures equality of opportunity for all citizens (including 
women ) in matters relating to employment or appointment to any Office under 
94 Article 39: "The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-
(a) that the citizen , men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of 
livelihood. 
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so 
distributed as best to subserve the common good; 
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the common detriment. 
(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women; 
(e) that the health and strength of workers men and women, and the tender age of 
children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to 
enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength. 
(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner 
and in conditions of freedom ..." 
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the State, Article 16 (2) prohibits discrimination in respect of any employment 
or Office under the State on the ground, inter alia, of sex. 
Legislative Measure: In order to implement the constitutional directive, the 
President of India promulgated on the 26th September, 1975, the Equal 
Remuneration Ordinance, 1975 so that the provisions of Article 39 of the 
constitution may be implemented in the year which is being celebrated as the 
International Women's Year. The Ordinance provides for payment of equal 
remuneration to men and women workers for the same work or work of similar 
nature and for the prevention of discrimination on grounds sex. The ordinance 
also ensures that there will be no discrimination against recruitment of women 
and provides for the setting up of Advisary Committees to promote employment 
opportunities for women. The Act received the assent of President on 
February 11, 1976, published in Gazette of India. 
Imortant Provisions: Some important provisions of the Equal 
Remuneration Act are discussed as follews:-
Selection 2 (a) defines appropriate government' to means-
(i) In relation to any employment carried on by or under the authority of the 
Central Government or a railway administration, or in relation to a 
banking Company ,a mine, oilfield or major port or any corporation 
established by or under a Central Act, the Central Government, and 
(ii)In relation to any other employment, the State Government. 
In K.E. Koshy Vs. State," the Court observed : 
"Having regard to the definition of appropriate government' given in 
section 2 (a) of the Act, the placement of the expression in the 
95 (1988) Lab. I.C Karnatak High Court. 879. 
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definition clause of the Act and the purpose for which it is enacted, 
it has to be held that the case of the firm and its partners would be 
covered by section 2 (a) (ii) of the Act (the residuary clause). Section 
2 (a) (i) is not attracted . The firm and its partners are independent 
contractors and it can not be said that their employment is the one 
carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. The 
case of the firm and its partners would be governed by the residuary 
provision in section 2 (a) (ii)and the State Government would be the 
appropriate government." 
Section 2 (g) defines" remuneration" to mean -
The basic wage or salary, and any additional emoluments what so ever 
payable, either in cash or in kind, to a person employed in respect of 
employment or work done in such employemnt, if the terms of the contract of 
employment,express or implied, were fulfilled. 
Section 2 (h) defines the term" same work or work of a similar nature". 
It states: 
Work in respect of which the skill, effort andresponsiblity required are 
the same, when performed under similar working conditions, by a man or a 
woman and the differences, if any, between the skill, effort and responsibility 
required of a man and those required of women are not of practical importance 
in relation to the terms and conditions of employment. 
In M/sMackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. Vs., Audrey D'Costa'%the 
Court held that in deciding whether the work is the same or of a similar nature, 
a broad approach should be taken. In doing so the duties actually and generally 
96. (1987) Lab. I.e. 961. 
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performed by men and women not those theoretically possible, should be 
looped at. 
Section 3 clearly provides that the provision of the Act shall have effect 
notwithstanding anything inconsistant therewith contained in any other law or 
in the terms of any award, agreement or contract of service, whether made 
before or after the commencement of the Act, or in any instrument having 
effect under any law for the time being in force. In Mackinnan Mackenzie's 
case" the Court said that the management can not, therefore, rely upon the 
settlement arrived at between the parties. The settlement has to yeild in favour 
of the provisions of the Act. The employer is bound to pay the same 
remuneration to both of them irrespective of the place where they were 
working unless it is shown that the women are not fit to do the work of the 
same stenographers. Nor can the management deliberately create such 
conditions of work only with the object of driving away women fi^om a 
particular type of work which they can otherwise perform with the object of 
paying then less remuneration elsewhere in its establishment. 
Section 4 imposes duty on an employer to pay equal remuneration men 
and women workers for same work or work of similar nature. In order to grant 
relief under section 4 the employee should establish that the remuneration paid 
by the employer, whether payable in cash or in kind is being paid at rates less 
favourable then those at which remuneration is paid by him to the employees 
of the opposite sex in such establishment for performing the same work or 
work of a simliar nature. Whether a particular work is same or similar in nature 
as another work can be determined on three consideration. In deciding 
whether the work is the same or broadly similar, the authority should take a 
broad view; next, in ascertaining whether any differences are of practical 
97. Ibid.. 
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importance, the authority should take an equally broad approach for the very 
concept of similar work implies differences in details, but these should not 
defeat a claim for equality on trivial grounds. It should look at the duties 
actually performed, not those theoretically possible. In making comparison 
the authority should look at the duties generally performed by men and 
women. Whether, however, both men and women work at inconvenient 
times, there is no requirement that all those who work e.g., at night, shall be 
paid the same basic rate as all those who work normal day shifts. Thus, a 
women who works days can not claim equally with a man on higher basic rate 
for working nights if, infact, there are women working nights on that rate too, 
and the applicant hereself would be entitled to that rate if she changed shifts. 
But that does not mean that there can be no discrimination at all between men 
and women in the matter of remuneration. There are some kinds of work which 
women may not be able to undertake. Men do work like loading, unloading, 
carrying and lifting heavier things which women can not do. In such cases 
there can not be any discrimination on the ground of sex. Discrimination 
arises only where men and women doing the same or similar kind of work are 
paid differently. Wherever sex discrimination is alleged, there should be a 
proper job evaluation before any fiirther enquiry is made. Ifthetwojobsin an 
establishment are accorded an equal value by the application of those criteria 
which are themselves non-discriminatary (i.e., those criteria which look 
directly to the nature and extent of the demands made by the job) as distinct 
fi-om criteria which set out different value for men and women on the same 
demands and it is found that a man and a woman employed on these two jobs 
are paid differently, then sex discrimination clearly arises. 
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The Act does not permit the management to pay to section of its 
employees doing the same work or work of similar nature lesser pay contrary 
to section 4(1) only because it is not able to pay equal remunaration to all. 
The applicability of the Act does not depend upon the financial ability of the 
management to pay equal remuneration as provided by it '^. 
If the two jobs in an establishment are accorded an equal value by the 
application of these criteria which are themselves non-discriminatary (i.e., 
those criteria which look directly to the nature and extent of the demands 
made by the job) as distinct from criteria which set out different values for men 
and women on the same demands and it is found that a man and a women 
employed on these two jobs are paid differently, then sex discrimination 
clearly arises '^ 
Sub-section (3) would be attracted only where in an establishment or 
an employment the rates of remuneration payable before the commencement 
of the Act for the men workers and for the women workers for the same work 
or work of a similar nature are different the proviso to sub-section (3) of 
section (4) comes in to operation only where sub section (3)is applicable,.Where 
there are no different scales of pay sub-section (3) of section 4 would not be 
attracted and, consequently, the proviso would not be applicable at all. The 
proviso can not travel beyond the provision to which it is a provision'*"*. 
Section 5 attempts to check discrimination in recruitment in future on 
the basis of sex except where the employment of women in such work is 
prohibited or restricted by or under any law. Section 6 provides for 
establishment of an advisar>' committee with the objective of increasing 
98. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd Vs. Audrey D' Costa 1987 Lab. l.C. 961. 
99. Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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employment opportunities for women. Section 7 empowers the appropriate 
government to appoint adjudicating authority to hear and decide complaints 
and claims arising out of non-payment of equal pay to both men and women. 
The Act also provides for appointment of an appellate authority to hear any 
appeal against the decision of the authority. Section 16 mapes an exception 
where difference in remuneration of men and women workers in any 
establishment is based on factors other than sex. 
During the last 10 years some defects, ambiguity and loopholes have 
been noticed. To overcome these defects, ambiguity and loopholes the Act 
was amended in 1987. According to this amendment Courts can take cognisance 
on the basis of complaints made by recognised organisations notified by the 
Centre or State Governments. The amendments in the Act also remove the 
ambiguity and loopholes in certain provisions of the Act and make penalties 
more stringent. 
(3) Judicial Attitude : In 1962 the Supreme Court was for the first time 
called upon to decide a claim for a higher pay scale. Among various grounds. 
Article 39 (d) was put forward to support it . But the Consittution Bench 
rejected the claim, observing that equal pay for equal work was an abstract 
doctrine and had nothing to do with Article 14 "". The trend thus set by the 
Supreme Court in 1962, was reversed only after about two decades, when a 
milestone in the area of implementation of the Equal Remuneration Act, was 
reached with the pronouncement of Supreme Court decision in Asiad Case"'^ 
The Court ruled that it is the principle of equality embodied in Article 14 of 
the constitution which finds expression in the provision of the Equal 
Remuneration Act, 1976. 
101 Kishori Mohan Lai Bakshi Vs Union of India A.I R 1962 S.C 1139. 
102 People 's Union for Democratic Rights Vs. Union of India (1982) II L.L.J. 454 
(S.C.) 
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lu Randhir Singh 'Case"'\ construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of 
Preamble and Article 39 (d), the Supreme Court observed: 
"It is true that the principle of equal pay for equal work' is not expressly 
declared by our constitution to be a fundamental goal. Article 39 (d) of 
the constitution proclaims 'equal pay for equal work for both men and 
women' as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal 
work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for 
everyone and as between the sexes"."*^ 
Mr. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy breathed Judical life in to the doctrine 
o f equal pay for equal work'. In this case, he gave it content by declaring that 
it is not a ' mere demagogic slogan' but a constitutional goal' capable of being 
achieved through constitutional remedies and enforcement of constitutional 
right. 
Several other cases followed where the principle of equal pay for equal 
work was applied by the Supreme Court . The Randhir Singh decision was 
afifirmed and expanded within two years by Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court in D.S. Nakara Vs. Union of India,"^* giving relief to the 
pensioners, justice Desai observed that the Central Government, the State 
Government and likewise all Public Sector Undertakings are expected to 
function like mode and enlightened employees". In this connection he explamed 
the objective of a socialist' State. While relying on the decision of Randhir 
Singh case, the Supreme Court in the case of P. Savita Vs. Union of India"", 
held that the equal pay for equal work envisaged in Article 39(d) of the 
103 Randhir Singh Vs Union of India, A I R 1982 S C 879 
104 Id at 881 
104a A 1 R 1983 S C 130 
105 A I R 1985 S C 1124 
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constitution of India and has exalted it to the position of a Fundamental Right 
by reading it alongwith Article 14. It was held by the Supreme Court in 
Surinder Singh Vs. Engineer-in-Chief, C.P.W.D,""" that the Central 
Government like all organs of State is committed to the Directive Principles 
of State Policy and Article 39 enshrines the principle of equal pay for equal 
work'. The claimants of relief in this case were poor daily -wages wokers 
employed for several years by the Central Public Works Department. They 
demanded parity in their waged with those of regular and permanent employees 
of the department on the basis of doing identical work. The Court granted the 
immediate relief in view of Randhir Singh decision. 
Again in Bhagwan Das Vs. State of Haryana '"^ the Supreme Court 
was of the view that 
(i) Persons doing similar work can not be denied equal pay on the ground 
that made or recruitment was different; and 
(ii) a temporary or casual employee performing the same or similar duties 
and functions is entitled to the same pay as that of a regular or permanent 
employee. 
A survey of the aforesaid decisions reveals the creative role of judiciary 
in securing equal pay for equal work to both sexes. Further the Court has 
brought equal remuneration withing contours of Fundamental Right of equality. 
However till 1987. it did not lay down the test for determining 'same and 
similar work'"*. 
106. A.I.R. 1986 S C 584 
107. A.I.R. 1987 S C 2049 
108. S.C. Srivastava, "Equal Remuneration for Men and Women', 87 (Journal of Indian 
Law Institute, 1990). 
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In MackinoD Makenzie's case the employee was working as a Lady 
Stenographer. The Lady Stenographers working in the establishment of the 
petitioner were called" Confidential Lady Stengographer' since they were 
attached to the senior executive working in the petitioner Company. In 
addition to the work of Stenographers they were also attending to the persons 
who came to interview the senior executives and to the work of filing, 
correspondence etc. There was practically no diference between the work 
which the Confidential Lady Stenographer were doing and the work of their 
male counterparts. She accordingly claimed the difference between the 
remuneration paid to her and her male counterpart. The Court held that the 
confidential Lady Stenographers were doing the same work or work of a 
similar nature as defined by section 2 (h) which the male stenographers in the 
Company were performing. There was practically no difference between the 
work which the confidential Lady Stenographers were doing and the work of 
their male Counterpart. 
It is submitted that in the cases discussed above and in many other cases 
the Supreme Court affirmed and reaffirmed the view taken in Randhir Singh's 
case. In fact by examining the above cases one can witness the judicial 
radicalism of the Supreme Court in developing the doctrine of equal pay for 
equal work in this decade. 
But, unfortunately this trend was departed and the traditional and 
conservative out look again took place in the latest pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court. In State of U.P.Vs. J.P. Chaurasia'"", the Supreme Court 
observed that the question of equal pay for equal work depends on several 
factors. More often fiinctions of two posts may appear to be the same or 
similar. But There may be difference in degrees in performance. The quantity 
109. (1989)1 S.C.C. 121, 
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of work may be the same, but the quality may be different. Equation of posts 
or equation of pay must be left to the executive government. It must be 
determined by expert bodies like pay Commission. The Court should not try 
to be a thinker with such equivalence unless it is shown that it was made with 
extraneaus considereation. The Supreme Court further said that this principle 
has no mechanical application in every case of similar work. It has to be read 
in to Article 14 of the constitution. Article 14 permits reasonable classification 
founded on different basis. 
In both Randhir Singh's case and Chaurasia's Case, Article 14 was 
strongly relied upon to achieve different ends. In 1982 in (Randhir Singh's 
Case) the equality clause of Article 14 was used to breath life into the doctrine 
of equal pay for equal work, in 1989 (Chaurasia' Case) the reasonable 
classificaton part of the same Article used to snufiFout its life. 
In reality the major section of deprived workers are working on 
starving wages even government sector. They are afraid of seeking equal pay 
for equal work due to poverty, unemployment and due to fear of victimisation. 
It is true that the Trade Union movement could not achieve equal pay for equal 
work as Fundamental Right after decades of struggle. Justice Chinnappa 
Reddi achieved by stroke of his pen. But such judge made law has its own 
limitations. Firstly, it can be nullified by subsequent judicial pronouncements. 
Secondly, the scope of its application is narrow. In this country Fundamental 
Rights are enforceable only against the State and not against individuals. 
Therefore, a person can challenge the violation of Article 14 only if the State 
disciminate him / her. There is no remedy if a private person discriminates. The 
doctrine of equal pay for equal work is unworkable against private employers. 
If the benefits of this doctrine is to reach the vast multitude of workers who 
are in the private sector, unorganised sector, the government should enact a 
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comprehensive legislation covering all categories of workers in all sectors, for 
the effective implementation of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work"". 
Further it is submitted that infact, there is not even a single piece of 
legislation in India guaranteeing a citizen equal pay for equal work, No State 
Machinery is there to protect the worker's right to get equal pay for equal 
work, of course, there is the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. But the Act is 
insufficient and ineffective. Firstly, it seeks to provide for payment of equal 
remuneration to male and female workers, but it does not guarantee equal pay 
for equal work among men. Secondly it provides for equal wages for man and 
women for same or similar work. Similar work is defined as one on which the 
skill, effort and responsibility are the same. But the government on subjective 
satisfaction has the power to declare that difference in remuneration between 
men and women in specific establishment is based on a factor other than sex. 
Moreover, establishing that the work is same or similar is an uphill task. For 
instance, in the construction industry women helpers carrying bricks are paid 
less than male helpers who carry cement begs. There is nothing in the 
argument that carrying 100 kg. of bricks is less strenuous than carrying 100 
kg. of cement. But a claim for equal pay could be easily defeated by saying that 
it is not same and similar work""'. Therefore, the government should enact 
a comprehensive legislation covering all categories of workers in all sectors, 
for the effective implementation of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. 
110 MISS Y Vishnupria "Equal Pay for Equal Work in India Myth or Reality", 88 
(Supreme Court Journal 1991) 
111. Ibid. 
e'y^^p^si^-'i/ 
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CHAPTER - V 
Freedom of Speech and Association 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to discuss freedoms engarafted 
in Article 19 of the Constitution in relation to working class. The rights of 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association 
and freedom of movement, protect some of the vital interests of the workers, 
strengthening their hands in forming trade unions, in staging demonstration 
for their genuine demands and in carrying on collective bargaining for the 
betterment of the class as a whole. These various freedoms are necessary not 
only to promote certain basic rights ofthe workers but also certain democratic 
values in, and oneness ofthe country. Present chapter is confined only to the 
discussion of the right of freedom of speech and expression, freedom of 
association, demonstration, strike, picketing, and collective bargaining. The 
recent controversial and unprecedented judgement ofthe Supreme Court in 
Bharat Kumar's case is also discussed. An attempt is further made to highlight 
the judicial attitude towards the right to strike, demonstration and to form 
association. 
A: Scope of Freedom of Speech and expression: In any democracy, workers 
must have the right to agitate to press their demands and grievances. The right 
to agitate empowers those without resources. We have many excellent rules 
and laws. But in practice, the workman is harassed and denied his rights at 
every step. The oppressed must have the right to take his problem to the 
streets. In fact, the working class of our country needs both freedom and food. 
Neither freedom nor food be sacrified at any cost. Freedom is unthinkable 
without free speech. Workers, man and woman who are free, should be in a 
position to exchange their ideas in order to manage their own affairs. The right 
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to protest, and agitate has to be kept alive in any democratic polity. "The best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market"'. Freedom devoid of free speech is meaning less. 
Freedom of epxression is supreme condition of mental and moral progress. 
It is widely believed that as a form of protest the general strike or hartal 
had evolved during the freedom struggle itself and the nation's top leaders 
gavenumerouscallsto people to suspend all work to convey how serious they 
were. 
Article 19 (1) (a), guarantees to all citizens, the right to freedom of 
speech and expression. The corresponding Article in the Draft Constitution 
was Article 13. Members of the Constituent Assembly hailed the guarantee of 
free speech and welcomed the Article guaranteeing Fundamental Right as "the 
most important", "the very life of the Draft Constitution", "the charter of 
liberties", "the crux of Fundamental Rights" etc.^ 
Freedom of speech is the bulwork of democratic government. This 
freedom is essential for the proper fiinctioning of the democratic process. In 
Romesh Thappar Vs. State of Madras^ the Supreme Court observed: 
"Freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all 
democratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public 
education, so essential for the proper fiinctioning of the process of popular 
Government, is possible"^. 
1. Abrams Vs United States, (1918) 250 U S. 616 (630) 
2. B Shiva Rao, 'The Framing of India's Constitution-A study'. Select Documents, 222 
(N.M Tnpathi (P) Ltd., Bombay 1968). 
3 (1950) S C R . 594 
4. Id at 602 
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Freedom of expression means the right to express once's convictions 
and opinions freely, by words of mouth, writing, printing, picture or any other 
manner. It would thus include not only the freedom of press', but the 
expression of one's ideas by any visible representation, such as by gesture and 
the like, by carrying banners and signs. 
In Express Newspapers Vs. Union of India** the court said that it is not 
to be understood, however, that the freedom of speech and expression 
includes the liberty to express or propagate one's own views only. It also 
includes the right to propagate or publish the views of other people, otherwise 
this freedom could not have included freedom of press which is obviously 
included in it. Expression includes the idea of, 'publication, and distribution' 
or circulation as well as the right to receive the matter distributed^. Freedom 
of speech and expression would thus include freedom to hold opinions, to 
seek, recieve and import information and ideas, either orally, by written or 
printed matter or by legally operated visual or auditary devices, such as radio, 
cinematograph, gramophone, loudspeaker, etc. 
The freedom of speech and expression has four broad special purposes 
to serve: 
(1) it helps an individual to attain self-fulfilment; (2) it assist in the 
discovery of truth; (3) it strengthens the capacity of an individual in participating 
in discussion making; and (4) it provides a machanism by which it would be 
possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change. 
The freedom of speech and expression is, however, not absolute. 
Absolute individual rights can not be guaranteed by any modem State. The 
5 Supra Note 3. 
6. AIR. 1958 S.C. 578 at 614 
7. Ibid. 
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majority of the founding fathers of the Constitution firmly believed that no 
freedom including freedom of speech and expression, could be absolute; and 
had to be subject to reasonable regulations. There was considerable controversy 
as regards the extent and area of restrictions that could be imposed upon the 
exercise of Fundamental Rights. 
Article 19(2)* as it fmally emerged and became part of the Constitution 
of India permitted the imposition of restrictions on the exercise of right of 
freedom of speech and expression. 
Extended form of freedom of speech and association: 
It is not a correct view that a right which is not specifically mentioned 
by name can never be a Fundamental Right within the meaning of Article 
19(1). The test is whether the right claimed is an integral part of a named 
Fundamental Right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the 
named Fundamental Right so that the exercise of such right is in reality and 
substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named Fundamental 
Right. 
In Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India' the Court observed: 
"The right to paint, or sing or dance or to write peotry or literature 
is also covered by Article 19(1) (a) because the conunon basic 
characterstic in all these activities is freedom of speech and 
expression"'". 
8 Article 19(2) "Nothing in sub-cluase (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of 
any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law 
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said 
sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of 
the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, 
or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an effence" 
9 A.l.R 1978 S C. 597 
10. Id. at 640. 
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lu this case the Union of India contended that the Fundamental Right 
guaranteed by the Constitution were available only within the territory of 
India. How could the Fundamental Rights be intended to be operative out side 
the territory of India when their exercise in the foreign territory could be 
protected by the State? The Court rejected these contentions and held that the 
right to freedom of speech and expression has no geographical limitations. 
The court further observed: 
" Freedom of speech and expression carries with it the right to gather 
information as also to speak and express oneself at home and abroad 
and to exchange thoughts and idea with others not only in India but 
also outside"". 
In Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Manubhai. D. Shah,'^ the 
Apex court explaining the scope of the freedom said that the words freedom 
of speech and expression, includes the right to propagate one's views through 
the print media or through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and 
television. Every citizen of this country, therefore, has the right to air his or 
her views through printing and the electronic media, subject to permissible 
restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution'^ The court 
directed Doordarshan to telecast respondent's award winning film. The 
grounds that the list of award winning film was long and 'therefore' it was not 
possible to telecast the film, can not be justified under Article 19(2) of the 
Constitution. 
11. Id. at 637. 
12. (1992)3 S.C.R. 595. 
12A Id at 607 
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In a historic judgement in Secretary, Ministry of Information and 
Broad-Casting Vs. Cricket Association of Bengal'\ the Supreme Court has 
considerably widened the scope and extent of the right to freedom of speech 
and expression and held that the Government has no monopoly on electronic 
media and a citizen has under Article 19( 1) (a) a right to telecast and broadcast 
to the viewers/listeners through electronic media Television and Radio any 
important event. The Government can impose restrictions on such a right only 
on grounds specified in clause (2) of Article 19 and not on any other ground. 
State monopoly on electronic media is not mentioned in clause(2) of Article 
19. 
In a signigficant judgement in Tata Press Ltd. Vs. Mahanagar Telephone 
Nigam Ltd.'"*, a three Judges Bench has held that a commercial speech 
(advertisement) is a part of the freedom of speech and expression granted 
under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. It can only be restricted on the 
grounds specified in clause (2) of Article 19. 
In a judgement of far reaching importance in People's Union for Civil 
Liberties Vs. Union of India", the court held that telephone tapping also 
violates Article 19( 1) (a) unless it comes within grounds of restrictions under 
Article 19(2). The freedom means the right to express one's convictions and 
opinions fireely by words of mouth, writing, printing, picture, or in other 
manner. When a person is talking on phone he is exercising his right to feedom 
of speech and expression. Telephone tapping unless comes within the grounds 
of restrictions under Article 19(2) would infract Article 19(l)(a) of the 
Constitution'" 
13. (1995)2 S.C C 161 
14 (1995)5 S C.C !39 
15 A.I.R. 1997 S.C 568. 
16. Id. at 575. 
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It is crystal clear from the above cases that during the last fifteen years 
the judiciary has given new dimensions to Article 19(l)(a). These decisions 
have heralded a new revolution. But unfortunately the judiciary has given step 
motherly treatment to the working class in relation to their right of freedom 
and expression. The recent judgement of the Supreme Court in Bharat 
Kumar's Case'' is the example of such step motherly treatment of the judiciary. 
In this case the Kerala High Court has declared bundh organised by any 
political party or trade union as unconstitutional and illegal. The Supreme 
Court on 12-11-1997 put its stamp on the Kerala High Court judgement. 
The Apex Court has failed to examine the instrumental value of non 
violent techniques of expressing disagreement with authority or expressing 
the views. It is respectfully submitted that there is a mixed reaction on the 
verdict of this case. An attempt is made to discuss the arguments given for an 
against the verdict of the above decision on the question of bandh (general 
strike) declared by the court as unconstitutional. The views of the leaders of 
political parties and Trade Unions and eminent lawyers are also discussed. 
Judicial attitude:-
It was contended in the Bharat Kumar's case that calling a bandh 
entails exhortion to violence and physicaUy restraining others who are citizens 
of the country and hence, it is illegal activity and can not be supported as a 
Fundamental Right of freedom of speech and expression or of assembling 
peaceably and without arms protected by Article 19(1) (a) and (b) of the 
Constitution. It was ftirther complained that by the calling of the bandh and 
holding of it, citizens are prevented from attending to their avocations and the 
traders are prevented from keeping open their shops or from carrying on their 
17. Bharat Kumar Vs. State of Kerala ,1997 (2) K.L.T. 287 (F.B). 
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business activities. It is also contended that the workers are prevented from 
attending to work in the factories and other manufacturing establishments 
leading to loss in production resulting in national loss. It is also contended that 
with a view to purvey terror, the organisers of the bandh also indulge in 
wanton acts Vandalism like destruction of Government property and transport 
vehicles and even private cars and two wheelers. These illegal acts cannot be 
recognised as part of the right of any person protected by Article 19( 1) of the 
Constitution. It is also contended that the right of the political parties, if any, 
to hold demonstrations or to show protest, can not extend to preventing the 
citizens of the country from exercising their Fundamental Rights of attending 
their business, their studies and their avocations and in such a context, the 
calling for and the holding of bandh ought to be declared illegal. It is 
complained that neither the State nor the police force take steps to prevent 
violence and to prevent coercion so that whenever a bandh is called, a citizen, 
out of fear for his life and his property, is forced to remain indoors. No person 
has a right to prevent a citizen from going to the hospital or from seeking 
medical aid and no person or organization has a right to prevent the doctors 
from attending their duties by attending on their patients and those who come 
to them for emergency treatment. The right to go to the railway station, the 
aerodrome and to the bus terminal could not be prevented in the guise of a 
protest at the instance of some of the political organisations and when such 
prevention is achieved by threat, sometimes naked and visible and somethimes 
by psychological means and by the stalking menace, the same has to prevented. 
Since the State and its machinery have failed the citizen, by doing nothing to 
ensure that he is enabled to enjoy his Fundamental Rights, the petioners are 
compelled to approach the court by invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 
of the Constitution. The petitioners submit that the Court in exercise of its 
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has not only the right but the 
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duty to protect the citizen and his Fundamental Rights guaranteed to him 
under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The court is reminded that though 
it can not direct the legislature to legislate or the executive to introduce a 
legislation, it has the duty to direct the executive to ensure that the rights of 
the citizens are not trampled upon by a political organisation or a violent 
minority and in that context, to issue any appropriate direction that may be 
required in the circumstances of the case. 
The opposite party i.e. Communist party of India (M) and Communist 
Party of India filed the counter affidavits and contended that the right to call 
for a bandit is Fundamental Right of political party and it is protected by 
Articles 19( 1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution. It is also contended that holding 
of bandh is spontaneous expression of protest against a national calamity or 
against the exploitation of the people. An attempt is made to deny the 
allegation that whenever bandh is sponsored it is accompanied by violence. 
The State Government also in its counter affidavit contended that the 
original petition is not maintainable since the relief sought for are only against 
political parties and organiser. It is further contended that the call for 
observing bandh peacefully and its observance individually and collectively, 
cannot be labelled and denounced as unconstitutional or unlawful. Prompt and 
stem action is taken against the miscreants and anti-social elements who 
indulge in vandalism and violence. It is stated that the Government is not 
competent to ban bandhs altogether, as illegal and unconstitutional. Since the 
Government have the duty to protect any classes of citizens irrespective of 
their political or other hues. Government always does everything possible to 
prevent violence and other unlawful acts in the wake of observance of a 
bandh. 
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The High Court observed that we can not ignore the reality of what 
would be involved when a bandh is called. It is no doubt true that while calling 
for a bandh it is not also announced that any citizen not participating in the 
bandh will be physically prevented or attacked. But experience has shown 
that when any attempt is made either to ply vehicles on the day of the bandh 
or to attend to one's own work, or to open one's shop to carry on trade, it has 
resulted in tbe concerned person being threatened with dire consequences if 
he took out his vehicle, if he went for his work or kept his shop open. 
It is argued on behalf of the respondants that the bandh could be 
peaceful or violent and even ifthe court were to act, it could act only to curtail 
violent bandhs and no peaceful bandhs. It is contended that the court cannot 
presume or generalise that the calling of a bandhs always entails, actual 
violence or the threat of violence is not participating in or acquiescing in the 
bandh. The decision in Kameshwar Prasad Vs. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1962 
S.C. 116) is referred to in that context. But the court did not accept the 
argument of the respondent. The Court said that the calling for a bandh is 
different fi-om call for general strike or hartal. The High Court agreed that the 
political parties and organisers may have right to call for non-cooperation or 
to call for a general strike as a form of protest against what they believe to be 
either an erroneous policy or exploitation. But when exercise of such a right 
violates the Fundamental Right of another citizen who is equally entitled to 
exercise his rights, the question is whether the right of the political party 
extends to the right of violating the right of another citizen. 
In Railway Board. New Delhi Vs. Niranjan Singh (A.I.R.) 1969 S.C. 
966 the Court obserxed; 
"The fact that the citizen of this country have freedom of speech, 
fi'eedom to assemble peacefully and freedom to form associations or 
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unions does not mean that they can exercise those freedoms in 
whatever place they please. The exercise of those freedoms will come 
to an end as soon as the right of some one else to hold his property 
intervenes. Such limitation is inherent in the exercise of those rights. 
The validity of that limitation is not to be judged by the tests 
prescribed by Sub. Articles (2) and (3) of Articles 19. In other words, 
the contents ofthe freedoms guaranteed under clauses (a),(b) and (c), 
the only freedom with which we are concerned in this apeal, do not 
include the right to exercise them in the properties belonging to 
others". 
It is submitted that the observations of the honourable Court in 
connection with the case under discussion may be distinguished. In the instant 
case the properties ofthe respondent is not directly involved. Moreover in 
many cases the bandh may be peacefiil and organised only to show their 
dissent or demonstration or protest against particular policy which may be 
determined by the interest ofthe people at large. 
The Court has specifically stated: 
"nothing stands in the way of political parties calling for a general 
strike or hartal unaccompanied by express or implied threat of 
violence to enforce it"'*. 
It is respectfully submitted that the observations are self contradictory. 
General strike is allowed provided there is no apprehension. This apprehension 
may be visualised by the enforcing authorities, if there is any apprehension 
they may take reasonable steps to prevent the people from causing losses to 
18. Bharat Kumar Vs. State of Kerala. 1997 (2) K.L.T. 287 at 299. 
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the masses. However, if the right to demonstrate in the form of bandh or 
general strike is taken away, the law enforcing authorities will never come into 
picture. This is a treatment to eliminate the patient and not the disease itself 
and therefore, a kind of interference in the affairs of executive, where as the 
constitution has clearly provided the principle of separation of power in the 
various organs of the State". 
Eminent lawyer Soli Sorabyjee, who represented the C.P.M. in this 
Case, rightly says: 
"There are three fallacies in this judgement. First, it assumes that a 
bandh is necessarily accompanied by violence. Second, it fails to distinguish 
between calling a bandh (which is non-coercive) and enforcing a bandh 
(which is Coercive). Third, the court's distinction between bandhs and hartal 
is illusory since both can be equally violent"^". 
The observation of the court on page 300 that "the State has not taken 
any step to control or regulate the bandhs^^", shows that the court has 
impliedly agreed that if the law enforcing authorities try to take steps to 
control or regulate the bandhs then the court may consider the right of the 
political parties to demonstrate. 
Prof Ishaque Qureshi" rightly pointed out that the above decision is 
an example of the over judicial activism which has become the fashion these 
19 Professor Ishaque Qureshi," Right to Dissent and Democracy," paper presented in 
National Seminar on Parliamentary Democracy and Judicial Activisni-lndian Con-
text, December 21-23. 1997, Organised by Faculty of Legal Studies , M.J.P Rohil 
Khand University BareiUy (U P) 
20 The Sunday Times of India, New Delhi, January 4,1998, under the heading,"The 
rights and wrongs of bandhs" on the page of Business and Finance 
21. Bharat Kumar Vs State of Kerala, 1997(2) K L.T 287 at 300 
22 Supra note 19 
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days. The reason of the over judicial activism is the political instability in our 
country. 
There are eminant lawyers, leaders of trade unions, political leaders 
etc. who expressed the views on the said judgement. The judgement is treated 
to be unprecedented which has been described by its critics as unfortunate and 
by other as just and fair. 
Analysing the judgement. Communist Party of India (C.P.I.) general 
secretary A.B. Bardhan says that the Supreme Court order denies the 'basic 
right' of the peole to voice their grievances and demands through agitational 
means. The bandit was one of the agitational methods that was devised by the 
Indian working people in the course of their movement. He further says " 'I 
can understand if they expect certain regulations to be followed. But a blanket 
ban, that too confirmed by the Supreme Court, is a serious infringement of the 
democratic rights". 
The judgement has upset the left movement. Communist Party of India 
(M) politburo member Prakash Karat says that by upholding the Kerala High 
Court verdict, the Supreme Court had entered an area which was in the domain 
of "political activities". Thejudiciary, hesays, should not be" decreeping what 
is the acceptable form of political or public protest actions"^"*. 
C.I.T.U. secretary W.R. Varada Rajan is firm : "This is a cruel slap on 
democratic rights. The Kerala High Court assumed that every call for a bandh 
was invariably accompanied by coercion, intimidation, violence, damage to 
23 The Hindustan Times, 17th November, 1997 Page 12, under the heading The 
inportance of bandhs-A highr form of Protest'. 
24 Ibid 
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property, public and private, and what not. The assumption is not correct."^'. 
The former attorney General Soli Sorabjee and Harish Salve sought to 
convince the Court that the High Court had in fact transgressed the legislative 
powers which alone can impose restrictions under Article 19(2). 
A Supreme Court Bench of justice J S . Verma, Justice B.N. Kirpal and 
justice V.N. Khare concurred with the High Court view saying: 
"We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court"^*. 
In fact, reasoned verdict justifying the High Court action by the Apex 
Court would have been of great import because the order would have been 
applicable across the country. 
On the other hand, arguing against the statement of several trade union 
leaders in West Bengal, who have termed the verdict as an 'infringement of 
their fundamental rights' Mr. B.P. Pant, an expert on labour and industrial 
laws, says, "general bandits not only bring all economic activity to a standstill, 
but hit 90 percent of our 350 million labour force which constitutes the 
unorganised sector and earns it bread on a daily basis".^' 
Sikkim Chief Minister says: 
"In a democracy, there are many ways to address genuine grievances 
of the people and there is no need to bring personal hardship to people as also 
destroying government properties"^*. 
25 Ibid 
26 The Communist Party of India (M) Vs Bharat Kumar J T 1997 (9) S.C 101 at 102. 
27. The Times of India. New Delhi. 24 November,1997 Page No 5 under the heading 
"Ban on Bandhs Is it necessary evil'? 
28 Ibid. 
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In theory, bandhs need not be violent. In practice they threaten the use 
offeree, implicitly, if not explicitly. Case law says that even the creation of 
a psychological climate of harassment violates a citizen's rights. Given the 
actual character of bandhs, whether called by political parties. Trade Unions, 
or religious organisation like (V.H.P.), ordinary citizens believe that the risk 
of injury is worse if they dare to ignore a bandh call. The Court holds, rightly, 
that to ignore this reality would be ostrich-like.^"^ 
The total ban on bandh is described in the Times of India, New Delhi 
dated 24.1.1997 as "not wise", because it is last resort of protest against any 
representation by the ruling government. This, forced bandh could be termed 
as an illegal act but peaceful bandh should be treated as a Fundamental Right 
of expression of protest against any repression by the government. The bandh 
is a form of protest. Change without protest is not possible. Prayers will not 
bring about a change. A Fundamental Right to protest and that too supported 
by I.L.O. conventions could not be given up easily. Hence a trade union leader 
Mr. Mahadevan says, "the Supreme Court judgement does not go into social 
situations which could arise suddenly. Any way, we are not cowed by the 
judgement. With rich exprerience in the field, we will not be found wanting in 
alternative methods of protest". 
No doubt the Supreme Court had protected the right of the individual 
while extinguishing the right of the collective people. Both rights could be 
exercise without conflict. The executive must ensure it and the judiciary could 
step in to monitor this. The court should strike balance between right of 
individual and right of collective people. 
29. Supra Note 20 
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It is submitted that bandhs (general strikes) or hartals are necessary 
evils for the protection of the rights of workers. The blanket ban on such 
activities will frustate the purpose of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to 
the workers and their organisations. The Supreme Court being a guardian and 
protector of the rights of citizens should protect the right s of the workers also. 
The apprehension of law and order should not be allowed to take away 
the Fundamental Rights of the workers. If there is violence during the bandh, 
attackers should be imprisioned instead of banning the bandhs. 
There is a need of administrative and judicial reforms which ensures 
accountability from administrators and judges. Today citizens can throw out 
politicians who misbehave, but not bureaucrats, policemen or judges who fail 
to do their jobs. There is need of reforms that make it simple to sack corrupt 
and callous administrators, who fail to remedy grievances quickly. It does not 
fall with in the scope of this chapter to discuss reforms in detail. It is, 
therefore, left for further research. 
(1) Demonstrations : 
A 'demonstration' is defined in the Lexicon Webster Dictionary as "as 
group action in public, such as marching or pecketing, to attempt to attain a 
certain goal"^". In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as "A public 
manifestation of feeling; often taking the form of association and mass-
meeting'"'. A demonstration is a visible manifestation of the feelings or 
sentiments of an individual or a group. It is thus a communication of one's 
ideas to others to whom it is intended to be conveyed. 
30, The Lexicon Webster Dictionary, Vol I, The English. Lenguage Institute of 
America Inc 
31 CT. Onions.'The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary". Vol. I, The Standard 
Literature Company (P) Ltd, Calcutta. 
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In Kameshwar Prasad Vs. State of Bihar'"', where the issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether the rules in the Bihar Government Servant's 
Conduct Rule, prohibiting strikes and demonstrations, infringed freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association, as those are 
guaranteed in Article 19(1) (a), (b) and (c), the Court held that the rules 
prohibiting demonstrations contravened freedom of speech and freedom of 
assembly, but that the rule prohibiting strikes was valid in as much as Article 
19( 1) (c) and did not guarantee a right to strike. 
In this case the first question that falls to be considered is whether the 
right to make a 'demonstration' is covered by either or both of the two 
freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) and Article 19(l ) (b) . In this regard 
the court has observed that a demonstration is in effect a form of speech or 
of expression, because speech need not be vocal since sings made by a dumb 
person would also be a form of speech. It has however to be recognised that 
the argument before the Court is confined to the prohibiting demonstration 
which is a form of speech and expression or of a mere assembly and speeches 
therein and not other forms of demonstration which do not fall within the 
content of Article 19(1) (a) or 19(1) (b). A demonstration might take the form 
of an assembly and even then the intention is to convey to the person or 
authority to whom the communication is intended the feelings of the group 
which assembls. It necessarily follows that there are forms of demonstration 
which would fall within the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) and 
19(1) (b). It is needless to add that from the very nature of things a 
demonstration may take various forms; it may be noisy and disorderly, for 
instance stone throwing by a crowd may be cited as an example of a violent 
and disorderly demonstration and this would not obviously be within Article 
31a. (1962) 1. L.L.J. S.C. 294. 
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19( 1) (a) or (b). It can equally be peaceful and orderly such as happens when 
the members of the group merely wear some badges drawing attention to their 
grievances. 
If thus particular forms of demonstration fall within the scope of 
Article 19(1) (a) or 19( 1) (b), the second question is whether R 4-A, in so far 
as it lays down an embargo on any form of demonstration for the redress of 
the grievances of Government employees, could be sustained as falling within 
the scope of Article 19(2)" and (3)". 
In regard to the second question the court observed: 
" Based on this aspect of the function of the rule the argument 
as regards Article 19(2) and (3) was put on a two fold basis: ( l ) tha t 
the maintenance of public order was directly dependent upon the 
existence of a body of Government servants who were themselves 
subject to strict discipline (2) The other aspect in which it was 
presented was the negative of the one just now mentioned that if 
Government servants were ill disciplined and were themselves to 
agitate in a disorderly mamier for the redress of their service grievances, 
this must lead to a demonstration of the public and would be reflected 
in the disappearance of public order. 
We find ourselves unable to uphold the submission on behalf of the 
State. In the first place, we are not here concerned with any rule for 
ensuring discipline among the police force which is the arm of the law 
32 Supra Note 8 
33 Article 19(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation 
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law 
imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, 
reasonable restrictions the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause 
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primarily charged with the maitenance of public order. The threat to 
public order should therefore arise from the nature of the demonstration 
prohibited . No doubt,if the rule were so framed as to single out those 
types of demonstration which were likely to lead to a disturbance of 
public tranquality or which would fall under the other limiting criteria 
specified in Article 19(2) the validity of the rule could have been 
sustained. The voice of the rule , in our opinion , consists in this that 
it lays a ban on every type of demonstration be the same however 
innocent and however incapable of causing a breach of public 
tranquility and does not confine itself to those forms of demonstration 
which might lead to that result... We would therefore allow the appeal 
in part and grant the appeUants a declaration that R4-A in the form in 
which it now stands prohibiting any form of demorstration is violative 
of the appellants rights, under Article 19(1) (a) and (b) and should 
therefore be struck down . It is only necessary to add that the rule in 
so far as it prohibits a strike , cannot be struck down since there is no 
Fundamental Right to resort to a strike. As the appellant have 
succeeded only in part...""* 
Similarly in O.K. Ghosh Vs. E.X. Joseph," R4-A." of Central CivU 
Service (Conduct) Rules 1955 was the subject matter. In this case the court 
has observed that the result of the decision of the court in Kameshwar Prasad's 
case is that in so far as the rule prohibits any form of demonstration, it is 
invalid. It is invalid in so far as it may prohibit participation in strikes. The 
charge against the respondent is not that he participated in any strike the 
33" Supra note 31 •• PP 301-302 
34 A.I R 1963. S C 812 
35 R4-A provides that no government servant shall participate in any demonstration 
or resot to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his 
condition of service. 
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charge is that he participated in the various demonstrations and that is a charge 
based upon that part of rule which prohibits demonstrations altogether. It is 
true that the demonstrations in which he is alleged to have participated 
actively were organised in connection with the strike but does not mean either 
in fact or in law that he participated in the strike himself Similarly, the charge 
that he took active part in the preparations made for the said strike, also does 
not mean in fact or in law that he participated in the strike. If he joined 
demonstrations organised in conection with the strike, or if he took part in the 
preparations for the strike, it cannot be said that he took part in the strike as 
such , and so, the charge cannot be reasonably construed to mean that his 
conduct amoimted to a contravention of the rule which prohibits strike. 
Therefore, though R4-A is partly and not whoUy, invalid as held by this court 
in the case of kameshwar Prasad, the particular charge against the respondent 
being on the basis of that part of the rule which is invalid, it must follow that 
the departmental proceedings based on that charge are also invalid and the 
departmental proceedings instituted against the respondent for the alleged 
contravention by him of R4-A must be quashed. 
In Railway Board, New Delhi Vs N. Singh^*, where the question before 
the Court was-whether the direction issued by the General Manager on June 
19, 1956 is violative of Article 19 (1) (a) to (c) and (3). 
36. A.I.R. 1969, S.C 966 
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These directions were issued in a circular^^ issued to all the heads of the 
departments The Court held that it is true that the freedoms guaranteed under 
our constitution are very valuable freedoms and this Court would resist 
abridging the ambit of those freedoms except to the extent permitted by the 
constitution. The fact that the citizens of this Country have freedom of speech, 
freedom to assmble peacably and freedom to form associations or unions does 
not mean that they can exercise those freedoms in whatever place they please. 
The exercise of those freedoms will come to an end as soon as the right of 
someone also to hold his property intervenes. Such a limitaion is inherent in 
the exercise of those rights. The validity of that limitation not to be judged by 
the tests prescribed by Sub-Article (2) and (3) of Article 19. In other words 
the contents of the freedoms guaranteed under causes (a) (b) and (c) do not 
include the right to exercise them in the properties belonging to others. 
Therefore the directions issued by the General Manager of Northern Railway 
prohibiting the railway employees from holding meetings within the railway 
premises including open grounds forming part of those premises does not 
deprive the workers of any of the freedoms guaranteed to them under Article 
19(1). It merely prohibits them from exercising any of them wathin the railway 
premises. The fact that the Indian Railways are State undertakings does not 
37. Circular reads " It has been brought to notice that in a number of cases railway 
employees have held meetings inside railway premises such as inside workshops, 
inside stores depots and within office compound. It may be pointed out that this 
practice is extremely objectionable and has to be stopped forthwith. All staff may 
be warned that if anyone of them is found organising or attending a meeting inside 
railway premises or at places of work, he will render himself liable to servere 
disciplinary action action as such action on his part will amount to misconduct 
arising out of violation of administrative instructions Meetings of workers can be 
held on open grounds away from the places of work with the permission of Railway 
authorities concerned if such open ground fall within railway boundary. 
You are to note these instructions very carefully and to ensure their strict 
comliance in future Please acknowledge receipt". 
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affect the rights of Northern Railway to enjoy their properties in the same 
manner as any private individual may do subject only to such restrictions as 
the law or the usage may place on them. 
It is submitted that a demonstratioo is a visible manifestation of the 
feelings or sentiments of an individual or a group. It is thus a communication 
of one's ideas to others to whom it is intended to be conveyed. It is in effect 
therefore a form of speech or of expression and would fall within the freedom 
guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a) but noisy and disorderly demonstrations 
would not obviously be within Article 19 (1) (a). A rule which imposes a 
blanket ban prohibiting any form of demonstration' for the redress of the 
grievances of the government servants is violative inter alia of the fundamental 
right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). 
The fact that citizens of this country have freedom of speech and 
expression does not mean that they can exercise this freedom in whatever 
place they please.The content of the freedom guaranteed under clause (a) 
does not include the right to exercise them in properties belonging to others. 
The right of the citizen to freedom of speech does not give him a right 
to insist that the proceedings of a meeting should be conducted in particular 
language or in particular way " . 
There is a case ", where Regulations 19 to 22 of Mysore Paper Mill 
Officers Regulations prohibit employees from approaching the media in 
relation to matters that pertain to the day-to-day functioning of the company. 
There is also a prohibition in respect of not only making such disclosures but 
in respect of documents and information that have come into possession or 
38. Linganna Vs State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1954 Mys 12. 
39 Mysore Paper Mills Officers Association Vs. State of Karnataka, (1995) II L.L.J. 
Karnataka, 228 
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knowledge of the employees in the course of their duties. Those regulations 
have been framed for the purpose of maintaining discipline and also 
confidentiality in relation to the functioning of the company, the court held 
that a careful reading of all the regulations indicates that there is no total or 
blanket bar on the exercise of rights of freedom of speech, expression and 
association, etc. All that is infact done is to impose some restrictions with 
regard to the manner in which an employee/Officer has to maintain, conduct 
himself Apart from discipline and propriety, it is also a requirmement of law 
that an Officer/employee of a company has to maintain certain degree of 
confidentiality and has to conduct himself with a degree of properiety. These 
are part of the job functions. There is a procedure for redressal of grievance 
and the management is certainly within its rights to prevent unauthorised or 
improper publication or going to press or media, with all sorts of issues that 
are within the confidential frame-work of the management. Restrictions 
contained in the regulations are reasonable and necessary and therefore do not 
offend Artocle 19 of the constitution. 
(2) Picketing: 
In India the word picketing' has not been defined in any statute. 
Judicial attempt to outline its contour is not comprehensive'"'. Various authors 
of Books'" and writers of articles*- on this subject, have, in addition, quoted 
from foreign decisions*^ to explain the nature of picketing. Even though Trade 
40 Damodar Ganesh Vs Stateof Bombay, A I R 1951, Bom, 459-462, Vimal Kishore 
Malhotra Vs State of U P . A I R 1956 All 56 
41 D N Vohra, 'Strikes. Lockouts and picketing (3rd ed, 1965) at 32 
42 S R Baj, "Freedon of speech and expression in Labour Management Relations' 5 
J 1 L 1 377 Quated from Dr S C Srivastava, 'Industrial Disputes and Labour 
Management Relations in India, 24, (Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1984) 
43 International Ladies Garment Workers'Union Vs Rother (1922)34 One K B 69, 
41 C C C 70 See also Piddington Vs Bates (1960)3 All E R 660, Tynam Vs 
Balmer (1965)3 All E R 99 
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Disputes Act of 1906 of England grants protection to picketers, none of the 
English Statute define that expression. The Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers Association 1965-68'" generally described picketing. 
Judicial decisions in England throw further light on the nature and concept of 
picketing. The expression to picket' means watching or spying or establishing 
a system of watching and surveillance, of propaganda of practices and 
manoeuvers with a view to rendering effective the boy-cotting of an industrial 
establishment by preventing the continuance of work. 
Under American constitution it has been held that freedom of speech 
includes the right of labour publicise the facts of a labour dispute by peaceful 
picketing, for, picketing is an effective means where by the people affected 
may enlighten the public on the nature and causes of the labour dispute. 
Hence, the State can not absolutely prohibit picketing, regardless of the 
purpotw- and circumstances.'*' 
But though the right to picket has been held to be included in the 
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has 
held that it can not be dogmatically equated with the Constitutionally protected 
freedom of speech, and that, accordmgly, picketing can be subjected to 
controls that would not be permissible in the case of pure speech.'**. 
The reason for this differentiation, according to the Supreme Court, is 
the 'compulsive features inherent in picketing beyond the aspect of mere 
communication as an appeal to reason': 
44. Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Emloyers' Association 1965-
68 Connd., 3622 (1968) P. 227-29. 
45 N.L.R.B, Vs. Drivers, (1960) 362 U.S. 274. See alsoThornhill Vs. Alabama, (1940) 
310 U.S. 88; Carlson Vs. California (1940) 310, U.S. 106. 
46 Teamsters Union Vs. Hanke, (1950) 339 U.S. 470; Amalgamated Food Employees 
Vs. Logan Valley, (1968) 391 U.S. 308. 
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"Industrial picketing is more than free speech, since it involves patrol 
of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may 
induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature 
of the ideas which are being disseminated — Publication in a 
newspapers, or distribution of circulars, may convey a picket line. 
But very purpose of a picket line is to exert influence, and it produces 
consequences, different jfrom other modes of communication. The 
loyalties and responses evoked and exerted by picket lines are unlike 
those flowing from appeals by printed words"."*' 
Thus in the United States, where picketing has attracted quite a good 
deal of judicial notice one of the most graphic descriptions has been given by 
Haller stein.** 
A picketer may: 
(1) Merely observe workers or customers; 
(2) Communicate information, e.g., that a strike is in progress, making 
either (a) true (b) unture or (c) libelous statments; 
(3) Persuade employees or customers not to engage in relation with 
employer: 
(a) through the use of banners, without speaking, carrying (i) true, or 
(ii) untrue, or (ii) Libelous legends, 
47 Hughes Vs Superior Court, (1950) 339 US 460 See also Bakery Drivers Vs Wohl 
(1942) 315 US 769 (776), quoted from Dr Durga Das Vasu.'Commentary on the 
Constitution of India, 211 (6th Edition, Vol C, J N Ghose and Sons, Calcutta, 
1977) 
48 Hallerstein, "Picketing Legislation and the Courts" 10 N Car L Rew 158. (1931) 
186, quoted from Dr S C Srivastava,"Industrial Disputes and Labour Management 
Relations in India 25,(Deep and Dee ublications. New Delhi, 1984). 
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(b) by speaking (i) in a calm dispassionate manner; (ii) in a heated, 
hostile manner (iii) using abusive epithets and profenity (iv) yelling 
loudly, (v) by persisting in making arguments when employees or 
customers refuse to listen. 
(c) by offering money or similar inducement to strike breakers; 
(4) Threaten employees or customers: 
(a) by the mere presence of the picketer, the presence may be a threat 
of, (i) physical violence, (ii) social obstracism, being branded in the 
community as a 'scab', (iii) a trade or employees boycott, i.e.preventing 
workers from securing employment and refusing to trade with 
customers, (iv) threatening injury to property. 
(b) by verbal threat; 
(5) Assault and use of violence; 
(6) Destruction of property; 
(7) Blocking of entrance and interference with traffic. 
The picketer may engage in a combination of any of the types of 
conduct enumerated above. The picketing may be carried on singly or in 
groups, it may be directed to employees alone or to customers alone or to 
both. It may involve persons who have contracts with the employer or those 
who have not or both. The picketer may station themselves or be moving in 
peaceful or intimidatary or violent manners with or without arms, at or near 
the place of work or business or residence of the person to whom the picketing 
is directed The immediate object of picketing is to secure the abstaining or 
doing that which the person to whom the picketing is directed has a right to 
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do or abstain from doing. The ultimate object in picketing is to coerce the 
management to accept the industrial disputes demands of workers. 
(a) Elements of Picketing : 
Several elements comprise picketing. There is, for instance: 
(i) Element of freedom of speech and expression to the extent to which 
the communication offsets and views are involved. 
(ii) Element of freedom of movement to the extent to which picketers 
remain stationary or indulge in movement. 
(iii) Element of freedom of association to the extent to which picketing 
involves group activity. 
(iv) Element of freedom to carry on trade, profession, or business to the 
extent to which the activities may be designed to improve the working 
conditions ofthe workers and adversely affect the corresponding right 
of the management or non-picketing workers. 
All these elements may not be concurrently present in each and every 
picketmg. Events often quickly move from a phase involving some of these 
elements to another involving other of these element s.''"' 
(b) As a permissible right : 
Picketing affects business. In British India early regulations and 
statutes which directy or indirectly rendered strikes illegal and exposed 
strikers to criminal prosecution also rendred picketing an offence, both in 
specified industries as well as generally. The I.P.C. affected picketing through 
49 S C Srivastava, "Industrial Disputes and Labour Management Relations in India" 
26 (Deep and Deep .Publications, New Delhi, 1984) 
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abetment and criminal intimidation,crimiiial restraint among other provision 
breach of contract. Since 1930 picketers could also be prosecuted for criminal 
conspiracy. The Criminal law Amendment Act, 1932 fiirther affected picketing 
.The relief given by the Trade Union Act did not extend to condoning such acts 
in fiirtherance of a trade disputes as amounted to an offence. The Trade 
Dispute Act, 1929 further affected picketing by declaring that inciting abetting 
or acting in further once of an illegal strike was an offence. Picketintg in 
support of a legal strike, picketing in the absence of any strike whatsoever is 
not necessarily legal. Even today, in order to maintain its legality, picketers 
conduct must stees clear of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932. 
The Indian Constitution added other dimensions to the problem. To the 
extent to which picketing involves elements of freedom of speech, movement, 
association and trade, profession or business, and to the extent to which the 
State is enjoined from taking away these freedoms that law cannot adversely 
affect picketing.'" 
In Raghuvir Vs. Emperor", where the accused who were desirous of 
preventing import of foreign cloth for sale, served a notice on Abdul Sattar, 
the concerned shopkeeper, requiring him, inter alia to execute an agreement 
not to import foreign cloth for sale at his shop for a period of at least one year, 
and stating that, if he did not do so, his shop would be picketted. Upholding 
the conviction of accused under section 506 of I.P.C.", Justice Dalai observed: 
50 Ibid at 27 
51 Al.R 1931 All 263. 
52 Section 506 of I P C says. "Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation 
shall be punished with imprisonment or either description for a term which may 
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both—". 
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"The notice and the agreement should be taken jointly. The applicant 
must have desired to cause alarm to Abdul Sattar by picketing, 
otberwise tbe threat of picketing would bave been not threat at all. 
They must have known that Abdul Sattar would be alarmed at the 
suggestion of picketing and would therefore agree to abide by the 
terms submitted by them to him to carry on his business. Business 
consists of constant purchase and sale. And a business would come 
to standstill if even a small shop is prohibited from importing articles 
with which it deals for a period of one year. Taking the common 
business point of view I have not the slightest doubt that the threat 
by the applicants amounted to injury to the property of Abdul 
Sattar"". 
There is another case" where the agricultural workers, who were 
negotiating with mirasdars, for better terms and conditions of service, tried 
to put pressure on the management through labour quarantine. They asked the 
employees not to work for management until the management agreed to the 
new terms and conditions of service. The agitating workers also threatend 
those employees that if they continue to work they would be excoimnunicated 
as well as barber and washermen would not render them services. It would be 
appreciated that, though the intent-element of section 503 of I.P.C." was 
present in this case, the overt-act element was not present: threat of ex-
53 Supra Note 51 at 264 
54 Inre Selathere, A I R 1949 Mad 546 
55 The offence of criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503 of I P C as 
"Whoever threatens another \^ith any injury to his person or, reputation or proeprty, 
or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with 
intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he 
IS not legally bound to do. or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled 
to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal 
intimidation" 
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communication or of deprivation of the services of washerman and barber 
could not be said to be threat of enjury to person, reputation or property of 
the employees. 
It is submitted that merely because strategies and tactics are changed, 
the act may not cease to be picketing. It makes no difference how a person 
prevails upon another to withdraw his labour in furtherance of an industrial 
dispute. So long as such withdrawal of labour is contemplated, the act is 
picketing, whether or not it is also criminal. It needs however to be emphasised 
at this stage that the threat of ex- communication or withdrawal of the 
services of the washerman and the barber should not be taken lightly, at least 
in rural communities of India'*. 
The criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 is the most important piece 
of Indian legislation affecting various aspects of picketing. Section 7 of the 
criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 says: 
(1) Whoever > 
(a) with intent to cause any person to abstain from doing or to 
do any act which such person has a right to do or to abstain from 
doing, obstructs or use violence to or intimidates such person 
or any number of his family or person in his employ, or loiters 
at or near a place where such person or member or employed 
person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be 
or persistently follows him from place to place, or interferes 
with any property owned or used by him or deprives him of or 
hinders him in the use thereof, or 
56. S.C Srivastava, "Industrial Dispute and Labour Management Relations in India", 
29 (Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1984). 
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(b) loiters or does any similar act at near the place where a 
person carries on business, in such a way and vnth intent that any 
person may thereby be deterred from entering or opproaching 
or dealing at such place, shall be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to six months, or with a fine which 
may extend to five hundred rupees or with both ". 
The above statute prohibits a number of activities of the picketers even 
in the course of peaceful picketing. It makes an offence to loiter about near 
and about the place of employment for publicizing the facts of or disputes and 
hence to be in conflict with Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. In Damodar 
Ganesh Vs. State" restriction on peaceful picketing was construed as reasonable 
in the interest of general public as it sought to interfere with fi^eedom of 
movement of other citizens. The freedom of speech under the Constitution 
which includes freedom of press, publication, Coimnunication and discussion 
is not absolute'* and reasonable restrictions can be imposed by law*'. So 
picketing at the place of employment during a strike which is legal as 
publicising the grievances of the employees may obstruct the employers and 
other non-striking employees in the performance of their duties and may tend 
to disturb as a result of conflict between the picketers and non-picketers. 
Therefore the State can restrict even peaceful picketing by workers if it 
encroaches upon the Fundamental Rights of the emloyers to pursue their trade 
or business or their right of movement due to physical obstruction caused by 
picketing. 
57. A I R . 1951 Bombay 459 
58. A.K. Gopalan Vs State of Madras 1950 S.C.R. 88 at 258. 
59. Ramjilal Vs. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 620 at 623. 
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The Constitutional validity of section 7 of the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act, 1932 was again challenged in Vimal Kishore Mehrotra Vs. 
State of U.P. "*. In this case the court said that section 7 of the said Act 
prohibits several acts. It may be that prohibition of some of these acts is 
unconstitutional. But that does not follow that prohibition of other acts is also 
unconstitutional. It is possible to separate the valid part from the invalid parts. 
So assuming (without deciding) that certain parts of sub-section (1) of section 
7 of the Act are ultra vires of the Constitution, the entire section 7 can not be 
condemned on that ground. 
It may be submitted that picketing per se is not unconstitutional or 
illegal under section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1932. It merely 
prohibits act of intimidation, coercion, violence, incitement or abatement of 
an offence in the conduct of a strike. The statute does not permit picketing as 
such without intimidation, coercion or molestation. 
No doubt during the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court had protected 
the Fundamental Rights of individual by doing liberal interpretation of Article 
19. But unfortunately the working class is being deprived of the liberal 
attitude of the Supreme Court in relation to their Fundamental Rights such as 
freedom of speech freedom of association including the right of picketing. The 
Supreme Court may strike a balance in this connection, viz., the liberty of the 
striking unions to resort to peacefril picketing and, norms of social control. 
(3) Strike : 
There are several definitions of strike which are found in the various 
decisions of the courts, dictionaries and in the statutes. 
59a. A.l.R 1956 All. 56. 
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lu England various judicial definitions have been attempted by the 
courts and the most accepted and precised which is as expounded by Manner, 
J, in Farrer Vs close''" It defined 'strike' as "a simultaneous cessation of work 
on part of the workmen". In United States of America in Uden Vs. 
Schaeffer''',the Court observed that a strike is the act of quiting work by a 
body of workmen for the purpose of coercing their employer to accede to 
some demands they have made upon him, and which he has refiised; but it is 
not a strike for workmen to quit work either singly or in a body, when they 
quitted without intention to return to work, whatever may be the reason that 
moves them so to do. 
Various dictionaries have defined the term 'strike'. But the dictionary 
definitions are not wholly in accord with one another. For example the Oxford 
Dictionary defines strike as " a concerted cessation of work on the part of a 
body of workers for the purpose of obtaining some concession jfrom the 
employer or employers." Webster's Dictionary defines "strike "as "the act of 
quitting work one by mutual understanding by a body of workmen as a means 
of enforcing compliance with demands made on their employer ; a stopping of 
work by workmen in order to obtain or resist a change in conditions of 
employment ." The Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences" defines 'strike' as ' 
concerted suspension ofwork by a body of employees, usually for the purpose 
of adjusting an existing dispute over the terms of the labaur contract.' The 
Encyclopadia Britannica" defines' strike 'as 'a stoppage ofwork by a common 
agreement on the part of work -people for the purpose of obtaining or 
resisting a change in the conditions of employment'. 
60 Farrer Vs Close, (1869) L R 4 Q B 602 (612), Per Thenna, J 
61 Uden Vs Schaeffer, 110 Wash 391 
62 Vol 14. P 419 
63 Vol 21. P 470 
277 
The statutes '^  in England has defined 'strike ' as a 'cessation of work 
by a body of persons employed in any trade or industry actiDg in combination 
or concerted refusal under a common understanding of any number of 
persons who are or have been so employed ,to continue to accept employment." 
Ludwig Teller*' describes four characteristics of'strike' as the term is 
employed in modern times, which are> 
(i) an established relationship between the strikers and the person or 
persons against whom the strike is called; 
(ii) the constituting of that relationship as one of en^loyer and employee; 
(iii)the existence of dispute between the parties and the utilisation by 
labour of the weapon of concerted refusal to continue to work as the 
method of persuading or coercing compliance with workmen's demand 
and 
(iv)the contention advanced by workers that although work ceases, the 
employment relation is deemed to continue albeit is a state of 
belligerant suspension. 
All these defmitons have common characterstic of quitting, cessation 
as discontinuance of work in combination, and further the idea that such a 
cessation must be for the purpose of wresting concessions from an employer. 
It is clearly agreed that cessation of work must be used as a weapon for the 
furtherance of some demands. 
63. Vol 21. P. 470 
64 Section 8(2)(a) of the repealed Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927( 17 & 
18Geo5,C.22). 
65. Ludwig Teller: Labour Disputes and collective Bargaining Vol. 1, Page. 236-37, 
S. 78. 
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111 India the defiiiition of strike is given under section 2 (q) of the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The definition of strike in section 2(q)is 
exhaustive . Section 2 (q) says: 
"Strike means a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any 
industry acting in combination , or a concerted refusal, or a refiisal under a 
common understanding of any number of persons who are or have been so 
employed to continue to work or to accept employment". 
The definition of'strike' may be analysed under the following heads 
Any industry — The words "employed in any industry 'postulate that there 
should be an 'industry' in which the concerned workmen are employed 
.In other words ,unless the establishment in which the striking persons 
are employed in an 'industry ',even if other essential elements of the 
definition are satisfied ,it would not be an strike withio the meaning of 
Section 2(q). 
Cessation of work or refusal to work: This head is further divided in 
to two sub-heads:-
(I)Cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting 
in combination -
The expression "acting in combination ;'concerted refiisal'or refusal 
under a common understanding 'though appear to be distinct ,the line of 
demarcation between is not quite clear and occasionally they overlap and may 
be compendiously described as 'concerted activities. The expression 'conerted 
activities' means any action that has been planned, arranged, adjusted or 
agreed on and settled between parties acting together pursuant to some design 
or scheme.The emphasis in strike is on acting together and not on pre planning 
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or pre arrangiug the parties, who resort to strike ,may come to a common 
understanding at the time in question without any formal agreement or 
consultations but nevertheless the concerted action must be collectively 
combined on the basis of spirit de corpes and must be combined together by 
the community of demands and interests with a view to compel employer ,to 
accede their demands of wages ,bonus, allowances ,hours of work, conditions 
of labour, holidays, and the like. The length or duration of the concerted 
activities is immaterial. 
Likewise the expressions cessation of work 'refusal to continue to 
work 'or to accept employment 'though not synonyms ,too overlap .The notion 
of quitting,cessation or discontinuance of work in combination is an essential 
requirement of the definition of strike . 
The element of combination in strike is the out come of the labour 
philosophy 'united we stand divided we fall ;lntroduction of steam power in 
production process changed the nature and content of traditional labour 
management relations. On the one hand an employer came to engage workers 
in hundreds and thausands. On the other hand ,the worker lost his individual 
status as a significant factor in the production process, he become one of the 
several easily replacement persons engaged in the factory. By and large, the 
value of his handicraftsmanship was taken over by the machines and lost his 
voice with the employer with whom he could now hardly communicate except 
through a hierarchy of stewards, superintendents assistant manager,deputy-
managers and managers. 
Moreover ,the legal recognition ofthe principle ofjoint stock company 
created a fictious employer ,whose shareholders were concerned more with 
the return on their investment than with the terms and conditions of service 
under which workers worked. Indeed, few shareholders even knew the 
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number of workers that were employed by their company, for less the terms 
and conditions under which they worked** 
The resuhing deteriorating bargaining power of workers and the 
growing distance between employers and workers, made it imperative on the 
part of workers to devise an effective means of reaching employers and 
bargaining with them from a position of strength . This position of strength 
is nothing but a combination. Thus mere cessation of work will not come 
within the purview of the definition of strike' unless it can further be shown 
that such cessation of work was combined action for the purpose of enforcing 
an industrial demand. Combination means agreement or concert. In order to 
establish such concert there need be no formal meetings, discussions, or even 
interchange or mutual consent or assent to a common purpose or a course of 
conduct. It may be deduced from similar acts and course of conduct. In Patiala 
Cement Co. Ltd. Vs. Certain workers", where certain workers successfully 
instigated their co-workers to participate in a demonstration against the 
Government for the delay in the disposal of adjudication proceedings. The 
demonstration lasted 15-20 minutes during which certain slogans were also 
shouted, the question arose whether the cessation of work amounted to a 
strike within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act 1947, The Labour 
Appellate Tribunal observed: 
" the cessation of work, even for about half an hour amounted 
to a strike within the meaning of the definition of "Strike" in the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"**. 
66 Dr Srrvastava, S C "Industrial Disputes and Labour Management Relations in 
India" 55 (1984, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi) 
67. (1955) II L L J. 57. 
68. Id at 59 
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lu other words, the fact that the duration of a strike was for a few 
minutes or for a few hours is irrelevant. It is true that stoppage of work even 
for about half an hour may amount to "strike'. 
It IS submitted that the work stoppage here was only the result of 
demonstration against the acts of the government, was not 'Strike'. 
In Buckingham and Camatic Mills Vs. Their workermen *' there was 
a solar eclips lasting until noon on November 1, 1984. The Madras Labour 
Union requested the management to suspend the working of morning shift and 
declare it a holiday. The management ultimately agreed to grant paid half-day 
holiday to the morning shift workers only; it being understood that the after-
noon and night shift workers would work as usual. The after noon shift 
workers, who came to work at 3 p.m., however demanded that they should 
also be paid holiday and on the mannagement refusal to grant the demand, a 
large number of workers applied for leave. The management rejected all these 
leave applications and exhorted workmen to work. The workmen did not, 
however, resume work until about 9 p.m. On these facts the labour Appellate 
Tribunal said: 
"We are inclined to hold that the stoppage of works for the period for 
about 2 to 4 hours in the circumstances of the case is not to be regarded 
as strike "^ ". 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Labour 
Appellate Tribunal and obser\'ed: 
69 (1951) I L L J 1 (Supplement) n T ). on apeal (1951) 2 L L J 314 (L AT) On 
special appeal (1953) 1 L L J 181 S C 
70 (1951)2L L J 314(L A T ) 
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"We have not been able to appreciate the view expressed by the 
Appellate Tribunal that stoppage of work for a period two to four 
hours —- can not be regarded as strike. Before the adjudicator the 
only point raised by the union was that it was a spontaneous and 
lightning strike but it was not said by them that stoppage of work did 
not fall within the definition of 'strike' as given in the Act. All 
necessar> ingredients, therefore, ofthe definition exists in the present 
case and stoppage of work on 1 November 1948 amounted to 
strike"^'. 
In Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Vs. M.G. Gunaseelan,'^ certain workmen 
demanded" 1st May" to be declared holiday so as to enable them to celebrate 
it. The employer rejected their demand. There upon, the workmen, who had 
casual leave due to their credit, enblock put in an individual applications for 
leave on 1st May and in anticipation of grant of such requested leave, absented 
themselves from work to participate in "May Day" celebration. On these facts 
the Labour Appellate Tribunal observed: 
" in making applications for leave they were submitting themselves to 
the authority and control ofthe company. They were excepting that 
the company would act reasonably and would grant them the holiday 
in view ofthe past precedents"". 
It is implicit in the definition of strike that: 
71. (1953) 1 L L J S C 181 at 183. 
72. (1954)11 L L J 656 
73. Id. at 661 
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" The cessation of work or concerted refusal to work must be in 
defiance of the authority of the employer"" . 
In Joseph's case^' it was held that the conduct of the concerted 
workmen (there being no defiance) did not amount to strike. Cessation of 
work even while working on paid overtime would amount to strike. But mere 
presence of certain workmen in the striking crowd in the absence of any 
satisfactory proof of their having 'ceased' to work or 'refused' to work would 
not amount to strike^^ Similarly in O.K. Ghosh Vs E.X. Joseph^^ where Rule 
4-A provides that no Government servant shall participate in any demonstration 
or resort to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his 
condition of service, the court observed: 
" in so far as the said rule prohibits a strike, it can not be struck 
down for the reason that there is no fundamental right to resort to a 
strike. Where the charge against the Government servant is not that 
he participated in any strike but the charge is that he participated in 
the various demonstrations that is a charge based upon that part of the 
rule which prohibits demonstrations altogether. The fact that the 
demonstration in which he is alleged to have participated actively 
were organised in connection with the strike does not mean either in 
fact or in law that he participated in the strike itself. Similarly, the 
charge that he took active part in the preparations made for the strike 
also does not mean in fact or in law that he participated in the strike 
and so the charge can not be reasonably construed to mean that his 
74. Id at 662 
75 Joseph and Co. Ltd Vs Fifth Industrial Tribunal [1974] Lab. I.C 522 (cal) 
76 Sitalpur Sugar Works Ltd Vs State of Bihar (1958) II L.L.J. 95 
77. A.I.R. 1063 S.C. 812. 
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conduct amouuted to a contravention of the rule which prohibits 
strikes"''. 
In Management of Katkona Colliery, Western Coal Fields Ltd. Vs. 
Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunar" it was held that 
in cases where workmen go on 'hunger strike' by refiraining from taking food 
in the off-duty periods, it would not be a strike within the meaning of section 
2(q). But if the 'hunger strike' is not simply refraining from taking food but 
also is accompanied by cessation of work by a body of persons employed in 
any industry, it would clearly come within the definition of strike. 
(Il)Concerted refusal or refusal under common understanding of any 
number of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to 
work or accept employment: A concerted refusal or refusal under 
common understanding to continue to work or to accept employment or 
to resume work by any number of persons is a strike. The refiisal of work 
means refiisal to perform duties for which they are appointed. If the 
workers are at liberty to do a particular work or not to do a work their 
refiisal to work does not amount to strike. For instance over- time work, 
if it is the duty of workers to do over-time work because it is the practice 
of that establishment to take overtime work from the workers in that 
case refusal to work over-time would amount to strike otherwise not. 
Thus the test to determine whether refusal to do overtime work constitutes 
a strike oi not would depend upon whether overtime was habitually 
worked in that industry.In North Brook Jute Co. Ltd. Vs Their workmen.*" 
the court said thai when the workmen refiise to do additional work which 
78 Ibid 
79 [1978] Lab IC 1531 ( M P ) 
80 1960 1 L L J 580 S C 
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the employer has no right in law to ask them to do ,it would not amount 
strike ,even if such refusal is Concerted or under common understanding. 
Interruption of work ,concerted refusal or refusal under common 
understanding to work or to accept employment even for a short time 
,say half and hour or less, would constitute strike within the meaning of 
section 2(q) of the Act*'. 
Right to strike: Ordinarily it is open to a trade union to go on strike 
or with hold labour . However in the constitution of India there is a 
Fundamental Right to form trade unions . Article 19( 1) (c) of the constitution 
declares that : 
"All citizens shall have the right to form association or unions". 
This right is not absolute clause (4) of Article 19 provides that: 
"Nothing in sub -clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation 
of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making 
any law imposing ,in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or 
public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right 
conferred by the said sub-clause." 
In Raghubar Vs. Union of India*^ and Kameshwar Vs. State of Bihar" 
the Supreme Court has however, held that the Constitutional freedom of 
association does not include any Fundamental Right to stike. In All India Bank 
Employees' Association Vs. Industiral Tribunal** the Supreme Court considered 
that right to form association is guaranteed in Article 19(1) (c). In this case 
81 Buckingham and Carnatic Mills Vs. Their workmens [1953] 1.L.L.J. 181(S.C.) 
82 A.I.R 1962 S.C 263. 
83. (.1962) Sup 3S.C.R. 369. 
84 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 171. 
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it was, contended that the right to'form an Union' carries with it as a 
concomitant right a guarantee that such unions shall achieve the objects for 
which they are formed. If this concomitant rights were not conceded, the right 
guaranteed to form unions would be an ideal right, an empty shadow lacking 
all substance, the Supreme Court did not support this argument and observed: 
"On the construction of the Article, we have reached the conclusion 
that even a very liberal interpretation of sub-clasuse (c) of clause (1) 
of Article 19 can not lead to the conclusion that the trade unions have 
a guaranteed right to an effective collective bargaining or to strike, 
either as a part of collective bargaining or otherwise. The right to 
strike or right to declare lockout may be controlled or restricted by 
appropriate industrial legislation and the validity of such legislation 
would have to be tested not with reference to the criteria laid down 
in clause (4) of Article 19 but by totally different consideration"*'. 
In Vasudevan vs S.D. Mittal,** the Bombay High Court held that the 
right to go on strike is of a different character. It is not joint or collective 
expression of views, but is joint or collective action. By its very nature it is 
brought possibilities of leading to violence. Our constitution is an elaborate 
one. If the constitution makers had intended to confer a Fundamental Right 
on the citizens to go on strike, they would have expressly said so. In these 
circumstances the right to go on delate strike in not included in Article 
19( I)(c). The law which seeks to obtain industrial peace by prohibiting strikes 
and lockouts cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to 
go on strike even if such right was guaranteed by the constitution. What the 
legislature had rendered illegal is to go on a strike during a limited period and 
85 Id at 181 
86. A 1 R 1962 Bom 52 Sec. also Janerdan Vs. Management H.M. Ltd., A I.R., 1956 
.Madh Bharat 195. 
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without first availing of the machinery or conciliation and arbitration. This is 
not an abridgement of the fundamental rights. 
It seems that the above decisions ignore the history of the constitutional 
provisions. The founding fathers recongnised that the effective functioning of 
trade unions, or even of Parliamentary system of Government, could not be 
ensured by securing to the citizens the mere right of forming associations or 
unions, that the right of collective action must also be secured to them. But, 
at the same time, they also recognised that collective action might (even if 
individual action did not) endanger public order or morality. They, therefore, 
provided that, subject to the right of the State to protect those interests, a 
citizen might do coDectively what he could do individually. 
An act which is illegal, if done by an individual, continues, to be illegal 
when done by two or more persons acting in combination. Article 19(l)(c) 
does not grant a charter, of liberty to the citizens to collectively do that which 
they can not do individually. On the other hand, an act which is legal if done 
by an individual may become illegal when done by two or more persons acting 
in combination. Article 19(4) indicates the permissible area of State regulation 
of combination as an element of liability*^. 
It follows from the aforesaid that: (i) if a citizen has a constitutionally 
guarenteed right to do some thing individually, then to that extent only and, 
further, subject to any reasonable restriction imposed under Article 19(4), the 
citizen has also a constitutionally guaranteed right to do that thing collectively, 
(ii) if the citizens right to act individually whether with regard to the nature 
of the act or with regard to the manners of doing it, is not constitutionally 
guaranteed. Article 19 (1) (c) does not guarantee the right to do that act 
87. Dr. S.C. , Srivastava . "industrial Disputes and Labour Management Relations in 
India". 236,23 7( Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1984). 
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collectively; and (iii) if the citizens right to act individually is consitutionally, 
guaranteed only under certain circumstances and in a certain manner, his right 
to act collectively is guaranteed not only subject to those limitations but also 
subject to any reasonable restriction placed under Article 19(4)**. 
History bears testimony that the Karachi Resolution of the India 
National Congress party on "Fundamantal Rights" in 1931 as modified at 
Bombay, and the 1937 as well as the 1945 Election Manifestoes of that party 
promised to secure to the citizens not only the right 'to form unions 'but also 
the right 'to declare strikes. It is true that the Indian National Congress Party 
had absolute majority in the Constitutent Assembly. 
Our Constitution reflects the views that were finally adopted by the 
Indian National Congress Party. It would, however, be a distortion of history 
if one were to assert that Article 19(l)(c) does not seek to guamtee the right 
of collective action because that Article, as finally adopted by the Constitutent 
Assembly, refers merely to 'the right to form association or unions' and neither 
to the purose, for the formation of such unions, namlly, 'protection of their 
interests', nor to the 'right to declare strike*'. Article 13 (1) (c) and Article 
13 (4) were the subject of good deal of discussion in the Constituent Assembly 
.(13) (1) (c)of the Draft Constitution read: 
"Subject to the other provision of this article , all citizens shall have the 
right .... to form association or unions"'". 
88 Ibid 
89 Ibid 
90 C.A D , Draft Constitution of India (1948), P.7. Quated from Dr Srivastava S.C. 
"Indistunal Disputes and Labour Management Relations in India,238 (Deep and 
Deep Publication, New Delh 1984). 
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and clause (4) of Article read: 
"Nothing in sub -clause (c) ofthe said clause shall affect the operation 
of any existing law ,or prevent the State from making any law , 
imposing ,in the interest of the general public, restriction on the 
exercise ofthe right conferred by the said sub- clause"". 
The members ofthe Constitutent Assembly were not happy with the 
wide powers which clause (4) conferred upon the State to regulate Combination. 
Shri H. J. Khandekar observed : 
" sub -clause (c) grant ' t o form association or unions.' Thus we 
are given the impression that we would have the right to form 
association or unions and thus to carry on organised agitation . For 
instance .we are given to believe that we could carry on organised 
agitation for the welfare of labour , that we can make in an organised 
fashion , a demand for the grant of bonus , and if necessary can 
assemble in public meetings to back up this demand . The truth is that 
the law restricting the right of holding public meetings would be 
enforced . Consequently in view of such a law or laws of this kind to 
be passed in fixture it may not be possible to hold any public meeting. 
Thus it is clear that the Government would be in a position to prevent 
if it so desires, any agitation by labour for demanding bonus, since all 
these restrictive laws would be applicable to the workers also. I, 
therefore, fail to see the significance of the right of forming associations 
when I fmd that its substance is taken away by clause (4). I submit that 
this Article is neither for the good of labour nor of the general 
community'"^. 
91 Ibid 
92 C A D Vol. VII at 765. 
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The Constituent Assembly in course and at the different stages, 
adopted three amendments relatives to the rights which we are considering; 
(i) The words ' subject to the other provisions of this Article', occurring in 
the operative portion of clause (1) of Article 13 were deleted;" 
(ii) The words' the general public occurring in clause (4) of Article 13 were 
substituted by the words 'public order or morality;'*^. 
(iii) The word 'reasonable' was inserted before the word 'restrictions' in the 
clause (4) of Article 13.". 
It is only after the aforesaid amendments were adopted by the members 
of the Constituent Assembly . became satisfied and expressed a sign of relief 
Shri T.T Krishnamachari (Madras :General) observed : 
" Sub-clause (c) of Article 13 (l)is very important . I do not 
know if people really realise as they would know in other countries 
and particularly in U.S., labour has had to undergo an enormous 
amount of trouble to obtain elementary rights on matters of the 
recognition of their rights in matter of the right to assemble together 
as a Union . I do not think that in my view clause (4) of this particular 
article unnecessarily abridges the rights confered by sub-clause (c) of 
clause (1) . M> own feeling is that we have more or less saught to cut 
across the difficulties which the other countries have faced in this 
particular matter and we have ensured for labour the very legetimate 
right to come together , to agitate and to obtain for themselves and 
for the members of their Union the rights that are justly theirs. That 
93 C A D Vol V l l at 784 
94 C A D Vol VII at 788 
95 C A D Vol VII at 787 
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I thiuk is more or less a charter for workers in this country and I am 
happ> to see that the vested interests have not tried in any way to 
abridge this particular right."^" 
Professor Shibban Lai Saksena (United Provinces : General) observed: 
" . this article may be truly stated to be the charter of our liberties 
and this is probably the most important Article in the whole Draft 
Constitution "" 
Referring to clause (4) of Article 13 he further observed : 
"Coming to clause (4), (9) must say that labour will now feel that 
today they have got their charter of liberty. They can now form unions 
subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order or 
morality. So, labour today will thank Dr. Ambedkar for accepting 
amendments which modified the original clause. In the original form 
you could not hold a meeting because it would be against the wishes 
of the general public. Now you will have to prove that the decision to 
ban a meeting is in the public you will have to prove that the decision 
to ban a meeting is the public interest or morality. This is the great 
charter of liberty for labour."'* 
Shiv Algu Rai Shastri (United Provinces : General) rightly remarked : 
"Freedom is a great art even greater than the art of music and dancing. 
One who is see from C.A.D. in music or dancing keeps his voice under 
control and maintains restraint and congrol over his bodily movement 
and on the movement of his feet. He has to move in accordance with 
96 C A D Vol VII at 773-774 
97 C A D Vol VII at 763 
98 C A D Vol Vll at 764 
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certain recongnised rules of music and dancing. He cannot sing and 
dance out of tune and time, in an unrestrained manner. He remains 
fu]Jy bound to the rules Full freedom is being conferred upon us but 
it can never mean that we should not be under any restriction 
whatsoever."'"' 
These expressions of opinion do not indicate that the framers of the 
constitution were securing merely the right to form associations or unions' and 
not the concomitant right of combine or collective action. 
Judiciary innovated the concept of concomitant rights. According to 
this theory it is not a correct view that a right which is not specifically 
mentioned by name can never be a Fundamental Right within the meaning of 
Article 19(1). In a number of cases'"" the scope of freedom of speech and 
expression was extended by the Supreme Court and various other rights which 
are not mentioned specifically in Article 19 are included in this freedom and 
expression. 
In All India Bank Emloyees' Association Case "" the Court said that a 
very liberal interpretation of sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 can not 
lead to the conclusion that the trade Unions have a guaranteed right to an 
effective collective barganing The Constitutional guarantee of the right to 
form associations or unions did not carry with it the fiirther guarantee of right 
to strike 
99 C A D Vol VII at 767 
100 Romesh Thapper Vs State of Madras (1950)SC R 594, BrijBhushan Vs State 
of Delhi (1950) S C R 605, Express Newspaper Vs Union of India, A 1 R 1958 
SC 578, Sakal Paper Vs Union of India, A I R 1962 S C 305, Maneka Gandhi 
Vs Union of India. AI R 1978 SC 597 
101 All India Bank Employees' Association Vs National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, 
A I R 1962 S C 171 Sec also Radhey Shyani Sharnia Vs Postmaster General 
Nagpur, (1964) 7 SC R 403 
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But it does not mean that right to strike does not have any value. This 
right lias been recognised by almost all democratic Countries 
It is respectfully submitted that strike in a given situation is only a form 
of demonstration There are different modes of demonstrations, e.g. go-slow, 
sit-in, tool-down, work to rule, absentism etc. and strike is one such mode of 
demonstration by workers for their right. The right to demonstrate and 
therefore, the right to strike is an important weapon in the armoury of the 
workers But the right ofstrikeisnot absolute under our industrial jurisprudence 
and restrictions have been placed on it .These are to found in sections 10(3), 
10-A (4-A) ,22 and 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947'" So it is further 
102 Section 10 (3) provides that where an industrial dispute has been referred to a 
Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this Section, the 
appropriate Government may by order prohibit the continuance of any strike or 
lockout in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the 
reference 
Section 10A(4-A) (1) provides that where an industrial dispute has been referred to 
arbitration and a notification has been issued under sub-section (3-A), the appro-
priate Government may. by order, prohibit the continuance of any strike or lookout 
in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the 
reference 
Sectopm 22 provides (1) No person emloyed in a public utility service shall go on strike 
in breach of contract-
(a) without giving to the employer notice of strike ,as hereinafter provided, within six 
weeks before striking, or 
(b) within fourteen days of giving such notice, or 
(c) before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any such notice as aforesaid, or 
(d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer 
and seven days after the conclusion of such proceddings 
(2) No employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his 
workman-
la) Without giving them notice of lock-out as hereinafter provided, within six weeks 
before locking-out, or 
(b) within fourteen days of giving such notice, or 
(c) before the expiry of the date of lock-out specified in any such notice as aforesaid, 
or 
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submitted that the Supreme Court being a guardiau and protector of the rights 
of citizen should also protect the rights ofthe workers specially right of strike, 
if this right is used peaceably by the workers and in contraction of reasonable 
restrictions engrafted ui Article 19(2) or 19 (4) ofthe Constitution of India. 
(d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer 
and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings 
(3) The notice of lock-out or strike under this section shall not be necessary where there 
IS already in existence a strike or, as the case may be, lock-out in the public utility 
service, but the employer shall send intimation of such lock-out or strike on the day 
on which It IS declared, to such authority as may be specified by the appropriate 
Government either generally or for a particular area or for a particular class of 
public utility services 
(4) The notice of strike referred to in sub-section (1) shall be given by such number of 
persons to such person or persons and in such manner as may be prescribed 
(5) The notice of lock-out referred to in sub-section (2) shall be given in such manner 
as may be prescribed 
(6) If on any day an employer receives from any person employed by him any such 
notices as are referred to in sub-section (1) or gives to any persons employed by him 
any such notices as are referred to in sub-section (2), he shall within five days, 
thereof reort to the appropriate Government or to such authority as that Government 
may prescribe the number of such notices received or given on that day 
23 Section 23 provides No workman who is employed in any industrial establishment 
shall go on strike in breach of contract and no employer of any such workman shall 
declare a lock-out-
(a) during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Board and seven days after 
the conclusion of such proceedings, 
(b) during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court. Tribunal or National 
Tribunal] and two months, after the conclusion of such proceedings, 
(bb) during the pendency of arbitration proceedings before an arbitrator and two 
months after the conclusion of such proceedings, where a notification has been 
issued under sub-section(3A) of section lOA, or 
(c) during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation, in respect of any 
of the matters covered by the settlement or award 
295 
(4) Collective Bargaining: 
C ollective bargainuig has developed to some extent in India since 
Independence Inspiration for peaceful settlement of differences between 
management and labour come from Gandhiji, who in his autobiography 
expressed his philosophy of industrial relations thus: 
"Man is an engme whose motive power is the soul . The largest 
quantity of work will not be done by this curious engine for pay or 
under pressure . It will be done when the motive force, that is to say 
tbe wiU OT the spirit of the cteatute jsbiovight to i l s gieatest strength 
by its own fiiel , namely by the affections. Assuming any given 
quantity of energy and sense in master and servant , the greatest 
material result obtainable by them will not be brought antagonism to 
each other but through affection for each other".'°^* 
Collective bargaining is camparatively new phenomenon . The 
production methods before the Industrial Revolution differed so much from 
those of modem industry that collective bargaining was not necessary . 
Agriculture was the predominant occupation. Agricultural wages and working 
conditions are hardly amenable to control by collective agreement . 
The development of industries created completely new problems . For 
example insecurity , industrial hazards ,urban problems and oppressive 
attitude of management. The oppressive power of management led to the 
organisation of trade unions. The Unions tried to help the workers in resolving 
their disputes with management and to strive for better working conditions. 
In regulating relations between groups the rule that "might makes 
right" gradually gave way to control by one or more centres of power. Now 
men are working towards newer techniques by which agreement, rather than 
102 . MR Gandhi. "The Story of My Experiment with Truth" (1956). quoted from M. 
Sur., Collective Bargaining. 57 (1965). 
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coercion, can become the care of the needed regulation. These argreements 
are often reluctant, no doubt, but less so than is submission to force. 
Collective bargamiug is the technique for voluntary regulation of industrial 
relations. Freedom of contract is the corresponding technique in Commerce 
and industry. Demorcracy is the technique in government; and efforts are 
begining at voluntarism in international relations."" 
In egalitarian society with its fast changing social norms, a concept 
tike, collective bargaining, is not capable of a precise definition. The content 
and scope of collective bargaining also varies from coimtry to country. 
Collective bargaining is a method by which the employers and their workmen 
settle their disputes among themselves relating to employment or non-
employment or terms of employment or condition of labour of the workmen, 
on the strength of the sanctions available to each side. Occasionally such 
bargaining results in amicable settlement arived at voluntarily and peacefully 
between the parties. The system is highly developed in many countries and is 
making headway slowly in India. "The process of reaching a collective 
agreement by collective bargaining is highly complicated one. It involves 
complex interchange of ideas combining argument, horse trading, bluff, 
cajolery and threats."'"^ By its very nature both parties want to yield less and 
get more. It is not qaualitatively different from a business deal in which both 
negotiators have something less than 100 percent trust in one another . Nor 
is it much different from the policy of diplomacy.'"' 
103 Indian Law Institute. 'Labour Law and Labour Relations-Cases and Materials', S3 
(N M Tripathi (P) Ltd . Bombay, 1987) 
104 Van D Kennedy, Unions, employers and Government 1966 P 115. Quoted from 
O P Malhotra."The Law of Industrial Disputes",8 (IV Edition Vol I, 1985, N M 
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The best justification for collective bargaining is that it is a system 
based on bipartite agreements, and as such, superior to any arrangements 
involving third party intervention in matters which essentially concern 
employers and workers this is recongnised even in our system in principle, but 
in practice, there seems to be a preference for adjudication. ""•. It can not be 
denied that during the last twenty years the adjudication machinary has 
exercised considerable influence on several aspects of conditions of work and 
labour management relations. Adjudication has been one of the instruments 
for improvement of wages and working conditions and for securing allowances 
for mamtaining real wages, for standardisation of wages, bonus and introducing 
uniformity in benefits and amenities. It has also helped to avert many work 
stoppage by providing an acceptable alternative to direct action and to protect 
and promote the interest, of the weaker sections of the working class, who 
were not well organised or were unable to bargain on an equal footing with 
the employer. It is stated that while adjudication has its defects, it has by and 
large succeded in bringing about some measure of industrial peace in the 
country; that industrial relations would have been worst, and work stoppage 
longer and indeed what is more important, conditions of work would have less 
attractive than what they are today, if things had been left to be settled by 
collective bargaining. The best course in the present situation is to carry on 
with the existing procedures, trying at the same time to remove the obvious 
defects in the system through suitable improvements or modification to make 
it more acceptable. Four specific points made in this coimection are : (i) the 
circumstances which neccesitated the provision of compulsory adjudication 
when the industrial desputes law was enacted in 1947 still continue (ii) the 
parties, particularly unions, are still unprepared and incapable, because of 
106, National Commission on Labour, 1969, Chapter 23, Industrial Relation - I at P 
325 
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orgauisatioiial and other weaknesses, to shoulder fiill responsibilities of 
collectix c bargaining (iii) immediate withdrawal of State intervention through 
adjudication will lead to choas, in the industrial field, which the country can 
ill afford, and (i\) there is always the third party to the dispute, viz, the 
community, and the State, as representing the community, must have the right 
to intervene and compel the parties to submit to decision of an adjudicator.'"^ 
On the other hand there are certain points which may throw the light on the 
importance of collective bargaining in the settlement of an industrial dispute. 
These are : (i) collective bargaining provides a method of introducing civil 
rights into industr>, that is, of requiring that management be conducted by rule 
rather than by arbitrary decisions. It establishes rules which define and restrict 
the traditional authority exercised by employers over their employees, placing 
part of the authority under joint control by union and management, (ii) 
collective bargaining helps the industrial system to function smoothly and 
efficiently because of its democratic nature. It by striking a proper balance 
between the conflicting expectations of labour management promotes, to a 
great extent, social justice in the industrial sector, (iii) Through collective 
bargaining the employer can know before hand the real grievances of the 
workers and can take precautions and thereby avoid strike. By avoiding strike 
the employer can produce even more than the target, (iv) It restricts 
managements, freedom of action, for even where management security is 
intact. It opens up a channel of conmiunication between the top and bottom 
of an undertaking which is difficult otherwise. 
There may be some other facts or points in favour or against of 
collective bargaining and adjudication respectively but one fact remains intact 
that the quest of industrial peace and harmony, by obviating the struggle and 
107 IbidP 225.226 
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strife ofthe working classesto ameliorate and imp rove their working conditions 
against the intrepreneuria) exploitation which may often lead to head long 
clashes and hamper production and disturb the social life ofthe community, 
collective bargainig by voluntary agreement has been adopted as the standard 
system in United States of America. But in India the tradition of free collective 
bargaining has always been weaker. Consequently there is more continuous 
and systamatic surveillance over industrial dispute on thepart ofthe Government 
by resorting to compulsory adjudication. But either system is free from its 
snags and snare on account of sharp clashes of interest and stormy quality of 
human nature. Collective bargaining contract is vulnerable for its 
encouragement of strikes, for its lack of principled and scientific decision and 
for its failure to protect the community's apart from its greatest drawback of 
third party intervention, is fiirther vuhaerable for its expense, its delays, its 
bitterness and acrimony, its frustrations and for its many wrong decisions. 
Hence with respect to the merits and demerits of collective bargaining vis-a-
vis compulsory industrial adjudication, there is a serious conflict and 
overlapping of views'"*. 
The process of collective bargaining though in limited form has been 
introduced in the year 1956 by amending the definition of'settlement' in 
section 2(p) ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(p) says : 
"Settlement means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation 
proceeding and includes a written agreement between arrived at 
otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such 
agreement has been signed by the parties there to in such manner as 
may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer 
108 O P Malhotra "The law of Industrial Disputes".8,9( Fourth edition. Vol. 1 1985, 
N M . Tripathi Pvt Ltd Bombay). 
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authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the 
conciliation office". 
Rule 58 ofthe Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 prescribes the 
Memorandum of settlement in Form H and also lays down the procedure for 
signing the settlement. Section 18( 1) makes such a settlement binding on the 
parties to their agreement of settlement section 19 prescribes the periods of 
operation interalia of such settlement and section 29 prescribespenalty for the 
breach of such a settlement. It appears that the process of collective bargaining 
yet rest on the statutory safequards. Thus though in principle collective 
bargaining has been recognised, the emphasis is mainly on adjudication. In 
practice, with the aid of these statutory provisions, the Government has 
retained ultimate control over the settlement of industrial disputes by resorting 
to compulsory adjudication. All the same, "there is significantly more bargaining 
now than there was ten years ago and in the most advanced situations it has 
become a solid fact of industrial life having built up on impressive range of 
subject matter and considerable structure of rules" '"' 
Article 19(l)(c) ofthe constitution of India guarantees to all citizens 
the right to form associations or unions and Article 19(4) gives power to the 
State to impose reasonable restrictions thereon, in the interest of sefeguarding 
the sovereignty and integrity of India a public order or morality. In All India 
Bank Employees Association vs National Industrial Tribunal"" it was argued 
that Article 19(l)(c) guarantees, as a concomitant to its right to form 
associations or unions, a right to effective collective bargaining and a right to 
strike. But the Supreme Court rejected the argument, saying that". 
109 Supra not 104 
110, A I R . 1962 S.C 171 
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"Even a very liberal interpretation of sub- cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 
cannot lead to the conclusion that the trade unions have a guaranteed 
right to an effective collective bargaining or to strike, either as part 
of collective bargaining or otherwise. The right to strike or the right 
to declare a lockout may be controlled or restricted by appropriate 
industrial legislation, and the validity of such legislation would have 
to be tested not with reference to criteria laid down in cl.(4) of Article 
19 but by totally different considerations'"". 
But even so the right is one of social importance in India's industrial 
development. Now the Government and judicial apathy towards collective 
bargaining is undergoing a gradual modification and the necessity of collective 
bargaining for adjusting labour management relations is urgently felt. The new 
trends appear to be one of non-interference especially in those labour matters 
which are covered by the settlement or agreement. To foster collective 
bargaining"^ courts have started envisaging the feasibility of trade unionism 
among the workers holding that individual dispute to become an industrial 
dispute must be espoused by the trade union. The Supreme Court observed: 
"This view recognizes the great importance in modem industrial life 
of collective bargaining between the workmen and the employees. It 
is well known how before the days of collective bargaining labour was 
at a great disadvantage in obtaining reasonable terms for contracts of 
service from his employer. As trade Unions development in the 
country and collective bargaining became the rule, the employers 
found it necessary and convenient to deal with the representatives of 
workmen, instead of individual workman, not only for the making or 
111 Id at 181 
112 Ram Prasad Vishwakarma Vs Industrial Tribunal (1961), 1. L.L.J. 504 (S.C.) 
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modification of contracts but in the matter of taking disciplinary 
action against one or more workmen as regards all other disputes""^ 
In the interest of collective bargaining the courts have also further 
stressed the need of one union in one industry.'"* Of course the courts are 
against compulsory unionism contrived through 'closed shop'" ' agreements 
which have neither legal validity nor moral justification. The Courts, however, 
in India have also confronted with many issues like the validity of trade union 
elections,"" the question of representation "^ of workers who are members of 
an unorganised trade union, modification of agreements and policy of 
encouraging collective bargaining by requiring that an industrial worker"* 
should not appear in any proceeding himself where there is a representative 
union etc. 
The importance of collective bargaining need not be under estimated. 
National Commission on Labour observed: 
"We envisage that in a democratic system pressure on Government to 
intervene or not to intervene in a dispute may be powerfijl. It may 
hardly be able to resist such pressures and the best way to meet them 
will be to evolve a regulatory procedure in which the State can be seen 
in the public eye to absolve itself of possible charges of political 
intervention. The requrements of national policy make it imperative 
that state regulation will have to coexist with collective bargaining. 
113. Ibid page 507. 
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At the same time, there are dangers in maintaining status-quo. There 
is a case for shift in emphasis and this shift will have to be in the 
direction of an increasingly greater scope for, and reliance on, 
collective barganing. But, any sudden change replacing adjudication 
by a system of collective bargaining would neither be called for nor 
practicable. The process has to be gradual. A beginning has to be 
made in the move towards collective bargaining by declaring that it 
will acquire primacy in the procedure for setting industrial dispute"'". 
There are certain important pre-requisites for the development of 
collective barganing process in our country. First, we have to evolve satisfactory 
arrangements for union recogniton by statute as also to create conditions in 
which such arrangements have a chance to succeed. Secondly, we have to 
indicate the place of which strike and lockout will have in such arrangements. 
Collective barganing can not exist without strike and lock-out. Thirdly, 
collective barganing requires a degree of maturity on the part of both parties. 
Here any element of strength in one party is by the same taken as element of 
weakness in the other. Fourthly collective barganing should be decalred as an 
integral part of India's national industrial relations policy and in order to give 
it a Constitutional sanctity, it should be incorporated in the Directive Principles 
of State Policy. By this there will be further inprovement in the collective 
barganing. Fifthly, stipulations in individual contracts which are contrary to 
a collective agreement and detrimental to the interest of the worker should be 
regarded as null and void. 
We may conclude that the State regulation or state control, the grant 
of union recognition and the strong trade union are the important prerequisites 
for the healthy process of collective barganing. Stipulations in individual 
119 Report of National Commission on Labour, 1969 ch 23 Industrial Relations, P 327. 
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contracts without the State control or State intervention will lead the revival 
of old, discarded and out dated doctrine of laissez- faire. 
The liberlised industrial policy fascinated and encouraged a large 
number of private investors, both national and foreign, to invest in the Indian 
economy on a large scale. The multinational companies are utilizing this 
golden apportunity in a big way to share Indian markets ostensibly to have a 
dominance in the competitive environment in the near future. The globalisation, 
open market economy, singning of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, it is now called world Trade Organisation ie W.T.O), and Dunkel 
proposal have given a new prospective. It holds promises but also have some 
predicaments. The collective barganing movement will gather strength and 
momentum in this country. Globalisation of Indian ecomomy questions the 
existing position or model of collective barganing. A fiituristic model has to 
be developed to cope with the develoments taking place in Indian economy. 
(a) Right to form Unions: 
Trade unions are formed in all forms of economy- capitalist, socialist 
and mixed. In all modern economic systems, the existence of a trade union is 
vital. Between the management and workers, trade union acts as a mediator, 
for upholding a smooth relationship between the two and ensuring maximum 
stability and achievement of eflQciency. Trade imionism has to play a vital role 
in ensuring industrial peace and democracy to the workers for their judicious 
demands. It is now generally agreed fact that trade unionism is beneficial not 
only to the working class but also to the industry and economy as a whole.'^^ 
A right to form trade unions was afforded by law to Indian workers 
comparatively very late. The lack of the law of trade unions for a long time 
120.Srikanta Mishra,"Modern Labour Laws and Indistrial Relations",141 (Deep and 
Deep Publications, 1992 . New Delhi) . 
305 
in India was due to the delayed industrialisation of the country. An Act to 
provide for the registration of trade unions and to define the law relating to 
registered trade unions for the first time passed in India in 1926 and it is known 
as the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Before the passing of this Act, labour 
organisations in India were subject to common law of the land. Further the 
constitution of India under Article 19( 1 )(c) has also conferred on all citizens 
a Fundamental Right to form associations or unions. Therefore, the right to 
form trade unions assumes importance in India as it is expressly recognised by 
both that is by an Act of the Legislature and the Constitution of India '^'. 
The statutory definition of the term 'trade union' in India is borrowed 
from the British Trade Union Acts of 1871, 1875 and 1913. The Indian Trade 
Unions Act, 1926 defines this expression under section 2(h) : 
"trade union means any combination, whether temporary or permanent, 
formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between 
workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen, or between 
employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the 
conduct ofanytrade or business, and includes federation oftwo oimore 
trade unions provided that this Act shall not afifect-
(i) any agreement between partners as to their own business; 
(ii) any agreement between an employer and those employed by him as to 
such employment; or 
(iii) any agreement in considerations of the sale of the good will of a 
business or of instruction in any profession, trade or handicraft". 
121. Ibid. 
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(b) Analyis of Trade Unions : 
(1) Tbe Ingredients of trade union are: 
(i) It must be a combination whether temporary or permanent 
(ii) The primary object of the union is to regulate the relations between-
(a) Workmen and employers, or 
(b) workmen and workmen, or 
(c) employers and employers, or 
(d) for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade 
or business. 
(2) The term trade union' includes any federation of two or more trade 
unions. 
(3) This definition shall have no effect on agreements as detailed in the 
proviso to the sub-section. 
(4) The membership of the trade union is not restricted under the Act to 
any particular class of persons'". 
Thus the analysis of the definition of the trade union clearly shows that 
the purpose of trade union is to maintain balance, harmony and proper 
adjustments in the relations of the persons involved in industrial process and 
production. The purpose of the trade union is not to secure harmony between 
the emloyers and workmen only but it is intended to secure peaceful relations 
between workmen and workmen and between employers and employers also. 
In the definition of trade union the regulation of relationship contemplated is 
122. Registrar, Trade Union Vs. M. Manswamy, 1974 Lab I.C 695 (Kant) 
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in regard to the conditions of service of the employees which postulates the 
existence of an employer who is concerned with the business, trade or 
industry Another primary object of the Trade Union is the imposition of 
restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade, business of its members. 
However, the use of the word 'primarily' in the Trade Unions Act suggest that 
trade unions can have other secondary objectives as well. A trade union may 
provide for other objectives also and it can not be refused registration simply 
on this ground. As long as the primary objectives are those that are mentioned 
in the Act, any trade union can claim registration inspite of certain secondary 
objectives in its Constitution. All that we can say is that the secondary and 
anciliary objectives should not be inconsistent with the primary objects. These 
objects, of course, must not be opposed to any law or opposed to public 
policy.'^^ 
We can distinguish three classes of objectives which trade union can 
have. The first may be classified as purely economic objectives, i.e. those 
which relate to questions concerning wages, hours of work, working and 
living conditions. The second one, viz. benefit purpose includes dispension of 
various benefits like sickness and unemloyment. The third group consists of 
social and political objective.'" 
The model Constitution and rules of trade unions cover these three 
classes of objectives. In fact the objectives that are in the Constitution of any 
trade union include the objectives mentioned above. The Act simply emphasises 
the supreme importance of the first type, viz., the purely economic objectives. 
It does not debar trade unions from having others. 
123 V G. Goswami "Labour and Industrial Laws", 158 (Central Law Agency, 
Allahabd,1986). 
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It indicates that the trade union may have primary objects as specified 
in Its definition as contained in section 2(h) of the Act and many other 
secondary objects as discussed above. What required is that the objects must 
not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act or opposed 
to any other law in force for the time being. 
The criteria for determining whether a particular association or persons 
is a trade union or not would depend on some of the factors. These factors 
are-(l) the existence of employer and employee engaged in the conduct of 
trade or business; (2) the association must be formed for the purpose of 
collective bargaining which is for securing improvements on matters like, 
basic pay. D. A., bonus, P.P., gratuity, leave, holidays, working hours, etc.; (3) 
the members of association or union must be workmen employed in trade or 
industry. 
Trade Union and Indian Constitution: The right to association, like the 
other Pundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. The 
Constitution provides that all citizens shall have the right to form association 
or unions. 
In D.A.V. College, Jullender Vs. State of Punjab"' Jaganmohan 
Reddy, J., while explaining the meaning of the right to form associations, 
observed: 
"The right to form an association implies that several individuals get 
together and form voluntarily an association with a common aim, 
legitimate purpose, and having a community of interests'"^''. 
In Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India"^ the court observed that the 
125. A 1 R. 1971 S.r. 1737 
126 Id at 1947 
127. A.I R 1978 S.C. 597 
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right to associatiou, like other Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of 
the C onslilution. represents one of the basic values cherished by the Indian 
people since the vedic times. Therefore, its guarantee, like that of the other 
Fundamental Rights, is "calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and 
create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to 
the fullest extent".'^* 
Sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 expressly guarantees the right 
to form trade unions. The right to form labour unions and trade unions is 
specifically and in terms guaranteed by the Constitution. Under Article 19(4), 
however, the legislature can impose reasonable restrictions by law in the 
interest of public order or morality. The existing statutes in India relating to 
formation, organisation and regulation of associations or unions a re ' " : 
(1) Co-operative Societies Act, 1912; the Companies Act, 1956; The 
Insurance Act, 1938; The Partnership Act, 1938; The Red Cross 
Society Act, 1920; The Religious Societies Act, 1889; The Societies 
Registration Act, 1860; The Universities Act, 1904; and Trade 
Unions Act, 1926. 
(2) The restrictive laws in this connection are : 
(a) Section 120-A India Penal Code, 1860; 
(b) Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908; 
(c) Indian Trade Unions Act. 1926 and 
(d) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."" 
128 Ibid P 620. 
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The workers, therefore, have the right to organize and select 
representatnes of then owii choosing for collective bargaining or other 
mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer. Labour 
may combine for the purposes of improving labour conditions,'^' for the 
purpose of obtaining such wages as they choose to agree to demand or 
promoting their common welfare, interest, safety, fixing of hours of work, 
payment of bonus, deamess allowance, holiday, leave, certain benefits, or for 
improved relations, or for compelling the employers to recognise the trade 
unions The right to organise and form association has been declared 
fundamental independently of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. The right 
of workers to organize unions or association is an exercise of the Constitutional 
right for lawful ends. The Allahabad High Court also observed: 
"The right to form association or unions under Article 19(l)(c) of the 
Constitution iaclude the right of the workmen to form trade unions for 
a lawful purpose. The purpose of an association is an integral part of the 
right, and if the purpose is restricted, the right is inevitably restricted. 
The right to form an association is not a right to be exercised in the 
vacum or any empty or paper right. Citizens do not begin to enjoy this 
right effectively immediately afler forming an association or a union on 
paper the employment and fulfilment of the right begins with the 
fulfilment of purpose for which the association is formed '^ ^". 
131 Sitaram Mills Ltd V RashtriyaMill Mazdoor Sangh,{1954)2L L J 737 See also 
Express Newspapers Ltd Vs Union of India, A 1 R 1958 S C 578, Standard 
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The right to association has been held to be comprehensive enough to 
include not on]> the right to the initial formation of the association but also 
the right to the continuance of the association as such for otherwise the right 
would become totally inefective and meaningless'". The word 'form' means 
not the right to commence but the right of continuance of the association as 
well. 
As regards the questions as to whether the right to form associations 
or unions includes the negative right not to form associations or Unions 
including the right not to be compelled to become a member of an association 
the present law is not clear. While some of the High Courts have taken the view 
that the positive right to form associations includes the negative right also "" 
the Supreme Cours's view on this matter is not clear. This is evident from its 
judgement in Tika Ramji Vs State of U.P."' , Bhagwati J., who delivered the 
Judgement of the Court observed: 
"In the jBrst place, assuming, that the right to form an association 
implies a right not to form an association it does not follow that the 
negative right must also be regarded as a Fundamental Right. The 
citizen of India have many rights which have not been given the 
sanctity of Fundamental Rights and there is nothing absurd or 
uncommon if the positive right alone is made a Fundamental Right"'^". 
In this case the validity of U.P. Sugar cane (Regulations of Suply and 
purchase) Act, 1955 was upheld on the ground that there was no compulsion 
on any canegrower to become a member of Canegrowers Cooperative Society. 
133. Damayanti Vs Union of India, A.l.R 1971 SC 966 at 971 See. Also V.G. Row 
Vs State of Madras, A.l.R 1951 Madras 147. 
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The right to form association which is guaranteed under Article 
!9( 1 )(c) does not carry with it concomitant right to every individual union to 
represent its members in an industrial dispute"^ or the concomitant right of 
effective collective bargaining. Nor does it include the right to strike'". 
Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., observed 
On the consideration of the Article — we have reached the conclusion 
that even a very liberal interpretation of sub. clause (c) of clause (1) 
of Article 19 can not lead to the conclusion that the trade unions have 
guaranteed right to an effective collective bargaining or to strike 
either as a part of collective bargaining or otherwise""'. 
B: Freedom of Association and Government Servants : 
Government servants also have the right to form an association for the 
protection and promotion of their legitimate claims and interest . However , 
the termination of services of a Government servants on the ground of his 
being a member of a trade union or the communist Party has been held not to 
offend his right under Article 19(1) (c) as he was left free to former join any 
association . He had no doubt a Fundamental Right to form association but he 
had no Fundamental Right to be continued in the Government service . The 
order terminating his services was not in contravention of Article 19(1) (c) 
because the order did not prevent him from continuing to be in communist 
party or trade unionist'"*''. 
As regard the right to strike of the Government servants it appears that 
they can not claim this right under Article 19(l)(c)'^' 
137 Raja Kulkarni Vs State of Bombay, A I.R. 1954 S.C. 73. 
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We may conclude that man has been called a social animal. He can not 
lead an isolated life. He seeks association with other human beings belonging 
to various groups such as family, caste, tribe conununity. He associates with 
others for common social, religious cultural, economic, political and other 
objectives. The constitution grants recognition to this natural desire, and 
confers a Fundamental Right on the citizens to form unions, subject to 
restrictions in the interest of public order and morality. The citizen's right to 
form unions includes his right to become a member of a union already existing, 
right to continue to manage and organise an union already formed, to 
formulate and implement the lawfiil objectives such unions or associations or 
to refiise to join an officially sponsered, or supported association to boycott 
a hostile association or to dissolve an association which becomes absolete. His 
associational freedom includes his right to attend, participate or address any 
meeting or take part in any demosntration organised by the association or 
union etc. His associational freedom protects the right of person not to 
become a member, if he does not want to join it, or voluntarily, to cease or to 
resign its membership.. In an association or Union like minded people can join 
together and work in furtherance of their objectives. The freedom of the 
workers to form and participate in the activities of an association is spelled out 
in the constitutional provisions in its widest amplitude, and is subjected only 
to the appropriate reasonable restrictions clause. The employment of this 
right can reasonably restricted in the interests of public order and morality. 
The reasonableness of restrictions is determined by a direct nexus between the 
demands of social control conclusive to public interest and the imposed 
restrictions. 
e'»/i7nsi^-n^'j 
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CHAPTER - VI 
Job Security 
It is hard fact that without job security a worker cannot perform his 
duties fearlessly and efficiently. Unjust dismissal and suspension; unmerited 
promotion and demotion; partiality towards one set of workers and regardless 
merits are the main causes which create sense of insecurity among the workers 
and civil servants. 
The present chapter is divided into two parts. Part 'A' delas with the 
security of job of the workers and an attempt has been made to discuss all the 
incidents and the protection which is provided in various statutes. In Part 'B' 
an attempt is further made to discuss the job sercurity which is provided in the 
constitution of India. The provision relating to services under the Union and 
States are laid down in Part XIV of the Constitution. The central idea of this 
chapter is to crystalise the important provisions of the Constitution. They are 
Articles 309, 310 and 311. 
(A) Workers 
(1) In retrospect: Modern Indian working class first germinated fi-om the 
construction of railways in India. Hundreds of workers who were 
engaged in this railway building were the harbingers of modern Indian 
working class. 
First railway building in India was undertaken by two private British 
companies, the Great India Railway Company, and the Great Peninsular 
Railway Company founded in London in 1845. Twenty miles were laid in 
1853, and two hundred and eighty eight in 1857. Larger scale construction 
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began, however, only after the great revolt of 1857-59 when the colonialists 
fiilly grasped the significance of communication lines to maintain their 
domination. 
Coal was indispensable for railway locomotion and quick expansion 
occurred in coal mining industry also along with construction of railways. 
Discovery and use of coal started in 1877. The Bengal Coal Company was 
founded in 1843 and the large collieries in Jharia came into operation in 1895. 
More effective means of communication, mainly railways and shipping 
lines being established, there was an increase in the number of mercantile 
enterprises importing manufactured goods and exporting raw materials, as 
well as in all types of plantation. As some raw materials needed initial 
processing before export, enterprises like rice mills, packing houses, flour 
mills, cotton pressing and ginning establishments, etc. sprang up like mushrooms 
to meet this need'. 
With an amazing capacity of foresight Karl Marx wrote^: 
"I know that the English millocracy intend to endow India with 
railways with the executive view of extracting at diminished expense 
the cotton and other raw materials for their manufacturers. But when 
you have once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, 
which possess iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its 
fabrication. You cannot maintain a net of railway over an immense 
country without introducing all those industrial processes necessary 
1 Sukonial Sen."working class of India-History of Emergence and Movement ', 23 
K.P. Bakchi and Company Calcutta. 1977). 
2 Karl Max."The Future Results of the British Rule in India," contained in 'One 
colonialisiv, by K. Marx and F. Engles. Foreign Langauages Publishing House. 
Moscow P 87, quoted from Dr. Sukomal Sen," working class of India-History of 
Emergence and Movement 23,( K.P. Bagchi and company, Calcutta, 1977). 
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to meet the immediate and current wants of railway locomotion, and 
out of which there must grow the application of machinery to those 
branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. The 
railway system will therefore, become, in India, truly the forerunner 
of modern industry". 
Meanwhile, plantation farming also developed intensively. The British 
Tea Company and Assam Tea, established in 1839. Although at the initial 
stage tea plantations faced many difficulties, with investment of immense 
British capital the industry greatly flourished. The contract labour used in the 
plantations differed little from slave labour and these semislaves also formed 
part of the growing Indian Labour. Jute industry also developed simultaneously. 
This industry monpolised by the British capitalists attracted much of the 
exported British capital. Jute was discovered by the East India Company in 
1775. It was first processed at Dundee in England in 1885. The first Jute mill 
of India was established in 1884 by Aukland at Rishra, near Calcutta\ 
Abundance of raw material and cheap labour lured the British capitalists 
to invest large amount of capital in setting up industries in India-Jute,coal 
mining and tea plantations claiming the major part of it. Calcutta turned out 
to be the main capital of British investment while Bombay developed as the 
principal centre of Indian capital. 
Development of large industrial units and expending commercial 
operations towards the close of the ninteenth century caused the growth and 
quick modernization of large cities and ports like Calcutta, Bombay and 
Madras. These cities and ports became the centres round which Indian labour 
developed as an organised class. 
3. Sukonial Sen "Working class of lndia,-History of Emergence and Movement 1850-
1970",25 { K.P Bagclii and company, Calcutta, 1977) 
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Prior to iudependance, apart from a fairly extensive network of 
railways, plantations, mines, cotton and jute textiles,sugar and cement 
factories among the more important industrial ventures in the country were 
three steel plants with a total capacity of 1.5 million tons of steel ignots, and 
a few engineering units. Today the complex of industry has changed. Assam 
no longer means jute tea; it means also fertilizers, chemicals, oil refining and 
distribution ,electricity generation and engineerng. Nor does Kerala mean 
cashew processing, coir manufacture and plantations; a prosperous fertilizer 
and chemical industry is growing up as are peterochemicals, oil refining, and 
ship-building. The face of Rajasthan is changing; sophisticated industries for 
the manufacture of ball bearings, synthetic fibres and electro magnetic and 
electronic instruments are coming up. Andhra Pradesh is no longer confined 
to agriculture and tobacco; it now has fertilizers, chemicals, ship-building and 
other industries. Madhya Pradesh and Orissa too are claiming a place on the 
country's industrial map. Older centres are diversifying. Bombay Poona, 
Surat,Barodo, Durgapur, Asansol, Ahmedabad, Bangalore and their 
surrounding areas, Hyderabad and its environs, the region around Madras and 
beyond are all having a greater measure of industrial activity. Kanpur no 
longer means mere textiles and leather; units manufacturing machine tools, 
transport equipments, automobiles, aeronautics, plastics and heavy chemicals 
are coming up. Small scale units in Punjab, Haryana manufacture a wide range 
of products such as woollen and cotton textiles, steel rolling, agricultural 
equipments, automobile part etc. These are symbols not only of increased 
industrial output, but also of a fair diversification of industrial structure. On 
account of expansion in industries employment increased tremandously. 
The industrial worker today has acquired a dignity, status in law, 
prestige not knwon to his predecessor. He has now a personality of his own. 
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He shares the benefits, albeit meagre, which a welfare State with a vast 
population and inadequate resources can offer, and some more. He enjoys a 
measure of social security; he is secure in his employment once he enters it; 
he can not be dismissed, terminated, discharged unjustly and has been given 
statutory and Constitutional protection against unjust dismissal, termination 
and discharge^. 
(2) Terms explained and Compared: 
(a) Worker, workman. Employee: 
The individual working in an undertaking or a factory has been called 
a worker, workman or an employee in various enactments. Each one of these 
terms is significant by itself and is not interchangeable with the other as the 
meanings assinged to these terms are different. Factories Act, 1948, uses the 
term "worker" to refer to a person employed in the factory and many other 
Acts borrow the term. The term "workman" is used in Industrial Disputes Act, 
1947, and Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The term 'employee' has been 
used in Employees State Insurance Act and Beedi and Cigar Workers 
(Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966. 
According to section 2(1) of Factories Act, 1948 worker means a 
person employed, directly or by or through any agency including a contractor 
with or without the knowledge of the Principal Employer whether for 
remuneration or not in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of 
the machinery or premises used for manufacturing process, or in any other 
kind of work incidental to. or connected with the manufacturing process, or 
the subject of manufacturing process but does not include any member of the 
armed forces of the Union. 
4. Report of the National Commission on Labour, 1969. at 31-32. 
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For covering a person within the scope of the term "worker" is that 
must be engaged or employed in the manufacturing process or in any kind of 
work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process. The worker, 
need not be directly employed by the Principal Emloyer. It is sufficient if a 
person has been employed by or through any agency including a contractor 
with or without the knowledge of the Principal Employer, whether employed 
for remuneration or not 
The term 'workman' has been defined in Section 2 (s) of the Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947. Workman' means any person (including an apprentice) 
employed ir any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, 
operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms 
of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding 
under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person 
who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a 
consequence of that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment 
has led that dispute, but does not include any such person-
(i) Who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Army Act, 1950 
or the Navy Act. 1957 or 
(ii) Who is employed in the police service or as an officer or employee 
of a prison; or 
(iii) Who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative 
capacity or 
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages 
exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per month or exercises, 
either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason 
of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. 
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Thus the definition of workman covers all pesous employed unskilled, 
manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work. It also includes apprentices, 
who may be employed for hire or reward and their contract of employment 
may be express or implied. For the purpose of any proceeding under this Act 
in relation to an industiral dispute, it includes any such person who has been 
dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence 
of that industrial dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has 
led to that dispute. The term workman excludes the persons on whom Army 
Act, Air Force Act, Navy (Discipline) Act, do apply. It also exculdes the 
person who is employed in the police service or an officer or other employee 
ofprison or who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity 
or draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per month. 
A comparison of the definition of "worker" in Factories Act, 1948 and 
"workman" in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, brings out a few significant 
differences. From one point of view, the term "worker" is wider than 
"workman" because it includes persons who may not be receiving wages. It is 
narrow in another sense because it includes persons employed in factories 
only. A workman may be employed in any industry. Before a person can 
become a worker, there must exist some relationsship between him and the 
manufacturing process. This is not so in the case of a workman. Again, the 
term "workman" distinguishes between non-supervisory, supervisory and 
managerial as well as administrative staff. It is exclusive of managers and 
administrators but includes supervisory staff whose monthly wages do not 
exceed one thousand six hundred. 
Section 2 (n) of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 defines the 
expression "workman". Under this section, the workman is a person other 
than whose employment is of casual nature and who is employed otherwise 
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than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business. He is employed on 
monthl\ wages not exceeding two- thousand rupees. 
The term "workmen" used in Workmen's Compensation is very narrow 
in its approach. It includes permanent worker, employed directly m the 
manufacturing process in any of the scheduled industries whose total monthly 
remuneration does not exceed two thousand rupees. 
According to section 2(f) of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions 
of Employment) Act, 1966,"employee" means a person employed directly or 
through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any establishment to do any 
work, skilled, unskilled, manual or clerical, and includes-
(i) any labour who is given raw material by an employer or a contractor for 
being made into beedi or cigar or both at home, 
(ii)any person not employed by an employer or a contractor but working 
with the permission of or under agreement with, the employer or 
contractor. 
Thus the definition of "employee" under section 2(f) is very wide and 
has the following features*" 
(a) The defmition includes the workers who work in industrial premises 
and establishment. 
(b) The Act also recognised "home worker" who is given raw material for 
processing beedis at home. 
(c) The Act also recognises "contract labour" by or through contractor. 
5, Substituted for one' by the workmen's compensation (Amendment) Act, 1995. w.e.f. 
15.9.1005 
0. See Zaheer uddin,"Labour welfare Laws and Employment Conditions in lndia",40 
(Deep and Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1985 ). 
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(d) Any person who is given raw material by an employer or a contractor 
is an employee. Again any person though not employed by an 
employer or a contractor but working with the permission or under 
agreement with the employer or a contactor is an employee. 
According to section 2(9) of Employees' State Insurance Act, 
"employee" means any person employed for wages or in connection with the 
work of a factory or establishment to which this Act applies and-
(i) Who is directly employed by the Principal Employer on any work of, or 
incidental of preliminary to or connected with the work of the factory or 
establishment whether such work is done by the employee in the factory 
or establishment or elsewhere, or 
(ii) Who is employed by or through an immediate employer on the premises 
of the factory or establishment or under the supervision of the Principal 
Employer or his agent on work which is ordinarily part of the work of 
the factory or establishment, or which is preliminary to the work carried 
on in or incidental to the purpose of the factory or establishment, or 
(iii) Whose services are temporarily lent or let on hire to the Principal 
Employer by the person with whom the person whose services are lent 
or to let on hire has entered into a contract of service. 
The definition of "employee" under E.S.I. Act is very wide like the one 
under Beedi and Cigar workers (Conditons of Employment) Act, 1966. The 
E.S.I. Scheme extends to all employees in covered establishments whether 
they are directly employed by Principal Employer or not. They may be 
employed by or through an immediate employer. The definition clearly 
indicates that the persons who are engaged in manual work and non-manual 
work both are covered for the purpose of this Act. Thus the term employee 
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includes every clerical labourer and part-time workers and apprentice. 
In order to determine whether a person is a workman or not the 
following two question maybe asked in relation to the defmition of'workman' 
given in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: 
What is the nature of work and degree of responsibility involved in 
performance of the duty? Is it mainly clerical or mainly administrative? Is it 
mainly supervisory' or supervision is secondary or incidental function? What 
is the extent of control and supervision by the employer over persons in 
question? A person who agrees to work and actually does work is a workman 
even though he may get other people to work along with himi. A contractor 
who is bound by the terms of contract to work himself, even if he employs 
other persons, will be workman. The worker may be employed even without 
the knowledge of Principal Employer for remuneration or not (section 2(1) of 
Factories Act 1948). It is not necessary that an employer should exercise his 
control directly. Piece rate workers working at home or elsewhere but under 
a measure of control by the employer are workmen. 
In the light of the above discussion , it is clear that aU skilled, unskilled, 
manual or clerical workers and office staff employed in an undertaking and 
working under the control of the employer are workmen. Musicians, Chemists, 
draftsmen, overseers, depot keepers, lauring auditors, pilots, radio officers, 
watch and ward jamadars, salesmen, apprentices, probationers, temporary 
and bodli workers, working journalists etc. all are workmen. Persons employed 
in supervisory capacity and drawing wages not exceeding Rs. 1000 per month 
are also workmen''. 
7 K N Vaid,' State and Labour m India', 22-23 (Asia Publishing House, Bombay 
1965). 
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(b) Employer In ordinary sense "employer" means any person who employs 
anotherperson for wages or salary. In the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditons 
of Employment) Act, 1966 under section 2(g), "employer" means-
(a) in relation to contract labour, the Principal Employer, and (b)in relation 
to other labour, the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs 
of any establishment or who has by reason of his advancing money 
supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the 
affairs of any establishment and includes any other person to whom the 
affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is 
called the managing agent, manager, superintendent or by any other 
name. 
The term "Principal Employer" is defined under section 2(m) of the 
Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 which 
means a person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged 
or employed in any establishment. 
The definition of "employer" has two parts, namely, sections 2 (g) (a) 
and 2 (g) (b). Two types of persons are made employers for the purpose of this 
Act. Under section 2(g) (a) the contract labour is either engaged or employed 
by a contractor and the employer has no knowledge of whom the contractor 
has employed or engaged, he would still be the Principal Employer in relation 
to such contract labour. This is, therefore, a deeming definition of "employer" 
where the contractual relationship of employer and employee may not exist. 
Section2 (g) (b) makes the person employer in relation to "other labour", 
when he has ultimate control over the affairs of an establishment or who by 
reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or otherwise, he has a 
substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment. The term 
"employer" includes any other person to whom the affairs of the establishment 
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are entrusted, whether such other person is called the managing agent, 
managei. superintendent or by any other name. Thus, in this definition, 
establishment is the basis for a person to be known as "employer". Accordingly, 
the worker's home where the family is rolling beedis with the help of the raw 
material supplied to them is an establishment. 
The Principal Employer being made an employer would be answerable 
civilly as well as criminally for everything that such an employer is required 
to do under the Act*. In M/S C.P. Patel Vs. State', the Court abserved: 
"The defmition of employer in section 2(g) sub-clause (a) which 
includes the Principal Employer in relation to contract labour 
and the definition of Principal Employer in section 2(m) are 
declared as invalid. The words' in relation to other labour' in 
sub-clause (b) of section 2 are to be treated as deleted. The rest 
of the Act is upheld as valid, and is to be read without these 
clauses". 
In Chirukandoth Chandrasekharan Vs. Union of India'" ,the court 
examined the method of contract system adopted in the Beedi industry and 
struck down sections 2(g) (a) and section 2(m) of the Act as unconstitutional. 
The court further held that the words" in relation to other labour" occurring 
in section 2(g) (b) had no place and had to be deleted. 
On the other hand, in Ganesh Beedi Works' Case" it was held otherwise. 
The court held that the Act is intended to achieve welfare benefits and 
amenities for the labour. That is why the manufacturer or trade mark holder 
8 Supra No 6 at 49 
9 A I R 1971 Bombay 244 at 245 
10 (1973) Lab I C 558 
11. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works Vs Union of India, (1974)11 Lab I C 1237 
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becomes the Principal Employer though he engages contract labour through 
the contractor. But he can not escape statutory liability imposed on him, by 
stating that he has engaged the labour through a contractor, and therefore, he 
is not responsible for the labour. In fact the contractor employs that labour 
onK for and on behalf of the Principal Employer. That is why the statute 
provides that even if the contractor engages labour without the knowledge of 
the employer, the Principal Employer is answerable for such labour, because 
the labour is engaged for or on his behalf The Act and the Rules thereunder 
the manufacturer requires the contractor to maintain log books and registers. 
It is through such books and registers that the manufacturers keeps control 
over both the contractors and the labour There is no restriction on the right 
of the maufacturer or the trade mark holder to carry on business. Therefore, 
the court held that the provisions of the Act contained in section 2(g) (a), 2(g) 
(b) and 2(m) are Constitutionally valid. Thus the decisions of C.P. Patel and 
C. Chandra Sekharan's cases were overruled. 
In place of the term "emplolyer", the term" occupier" has been used in 
section 2(n) ofthe Factories Act, 1948. "Occupier" means the person who has 
ultimate control over the affairs ofthe factory. The definition ofthe occupier 
has been amended in 1976 and 1987 and now it covers under its purview many 
other persons'^. 
12 Section 2(n) ofthe Factories Act, 1948 defines 'occupier' as: "occupier of a factory 
means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs ofthe factory. Provided 
that-
(i) in the case of a firm or other accociation of individuals, any one ofthe individual 
partners or members thereof shall be demmed to be occupier: 
(ii) in the case ofacompany.any one ofthe directors shall be deemed to be the occupier. 
(ill) in the case of a factory owneci or Controlled by the Central Government or any State 
Government, or any local authoritv, the person or persons appointed to manage the 
affairs ofthe factory by the Centra) Government, the State Government or the local 
authority, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the occupier. 
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Under the Factories Act, the term "occupier" does not include the terra 
"Principal Employer", while in Beedi and Cigar Workers Act, the term 
Principal Employer" is expressly included and it widens the area of the 
definition. 
In the definition of "occupier" the expression 'who has ultimate control 
over the affairs of the factory' is used. On the other hand in the definition of 
"employer" the expression— 'affairs of the establishment are entrusted, 
whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager superintendent 
or by only other name' is used. The later expression covers a area more than 
that in the former expression. The later expression includes" managing agent", 
"manager", "superintendent" oraperson"by othername". The former expression 
includes only "manager agent". 
Further the expression 'ultimate Control over the affairs of the factory' 
used in the defmition of occupier has limited scope than the expression 'has 
the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment, used in the definition 
of "employer" under Beedi and Cigar workers (Condi t ions of 
Employment )Act, 1966". 
An "employer" under section 2(g) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 
means-
13 Section 2 (g) of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Emloynient) Act, 1966 
defines 'employer' as: 
' employer means.-
(a) in relation to contract labour, the principle employer, and 
(b) in relation to other labour, the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs 
of any establishment or who has. by reason of his advancing money, suplying good 
or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the afairs of any establishment, 
and includes an> other person to wliom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, 
whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager, superintendent 
or by any-other name 
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(i) in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any 
department ofthe Central Government or State Government; the authority 
prescribed on this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the head 
ofthe department;-
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, 
the chief of executive officer of that authority. 
The definition of "employer" under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in 
relation to the definition of "employer" under Beedi and Cigar Workers 
(Condtions of Employment) Act, 1966, is neither exhaustive nor inclusive. 
Under Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, the word "employer" is not speciffically 
defined. It merely indicate who is to be considered an employer for the 
purposses of an industry carried on by or under the authority of a department 
of Government and or on behalf of a local authority. 
The definition of "employer" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, 
does not cover the contract labour as under Beedi and Cigar Workers Act, 
1966. 
The term "employer" has been defined under section 2 (e) of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The expression "employer" includes: 
(1) any body of persons whether incorporated or otherwise; 
(2) any managing agent of an employer i.e., a person entitled to the 
management ofthe whole affairs of another person. He differs fi-om the 
manager though the later has similar managements in his hand, he is 
subordinate to the employer, while the managing agent is not; 
(3) legal representative of a deceased employer; and 
(4) When the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to 
another person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of 
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service of apprenticeship, such other person while the workman is 
working for him 
The word "employer" means any person who gives employment to any 
other person. Unlike the word "employer" which is defined in Beedi and Cigar 
Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act,1966. includes and also a legal 
representative of a deceased employer. The term"apprentice" is also added in 
the definition of "employer" under Workmen's Compensation Act. 
There is one more important difference between the definition of 
"employer" under the two Acts. Under Beedi and Cigar Workers Act, the 
word "includes" is used in the beginning of the definition clause. Section 2 (e) 
of Workmen's Compensation Act uses the word "means" in such a case as 
distinct from the word "includes". 
In England under the Act of 1925 the original employer also continues 
to be the employer. In India, the exemption of the original employer for any 
accident during the period of hire or letting may leave the workman without 
any remedy. For intance, if a truck owner hires out the truck with services of 
the driver and cleaner on a casual work, the hirer may avoid liability by 
pleading that the employment not being for his trade or business and being of 
a casual nature, the driver and cleaner were not workmen so far as he was 
concerned under section 2(n) of the workmen's compensation Act. On the 
other hand, the permanent employer may plead under section 2 (n) that during 
the period of hire he had ceased to be the employer for the purposes of this 
Act. 
It is submitted that the difmition of "employer" under Workmen's 
Compensation Act, covers area larger than that under Beedi and Cigar 
workers (Canditions of Employment) Act 1966'^. 
14.Supra note 6 at p. 48-53 
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(3) Discipline: Worker and employer are two participants of business 
organisation. This organisation is like a chariot and worker and employer are 
the two wheels of this chariot. "Each needs the other: capital cannot do 
without labor, nor labor without capital". Pope Leo XIII. Good discipline is 
necessary for the orderly conduct of any organisation (industry). Good 
discipline means "orderly conduct of affairs by the members of an organization 
who adhere to its necessary regulations because they desire to cooperate 
harmoniously in forwarding the ends which the group ha s in view and willingly 
recognise that do this their own wishes must be brought into reasonable unison 
with the requirement of the group in action. 
Good discipline would require better performance from both the 
management and the employees. The important requirements of such a good 
discipline are: 
(l)The foremost thing is to see that every member of the organisation 
knows just what is expected of him and to have the members of the group 
and his superior no less than himself support him in seeing that it is done. 
(2)The disciplinary plan including the statement of rules, and imposition of 
penalties should gradually be shared in by the employees in an organised 
way. 
(3)The rules and regulations must be (a) as few as possible, (b) as simple 
as possible, (c) as explicit as possible. 
(4)The rules should be considered as means and not ends. There should be 
periodical reviews of the rules. 
(5)The rules should be widely publicised and communicated to the 
employees. 
331 
(6)There must be consistency and fairness in the application and enforcement 
of the rules. Those who are responsible for enforcement of the rules must 
themselves respect them. Preferably there should be an agreed procedure 
of appeal, chance for statement and hearing of a case, and final decision 
by an impartial domestic tribunal. 
(7)If a rule is infringed fi^equently, the real cause of such infi-ingement must 
be looked into. 
(8)Penaltiesand Punishments should be devised on the theory of constructive 
correction and not vindictiveness. The emphasis should be on a plan of 
rewards for compliance w4th rules rather than on the penalty features. 
Justice should be tempered with mercy and humanism, patience and 
understanding". 
Industrial discipline is necessary for the well ordered conduct of the 
industrial activity. For a good discipline the employers as well as the workers 
should follow the above requirements. It is submitted that hard and efficient 
work on the one hand and the avoidance of indiscipline activities on the part 
of the workers on the other, wiU be needed for achieving the goal which the 
community desires to achieve. 
(a) Misconduct : The term "misconduct" has not been defined either in the 
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or in the Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act, 1946. The dictionary meanings of the word, "misconduct" are-
"improper behaviour; intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule 
of standard of behaviour". In so far as the relationship of industrial employment 
is concerend. a workman has certain express or implied obligations towards 
his employer. Any conduct on the part of an employee inconsistant with the 
15 Dr G.M Kothari." Labour Demands and Their Adjudication". l.Vol. II, N.M. 
Tripathi (P) Ltd Bombay. 1977) 
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faithful discharge of his duties towards his employer would be a misconduct. 
Any breach of the express or implied duties of an employee towards his 
employer, therefore, unless it be of trifling nature, would constitute an act of 
misconduct. In industrial law, the word' misconduct' has acquired a specific 
connotation. It cannot mean inefficiency or slackness. It is something far more 
positive and certainly deliberate. The charge of'misconduct', therefore, is the 
charge of some positive act or of conduct which would be quite incompatible 
with the express and implied terms of relationship of the employee to the 
employer'*'. 
Under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 
1946 framed under the Industrial Employment ('Standing Orders) Act, 1946, 
the Central Government has prescribed the Model Standing Orders in Schedule 
1, Clause 14(3) of which provides that the following acts and omissions shall 
be treated as misconduct: 
(a) wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether alone or in 
combination with other, to any lawful and reasonable order of a 
superior; 
(b) theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's 
business or property; 
(c) wilful damage to or loss of employer's goods or property; 
(d) taking or giving bribes or any illegal gratification; 
(e) habitual absence without leave, or absence without leave for more 
then 10 days. 
(f) habitual late attendence; 
16 OP Malhotra,"The law of Industiral Disputes".766 .Vol.11. (N.M. Tripathi (P) 
Ltd Bombay 1985). 
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(g) habitual breach of any law applicable to the establishment; 
(h) riotous or disorderly behaviour during working hours at the 
establishment or any act subversive of discipline; 
(i) habitual negligence or neglect of work; 
(j) frequent reception or any act or omission for which a fine may be 
imposed to a maximum of 2% of the wages in month or 
(k) striking work or inciting other to strike in contraventiotf of the 
provisions of any law, or rule having the force of law. 
From the language of this Model Standing Order itself, it is clear that 
it does not define misconduct or illustrate it exhaustively. It is not possible 
to provide for every type of misconduct in the Standing Orders for justifying 
disciplinary action against the workman.What is misconduct, will naturally 
depend upon the circumstances of each case. When there are. Standing 
Orders, there would be no difficulty because they define "misconduct'. In the 
absence of the Standing Orders, however, the question will have to be dealt 
with reasonably and in accordance with commonsense. As to what acts can be 
treated as acts of misconduct, therefore, would depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
(b) Punishment : Punishment is the ultimate sanction of discipline. The 
imposition of punishment by an employer on bis employee is an exercise of 
quasi-judicial authority. The act of punishment by itself may be an 
administrative act, yet it can be lawfully done only after proceeding judicially. 
It also involves exercise of judgement'^. The proceeding culminating in this 
act are, therefore, held to be quasi judicial'*. 
17 Cooper Vs. Wandsworth Boardof Works (1863) 14 C,B. 180; A.N. Tendulkar Vs. 
CF Mathias, A.I R 1965 Bombay 187. Dharnimohan Vs. State of Assam. A.I.R. 
1063 Assam 183 
18. Dharnimohan Vs. State of Assam of Assam, A.I.R. 1963 Assam 183. 
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Every authority exercising quasi-judicial power of imposition of 
punishnienl can do so only in accordance with tlie following rules 
(a) No punishment can be imposed on an employee unless it is supported 
by fmdmgs arrived at a disciplinary inquiry and 
(b) Every disciplinary inquiry must be held as follows: 
(i) where statute. Standing Orders, award, settlement or any binding 
service rules lay down any procedure for conduct of such inquiry then 
in accordance with such disciplinary law; 
(ii) where no specific disciplinary law or express rules are provided then in 
accordance with the rules of "Natural justice" 
Every punitive action must be preceded by a quasi-judicial proceeding 
or investigation called "disciplinary inquiry" or domestic inquiry". The 
application of these principles to industrial employment is recognition of 
social justice in employment matters, the denial of which would amount to 
denial of secruity of service to the employees against the arbitrary and 
capricious actions of the employers. Though the management concerned has 
power to direct its OWTI internal administration and discipline the emergence 
of modern concept of social justice that an employee should be protected 
against vindictive or capricious action on the part of the management which 
may affect the security of his service, has resulted in subjecting managerial 
discretion to certain restrictions. At the same time undue interference by a 
tribunal with administration and management has not been encouraged'^. 
(c) Kinds of Punishment: It is already discussed earlier that punishment is 
the ultimate sanction of discipline. The disciplinary sanctions which are 
19 Buckinghan and Carnatic Mills Ltd Vs. Their workmen, 1951 11 L.L.J. 314, 
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imposed for misconduct against employee are also innumerable in their 
variety Bui in practice, depending upon the gra\ity of misconduct committed, 
generally the following punishments are inflicted as disciplinary action. 
Warning, Fine, withholding increments. Demotion. Suspension. Discharge 
and Dismissal 
(i) Warning Warning is a minor punishment when administered to a 
workman in writing by the employer for some blameworthy act or omission. 
Though not identical, warning is analogous to" censure" as administered to 
employee. 
Since warning is punishment, it is to be administered to a workman 
after giving him an opportunity to explain the act or omission alleged against 
him and after considering his explanation. However, as this punishment is of 
miled nature, the procedure to be adopted for administering a warning need 
not be as elaborate as in the case of major punishment of "discharge" and 
"dismissal" 
(ii) Fine : Fine is pecuniary punishment that may be inflicted by the employer 
against the workman for some blame-worthy act or omission. The Standiog 
Orders of some establishment provide for the imposition of fines in case of 
certain act of misconduct. This power under the Standing Orders, however, 
is subject to section 8 of the Payment of wages Act.^" 
20 Section 8 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 reads ,"(1) No fine shall be imposed on 
any employed person save in respect of such acts and omissions on his part as the employer, 
with previous aroval of the State- Government or of the prescribed authority, may have 
specified by notice under su-section (2) 
(2) A notice specifying such acts and omissions shall be exhibited in the prescribed 
manner on the premises in which the employment is carried on or in the case of persons 
employed upon a railway (otherwise than in a factory) at the prescribed place or places 
(3) No fine shall be imposed on any employed person until he has been given an 
opportunity of showing cause against the fine, or otherwise than in accordance with such 
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(iii) Withholding increment In case of graded scales, increments are 
automatic till efTicieiic) bar or the maximum of a scale is reached Withholding 
increments in such a case is punishment This punishment materially affects 
the workman concerned in his earning. Hence this punishment can be inflicted 
only for proved inefficiency or acts of misconduct, such as insubordination or 
habitual negligence, etc. after giving him a fair apportunity to explain his 
conduct-'. 
(iv) Demotion : Demotion is the negative of promotion whereby not only the 
delinquent employee is not promoted to the next job, but he is also downgraded 
from the present job and is reduced to a lower cadre of service. This 
punishment is somewhat analogous to "reduction in rank" as envisaged by 
Article 311 of the constitution It is severer in degree than the forgoing 
punishments. This punishment may be inflicted in accordance with the degree 
of severity of misconduct proved against the delinquent workman. The 
procedure to be followed for administering this punishment is the same as in 
the case of "discharge" and "dismissal". 
precedure as may be prescribed for the imposition of fines 
(4) The total amount of fine which may be imposed in any one wage period on any 
emloyed person shall not exceed an amount equal to 3 per cent in the rupee of the wagres 
payable to him in respect of that wage period 
(5) No fine shall be imposed on any employed person who is under the age of fifteen 
years 
(6) No fine iniosed on any emloyed person shall be recovered from him by 
instalments or after the expiry of sixty days from the day on which it was imposed 
(7) Every fine shall be deemed to have been imposed, on the day of the act or 
omission in respect of which it was imposed 
(8) All fines and all realisations thereof shall be recorded in a register only to 
such purposes beneficial to the person employed in the factory or establishment as are 
approved by the prescribed authority 
Explanation - When the persons employed upon or in any railway, factory that 
the fund shall be applied only to such purposes as are aproved by the prescribed authority " 
21 Supra note 16 at 888 
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(v) Suspension Suspension connotes temporary cessation of the right to 
work or laboui. Lord Goddard, in Marshall Vs. English Electric Co.Ltd^^ 
discribed suspension as "dismissal mitigated at the discretion of the employer 
by a promise to re-employ". It merely amountsto a postponement ofthe actual 
performance ofthe contract, and in the case of a continuing contract like the 
contract of service between master and servant suspension means that the 
relationship of master and servant remains in abeyance for a certain period". 
Though an order of suspension affects the efficiency of employee injuriously, 
he continues to be in the service ofthe employer. In other words, suspension 
does not dissolve the vinculam juris ofthe employment relationship. During 
the period of suspension, though the parties are absolved from some of their 
obligations, a connection however tenuous, continues between the master and 
the servant. The servant therefore, connot seek employment anywhere, 
though he does not perform his normal duties for his master. Likewise, the 
master is obliged to give a subsistence allowance to the servant, though he 
may not be obliged to pay him the full wages which are to be paid for the 
specific work done by the servant^\ 
Suspension in industiral law is ordinarily of two kinds: 
(a) Suspension as an interim measure pending a domestic enquiry; and 
(b) Suspension as a substantive punishment. 
(a) Suspension pending enquiry : Afier the service of charge sheet, where 
the charges are of serious nature, the employer may suspend the delinquent 
workman pending the enquiry. But there is no hard and fast rule that the 
service of charge sheet must precede the suspension order. If the misconduct 
11 [1Q45) I. All. E R. 653 (655) (C.A.) 
23. D.S., Northern Rly Vs. Mukand Lai [1957] II L.L.J 452; Ram Dular Vs. Ganesh 
Flour Mills Co Ltd [1957] 1 L.L.J. 553. 
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alleged is of very grave nature and the workman is apprehended at the spot of 
the commission of the offence, the employer, in such circumstances may 
forthwith suspend the workman and then serve him with the charge-sheet. In 
Delhi Electric Supply undertaking Vs. G.P. Satsangi^"'the Court observed that 
the power of suspension has to be exercised with circumspection, care and 
after application of mind. The disciplinary authority must make a fair and 
proper assessment of the matter in the given circumstances and carefully 
scrutinise that prima facie there exists grave and compelling circumstances 
which in the light of the material available and collected during the primary 
investigation would lead to the likelihood of removal or dismissal of employee 
from service. A proper judgement exercised would prevent unnecessary 
harassment and humiliation of suspension. 
(b) Suspension as a punishment: Suspension as punishment can be inflicted 
on a workman for a specified period as permissible under the contract of 
service or the Standing Orders after finding the workman guilty of misconduct 
committed by him. Suspension by way of punishment under the relevant 
Standing Orders would not alter the character of suspension as a temporary 
action as distinct from the permanent measure of termination of employment. 
The efi^ ect of the punishment of suspension is that the relationship of the 
master and servant is temporarily suspended with the consequence that the 
servant is not bound to render service and master is not bound to pay. In other 
words, the workman will not be entitled to wages for the period of suspension. 
(vi) Discharge : The punishments discussed above inflicted as punishment for 
an act of misconduct while the workman continues in the employment of the 
employer. These punishments are generally known as minor punishments or 
light punishments m the parlance of Industrial Law. "Discharge" of a workman 
24, (1984) Lab. I.e. 65 (Delhi). 
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from senice as punishment is known as 'major punishment'. In this punishment, 
the contract of employment is determined and the employer-employee 
relationship ceases to exists. Discharge as a punishment is milder than the 
extreme punishment of dismissal though like dismissal, it also puts the 
contract of service to an end. In case of dismissal the employee loses a number 
of benefits where as in case of discharge only the contract of service is 
terminated from a particular date and the employee is not deprived of the 
benefits occuring to him to that date. The expressions 'dismissal' and 
'discharge' as measures of punishment for misconduct in industrial law have 
acquired different connotations and one cannot be equated with the other. 
(vH) Dismissal: The dictionary meaning of the word "dismissal" is "to let go"; 
to "relieve from duty". In ordinaryparlance it means nothing more or less than 
termination of a person's office. Dismissal is the ultimate and most drastic 
disciplinary sanction which may be inflicted by an employee for an act of 
misconduct against an industrial workman. Hence, if there is no misconduct, 
there can be no punishment. In Moti Ram Vs. General Manager, N.E.F. 
Railway^', the court observed : 
"Punishment is, therefore, correlated to misconduct, both in its positive 
and negative aspects. That is to say, punishment could be sustained if 
there was misconduct and could not be meted out if there was no 
misconduct".^" 
In bringing the service of a workman to an end, as a measure of 
punishment for misconduct, the employer has to comply with the requirements 
of the procedure laid down in the Standing Orders applicable to his 
establishment or with rules of natural justice. In other words, the service, as 
25. (1964) II L L.J 467 S C 
26 Id at 493. 
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a measure of punishment, can be terminated only after giving the delinquent 
employee an opportunity to defend himself against the charges levelled 
against him by holding a fair and proper domestic enquiry. If the workman is 
found guilty of the charges by the enquiry officer, the employer will be 
justified to inflict the punishment of discharge or dismissal". 
The employer's right to dismiss a workman arises from the terms, 
express or implied, of the contract of employment. The employers and the 
workmen, therefore, are free to limit the employer's right of dismissal or to 
extend it by incorporation provisions in the service rules or the Standing 
Orders applicable to the establishments, which may make certain acts 
dismissable which otherwise might not give rise to the right of dismissal. 
However, the justifiability of the punishment of discharge or dismissal would 
depend upon the degree of misconduct necessary to establish a right to dismiss 
a workman^*. 
In A.H. Mehta Vs. Bank of Baroda" the Court has observed : 
"The charge-sheet is vague. The evidence does not indicate how the 
petitioner was grossly negligent. It is, on the contrary, shown that he 
was a diligent employee and it has been established that he had taken 
all precautionary steps which he was required to take. It is established 
that the locking system was faulty. In such circumstances, the 
petitioner could not be punished by a severe punishment of dismissal. 
The punishment is shockingly disproportionate".^" 
27. OP. Malhotra," The Law of Industrial Disputes",891 (Vol. II, N.M. Tripalhi (P) 
Ltd Boniba>. 1985) 
28 Ibid 
29. 0 9 9 3 ) 1 L.L.J. Bombay. 322. 
30. Ibid. 
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In Cooperative Central Bank' case^' the Court observed: 
"—The employer has a right, recognised in law, to dismiss his servant 
for misconduct. But he is not bound to dismiss him. That right to 
dismiss is recognised in law in order to protect the interest of the 
master. The master himself is the best judge of the circumstances 
under which he may choose or elect to exercise or refrain from 
exercising that power or right of dismissal. He can waive that right 
after condoning the misconduct. But he can not exercise that right 
after condoning the misconduct. The choice, election, condonation as 
well as the waiver may be either express or implied, depending upon 
the particular circumstances of each case. But they must be 
unequivocal, unqualified and unconditional to be effective, operative 
and valid^'*. 
It is well settled that there can be no dismissal or discharge made with 
retrospective effect. Such dismissal caimot be sustained in law. But this 
principle is subject to the condition that if such a dismissal be made according 
to the terms of service, either contractual or statutory; for example, contained 
in the Standing Orders, such dismissal is within the competence of the 
employer". Such terms of service may be modified according to law, but as 
long as they stand unmodified, they bind the parties, unless of course, such 
terms contravene the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act, 1946 or any other law. Whether the retrospective dismissal is 
justified or not would depend upon the peculiar circumstances of a case. The 
order of dismissal cannot be said to be invalid merely because it is sought to 
be given effect retrospectively. In other words, if the order is otherwise valid 
the mere retrospectivity would not make it invalid in its entirely. In any case, 
31 Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. Vs. Labour Court, Guntur [1978] Lab. I.C. 1699 . 
31a Id. at 1702. 
32. Harbanslal Malhotra and Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. State Bank of West Bengal (1964) II 
L.L.J. 342 (cal). 
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the dismissal may be given effect to from the date of the order instead of 
retrospectively" 
(d) Rules of Natural Justice : Natural justice is a justice that is simple and 
elementary and distinct from justice that complex, and technical. 
The rules of natural justice mean and include the following: 
(i) That every person whose civil rights are affected must have a reasonable 
notice of the case he has to met. 
(ii) That he must have reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence. 
(iii) That the hearing must be by an impartial tribunal, i.e. a person who is 
neither directly nor indirectly a party to the case. 
(iv)That the authority must act in good faith, and not arbitraily but 
reasonably. 
The rules of natural justice may be varied depending upon the subject 
matter of the dispute or circumstances of a particular case. The fixed content 
of the rules of natural justice is that justice must be done to the parties. 
Without diluting this substance of the rules, variations in procedure can be 
affected^^. 
In Shri Bhagwan Vs. Ram Chandra", it was held that the application 
of the doctrine depends upon the administrative authority, character of the 
rights to be affected and the scheme and policy of the statute and other 
relevant circumstances and in vievv of the special circumstances relating to 
33 Heniant Kumar Vs S N Mukherjee, A 1 R 1954 Cal 340 . Calcutta Chemical Co 
Ltd Vs D K Barmar (1969) Lab I C 1498 at 1511 (Pat) 
34 Mukhtiar Singh Vs State of U P . A I R 1957 All 297 at 301 
35 1965 (3) S C R 222 
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employment under the government, opportunity should have been furnished 
at both the stages. 
The different constitution of the tribunals may also require variance in 
compliance with the rules. The requirement of natural justice may vary from 
different situations and varying constitutions of tribunals and the question 
should not be decided with any preconceived notions^\ Because of this the 
desciplinary enquiries against the employees are permitted to be conducted by 
employers, even though the employers themselves initiate the enquiries, 
charge sheet the employees and to that extent are interested in the matter. 
Inspite of such interest they become judges of their own cause and have right 
to punish the employee". 
It would, therefore, appear that in appropriate cases even the principles 
of natural justice can be dispensed with or waived in matters of disciplinary 
enquiries^*. 
The real test whether the principles of natural justice have been 
complied with or not lies in seeing whether the non observance of any of these 
principles has resulted in miscarriage of justice or has affected the course of 
justice. If the party affected has been given reasonable opportunity of 
presenting his case then the requirements of natural justice are substantially 
fulfilled and no grievance can be made of infringement of the rules of natural 
justice by reference to definition of natural justice or citations of natural 
justice given in different cases from time to time. Thus the principles of natural 
justice are not inflexible rules. The flexibility of these principles has been 
recognised by the Supreme Court in as much as in cases of obvious 
misconducts". 
36 Ranieshwar Singh Vs Union of India, 1967 I.L.L J 792 
37 N V Nair Vs Government of Kerala, A I R 1962 Kerala 43 
38 Dr G M Kothari. "Labour Demands and Their Adjudication". 4 (Vol II N M 
Tribathi (P) Ltd , Bombay. 1977) 
39 Ibid 
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The rules of natural justice based on the fundamental principle "audi 
alteram pai tem" which goes back to centuries. These rules have now received 
acceptance from the Supreme Court of India in a series of cases. 
The Supreme Court regarded the rule as essential condition for the 
validity of a statute in case it provides for the termination of the services of 
an employee without an inquiry and without observing the rules of natural 
justice^". 
In Charanlal Sahu Vs. Union of India'" the Supreme Court observed 
that they (rules of natural justice) are integrally embeded in our Constitutional 
frame work and their prestige, glory and primacy cannot and should not be 
allowed to be submerged by the exigencies of particular situations or cases. 
The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding. Its remedial 
significance has considerably increased. 
In Mohinder Singh Case"*- Krishna Iyer J. observed: 
"Natural justice is a pervasive fact of secular principle where a spiritual 
touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness 
a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, 
save where valid law excludes. It applies when people are affected by acts of 
authority. It is the bone ofhealthy Government, recognised from earliest times 
and not a mystic testment of judge-made law. Indeed, from the legendary day 
of Adam-and of Kautilya's Arthshastra-the rule of law has had this stamp of 
natural justice which makes it social justice—Today its application must be 
sustained by curient legislation, case law of other extant principle, not the 
40 Central Inland Water Transport Corp Vs Brojo Natli Gonguiy, A I R 1986 S C 
1571 
41 A l R 1990 S C 1480 
42 Mohinder Singh Vs Chief Election Commissioner, A I R 1978 S C 851 
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hoary chords of legend and history"^'. 
Tlie concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in 
recent years. In the past, it was thought that it included two rules, namely-( 1) 
No one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debit esse judex in propria 
Causa or nemo judex in re sua), and (2) No decision shall be given against a 
party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very 
soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is quasi-judicial inquiries 
must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. 
But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the 
rules of natural justice. 
The Court reiterated in 1993 that there can be no distinction between 
a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of 
rules of natural justice. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi-
judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if rules of natural justice are 
calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of 
justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable only to quasi-judical 
enquiry and not to administrative inquiry, it must logically apply to both**. 
In Union of India Vs. P.Seth^', in relation to the matter of compulsory 
retirement, the Supreme Court said that the rule of audi alteram Partem is not 
applicable in such a case as the order of compulsory retirement is not penal 
in nature. But the court held that the judicial review of the said order can be 
made on the grounds of malafides, arbitrariness or perversity. 
43. Id at 870 
44. D.K Yadav Vs. J M A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 S.C.C. 259. 
45. A.l.R 1994 S.C 1261. 
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Rules of natural justice need not be followed if termination of service 
follovNs legislative direction'" 
About the fairness of procedure the court in M.S. Nally, Bharat 
Eugmeering Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar*', said that it is fundamental principle 
of good administration showing that justice not only done but seem to have 
been done. It should be observed even where principles of natural justice are 
not applicable. What would amount to fairness would depend on particular 
facts and circumstances. 
The rule of procedural fairness requires that if the disciplinary authority 
before passing an order of punishment does not supply or show the material 
to delinquent officer, the order should be declared bad in law. In such cases 
the plea that the report on the basis of which punishment is imposed is a 
privileged documents is not sustainable**'. But where the inspection of document 
not relevant to the charges is disallowed, it does not vitiate the inquiry". 
Natural justice has various facets and acting fairely is one of them. Fair 
play is a part of the public policy and is a guarantee for justice to citizens. In 
our system of Rule of law every social agency conferred with power is 
required to act fairly so that social action would be just and there would be 
fiirtherance of the well-being of citizens'". 
To constitute bias there must be reasonableness of the apprehension of 
bias m the mind of the party. The purity of administration requires that the 
party to the proceedings should not have apprehension that the authority is 
46 L N M Institute of Economic Development and social change Vs State of Bihar. 
A I R i566 5 C 1 i3o 
47 (1990) 2 S C C 48 
48 State Bank of India Vs D C Agrawal, A 1 R 1993 S C 1197 
49 State of Rajasthan Vs S K Dutta Sharma. 1993 Supp (4) S C C 61 
50 K I ShephardVs Union of India, (1987) 4 S C C 431 
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biased aud is likely to decide against the party. But it is not every suspicion 
felt by a party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the 
proceedings is biased. The apprehension must be judged from a healthy, 
reasonable and average point of view and not an mere apprehension of any 
whimsical person. Vague suspecionsofwhimsical. capricious and unreasonable 
people are not our standard to regulate our vision. It is the reasonableness and 
the apprehension of an average honest man that must be taken note of". 
Natural justice generally requires that persons liable to be directly 
affected by proposed administrative acts, decisions or proceedings be given 
adequate notice of what is proposed so that they may be in a position-(a) to 
make representation on their owoi behalf; (b) or to appear at a hearing or 
enquiry (if one is held); and (c) effectively to prepare their own case and to 
ansewer the case (if any) they have to meet". 
In Nand Kumar Jham Vs. Food Corporation of India" the court held 
that the appellate authority has passed the order without hearing the petitioner. 
The court is entitled to examine whether the principles of natual justice have 
been followed. Order violates principles of natural justice. 
In A.C. Pradhan Vs. L .TC" , the court held the enquiry officer had 
examined the party and relied on the evidence given by him, but without 
making him available for cross-examination. This was in gross violation of 
principles of natural justice. 
Omission to comply with the requirement of the rule of audi alteram 
Partem, as a general rule, vitiate a decision. Where there is violation of natural 
51 International Ariports Authority Vs. K.D. Bali (1988) 2 S.C.C. 360. 
52 K.l Shephard Vs. Union of India, (1987) 4 S.C.C. 431. 
53. (1993)1. L.L.J.,M.P 1132. 
54. (1993) II L.L.J., Orissa. 1080. 
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justice no resultant or independed prejudice need be shown, as the denial of 
natural justice is. ni itself, sufficient prejudice and it is no answer to sa> that 
even with obser\ance of natural justice the same conclusion would have 
reached^'. 
It has been asserted that part of the principles of natural justice is that 
a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision apart from the decision 
itself. In other words, party is entitled to know the reason, for the decision, 
be it judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative. 
The Supreme Court in Maharastra State Board of Secondry and Higher 
Secondry Education Vs. KS. Gandhi'*,emphasized the need of recording the 
reason not only in quasi-Judicial but also in administrative decisions. The 
Court observed that reasons are harbinger between the mind of maker of the 
order to the controversy in questions and decisions or conclusion arrived at. 
They also exclude the chance to reach arbitrary, whimsical or capricious 
decision or Conclusion. The reasons assure an in built support to the 
conclusion or decision reached. When an order affects the right of a citizen or 
a person irrespective of the fact whether it is a quasi-judicial or administrative 
order and unless the rule expressly or by necessary implication excludes 
recording of reasons, it is implicit that the principles of natural justice or fair 
play require recording of germane and precise relevant reasons as a part of fair 
procedure. 
(4) Remedies : There are more than hundred labour enactments. Central and 
State and they contain their own judicial (or quasi-judicial) and administrative 
authorities to implement their provisions. These authorities are given different 
names and are designated differently such as Commissioner, authority, Court, 
Tribunals. 
55 Union Carbide Corporation Vs Union of India. (1991) 4 S C.C. 584 at 595 
56. (1991)2 S.C.C 716. 738. 
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(a) Commissioner : Under section 15 of the Payment Of Wages Act, 1936 the 
State Ciovernment is empowered to appoint any C ommissioner for Workmen's 
Compensation or any other officer with experience as a judge of civil court or 
as stipendiar> Magistrate or Presiding Officer of a labour court or a tribunal, 
to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising 
out deductions from the wages or delay in payment of wages, of persons 
employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claim. 
The jurisdiction of the commissioner to deal with such cases is exclusive as 
matters lying within the jurisdiction of the authority are excluded fi-om the 
jurisdication ofordinary civil courts. Proceedings before the Authority begain 
by an application which must be made within six months from the date of the 
un- authorised deduction. In suitable cases, the Authority can entertain an 
application even though presented after expiry of the prescribed period. The 
parties can appear through a legal practioner, or an official of a registered 
trade union etc. The Authority is required to give a reasonable opportunity of 
being heard to the applicant and the employer. In other words they are bound 
to follow the rules of natural justice. Under section 18 of the said Act, the 
Authority has the poweres of a civil court in respect of taking evidence, 
enforcing the attendence of witnesses and compelling the production of 
documents etc. Any amount directed to be paid by the Authority may be 
recovered from the employer, as if it were a fine imposed by a magistrate. An 
appeal lies to the district court or the court of small causes against the order 
of the authority. These courtshave power to refer questions of law to the High 
Court. 
Section 20 the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 empowers the 
State Government to appoint Commissioner for workmen's compensation for 
different areas within the State. No formal qualifications for the Commissions 
350 
have been prescribed. The Commissioner has power to determine the liability 
of a person to pay compensation under the Act. In deciding any matter before 
him, the commissioner may take the assistance of one or more persons having 
special knowledge of any matter relevant to issues before him. In this way, the 
Commissioner can secure some expert knowledge regarding the problems he 
has to adjudicate upon. Ususally the assistance of a njedical expert is called 
for. The Commissioner is given all the powers of a civil court under the C.P.C., 
1908 for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance of 
witnesses and compelling the production of documents and material objects". 
The proceedings before the Conmiissioner commence by filing an application; 
accompanied by the prescribed fee and stating the prescribed particulars. No 
application is to be made unles some question has arisen between the parties 
which they have been unable to settle by agreement". The parties are entitled 
to appear through a legal practitioner, an officer of an insurance company or 
a registered trade union, or, with the permission of the Commissioner, any 
other authorised person'^ etc. Sections 27 and 30 provide that the Indian 
Evidence Act, does not apply to the proceeding, before him. However, the 
Commissioner is required to record briefly the evidence of every witness. 
Subject to the rules made by the Government, the Conmiissioner has power 
to award costs at his discretion. The Conmiissioner may recover as arrears of 
land revenue any amount payable by any person under the statute. A limited 
right of appeal in cases involving substantial question of law, and submission 
of question of law by the commissioner, if he deems fit, to the High Court. 
Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 empowers the Appropriate 
Government to appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or 
57 Section 23 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 
58. Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 
59. Section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 
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any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour 
Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not 
below the rank of a labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience 
as a Judge of a Civil Court or as stipendiary Magistrate to be authority to hear 
and decide for any specified area aU claims arising out of payment of less than 
the minimum rates of wages or in respect of the payment of remuneration for 
days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c) of 
sub-section(l) of section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 
14, to employees employeed or paid in that area. The application to the 
authroity must be made by the workman or by a lawyer on his behalf, within 
six months of the date on which the mininum wage become payable, but the 
aplication may be admitted after six months when the applicant satisfies the 
authority that he has sufficient cause for not making the application within 
such period. The authority possesses all powers of a civil court for purposes 
of taking evidence, and enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling the 
production of documents and it is to be a civil court for the purpose of section 
195 and chapter. XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (now Code 
of 1973). 
Sections 74 to 83 of the Employees'. State Insurance Act, 1948 deal 
with adjudication of disputes and claims. The Act establishes the Employees' 
State Insurance Corporation for administering the scheme of health insurance 
for the benefit of industrial workers. It also provides for establishment by the 
State Government of employees' insurance courts to decide disputes and 
adjudicate on claims about various matters under the statute. The court is to 
consist of such number of judges as the State Government may think fit to 
appoint. Any person who is or has been a judicial officer or is a legal 
practitioner of five years' standing is qualified to be appointed as a judge of 
the court. 
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The proceedings before the court commence by au application in the 
prescribed form which is to contain such particulars and is to be accompanied 
by such fee as may be prescribed by the rules made by the State Government 
in consultation with the employees' State Insurance Corporation. A party is 
entittled to be presented by a legal practitioner, an officer of registered trade 
union or with the permission of the court, any other authorised person. It is 
required to follow the procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the 
State Government. The court has all the powers of a civil court in the matter 
of enforcing the attendance of witnesses, administering oath, compelling the 
discovery and production of documents, and recording evidence, etc. The 
order ofthe court is enforceable as a decree of civil court. The court has power 
to submit any question of law for the decision of the High Court in a case 
pending before it. Any order ofthe court involving substantial question of law 
is also appealable to the High Court. 
(b) Labour Tribunals : Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is the most important 
piece of labour legislation for adjudication of labour disputes. The Act makes 
provision for the creation of three kinds of Tribunals: Labour Court, Industiral 
Tribunals and National Tribunals. The appropriate government (Central or 
State as the case may be) is authorised to constitute one or more labour courts 
for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to matter specified in the 
second schedule to the statute and Industrial Tribunals for adjudication of 
disputes specified in the second or third schedule. The Central Government 
is empowered to constitute one or more National Tribunals for adjudication 
of disputes which involve question of national importance or affecting 
industrial establishments in more than one State. These Tribunals get their 
jurisdiction to decide a case only when it is referred to them by the appropriate 
government. Each of these bodies is to consist of one person only known 
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presiding officer for said body. These authorities or Labour Tribunals have 
been empowered to follow such procedure as they may think fit. The Indian 
Evidenc Act, does not apply to proceedings of these Tribunals. But since they 
are quasi-judicial bodies, principles of natural justice are to be followed by 
them. They may, if they think fit, take the assistance of one or more assessors 
having special knowledge of the matter under consideration by them. An 
employee is entitted to be represented by an officer of the relevant trade Union 
and an employer by the officer of the relevant association of the employers. 
Parties may be represented by a legal practitioner only with the consent of 
each other and the labour Tribunal. The Tribunals have discretion to award 
costs subject to any rules made under the statute. As in the case of other 
Tribunals, the Labour Tribunals have the powers of a civil court with regard 
to enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; 
compelling the production of documents; issuing commissions for examination 
of witnesses, etc. At the conclusion of proceedings, the Tribunals are to 
submit their award to appropriate government within a specified time. Within 
30 days of its receipt, the award is to be published by the Government. The 
award becomes enforceable at the expiry of 30 days of its publication, unless 
the Government is of the opinion that it is inexpedient on public grounds 
affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or part 
of the award and in such a case the Government may make an order rejecting 
or modifying the award. If no such order is made, the award becomes 
enforceable at the expiry of 90 days of an order has been made, then it has to 
be laid along with the award before the legislature as soon as possible and 
becomes enforceable at the expiry of 15 days of its laying. Judicial review is 
excluded and an award published by the government is not called in question 
in any manner whatsoever"". 
60. MP. Jain and S.N. Jain,"Principles of Administrative Law,"N.M. Tripathi (P)Ltd., 
Bombay. 1986. P.P. 200-201. 
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In 1950, a Central Labour Appellate Tribunal having four benches 
functioning at Bombay, Calcutta, Lucknowand Madras was set up with a view 
to provide a Central Appellate Authority to review the divergent and sometimes 
conflicting decisions of numerous Industiral Tribunals and to coordinate their 
activities. The Tribunal was manned generally by retired High Court judeges 
and could hear appeals, inter alia, involving substantial question of law. This 
Tribunal functioned only for six years and then a feeling gained ground that 
the Tribunal took an unduly long time to dispose of appeals, and unnecessary 
expenses were involved as important matters would in any case go to the 
Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Tribunal 
was abolished in 1956. The Tribunal did act as a corrective to decisions of 
Industiral Tribunals and its hasty abolition in 1956 removed the restraining 
influence over the decisions of Indistrial Tribunals and created a vaccum. The 
vaccum has however, been filled by the Supreme Court under Article 136. 
With its abolition the Court has liberally heard appeals fi-om the Labour 
Tribunals. A large number of appeals have come before the Court after the 
abolition of Labour Appellate Tribual and it has emerged as a major policy 
making and law making organ in the area of labour Law. 
(5) Judicial Control of Labour Tribunals: The proceedings conducted by 
the Industrial Tribunals are judicial proceedings and the decisions and awards 
are subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the 
Constitution*'. The Tribunal is also subject to the supervisory judridiction of 
the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution". Article 136 of the 
Constitution vests the Supreme Court with discretion to entertain appeals 
61. Express News papers Vs workers, A I.R. 1963 S.C 569. 
62 Clause (1). which had been substituted by the 42 nd Amendment Act, 1976, has been 
revised by the 44th Amendment Act. 1978. clause (5), inserted by the 42nd 
Amendment Act, has been omitted by 44th Amendment Act, 1978. Article 227 has 
thus been restored to its orginal Text. 
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against the orders of Tribunals by granting special leave. 
A very important aspect of Article 136 is that it empowers the Supreme 
Court to hear appeals from a tribunal in any cause or matter. In the modem 
era of 'Social Welfare' State, there is a vast extension in Governmental 
operations, activities and responsibilities so much so that it is known as the 
administrative age. Many functions undertaken by a modem Govemment give 
rise to opportunities for adjudication and thus India along with other democratic 
countries has come to have a host varied adjudicatory bodies outside the 
regular judicial hierarchy. Though the Indian Constitution makes provision 
for a well ordered and well regulated judicial system, yet it will be wrong to 
assume that the courts monepolise the entire business of adjudication. Side by 
side with the courts, a plethora of bodies and officials also carry on adjudicatory 
functions under powers conferred on them by legislation and determine 
innumerable classes of application, claims and controversies between the 
administration and individuals, or between the individuals themselves. Most 
of these adjudicatory bodies are characterised as "quasi-judicial", indicating 
thereby that these are not courts "pure and simple", but partake of some 
features of both courts an well asthe administration. "Quasi-judicial* indicates 
a process which is both judicial as well as administrative at one and the some 
time". 
In Durga Shankar Mehta Vs. Raghuraj Singh*^, the Supreme Court 
define 'Tribunal in the following words: 
" The expression 'Tribuanl'asusedin Article 136 doesnot mean 
the same thing as 'Court' but includes, within its ambit, all adjudicating 
bodies, provided they are constituted by the State and are invested 
63. M P Jain "Indian Constitutional Law". N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1987, P. 135. 
64. (1955) S.C.R 267. 
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with judicial as distinguished from administrative or executive 
fundtions". 
In Bharat Bank Vs. Employees''', the Supreme Court observed that 
though Tribunals are clad in many of the trappings of a court and though they 
exercise quasi-judicial functions, they are not full-fledged courts. Thus, a 
Tribunal is an adjudicating body which decides controversies between the 
parties and exercises judicial powers on distinguished from purely 
administrative functions and thus possesses some of the trappings of a court, 
but not all. 
The use of the word 'Tribunal' in the Article 136 assumes a special 
significance, for it indicates that the Supreme Court can hear appeals from the 
decisions of such bodies as may not be courts in the traditional sense. The 
statutes creating these bodies may at times provide for some form of judicial 
Control over them, but many a time, the statutes provide no such control; on 
the other hand, some statutes even go to extent of declaring decisions by these 
bodies "final", thus barring a recourse to courts, under ordinary legal processes, 
by an individual suffering from a sense of grievance against a decision of such 
an adjudicatory body. The great merit of Article 136 is that, irrespeective of 
any statutory provision to the contrary, the Supreme Court can control these 
adjudicatary bodies by hearing appeals from their decisions and 
pronouncements. Without some kind of judicial control there is a danger that 
tribunals might degenerate into arbitrary bodies, which would be foreign to a 
democratic Constitution. This the heart of the matter and the reason why the 
Supreme Court should exercise jurisdiction over Tribunal*. 
65. (1950) S C R . 459. 
66. Supra note 61 at 135-136 
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The Supreme Court's approach, iii this regard, has been conditioned by 
two main considerations: (i) the Court's power under Article 136 is 
extraordinary and discretionary and should, therefore, be used in exceptional 
circumstances; and (ii) this power should be exercised whenever there is a 
miscarriage of justice. Though the Court is having very wide power under 
Article 136 yet, the pre requisites or its interference to set right the decisions 
of Tribunals can generally be categorised as follows: 
(1) The Tribunal acts in excess of its jurisdiction or fails to exercise 
a patent jurisdiction*' 
(2) It has acted illegal;'* 
(3) There is an error of law;*' 
(4) The Tribunal has erroneously applied well accepted principles of 
jurisprudence, 
(5) The order of Tribunal is erroneous™ 
(6) The Tribunal acts against principles of Natural justice^' or has 
approached the question in a manner likely to result in injustice; 
(7) There is a patent error of law in Tribunal decision'^. 
These categories are not exhaustive but are merely illustrative. 
It may be interesting to note that so far the Supreme Court has been 
rather liberal in granting leave to appeal from Labour Tribunals. In case of 
67. J.K. Iron and Steel Co.Vs Mazdoor Union. A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 231. 
68 Sangrani Singh Vs. Election Tribunal. A.I.R. 1955 S.C 425 
69 Hindustan Antibiotics Vs Workman. AIR. 1967 S C. 948. 
70 Bhikaji Keshao Vs. Brij Lai Nand lal. A.I.R. 1955 S.C 610 
71. J.K Iron and Steel Co Vs. Mazdoor Union, A.I.R 1956 S.C. 231 
72. Kays Concern Vs. India. AIR. . 1976 S.C. 1525 
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these Tribunals, the Court has not confined itself to questions of jurisdiction, 
of Natural justice, or patent error of law, but has assumed somewhat wider 
functions to settle important principles of industrial law". 
In workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. Vs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd.,'^ it has 
been argued that if the appropriate government or the Authority is held to be 
exercising fiinctions which are judicial in nature, then it must be held to be 
functioning as a tribunal for the purpose of Article 136 of the Constitution and 
an appeal would lie to the Supreme Court against such order. The Court held 
that although the appropriate government or authority is required to act 
judicially while granting or refusing permission for retrenchment of workman 
under sub-section (2) of section 25-N,itisnot invested with the judicial power 
of the State and it can not be regarded as a Tribunal within the meaning of 
Article 136 and no apeal would, therefore, lie to the Supreme Court. 
Mere rejection of Special Leave Petition can not be construed as seal 
of approval as a decision of Supreme Court so as to oust the juresdiction of 
High Court in heraring matters under Article 226 of Constitution. If the 
Supreme Court, in its descretion, refused to grant Special Leave to appeal, 
then there is no appeal". The doctrine of merger or fusing the judgement of 
the lower court in that of the appellate court does not apply to such a situation. 
The contention that the workman was doing no other work than that 
of a sprayman which was not disturbed by the High Court, that in fact the 
workman was doing the work of duplicator of designs as well as a tracer and 
sprayman. It is a finding of fact and can not be disturbed by the court under 
73. AC C Ltd Vs. Cement workers Union A.l R. 1972 S.C 1552. 
74 (1092) L.L.J 11. S.C 204 
75. Punjab State Electricity Board Vs. A.K. Sehgal (1991) II L.L.J (Punjab and 
HaryanaH.C.) 165. 
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Article 136 of the Constitution'^ 
In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. Ajay Kumar Gulati" where 
appeal was preferred by the employer. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, 
against the Judgement and order of the Delhi High Court giving certain 
directions with respect to the scope of disciplinary enquiry to be conducted 
against the respondant-employee, the court observed : 
" we are not prepared to agree. The High Court has given reasons for 
the direction has given, in superession of the orders of the notified 
disciplinary authority. We are unable to say that the view taken by the 
High Court is not a possible view. Acting under Article 136, we do 
not think it advisable to interfere with the order of the High Court, 
even we find that another view of the matter is possible"'*. 
Though the Court takes the formal position that it does not sit as a 
regular court of appeal over labour Tribunals, yet the fact remains that, in 
practice, it has emerged as the Supreme law maker, and a senior policy making 
partner, in area of substantive industrial law. The court hastaken the view that 
certainly in the area of labour law is very essential as it is a significant factor 
in the socio-economic devleopment of the country. If the numeraous labour 
tribunals are left fi^ee to interpret and apply the law, great uncertainly would 
arise as there is no central form to introduce uniformity of approach amongst 
these bodies. The Supreme Court has taken upon itself the task of defining, 
ascertaining, refining and laying down a uniform system of labour law. 
76 I Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs Labour Court Kanpur, 2 Ghayas Ahmed Khan 
Vs Swadeshi Cotton Mills. (1995) 11 L L J S.C 637 
77 1996(3)S.L J 38 S C 
78. Id at 47. 
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Article 227 confers on all High Courts power of superintendence over 
all courts and Tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction. The High Courts 
have such a power on all subordinate courts and Tribunals. 
In regard to jurisdiction over Tribunals, the amendment of Article 227 
made by the 42nd Amendment has been superseded by the 44th Amendment 
Act, 1978. Hence the jurisdition of the High Court over Tribunals has been 
restored and the old case law will apply. 
Briefly speaking the High Court may quash the order or decision of an 
inferior tribunal on the following grounds: 
(a) That the impugned order or decision is without jurisdiction'', or 
against the principles of natural justice,*" or involves non exercise of 
jurisdiction, or grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law 
as distinguished from a merely erraneous decision of fact or law or 
patent irregularity in procedure*' or an error of law apparent on the face 
of the record*^ or that the finding is 'perverse', being founded on no 
material whatever*^ 
(b) That the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 does not 
amount to exercising the power of appeal or revision on question of fact 
or of law, not affecting jurisdiction. 
In Jila Sahakari Kendriya Bank Vs. Labour court*^ where the Labour 
79 Woman Vs Sri Krishna (1962) [C A 56/61] cited by Durga Das Basu," Sharter 
Constitution of India," Prentice-Hall of India(P) Ltd . New Delhi 1995 .731 
80 Santosh Vs Mod Singh A 1 R 1958 S C 312. Waryam Vs Amarnath (1954) 
SCR 565. DahyaLal Vs State of Maharashta A 1 R 1964 S C 1320 
81 Rajkamal Vs Indian Motion Picture Union (1963) 1 L.L J 318 (S C ) 
82 Pro\ Transport Service Vs State Industrial Court, A I R , 1963 S C 114 
83 State of OnssaVs Murlidar, A I R 1963 SC 404, Nibaram Vs Mahendra, A I R 
1963 S C 1895 
84 (1993) I L L J (M P ) 18 
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Court, on a proper consideration of evidence, recorded a categorical finding 
at the employer-bank, with a view to reduce the pay, passed the termination 
order while in reality the services were never terminated nor any fresh 
appouitment given. Labour Court has held that it was a case of illegal 
deduction- The Court held that the Labour Court has given a categorical 
finding, and the criticism that impugned order is perverse or with jurisdiction 
is wholly unfounded and rather uncharitable. The scope for interference under 
Article 227 is extremely narrow and no grounds have been made out for 
interference. 
In Commanding Officer, INHS and Gopinath Vs. Y.C. Sharma, 
Commanding Officer, INHS", the respandents contended that they were 
working in the canteen and doing various jobs like cook, attendant etc. and 
therefore wages should be fixed as sheduled employee. According to 
petitioners, the respondedts were only part-time workers and their working 
hours were for 5 hours per day. Petitioners fiirther contended that they are 
making no profits. It is meant for patients in the hospitals and respondents 
therefore, are not covered by the Minimum Wages Act. The court said that the 
learned trial judge has carefully considered all the contentions raised before 
him and the finding recorded by him do not suffer from any illegality. There 
is no error apparent on the face of the record which calls for interference. In 
pfizer Limited Vs. Mazdoor Congress and other** where appeals by special 
leave from the judgement of the Bombay High Coun whereby the petition 
under Article 227 of the Constitution, filed by respondents, was allowed and 
orders of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court which upheld the 
termination of their services was quashed with a direction to the appellant to 
give all coneiquential benefits to the to said respondents. 
85 (1995) II L.L.J. (Bombay) 891 
86. 1997 (1) S.L.J. 41(S.C.). 
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Challenging the correctness of the said decision, learned semior 
counsel for the appellant submitted that the concurrent finding of fact arrived 
at by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court, to the effect that the appellate 
had committed no unfair labour practice, aught not to have been set aside by 
the High Court exercsing limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the 
Constitution. He further submitted that if the facts of the case are examined 
the only conclusion which would be arrived at was that the appellant company 
had acted bonafide and the action of terminating the services of respondents 
was in accordance with its Standing Orders and did not amount to any unfair 
labour practice as comtemplated by the said Act. 
The learned senior counsel for respondents on the other hand while 
supporting the judgement of the High Court submitted that the decision of the 
Labour Court and the Industiral Court was perverse and, therefore, the High 
Court was justified in the granting relief to respondents. The court held that 
the High Court clearly erred in allowing respondents to made out new case and 
then in coming to a conclusion which is clearly untenable. The orders of the 
labour and Industrial Court did not call for any interference. 
If there is an alternative legal remedy, it would not be proper for the 
High Court to entertain an application under Article 227. This is, however, not 
a rigid rule and in special circumstances the High coun may intervene even if 
there is an alternative legal remedy*^ 
A few points of distinction between Article 226 and Article 227 may 
be noted. The jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 extend to judicial, 
quasi judicial and administrative bodies, but under Article 227 the jurisdiction 
extens only to courts and Tribunals. Under Article 227 the High Court may 
87 Maneck Custodji Vs. Sarafazali, A.l.R. 1976 S.C 2446 
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interfere suo motu, but under Article 226 it will interfere on the application 
of a party Furtliei. under Article 226 the High Court merely annuls the 
decision, but under Article 227 it can do that and also issue fixrther directions 
iu the matter, and to this extent judicial review under Article 227 is broader 
than Article 226. Inspite of some of these distinctions between the two 
Articles, there does not appear to be any substantial reason for enacting 
Article 227 so far as administrative bodies (Tribunals) are concerned**. 
Article 226 empowers the High Court to issue writs, directions or 
orders in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto 
and certiorari-(a) for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part 
III, and (b) for any other purposes. Under the first part, a writ may be issued 
under the Article only after a decision that the aggrieved party has a 
Fundamental Right and that it has been infringed. Similarly, under the second 
part, it may be issued only after a finding that the aggrieved party has a legal 
right which entitles him to any of the aforesaid writs and that such right has 
been infringed. 
Article 226 conferes on all High Courts very wide powes in the matter 
of issuing writs which they never possessed before. There are only two 
limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers by a High Court under 
this Article: (a) that the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories" 
in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction (b) that the person or authority to 
whom the High Court is empowered to issue the writs "must be within those 
territories" and this implies that they must be amendable to the jurisdiction of 
the court either by residence or location wdthiu those territories. 
88 M Hidayatullah,"Constitutional Law of India," 127 (Vol.11, Arnold, Heinemann 
Publishers (India) P Ltd . New Delhi. 1986). 
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In Chandigarh Administration Vs. Manpreet Singh*" it was held that 
under Article 226 the High Court does not sit or act as an appelate authority 
over the action of subordinate authorities or Tribunal. The jurisdiction is 
supervisory in nature. It can strike down impugned rule and direct the 
authorities to reframe it but can not itself reframe it. 
The power of the High Court to issue the writs under Article 226 can 
be exercised for a twofold purpose, viz., the emforcement of (a) Fundamental 
Rights, as well as (b) non-fiindamental or ordinary legal rights. 
The jurisdiction thus conferred on a High Court is to protect not only 
the Fundamental Rights but even any other legal right as is clear from the 
words any other purpose. 
Mandamus will issue to command a Tribunal to dispose of an application, 
where it fails to deal with it within a reasonable time. Mandamus will lie to 
compel a statutory tribunal to perform its legal duty, eg., to record its reasons 
or findings on material facts, where the relevant statutes requires it to do so'". 
In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. S.B. of B. and J. Employees' 
Association" the court observed that it is not that this court in exercise of its 
jurisdiction can issue a mandamus to a statutory authority of the kind 
envisaged in Article 12 of the constitution, but can issue it to enable a person 
or body performing public duty and that such public duty for the writ to be 
enforceable need not be created or imposed by statute. It may sufficient for 
the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even 
contract 
89 (1992) 1 SS C 380 
90. Tara Chand Vs Municipal Corporation, A 1 R .1977 S.C 567 
91 (1993)1L.L J. (Madras) 61. 
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Certiorari is available when a Tribunal acts without or in excess of 
jurisdiction It also available against a quasi-judicial decision on the additional 
ground that the decision is unconstitutional, e.g., where the decision offends 
a fundamental right"* ,^ 
In H.S. Vasantasenaiah Vs. T.D.C., K.S.R.T.C." the Kamatak High 
Court observed; 
"In our opinion, the Labour Court erred in law in attributing that fault 
to the petitioner-appellant. Under Article 226, this Court has got 
power to entertain the petitions and to grant the relief, where, in its 
opinion, the order appears to be illegal or suffering from error of law 
apparent on the face of record or the order appears to be suffering 
from error of jurisdiction and the like, the doctrine of alternative 
remedy does not by itself create a bar in the courts exercising 
judridiction under Article 226"^^. 
The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under section 33-A of the 
Industiral Disputes Act, 1947, depends upon the existence of the conditions 
mentioned in that section. Similarly, the question whether the employees 
before the Tribunal are "workmen" or whether the dispute is an "industrial 
dispute" within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, is a jurisdictional 
issue, the finding on which is open lo scrutiny in a writ of certiorari". 
While it is true that the jurisdiction of review is limited but under 
Article 226 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to prevent 
miscarriage of justice. If the court is satisfied that the judgement has resulted 
92 Ujjam Bai Vs State of UP AIR 1962 SC. 1621 
93 (1995) II L.L J (Karnataka). 835 
94. Id. at 839 
95. Srinivasa Vs. State of Mysore, A.I.R 1960 S.C. 350. 
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in miscarreage of justice, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each 
case it will be open to the court to recall its earlier order 
Where an order by a statutory authority is wholly without jurisdiction 
and where there is no question of any inquiry into facts and the matter arises 
as a pure question of law, it is open to this court to decide the question of 
jurisdiction straight way, without driving the parties to the alternative 
remedy"'. 
Certiorari will lie where a judicial or quasi-judicial authority has 
violated the principles of natural justice even though the authority has acted 
within its jurisdiction, and even though the legislature has provided a 'finality 
clause' in the relevent statute". 
The power of a High Court under Article 226 in not confined only 
issuing writs; it is broader than that for a High Court may also issue a suitable 
direction or order for enforcing a legal right. It may even grant a declaratory 
relief when writ is not a proper remedy. 
Recently the seven judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 
L. Chandra Kumar case'* ruled that Parliament could not divest Constitutional 
Courts of the power of judicial review even by way of a constitutional 
amendment. 
The court held in a unanimous judgement that power of judicial review 
over legislative action rested in the High Courts under Article 226 and the 
apex Court under Article 32 of the constitution was on integral and essential 
feature of the Constitution and formed part of its basic structure.''* 
96 M/S Allied Sales Corporation Vs A P Shops and Establishment Act (1996) II 
LL J ( A P ) 5 1 6 
97 Ravi Vs Unionof India A 1 R 1994 S C 1558 
98 L Chandra Kumar Vs Union of India, A I R 1997 S C 1125 
99 L Chandra Kumar Vs Union of India , 1997 (3) SCALE 40 
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An analysis of the laws and the administration thereof in the field of 
labour shows that it suffers from a mumber of maladies. The exercise of quasi-
judicial power by the various authorities created by law to secure justice to 
the labour has not been very sucessful. This failure to attain the objective of 
socio-economic justice becomes evident when we examine the ground realities 
in this area. Various steps have been taken by the State to attain the objective 
of a fair deal to the labour. An analysis of the working of the machinery created 
and worked for this purpose shows various difficulties and for the sake of 
clarity an examination thereof is undertaken as below: 
The main objective is to provide adequate monetory and other benefits 
which will secure a life worth living to this section of the society. For this 
purpose the following major legislative measures are taken by the State: 
(1) Recruitment: In the early days of organised industry in India, factories 
and plantations found considerable difficulty in recruiting the necessary 
labour due to the reluctance of the workers to leave their villages and work 
in distant towns or plantations under strange environments. This forced the 
employers to recruit labour by all sorts of means, which they could adopt, and 
the systems of recruiting labour through intermediaries and through contractors 
come into existence. This continues even to this day. This recuritment of 
labour through inteimediaries has been a marked feature of several Indian 
industries for a long time. The task of engagement of the workers is performed 
by middlemen or jobber known in different parts of India and in different 
industries by different names, such as Sardar Mistry , Mukadam, Tindal, 
Chowdhry, Kangany and the like. In a large factar>' there are jobbers, head 
jobbers and woman jobber. 
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In view of the evils of contract labour system, pointed out by ^erveral 
C onimittees. Enquiries and Conferences, stes had been taken to regulate the 
system and abolish it wherever practicable The scope and diflnitioD of 
'worker' in the Factories Act 1948, the Mines Act, 1952, Plantation Labour 
Act, 1951, the Beedi and Cigar workers (Condition of Emloyment) Act, 1966 
was enlarged to include contract labour. Under the Employees' State Insurance 
Act, 1948, health insurance benefits were extened to contract workers. The 
Dock workers' (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948, protected the 
emloyment, wages, and welfare conditions of specified categories of contract 
labour. The provisions of Minimum wages Act, 1948 applied to contract 
labour in scheduled employment. The various Industrial Relations Acts are 
passed by various States to cover contract labour. The workmen's 
Compensation Act already applied to contract labour also. 
In spite of the measures mentioned above, the evils of contract labour 
system continued as the provisions in various Acts regarding contract labour, 
were evaded by the employers. On the basis of the various surveys, the 
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 was passed. The Act 
aims at the abolition of contract labour in respect of such categories as may 
be notified by the Appropriate Government in the light of the criteria laid 
down for the purpose and the regulation of service conditions of contract 
labour where such abolition is not possible. 
It may be pointed out that many industries with the object of building 
up a permanent labour force, give preference for emloyment to the sons and 
relatives of their existing employees. It is argued that such people get easily 
accustomed to factory discipline and are more amenable to management. 
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However such system is full of dangers. In practice such a preference leads to 
favountisui. nepotism and e\en to comniunalism and racialism and many 
inefficient hands get the job. 
In some factories there is a direct system of recruitment. The general 
procedure for direct recruitment is exhibition of a notice at the factory gate 
that so much labour is required. Then the General Manager himself or any 
other official or the Labour Superintendent comes to the gate and selects the 
necessary labour. Sometimes the recruitment for fresh recruits is brought to 
the notice of those already working in the factory, who advertise it among 
their friends and relations. A large number of applicants thus comes to the 
factory gates on the following or the appointed day. 
However, these methods are generally effective only for securing 
unskilled or substitute workers. Recruitment of skilled and semi-skilled 
labour is more difficult and is made either by promoting more efficient 
workers or by inviting applications and making a direct selection after some 
trade test if necessary. 
(2) Conditions of employment and labour: With the advent of Trade 
Unionism and collective bargaining new problems of maintaining industrial 
peace and production for the society were created. It was then considered that 
the society had a vital interest in the settlement of terms and conditions of 
emloyment of industrial labour and thus the settlement of labour problems 
become tripartite and the State representing the society entered on the scene. 
The importance of making a law defining precisely the conditions of 
emloyment was emphasised during discussions in the Tripartite Labour 
Conference. To give effect to the new ideology the Industrial Employment 
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(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 was enacted by the Central Government. It is 
obligatory upon all the employers covered by this Act to define conditions of 
employment under them. The conditions of emloyment must also be made 
known to workmen employed by such employers. 
The Factories Act is a labour welfare enactment codified with a view 
to regulate working conditions in the factories and to provide with the health, 
safety and welfare measures. Thus the main object of the Act as is evident from 
the provisions of the Factories Act, was to ensure proper, safe and healthy 
working conditions in the factories so that the workers may feel interest and 
charm in going to being afraid of bodily strain and without fear and danger of 
infection and accidents. In order to ensure safe, healthy and sanitary working 
conditions including rest intervals and measures of their welfare, the Act 
makes provision for the appointment of Inspectors to see that the objects of 
the Act are achieved and benefits are ensured to the workers. 
(3) Wages and Compensation : The total earnings of workmen consist of 
basic wage, deamess allowance and bonus. Deamess allowance has relation 
to cost of living index of different industrial centres and hence, is not uniform. 
Similarly bonus is not uniform and depends upon the profits declared by an 
industry. The basic wage rates have been fixed by various award of 
adjudicators and Industrial Tribunals and the minimum wages under the 
Minimum wages Act of 1948. 
Freedom from want and security against economic fear is one of the 
fundamental needs of our country. The Constitution affirms to all people of 
India, niter alia, social and economic justice, but this has yet to be secured by 
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peacefijl, social and legislative steps. It is the fiinction of an ideal welfare state 
to give to everv citizen the opportunity of earning his living and freedom from 
fear-fear specially of economic ruin which can involve physical and even moral 
ruin 
In order to provide social security to the working people various 
legislative stes have been taken in our country like other countries of the 
world. 
The security of the wages is provided under the Payment of wages Act, 
1936. A series of amendments have been made in order to keep pace with the 
changing circumstances and necessities of labour class. The Act has been 
drastically, amended in 1982 with a view to extending its protection to large 
number of persons and making the provisions of the Act more effective and 
beneficial. 
The general principles of workmen's compensation had almost universal 
acceptance and India was then nearly alone amongst civilised countries 
without legislative measures embodying those principles. For a number of 
years the generous emloyers had been in the habit of giving compensation 
voluntarily, but this practice was by no means general. The growing complexity 
of industry in the country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent 
danger of workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen 
themselves rendered it advisable that they should be protected as far as 
possible from hardship arising from accidents. For this purpose the Workmen's 
Compensation, Act 1923 was passed. 
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The general shceme of the Act is that compensation should ordinarily 
be given to vvorkmen who sustain personal injuries by accidents arising out of 
an in the course of their employment. Compensation will also be given in 
certain limited circumstances for disease. The actual rates of compensation 
payable are fixed and every case subject to a maxima. 
Recently the provisions of the Act have been amended by the workmen's 
Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1995 with a view to provide economic 
security in a better possible manner. By way of omission, insertion and 
substitution the provisions of sections 2, 4, 4-A, 8,14, 18-A, 21,22,23,30 and 
Schedules 1, II and III have been amended. The new sections 15-A and 15-B 
have been inserted after section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
1923. This amendment extends the benefits of this Act to the workmen 
concerned in the specified conditions. 
These are some legislative measures taken for the betterment of the 
workers. 
True worth of legislative measures can only be realised by providing a 
machinery for deciding the dispute arising therefrom which is suitable ia such 
areas. Thus the existence of an effective working of the enforcement machinery 
is to be ensured by providing a suitable procedure and appropriate deciding 
authority. 
The existing machinery of the court justice is primarily designed for 
private dispute between the two individuals. It is not appropriate for the 
enforcement of welfaie legislative measures. This is due to two particular 
reasons:-
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Firstly judges do not possess expert knowledge iii any particular field 
to which a welfare legislative measure is to apply. Judges possess a general 
knowledge of laws and experience in settling different t>'pes of disputes. 
Secondly the procedure prescribed for the resolution of disputes 
generally suffers from various defects. For example laws of evidence are 
technical and question of admissibility of evidence are central to the law of 
evidence. Generally the Code of Civil Procedure is applied by various 
authorities. Further the rules of natural justice developed in different areas of 
human relations are made applicable to welfare legislation also. 
Parties in a dispute relating to legislative measures are the workers and 
the emloyer. The biggest emloyer is the State today as in almost in every area 
of human endeavor. We find public organisations which employ a very large 
number of people. 
The result is the capacity to fight a case is very unequal in case of an 
employer and the worker. The resources at the disposal of the worker are very 
limited. He has no money for making the payment of the fees of the advocates 
and other attendent expenditure. The nature of procedure wherein adjourments 
are readily granted makes the dispute a very very long affairs Capacity to wait 
of worker is very limited as compared to an employer particularly where a 
State run corporation or other organisation is a party to the dispute. In short 
unequal resources and unequal capacity to wait places the workers in a very 
advantageous position. 
The need for speedy inexpensive commonsense justice is required. For 
this purpose our social welfare labour legislations should be amended so as to 
make it more effective system of the resolution of disputes in the field of 
welfare of workers. 
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(B) Civil Services 
The civil servant is indispensable for the governance of the country in 
the modern administrative age. Ministers frame policies and legislatures enact 
laws, but the task of efficiently and effectively implementing these policies and 
laws falls on the civil servants. The constitution, therefore, seeks to inculcate 
in the civil servants a sense of security and fairplay so that he may work and 
function efficiently and give his best to country. Nevertheless, the overriding 
power of the government to dismiss or demote a servant has been kept intact, 
even though safeguards have been provided subject to which only such a 
power can be exercised. The service jurisprudence in India is rather complex, 
intertwined as it is with legislation, rules, directions, practices, judicial 
decisions and with principles of Administrative Law, Constitutional law. 
Fundamental Rights and Natural Justice. The role of the courts in this area is 
crucial as they seek to draw a balance between two needs of the civil service; 
the need to maintain discipline in the ranks of the civil servants and the need 
to ensure that the disciplinary authorities exercise their powers properly and 
fairly. 
In contemporary India the civil servants are facing anormous difficulties 
such as political transfers, suspensions and compulsory retirement etc. 
The civil services consist of the body of officials in the service of the 
Government of India. The members of the civil services hold civil post and are 
not members of the naval, military or air forces, and also do not occupy 
political offices, for instance, membership of a Council of Ministers. He is 
appointed by, or on behalf of the President to hold a civil post, and perform 
public duties; and usually but not necessarily, he is paid out of consolidated 
fund of India. There isno formal definition of post'and civil post'. The senses 
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in which they are used in the services Chapter of Part XIV of the Constitution 
is indicated by their context and setting. 
(1) In Retrospect : India under British rule had developed, by the closing 
years of the nineteenth century, a well recognised civil services an essential 
feature of which was that control over it was vested in the executive . The 
members of the civil service of the Crown in India were governed both in the 
matter of their appointment and regulation of the conditions of their service, 
classification ,methods of recruitment, pay and allowances, and discipline and 
conduct by rules made by executive. In the Government of India Act, 1919 
specific provision was made enabling Secretary of State to make rules for 
regulating the classification of the civil services in India ,the methods of their 
recruitment, their conditions of service ,pay allowances , and discipline and 
conduct . The Act also provided that such rules might , to such extent and in 
respect of such matters as might be prescribed , delegate the power of making 
rules to the Governor-General in Council or to a local governments or 
authorise the Indian Legislature or local Legislatures to make laws regulating 
the public service. Thus the ultimate Control over the services vested in the 
Secretary of State in Council and, in fact, the Fundamental Rules' which 
governed all major matters relating to conditions of service were made by him. 
Even the Legislature in India derived their power by authority delegated to 
them by the Secretary of State'"". In the rules made by the Secretary of State 
in Council. Rule 55 was most important. The Rule laid down :-
"without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Service Inquaries 
Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank shall 
be passed on a member of a service other than an order based on facts 
which had led to his conviction in a criminal court, or Court Martial 
100 B. Shiva Rao." The Framing of India's Constitution', a study.708 (The Indian 
Institute of Public Administration, 1968, New Delhi) 
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unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is 
proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportu-
nity to defend himself™" 
At the end of the first world war, the top echelons of the important 
services, especially those working under Provincial Governments, consisted 
of what were known as the "All India Services," governed a wide variety of 
departments. There were, in the first place, the Indian Civil Services and the 
Indian Police Service, which provided the fi-ame work of the administrative 
machinery. In addition there were the Indian Forest Service, the Indian 
Educational Service, the Indian Agricultural Service, the Indian Service of 
Engineering (comprising an Irrigation Branch and Roads and Buildings 
Branch), the Indian Veterinary Service, the Indian Forest Engineering Service 
and the Indian Medical Service (civil). The initial appointments and conditions 
of service for aU these services were made by the Secretary of State and each 
officer executed a covenant with the Secretary of State setting out the terms 
under which he. was to serve. In addition to the all India services there were 
the central services under the Government of India and the provincial services 
in Provinces; lastly the Subordinate Service"". 
During the years following the inauguration of the 1919 Act it was 
decided that, as a consiquence of the decision to effect the progressive 
transfer of power to Governments in India, the number of all India services, 
under the direct control of the secretary of State should be progressively 
reduced especially in those fields of administration that were transferred to 
ministerial control. It was now to be left to the Provincial Government to 
recognise in gradual stages thehigher cadres oftheir services in the transferred 
101 Indian Statutary (Simon) Commission Report (1930), Vol. I, para 290. Quated 
from B Shiva Rao, "The Framing of India's Constitution- A study.708-709 (The 
Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1968) 
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subject, and recruitment and control of the Secretary of State in council were 
accordingly discontinued. This policy resulted, by the early thirties, in the 
Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police Service, the Ecclesiastical Service 
being retained by the Secretary of State and the rest being converted into 
provincial services, safeguards being provided to secure the rights and 
privilege guaranteed to officers recruited earlier to the All India Services.'" 
Government of India Act, 1935 formalized this position. The relevant 
provisions of that Act laid down that power to make appointments would be 
vested, in respect of Central Services in the Governor-General, and in the case 
of provincial Services in the respective Govemnors. Like wise, the power to 
regulate conditions of service of the members of these services was also 
conferred on the Governor-General or the appropriate Provincial Government. 
Provision was also made that Acts of the appropriate Legislatures might 
regulate the conditons of service of persons in the civil service. But the scope 
of such legislation was elaborately set out in the Report of the Joint Select 
Committee 1934. The Committee made it quite clear that the purpose of the 
Acts of the Legislatures would be to give general legal sanction to the status 
and rights of the services. The terms 'Status and 'rights' in the opinion of the 
Committee, covered firstly, protection against individual injury amounting to 
breach of contract and against individual unfair treatment through disciplinary 
action or refusal of promotion; and secondly, protection against such arbitrary 
alterations in the organisation of the services themselves as might damage the 
professional prospects of their members generally. Safeguards were included 
102 Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, Report, (1934), Para 
277 
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in the Act"" laying down the procedures to be followed for dismissal, removal 
or reduction in rank of civil servants, and as a further safeguard a special 
responsibility was conferred on the Governor-General and the Governors for 
the protection of legitimate interests of the services. Power was also specifically 
vested in them to deal with the cases of individual Government servants in 
such manner as they considered just and equitable even if this departed from 
the rules or Acts applicable- so long as the case of the officer was dealt with 
in a manner more liberal than that provided by the rules.'"^ 
Future recruitment by theSecretory of State was to be made to the 
Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police, and the Civil branch of the Indian 
Medical Service. For the Secretory of State's officers detailed safeguards 
were provided Their salary, remuneration and rights in regard to medical 
attendance were to be decided exclusively by the Secretary of State. The 
number and character of the posts to be held by them were to be decided by 
the Secretary ofState through rulesprescribing detailed provisions specifying 
the individual posts under the Centre and in the State to which the Secretary 
of State's officers alone were to be appointed. A suitable provision was also 
laid down for safeguarding their rights in disciplinary matters."" 
103 Section 12(1) (d) of the Government of India Act, 1935 provides that in the 
exercise of his functions the Governnor-General shall have the special responsibili-
ties, that IS to say- the securing to, and to the dependants of persons who are or have 
been members of the public services of any rights provided or preserved for them by 
or under this Act and the Safeguarding of their legitimate interests 
Section 52(1) (c) of the said Act provides that in the exercise of his functions the 
Governor shall have the special resonsibilities, that is to say- the securing to, and 
to the dependants of, persons who are or have been members of the public services 
of any rights provided or preserved for them by or under this Act, and the 
safeguarding of their legitimate interests 
104 B Shiva Rao.'The Framing of Indian's Constitution-A study, 710 (The Indian 
Institute of Public Administration. New Delhi,1968) 
105 IbidP 711 
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On the basis of the grounds discussed above the Constituent Assembly 
considered ihe question of the public service. In the earlier discussion on the 
principles of the Constitution not much consideration was given to the 
provisions to be made in regard to the services. However the Union Constitution 
Committee included a specific recommendation that there should be All India 
Services whose recruitment and conditions of service would be regulated by 
federal law. The result of Independence and partition of the country was that 
our country suffered heavy reduction in the higher ranks of the services, 
espacially in the cadres of the Indian Civil Services and the Indian Police. A 
considerable number of Europeans who were the members of these services 
chose to retire. A number of officers opted to serve the Dominion of Pakistan. 
The result coupled with the fact that recruitment to these services had also 
been considerably slowed down. The New All India Services were created to 
fill this gap. 
Sri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar was of the opinion that the establishment 
of All India Service would be desireable in cases where it was necessary to 
attract to the highest services the best material available in the country, 
transgressing provincial boundries for the purpose of attracting this material. '"* 
The proposal of the Union Constitution Committee was adopted 
without any further discussion. 
Theie were complete provisions for regulating recruitment and 
conditions of service of members of the various public services in the first 
Draft of B.N. Rau'"\ This Draft followed the provisions of the Government 
of India Act of 1935 but adapted them to the circumstances of a Government 
working in complete responsibility to Legislature. 
106 C A D Vol IVP. 965 
107 Select Documents III, l(i), clauses 215-8, pp 89-90. 
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The Drafting Committee Considered these provisions in January and 
February 1948 and made certain changes and omitted some provisions relating 
to defence services and simlified the provisions relatmg to the civil services. 
The Committee was of opinion that detailed provisions with regard to the 
recruitment and conditions of service of persons in defence services or those 
servmg the Union or a State in a civil capacity should not be included in the 
Constitution, but should be left to be regulated by Acts of the appropriate 
legislature The Draft Constitution as settled by the Drafting Committee 
contained three Articles '"* These Articles are mentioned in Select Documents 
III, 6, PP. 625-6 
108 Article 281 Article 281 says "In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, 
the expression 'State' means a State for the time being specified in Part I of the First 
Schedule 
Article 282 (1) Article 282 says "(1) Subject to the provisions of clause(2) of this 
Article, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment and the 
conditons of service of persons appointed to public services and to post in connection 
with affairs of the Union or any State 
(2) No person who is a member of any civil service or holds any civil post in connection 
with the affairs of the Government of India or the Government of a State shall be 
dismissed, removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable 
apportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to 
him Provided that this clause shall not appiy-
(a) Where a person is dismissed, removed, reduced in rank on the ground of conduct 
which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or 
(b) Where an authority empowered to dismiss a person or remove him or reduce him 
in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing. 
It is not reasonably practicable to give that person an opportunity of showing cause " 
Article 283 Article 283 reads, "Until other provision is made in this behalf under this 
Constitution, any rules which were in force immediately before the commencement 
of this Constitution and were applicable to any public service or any post which has 
continued to exist after the commencement of this Constitution as a service or post 
under the Union or a State shall continue in force so far as consistent with the 
provisions of this Constitution " 
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These draft Articles sought in the first place to establish the basic 
position that both recruitment and conditions of sen. ice should not be within 
the executive jurisdiction of the Government, but should be made expressly 
subject to legislative control and the rules in force immediately before the 
commencement of the Constitution were kept alive only for an interim period 
until the Legisltures passed the necessary laws. They also protected civil 
servants from arbitrary dismissal, removal or reduction. These major penalties 
could not be imposed except after they were given a reasonable opportunity 
of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken; this requirement 
could be waived in two circumstances; where dismissal, removal or reduction 
in rank was ordered on the ground of conduct which led to a conviction on a 
criminal charge, and where it was not practicable to give a Government 
servant this opportunity. The Drafting Committee's reason for this simplified 
provision was that it should be left to the legislatures to regulate all matters 
relating to the services. In this regard. Dr. Ambedkar in his letter to the 
President of the Constituent Assembly said:'"' 
"The committee has refi^ained from inserting in the Constitution any 
detailed provisions relating to the services; the committee considers 
that they should be regulated by Acts of the appropriate legislature 
rather than by Constitutional provisoons, as the committee feels that 
the future legislatures in this country, as in other countries, may be 
trusted to deal fairly with the services". 
The Drafting Committee, at this stage, laid the whole responsibility for 
safeguarding the rights of all members of the services on legislative action 
taken by the appropriate Legislatures in pursuance of the relevant entries in 
the legislative lists. 
109 Select Documents 111, 6, articles 281-3 P. 516. 
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When the Draft Constitution as settled by the Drafting Committee was 
ciiculated. various cominents were recieved from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and from the judges of the Federal Court and Chief Justices of the High 
Courts. On recieving comments, the Drafting Committee decided that a new 
chapter relating to district Judges and the subordinate judicial service should 
be included in the chapter in the constitution relating to the judiciary. The 
Ministry of Home Affairs was very emphatic that provision in specific terms 
should be included in the Constitution for the setting up of the Indian 
Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service as all India Services. The 
Ministry also suggested the inclusion of a clause to the effect that every person 
who was a member of a Secretary of State's Service (formerly Known as an 
all India Service) the new Indian Administrative service or the Indian Police 
service should be entitled to the same conditions of service as respects 
remuneration, leave and pension and the same rights as respects disciplinary 
measures and tenure of office (or rights as similar thereto as the changed 
circumstances would permit) as he was entitled to before the commencement 
of the constitution. These suggestion were considered by the Constitutional 
Adviser who recommended thier acceT»tance with some amendment? 
The amendments made in the Draft Constitution in the light of above 
suggestion were considered by the Assembly on September 7 and 8, 1949. As 
against three Articles introduced in February 1948, the Drafting Conmiittee 
now proposed the adoption of six Articles providing for a variety of matters. 
There was a criticism on these Articles. A considerable discussion was taken 
place on some of these Articles. Dr. Ambedkar had satisfactory answered. In 
the light of satisfactory answers and explanations the Assembly adopted all 
the Articles as suggested by the Drafting Committee. 
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At the revision stage the Articles on the services were renumbered as 
Articles 308 to 314. 
(2) Under the Constitution : 
The provisons relating to services under the Union and the States are 
laid down in Part XIV of the Constitution. The most important provisions 
relating to civil servants are envisaged in Articles 309, 310 and 311. 
Article 309"° :Recruitment and conditions of Service: Recruitment is a 
comprehensive term and includes any method provided for inducting a person 
in public service. Appointment, selection, promotion, deputation are all well 
known methods of recruitment. Even appointment by transfer is not unknowTi'" 
The power of the Government under Article 309 of the Constitution to 
make rules, regulating the condition of service of Government employees 
could in no way be fettered by any agreement even if such agreement was 
proved."^ 
110. Article 309 Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts of the appropriate 
legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of persons 
appointed, to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union 
or of any State 
Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he 
may direct in the case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of the 
Union, and for the Governor of a State or such person as he may direct in the case 
of services and posts in connection with affairs of the State, to make rules regulating 
the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services 
and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of appropriate 
Legislature under this Article, and any rules so made shall have effect subject to the 
provisions of such Act. 
111 Narayanan Vs State of Karnataka (1994) Supp.(l) S C C 44 
112 C Sankaranayanan Vs State of Kerala, A I.R. 1971 SC 1997. 
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Article 309 empowers Parliament and the State legislature to regulate 
the lecriiitment and the conditions of service of the persons appointed to 
public services and posts under the Union and States, respectively. Untill 
provision is made b> an appropriate legislature (Parliament or Stare legislature) 
under this Article, the President and the Governors may make rules for 
regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to 
such services and posts. The rule making power of the Government (President 
or Governors) is identical with that of the legislature " \ The Constitution lays 
down certain general provisions. It does not provide detailed rules for 
recruitment or conditions of services of the Union or of the State. The power 
is left to respective legislatures (Entry 70 of List I and 41 of List II). The 
power of appointment belonging to the Executive will thus be subject to the 
legislative control. In Mubarak Vs. Banerjee"^ it was held that it is not 
necessary for the exercise of the legislative power under Entry 70 of List I or 
41 of the list II that it must be made by a specific legislation under Article 309. 
Article 309 does not stand in the way of an appropriate legislature in laying 
down necessary conditions of service in any general law enacted by it, e.g.. 
Section 86(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 
The opening words of Article 309 subject to provisions of the 
Constitution, however, made it clear that the law-making power of legislature 
and the rule-making power of the executive must not contravene any provision 
ofthe Constitution such as Articles 14, 15; 16; 19; 299; 234; 310( 1); 311(1) 
or 311(2). 
113 RaniAvtarVs Siateof U P . A 1 R 1962 All 328 
114 A I R 1958 All 323 
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The Constitution itself provides the mode of appointment and Conditions 
of service uf certain officers in connection with the affairs of the Union and 
the States, e.g., the Attorney General of India and certain classes of public 
servants, eg the staff of each House ofParhameut and of a State legislature, 
officers of the Supreme Court, persons serving in the Indian Audit and 
Accounts Department, officers of High Court. Hence Art. 309 shall have no 
application to these classes of Government servants. 
The provisions in Article 309 are only enabling ones. They do not 
impose any duty or obligation on the legislature to enact only Act or on the 
President or the Governor to make rules with regard to conditions of service 
of civil servants. They do not also impose any duty or obligation on the 
Government to make rules with regard to civil services. Any recruitment or 
appointment done by the Government in exercise of its executive power 
relating to civil services can not therefore be said to be invalid merely because 
no rule or law has been made under Article 309 '". In Mallikarjuna Vs. State 
of A.P."*andN.T.B. Vs. Kamataka P.S.C.,"^The S.C. held that the court can 
not issue mandamus to the Government to make rules or to legislate under 
Article 309 nor issue any direction to the Government to adopt a measure 
which would involve an mcrease in expenditure. 
When there is neither legislation nor rules, qualifications for civil 
services may be laid down by the Government by an executive order "*. Even 
after Rules are framed under Article 309, there is nothing to debar the 
Government to fill up gaps by administrative instructions on the matters in 
115 Mubarak Vs Banerjee, A l.R. 1958 All 323. See also B Nagrajan Vs State of 
Mysore A I R 1966 S C 1942; State of Mysore Vs Panianabhacharya A I R 
1966 S C 602 
116 A.I R 19P0 S C. 1251 
117. A.I R 1990 S.C. 1233 
118. Raniesh Vs State of Bihar A.I.R. 1978 S C. 327 
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respect of which the Rules are silent though the Rules cannot be amended or 
superseded by administrative instruction nor can they be superimposed by any 
thing inconsistent with the Rules'". 
An administrative policy or instruction can be made or changed by the 
Executive, without any formality. The court can not interfere with the 
formulation or change of administrative policy of the Government unless it 
violates some provisions of the constitution, such as Article 14, which 
requires that even an Administrative authority must act fairly and treat its 
employees equally. No change should, therefore, be made secretly or 
capriciously or on any ulterior motive. If these conditions are violated, the 
court may interfere, with suitable directions as to how fairness or equality of 
treatment could be achieved. 
In Verma Vs. Union of India'^", it was held that an administrative order 
may be reviewed; but if rights of parties are to be affected, rules of natural 
justice must be complied with. The decision taken after review is subject to 
judicial review like any other administrative decision. 
In Indra Vs. Union of India'^', the court held that executive orders 
made under Article 73 have for their operation and equal efficiency as an Act 
of Parliament or the Rules made by the President under Article 309. But 
statutory rules can not be altered by administrative instruction. 
In Bhalnager Vs. Union of India'" the court observed that once the 
Union and the State Government frame rules, their action in respect of matters 
covered by rules should be regulated by the rules. The rule framed under 
119 Sant Ram Vs State of Rajasthan, A I.R. 1967 S.C. 1910 at 1914. 
120 A I R . 1980 S C 1461 
121.(1992)Supp (3 )S C C 217. 
122.(1991) 1 S.C.C 544 
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Article 309 are solemn rules haviug binding effect. Governments should 
refrau) from acting in a manner not contemplated by their own rules. 
The proviso to Article 309 is a transitional provison empowering the 
executive to make rules having the force of law, relating to the above matters 
until the appropriate legislatures legislate on the subject. Further, until the 
powers conferred by the present Article 309 are exercised, the existing rules 
will continue to be in force, under Article 311, post ,in so far as they are not 
inconsistent with the provisons of the Constitution'". 
In Iyengar Vs. State of Mysore'" the Maysore High court held that the 
rules can be amended or varied by the President or the Governor as the case 
may be in view of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, so long as the 
appropriate legislature does not exercise its power under Article 309. 
However, the Supreme Court in State of Madras Vs. 
Padmanabhacharya'" stated that since the power of the President or the 
Governor under the proviso to Article 309 is not co-extensive with the power 
of the legislature under entry 70 of List I or entry 41 of list II in the Seventh 
Schedule to the Constitution, the President or the Governor has no power 
under the proviso to make a rule declaring that persons who were invalidly 
retired. The legislature however, can make a law effecting such validation. 
In the case of Union territories, the rule making power under the 
Proviso to Article 309 has to be exercised by the President until Parliament 
legislates in that behalf '^ *. 
123 Durga Das Basu,"Shorter Constitution of India" 896 (12th edition, 1996, Prentice-
Hall of India (P)Ltd , New Delhi) 
124 A I R 1061 Mysore 37 at 41 
125 A I R 1966 S.C 602 at 605 
126 Gobaiousaniy Vs Pondicherry, A.I R 1968 Mad 298 at 299 
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Article 309 gives, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, full 
powers to the government to make rules. In Roshan Lai Vs. Union of India'^' 
it was held that the rules providing for terms of service can be altered 
unilaterally by the Government, and this is so because once appointed to his 
post or office, the government servant acquires status and his rights and 
obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties but by statute 
or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the 
Government. The legal position of a government servant is more one of a 
status than of contract. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship 
voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of status are fixed by 
the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In C. 
Sankarauarayan Vs. State of Kerala"*, the nature of power to regulate the 
conditions of service of teachers in Government and Government aided 
schools was in issue. The Government had issued an order raising the age of 
retirement from 55 to 58 years after a memorandum submitted by the 
appellants in this regard. The rules framed under the Kerala Education Act 
of 1958 were amended accordingly. Subsequently, in suspension of its earlier 
order, the Government reduced the age of retirement to 55 years, and made 
the necessary amendements in the rules also. It was argued that the earlier 
order raising the age of retirement to 58 years was issued as a result of an 
understanding which could be considered as a binding contract or agreement 
between the Government and the teachers and, therefore, can not be unilaterally 
altered. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the powers 
of the Governor under Article 309 to regulate the conditions cannot be 
fettered by an agreement or contract. The Court further did not accept also 
the plea of estoppel in such matters. 
127. A.l.R. 1967 S.C. 1889 at 1894 
128. (1971)2 S C.C. 361. 
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In Sri C.R. Rangadhamaiah Vs. Chairman, Railway Board'", it was 
held that the President has under the Proviso to Article 309 ofthe Constitution 
power to promulgate rules with retrospective effect. This, however, is subject 
to the condition that the rules do not offend any ofthe Fundamental Rights 
conferred by Part III ofthe Constitution. It was held on the ground that the 
vested rights ofthe applicants in the matter of receiving pension and other 
retirai benefits have been affected by the retrospective operation of the 
amended rule. It is well settled that pension is a valuable right which a 
Government ser\'ant earns. It is neither charity nor bounty. Government 
servant acquires right to pension and other retirement benefits on the date he 
retires from service. Deprivation of such a valuable vested right after retirement 
is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14. In 
State of J and K Vs. Khosa"" it was held that rule which classifies existing 
employees for promotional purposes undoubtedly operates on those who 
entered service before the framing ofthe rule, it operates in future in the sense 
that it governs the future right of promotion of those who are already in 
service. The impugned rules do not recall a promotion already made. 
As it has already been mentioned that the power conferred by Article 
309 is subject to the opening words ofthe Article which govern not only the 
power of the legislature but also the rule making power conferred by the 
Proviso. Hence if any rule contravenes any ofthe provisons ofthe Constitution, 
eg. Articles'" 14,15,16,19,299,234,310 (1), 311 ( l ) o r 3 1 1 (2) therule shaU 
be void. 
129 1904 (2) S.L.J, (CAT) Bangalore 68 at 81. 
130. A.I R 1974 S.C. 1. 
131. See Chater IV of this work for the detailed discussion of Articles 14,15 and 16. 
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(a) Tenure of Office. 
Article 310 of the Constitution accepts and adopts the Common law 
doctrine of pleausre, but the chances of its ill effect and misuse have been 
minimised by the provisions of Article 311. In Moti Ram Vs N.E. Frontier 
Railway '^-, the Supreme court observed that there is no doubt that the 
pleausre of the President has lost some of its majesty and power, beause it is 
clearly controlled by the provisions of Article 311, and so, the field that is 
covered by Article 311 on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant 
words used in that Article, would be excluded from the operation of the 
absolute doctrine of pleausre. In P.L. Dhingra Vs Union of India'" the 
Supreme Court observed that though the two qualifications are set out 
separately in Article 311, they quite clearly restrict the operation of the rule 
embodied in Article 310 (1). In other words, the provisions of Article 311 
operate as proviso to Article 310( 1). In State of Bihar Vs. Abdul Majid""*, the 
Supreme Court held that the rule of English law that a civil servant cannot 
maintain a suit against the State or against the Crowoi for recovery of arrears 
of salary does not prevail in this country and it has been negatived by the 
statutory law in India. The Government servants are entitled to relief like any 
other person under the ordinary law and that relief, therefore, is regulated by 
the C.P.C. 
Clause (1) of the Article 310 provides that every person who is a 
member of a Defence Service or of a Civil Service of the Union or of an All 
India Services or holds any post connected with Defence or any Civil post 
under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President. Similarly, 
every person who is a member of a Civil Service of a State or holds any civil 
132 M R 1064 S C 600 at 609 , 
133 A I R 1958 S C 36 at 41 
134 A I R 1954 S C 245 
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post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the 
State The general rule of holdhig office during the pleasure of the President 
or the Governor, as the case may be, will operate subject to, except as 
expressly provided by this Constitution 
The Constitutional doctrine that the public servants hold office during 
the pleasure of the President or the Governors, as the case may be, has two 
important consequences. First, the Government has the right to regulate or 
determine the tenure of its employees at pleasure, notwithstanding any thing 
in their contract to the contrary, provided that the mandetary provisions laid 
down in Article 311 have been observed. So long as the statutory inhibition, 
if any, are not contravened the civil servants have no right to complain of any 
cause of action against Government. Secondly, the Government has no power 
to restrict or give up its prerogative of terminating the services of its 
employees at pleasure under any contract made with the employee except to 
the extent recognised by clause (2)'^' 
The power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure, subject to the 
provisions Article 311, is not an executive power under Article 154, but a 
constitutional power and is not capable of being delegated to the officers 
subordinate to him'^'' Later the Supreme Court in Sardari Lai Vs. State of 
Punjab"^ also stated that the executive functions of the nature entrusted by 
certain Articles in which the President has to be satisfied personally about the 
existence of certain facts or state of affairs can not be delegated by him to any 
one else. In support of this view the court relied on the observation in 
Jayantilal Amritlal Vs. F.N. Rama "*, that the powers of the President under 
135 V N Shukla. "Constitution of India".507 (6th edition, 1981, Eastern Book 
Company. Lucknow) 
13c State of U P Vs Babu Ram Upadhya. A I R 1961 S C 751 
137 (1971) 1 S C C 411 
138 A I R 1964 S C 648 
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Article 311(2) can not be delegated. But, these propositions were described 
as not the correct statement and no longer good law after the decision in 
Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab'", wherein the propositions reformulated: 
(a) The distinction made in the Jayantilal Amritlal case between the executive 
functions of the President does not lead to any conclusion that the President 
is not the Constitutional head of the Government, (b) The President as well 
as the Governor, is the Constitutional or formal head and exercise his power 
and functions conferred on him by or under this Constitution on the aid and 
advice of his council of Ministers, (c) The President, as well as the Governor, 
in the exercise of his discretion under Article 310(1) acts on the aid and advice 
of the Council of Ministers and not required to act personally. It was, 
therefore, held that the appointment or dismissal or removal of persons 
belonging to judicial service of the State is not a personal fiinction but is an 
executive function exercised within the rules made in that behalf under the 
Constitution. Thus it has now been clearly established that the pleasure of the 
Present or the Governor under Article 310( 1) is exercised not in any personal 
capacity but as head of the Government acting on the aid and advice of the 
Council of Ministers"*". 
Clasue(2) specially empowers the Government to enter into special 
contracts with new entrants, qualifying or limiting the application of the rule 
of dismissal at pleasure. It enacts that the President, or the Governor may, for 
securmg the services of persons for compensation in the event of premature 
abolition of office or retirement not due to misconduct. It will be noted that 
such a contract can be made only with a new entrant, i.e. with a person who 
is not already a member of a Defence Service, of an All India Service, or of 
a Civil Service of the Union or of a State''". 
139. (1974)2 sec. 831. 
140. Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel A.l.R. 1985 S.C. 1416; Satyavir Singh Vs. 
Union of India. 1986 S.C, 555 at 559. 
141. Supra note 135. 
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(b) Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank : The preceding Article 310 
enacts the general principle that a Government servant holds office during the 
pleasure of the Government The Article Sir"*- places two restrictions on the 
prerogative of dismissal at pleasure These are 
(i) that person employed in civil capacities under the Union or State 
shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to 
that by which they were appointed, and 
(ii) no such person shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank 
except after an enquiry as provided in clause (2) 
These two safeguards provided in this Article do not apply to all 
Government servants They apply only to the persons who are members of a 
Civil Service of the Union or of an All India Service or of a Civil Service of 
a State or to the persons who hold a civil post under the Union or State These 
safeguard are not applicable to members of defence forces or to any post 
connected with defence 
142 Article 111 roMdes (I) Noperson who is a member of a CIMI serviceof theUnion 
or an all India sers'ice as civil serv ice of a State or holds a ci\ il post under the Union 
or a State shall be dismissed or renio\ ed b> an authorit> subordinate to that by which 
be was appointed 
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced m rank 
except and it shall not be necessar> to give such person am opportunity or making 
representation on the penalty proposed 
ProMdcd futher that this clause shall not apl\ 
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of 
conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or 
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or practicable to hold such 
inquir), or 
(c) w here the Presendeut or the Go% ernor. as the case may be. is satisfied to hold 
such inqum 
O) If in respect of anv such person as aforsaid. a question shall be final 
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The Article makes no distinction between permanent and temporary 
memebrs of the services or between persons holding permanent or temporary 
posts. In Porshotam Vs. Union of India"\ the Supreme Court has observed: 
"Article 311 does not, in terms, say that the protection of that Article 
extends to only to persons who are permanent members of the 
services or who hold permanent civil post —. In our judgement, just 
as Article 310, in terms, makes distinction between permanent and 
temporary members of the services or between persons holding 
temporary or permanent posts in the matter of their tenure being 
dependent upon the pleasure of the President or the Governor, so 
does Article 311, in our view, make no distinction between the two, 
classes, both of which are, therefore, within its protection, and the 
decision holding the contrary view can not be supported as correct"'**^. 
In S.L. Agarwal Vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd."" the court held that an 
employee of a company incorporated under the companies Act such as the 
Hindustan Steel Ltd, is not a holder of civil post under the Union because the 
company isnot a departments ofthe Government of India. Similarly employees 
of institutions such as Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which are 
sponsored and controlled by the Central Government but are registered under 
the Societies Registration Act do not get protection of Article 311. In 1975 
the Supreme Court in Sukhdeo Singh's case"** held that statutory corporation 
143.AIR. 1958 S.C. 36. 
144. Id at 43-44. 
145.(1970) 1 S.C.C. 177. See also Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. Vs. workmen, (1971)1 
S.C.R 652; Praga Tools Corporation Vs. C.A. Imanual (1969)1 S.C.C. 585; 
Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State Bihar (1969) 1 S.C.C. 765; Sabhajit 
Tewary Vs. Union of India (1975)1 S.C.C. 485. 
146. Sukhdeo Singh Vs. Bhagatram. (1975)1 S.C.C. 421. 
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such as the L.I.C., O.N.G.C and Industrial Fiannce Corporation are "State" 
under Article 12, yet to their employees also the protection of Article 311 is 
not available"*'. 
In the light of the above discussion it is crystal clear that the 
Constitutional protection, offered by either clause( I) or clause(2) of Article 
311, can not be taken away by any legislation short of amendment of the 
Constitution. Any law which seeks to do this even indirectly, must be held to 
be void. 
In Saba's case"**, it was held that where all the functions of a department 
of the State or Union Government along with posts are transferred to some 
University or Government Corporation, a situation is created where the 
employees remain holders of Government posts but activities are transferred 
to the newly created organization. Policy decision of the Government to 
convert a Government department to a Corporation cannot be questioned by 
the holders of Government posts. They cannot however, also be forcibly 
removed from Government service on account of this decision. Government 
can give an option to the holders of such posts either to be absorbed in some 
other department or to leave the service of the State and to opt for the service 
of the Government Corporation / undertaking in question. Once any such 
employee of the State opts for the service of the Corporation, he ceases to be 
in service of the State and is not entitled to retain lien in the Government. 
147. Id at 447. 
148.S.K. Saha Vs. Prem Prakash Agrawal, (1994) I S.C.C. 432-433. 
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Suspension of a Government servent from service is neither dismissal 
nor removal and is not therefore within the scope of protection of Article 311 
of the Constitution"". But it has been held that suspension with retrospective 
efifect is invalid. Likewise, termination or reduction in rank of a temporary 
servant brought about by abolition of the post would not attract Article 
311(2). 
(c) Power of the subordinate authority -
Clause (1) of Article 311 applies only if the following conditions are 
satisfred-
(1) That the person whose services are terminated is a member of a Civil 
Service or holds a civil post; 
(2) That such termination amounts to dismissal'or removal'. Thus clause 
(1) need not be complied with where a person is discharged in terms 
of conditions of his contract of service similarly, where the penalty 
awarded is other than dismissal or removal, e.g., reduction in rank, or 
suspension, it may be awarded by an authority who is empowered in 
that behalf by the rules even though he is not the appointing authority'. 
In Satinder Vs. State Bank of Patiala"", the court observed that 
Article 311 (1) governs those belonging to certain stated services, it 
does not apply to bank employees. 
Clause (1) of Article 311 makes it clear that the order of dismissal of 
a civil servant should be made by an authority who is not subordinate to the 
authority who appointed that civil servant. In Mahesh Prasad Vs. State of 
149. Sukhbans Singh Vs. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1962 SC. 1711 See also Bhairon 
Prasad Vs. State, I.LR 1960 Raj. 952. Quoted from V.N. Shukla," Constitution 
of Indian" 509 (6th Edition,1981, Eastern Book company, Lucknow). 
150. (1992) Supp. (2) S.C.C. 224. 
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U.P. '" it was held that dismissal by an officer subordinate to the appointing 
authority is null and void. The term' subordinate' refers to subordinate in rank 
and not in respect of function. It is not necessary that the dismissal or removal 
must be ordered by the very same authority who made the appointment or by 
his direct superior. There is a compliance with the clause if the dismissing 
authority is not lower in rank or grade than the appointing authority. 
The dismissal will not be illegal where the order of dismissal is passed 
by apointing authority the order is merely communicated by some subordinate 
authority. The appointing authority can not delegate his power of dismissal or 
removal to a subordinate authority, so as to destroy the protection afforded 
by the Constitution, unless the Constitution itself authorieses such delegation 
by other provisions'". 
Appointing authority means the authority which actually appointed the 
officer to the service which he has terminated. Where there is change in the 
administration and the previous service is terminated and a fresh appointment 
is made, the appointing authority thereafter is the officer who makes the fresh 
appointment. If, however, the previous service is continued by an order of the 
new administration or by law, the appointing authority is the authority who 
corresponds to the authroity who made the initial appointment. Where the 
power to appoint is vested by statutory provision in one authority, to be 
exercised on the advice of another, it is the former who is to be regarded as 
the appointing authroity. 
In Srinivasa Vs. C.A G. '" the court observed that what clause(l) of 
Article 311 requires is that the order of dismissal or removal must be made by 
151. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 70. 
152. Ramchandra Vs. D.I.G., A.I.R. 1957 M.P. 124. 
153. (1993)1. sec. 419. 
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an authority not subordinate to the appointing authority. It does not require 
that the order initiating the inquiry or the inquiry itself must be made by the 
appointing authority himself or by some person not subordinate to him. 
The provisons of Article 311 extends to all persons holding a civil post 
under the Union or a State, including members of the All-India and State 
Services. The expression civil post means an appointment or office on the civil 
side of the administration as distinguished from the post under the Defence 
Forces. The only persons who are excluded from the purview of Article 311 
(1) are- (i) a members of Defence Service, and (ii) persons holding any post 
connected with defence. 
The term post' denotes an office. A post under the State is an office 
or a position to which duties in connection with the affairs of the State are 
attached, an office or position to which a person is appointed and which may 
exist apart from and independently of the holder of post. Article 310(2) 
contemplates that a post may be abolished and a person holding a post may be 
required to vacate the post, and it emphasises the idea of a post existing apart 
from the holder of the post. A post may be created before the appointment or 
simultaneously with it. A post is an employment, but every appointment is not 
a post. A casual labourer is not the holder of a post. A post under the State 
means a post under the administrative control of the State'"*. It has already 
been discussed the case of Sukhadeo Singh Vs. Bhaghat Ram, in which it was 
held that statutory corporation such as L.I.C., O.N.G.C. and Industrial 
Finance Corporation are "State" under Articlel2, yet to their employees also 
the protection of Article 311 is not available. The employee of such statutory 
corporation can not be said to hold a civil post under the State, so as to attract 
Article 311 
154. Durga Das Basu, " Shorter Constitution of India", 948-49 (12th edition, 1996, 
Prentice- Hall of India (P) Ltd., New Delhi). 
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There is another reason why courts have refused to interfere with the 
termination of services of employees of statutory authorities, by the writ of 
mandamus. This writ issues only if there is any statutory duty or obligation 
which may be enforced against authority. In the absence of statutory limitations, 
employment under statutory authority is governed by the ordinary law of 
master and servant and the relation between the employer and the employee 
is contractual, so that mandamus will not lie to interfere with an order of 
removal made by such authority, in the absence of breach of statutory duty"'. 
If the termination of service is in breach of a statutory obligation in 
compliance with which only the employment can be terminated, a writ under 
Article 226 as well as a suit for declaration will lie. But if the regulations do 
not impose any statutory obligation but merely embody the terms of the 
contract of employment, only a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal will 
lie, in case of such regulations"*. 
A person, however, cannot be said to have a status of holding a civil 
post under the State merely because his salary or wages are paid from State 
funds or that State exercises certain amount of control over the post. 
The other safeguard which the Constitution affords to a civil servant 
is that he shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after 
an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given 
a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and where 
it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty until he 
has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the 
penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such 
inquiry. 
155. UP. State Warehousing Corporation Vs. Tyagi A.].R. 1970 S.C. 1244 at 1255 
156. Ibid. 
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Clause (2) of Article 311 applies only when an employee is dismissed, 
removed or reduced in rank, before the normal period of service, against his 
will and by way of penalty or punishment. It does not apply in case of any other 
punishment. 
The form of the order or expressions used in the order are not 
conclusive on the question whether it is by way punishment. In Parshottam Vs. 
Union of India'" and Champak Lai Vs. Union India"*, the court observed that 
penalty or punishment should be determined from the circumstances of each 
case by applying a two-fold test : 
(a) Whetherthe Government servant, whose services have been terminated, 
had a right to the post or the rank; 
(b) whether has been visited with evil consequences, e.g., forfeiture of the 
benefits already earned by him. 
If either of these two tests is satisfied, it must be held that the servant 
has been punished, so as to attract Article 311 (2). 
Premature termination of services of a Government servant holding a 
temporary post for a fixed term will also attract Arcticle 311(2)"'. 
In Moti Ram Vs. N.E.F. Rly'*", the Supreme Court has settled the 
controversy by drawing a distinction between two classes of Government 
servants. Viz., (a) those who have a right to or lien upon the post held by them; 
and (b) those who have no such right. 
157. AIR. 1958 S.C. 36. 
158 A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1854. 
159. Supra note 157. 
160. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600 
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Where a Government servant has the right to hold a post either 
according to contract or the conditions of his service, the mere fact of 
termination of his service vsdll be deemed to be penal and Article 311 (2) will 
be attracted, whether such termination takes place assigning any reason or 
not. It follows, therefore, that the service of the following classes of Government 
servant can not be terminated without compliance with Article 311 (2) ' " : 
(i) Termination of the service of a Government servant holding a permanent 
post, substantively, - prior to the age of superannuation, except by 
way of compulsory retirement, according to the rules'". 
(ii) Premature termination of the services of a Government servant 
holding a temporary post for a fixed term''^ 
(iii) Termination of the services of persons in qua si-permanent' service 
otherwise than according to rule 6 of the Central Civil Service 
(Temporary Service) Rule , 1949. 
In the foregoing cases termination of service will ipso facto amount to 
dismissal' or removal irrespective of any penal intention or additional penal 
consequence being involved, because the employee in question had a right to 
hold the post till the age of superannuation or some other specified time, as 
the case may be, and the deprivation of such right per se constitute a penalty. 
But even in the above cases. Article 311(2) will not be attracted if (a) 
Government has a right to discharge or retire the Government Servant under 
the conditions of his service or terms of a contract, and (b) such discharge or 
161. Durga Das Basu," Shorter Constitution of India",956 (12th Edition, 1996, 
Prentice-Hall of India (P) Ltd., New Delhi). 
162. Supra note 160 at 610,612. 
163. Parshottam Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36. 
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retirement does not involve any penal consequence by vs^ ay of loss of salary, 
allowance, pension or other benefits already acquired by his past service'*^. In 
any case, the motive behind the order is immaterial'". 
It has been also held that where the ground statedly mentioned for the 
termination of the service in such which is capable of being explained by the 
employee, opportunity should be given to him to do so under clause(2)'". The 
grounds of misconduct, physical or mental incapacity, neglect of his duty, 
absenting without leave and reasonable cause, and over-staying an expiry of 
leave, have all been held to be such cases. 
(d) Position of Temporary Employee: 
In regard to discharge of temporary employee, in some earlier cases it 
was settled that where a temporary Government employee is simply discharged 
in terms of his employment, without casting any stigma in order of discharge, 
the order could not be said penal, so as to attract Article 311 (2). But the 
recent view is different. In JamaU Singh Vs. State of Punjab'*^ the court held 
that the express terms of the order of discharge are not conclusive on this 
point. Where the petitioner for some misconduct, the court would go behind 
the terms of the order of discharge and examine all the attendant circumstances, 
in order to find out whether the form of the order was only a camouflage for 
an order of dismissal for misconduct, which could not be made without 
complying with Article 311(2). 
164. Balakotiah Vs. Union of India A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 232 
165 Ibid. 
166. Shyamlal Vs. State of U.P. 1955 S.C.R. 26 at 41. See also Union of India Vs. 
Jeevan Ram. AIR. 1958 S.C 905; Purushotham lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India, 
A.I R. 1958 S.C 36; Mafat Lal Vs. Divisional Controller.(1966) 3 SCR. 40; 
Union Territory Vs. Gopal, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 60. 
167. AIR. 1986 S.C. 1626, 1627. 
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In State of U.P. Vs. Kaushal'**, a three-Judge Bench has summed up the 
two propositions and thus observed that-
(a) If on the perusal of the character roll entries or on the basis of 
preliminary enquiry on allegations made against an employee, the 
competent authority is satisfied that the employee is not suitable for 
the service where upon the services of the temporary employee are 
terminated, no exception can be taken to such an order of termination. 
A temporary Government servant has not right to hold the post; his 
services are liable to be terminated by giving him one month's notice without 
assigning any reason either under the terms the contract providing for such 
termination or under the relevant statutory rules regarding the terms and 
conditions temporary Government servants. 
(b) If the competent authority decides to take punitive action it may do 
so (only) by holding a formal inquiry by fi-aming charges and giving 
an opportunity to the government servant in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 
(e)Adhoc appointment : 
An adhoc arrangement is an appointment made for a particular end or 
purpose at hand without resorting to the rules or procedure for making 
regular' appointments. 
Thus, where there is a leave or other temporary vacancy, it is open to 
the appointing authority to make an adhoc appointment for the particular 
purpose of filling it, so long as that appointment is otherwise, unexceptional. 
Such adhoc appointments are often made where there are no service rules to 
guide and control the discretion of the appointing authority. It may also be that 
168. (1991) s e c . 691 at 697-98. 
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the service rules may themselves provide for the making of adhoc 
appointments"'^ 
An adhoc appointee oi promotee has no right to the post*^° because by 
its very nature it is a stop-gap arrangement until a regular appointment or 
promotion is made and therefore, in that sense the incumbent holds a very 
precarious tenure and would, therefore, be liable to be discharged or reverted 
to make room for a regular appointee or promotee, pending which the adhoc 
arrangement was resorted to. 
The discharge or reversal of an adhoc appointment even after he has 
continued for any length of time would not amount to dismissal or reduction 
in rank so as to attract Article 311(2), unless it is shown that it was intended 
to be a measure of punishment or the order cast any stigma on him or was 
otherwise mala&de, or it inflicts upon the delinquent civil consequences of a 
penal nature'^'. 
The burden of proof is on the employee to show that the termination 
is penal, in the sense explained above, and the clause(2) is attracted. 
Dismissal or removal: The distinction between dismissal and removal lies in 
the consequences of the respective orders. Thus, while a person 'dismissed' is 
ineligible for re-employment imderthe Government, no such disqualification 
attaches to a person removed'. This difference is based upon Departmental 
Rule, but form the Constitutional stand point, the following elements are 
common to both :-
169. Virendra Vs. State of U.P. (1995) I S.C.R 415 at 436. 
170. Supra note 168 
171. Ibid. See also Vasudeva Vs. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2292 at 2293,94; 
Babu Lai Vs. State of Haryana (1991)2 S.C.C. 335 at 336. 
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(1) Removal or dismissal form service stand on the same footing and both 
bring about a termination of service, though every termination of 
service does not amount to removal or dismissal. 
(2) Both are penalties awarded on the ground that the conduct of the 
Government servant is blameworthy or deficient in some respect. 
(3) Both entail penal consequences, such as the forfeiture of the right to 
salary, allowances or pension already acquired, 
(4) It follows that Article 311 (2) would be attracted whether the order of 
termination is one of dismissal or removal (or amounts to reduction 
in rank)'". 
The form of or the term used in the order is not conclusive. The 
substance of the order should be looked into each case if m substance the order 
deprives him of his existing right to the post or visit him with evil consequences 
like forfeiture of benefits which he had already covered clause(2) would be 
attracted ' ' \ 
Further, clause(2) would be attracted only if the termination is against 
the will or willingness of the Government servant to continue to serve. If he 
voluntarily asks for permission to retire or quit the service, the clause is not 
attracted '^ •*. 
172 Durga D As Basu," Shorter Constitution of India" 960 ( Prentice-Hall of India (P) 
Ltd. New Delhi, 12th edition, 1996). 
173. PursuhottamLalDhingra Vs. Union of India AIR. 1958 S.C, 30. See also State 
of Orissa Vs. Ram Narayan AIR. 1961 S.C. 177 at 180 JeevanLal Vs. Union of 
India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 905 at 908. 
174.Jai Shankar Vs. State (1966)1. SCR. 825 at 829. See also Raj Kumar Vs. Union 
oflndia.A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 180; Jai Ram Vs. Union of India, AIR. 1954 S.C. 584. 
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Stigma : It is now settled that ' stigma' in an order of discharge of a temporary 
compulsory retirement or reversion from an officiating post. Constitute a 
penal consequence, so as to attract Article 311(2). By stigma is meant an 
aspiration or reflection on the conduct or efficiency or the like of the 
Government employee. It would affect his future prospects a penal or evil 
consequnce, and consequently clause (2) Article 311 applies. 
There is a consensus of opinion that a stigma will require compliance 
with Article 311(2) only if it is expressly attached to the order of termination 
of service or reduction itself'". 
But where the order is itself contains no express word throwing any 
stigma on the Government servant, the question arises as to whether the court 
can delve into the connection files to discover whether some kind of stigma 
can be inferred therefrom. According to one view, it can not be do so"*. 
The other view is that it can be so done. The earlier notings or opinions 
expressed must be considered to see whether the accusation amounting to 
stigma was a mere motive or was the foundation for the final order. If it was 
the former, clause(2) would not be attracted. If it was the latter, it would be 
attracted'^l 
A stigma has been inferred from the follwing circumstances, so as to 
attract Article 311(2)"^ 
(i) Whfcre an order of reversion of a member of an All India Service from 
the Union to a lower post in a State was preceded by correspondence 
175. Saksena Vs. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1264 at 1266. 
176. State of U.P. Vs. Madan Mohan, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1260. 
177. State of Punjab Vs. Sukhraj, AIR. 1968 S.C. 1089 at 1094; Debesh Chandra Vs. 
Union of India. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 77 at 83. 
178. Durga Das Basu," Shorter Consititution of India"962 (12th Edition, 1996. 
Prentice-Hall of India (P) Ltd, New Delhi). 
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which stated that the petitioner did not come to the standard and gave 
him an option to accept a lower post under the Union. 
(ii) where an order of compulsory retirement is made with the remark that 
the officer has outlived his utility; 
(iii) where an order of discharge of a temporary employee is based on the 
finding of misconduct of the employee after an inquiry [which did not 
comply with the requirements of Article 311(2)]; 
(iv) an imputation that the employee has lost confidence in the employee. 
On the other hand, there is no stigma " ' : 
(i) where subsequent to the order of discharge and, in reply to his 
representations, the employee has been told that he could not be re-
employed because he was an ex-convict; 
(ii) where the order of discharge or reversion is preceded by an informal 
inquiry as to whether the Government servant is fit to be retained in 
the service or post to which he had acquired no legal right. 
(iii) where an order of compulsory retirement, according to rules, is 
preceded by an adverse entry in confidential report; 
(iv) where, there being no express words of stigma in an order compulsory 
retirement, the order is made under a rule which prescribes lack of 
integrity as one of the factors for consideration while making an order 
under the rule. 
(v) where the letter which contained the proposal for con^ulsory retirement 
contained a stigma but the order itself did not contain any stigma; 
179. Ibid. PP. 962-963. 
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(vi) where the order of reversion from an officiating oppointment stated 
that the petitioner was found unsuitable for the higher post, similarly 
in the case of a probationer, discharge on the ground of unsatisfactory 
work and conduct would not per se constitute stigma. 
Abolition of Post : when a post is temporary, the abolition of such post arises 
no problem because appointment to a temporary post confers no right upon 
the employee to hold that post"". In such cases Article 311(2) is not plainly 
attracted when such employee is simply 'discharged' on the abolition of post. 
But, if it is a permanent post, clause(2) would be attracted, because, on 
appo'mtment to such post, the employee acquires a legal right to hold until any 
of certain contingencies take place"'. 
It is now settled from the judgements of K. Rajendran Vs. State of 
T.N.'"; Gurdeep Vs. Union of India"^ M.L. Kamra Vs. N.I.A;'«^Dhanoa Vs. 
Union of India"'; Ramanatha Vs. State of Kerala"*; Shankaranarayana Vs. 
State of Mysore"^ that even in the case of a permanent post Article 311(2) 
was not attracted, simply because abolition of a post for administrative 
exigencies could not be said to be a 'punishment' for some misconduct, and 
also because the creation and abolition of a post is the exclusive concern of 
the executive. The court thus upheld the abolition of the post of Election 
Commissioners v^athin 3 months of their creation. The case, however, becomes 
180. Purushotham Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36. 
181. Moti Ram N.E. F Rly. A I R . 1964 S.C. 600at 608 
182. A I R . 1982 S.C. 1107. 
183. A I R . 1982 S.C. 1176. 
184. (1992)2 S.C.C. 36 at 40,42. 
185. A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1745. 
186. A I R . 1973 S.C. 2641. 
187. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1571 at 1575-76. 
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different where the abolition of a post is mala fide and been resorted to as a 
mask for penal action in order to avoid Article 311(2). 
Even though Government has the right to abolish a post, by executive 
order or by legislation, such action is subject to judicial review, on grounds 
of mala fides, or unconstitutionality. 
But the question whether such person who loses his job as a result of 
abolition of post should be rehabilitated by giving an alternative employment 
is a matter of policy on which the court has no voice. 
Compulsory retirement: A compulsory retirement (or premature retirments), 
without any additional loss, does not attract Article 311(2), even though 
misconduct or inefiBciency weighs with the Government in ordering compulsory 
retirement**'. 
But the case becomes otherwise if some aspersion or stigma is expressly 
attached to the order itself, e.g. that the officer has outlived his utility''"; or 
the order of compulsory retirement is made after finding the delinquent guilty 
of the charges in a departmental proceeding. 
In Dalip Singh's case"', it was held that the retirement even before the 
age of superannuation, if it is ordered in pursuance of a policy retrenchment 
or other administrative reason and on payment of a proportionate pension, 
does not amount to 'removal' as there is not element of penalty involved 
except where he has a statutory right to continue upon a particular age. But 
188. Supra note 185 
189. Dalip Singh Vs. State of Punjab. A.I.R. 1960 B.C. 1305 at 1308. Gian Singh Vs. 
Pand H. High Court, A I.R. 1980. S.C. 1894 at 1896; Tej Pal Vs. State of MP. 
(1986)3 sec. 604 at 610,611 . 
190. Jagdish Vs. Union of India, AIR. 1964 S.C. 449; State of Bombay Vs. Nurul 
Latif. AIR. 1966. S.C. 269. 
191. Dalip Singh Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1305 at 1308. 
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the observation in Dalip Singh's case, must now be read subject to the 
observations in Moti Ram's case '" that if a rule provides for compulsory 
retirement at any time, without providing for a minimum period of service 
after which only the compulsory retirement may be ordered, that rule itself 
must be held to be void for contravention of Article 311 (2) because such 
compulsory retirement, in the case of a permanent government servant, 
amounts to a removal'. 
An order of compulsory retirement may be challenged on the following 
possible grounds: 
(1) That it amounts to removal within the meaning of Article 311 (2) and 
is accordingly invalid for contravention of the requirements of that 
Article, e.g.; where it has been ordered as penalty in a disciplinary 
proceeding, or otherwise than under a rule providing for compulsory 
retirement on the age of superannuation. 
(2) that the rule under when the order has been made is unconstitutional 
and invalid'", e.g.; 
(i) where the rule does not fix any age of superannuation but enables 
the Government to retire a Government servant at any time, without 
payment of full pension. 
(ii) where the age of superannuation has not been reasonably fixed and 
is unreasonably short. 
192. Moti Ram Vs. N.E.F. Rly. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600 at 617. 
193. Chief Justice Vs. Dikshitalu, AIR. 1979 S.C. 193; Murari Vs. Government of 
India, AIR. 1985 S.C. 981; Dalip Singh Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 
1305. 
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(3) that the order is ultra vires the provision of the rule under which it 
purports to have been made, e.g., that the condition precedent for the 
application of the rule had not been satisfied. Thus, where the rule requires 
that compulsory retirement can be ordered only, in the public interest, it is 
open for the petitioner to show that there was, in fact, no such interest, 
involved. But in the absence of malafldes, the determination of the State 
Government in this behalf shall prevail and competent for the Government to 
order compulsory retirement on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency"^. 
Superannuation : The term superannuation means that age on the attainment 
of which a Government Servant ceases to have a right to continue in 
Government service. 
It is competent for Government to fix any age for superannuation and 
to raise or reduce it form time to time. There is no cause of action if an order 
raising the age is modified subsequently, thus affecting those who had 
benefited from the previous order. It can not be urged that enforcement of the 
reduced age amounts to removal"". 
There is no obligation to order retirement as soon as the age of 
retirement is reached. The power can be exercised any time thereafter, 
provided the requirements are fiilfiled. 
A permanent Government servant has a right to hold his post up to his 
age of sueprannuation but not beyond that. In State of Assam Vs. Premdhar"* 
it was held that if a Government servant is retained in service after he has 
194. Shivcharan Vs. State of Mysore. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 280 at 282; Ram Dial Vs. State 
of Punjab, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1518. 
195.BishunNarianVs. StateofU.P.,A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1567at 1569; Shastry Vs. State 
of A.P.. A.I.R. 1987. S.C. 1003. 
196. AIR. 1970 S.C. 1314. 
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attained the age of superannuatioa, such retention would not confer upon him 
any right to continue in service, so that termination of his service, on any 
ground thereafter, cannot constitute 'dismissal' or removal. The reason is that 
such retention which is at the discretion of the Government, does not confer 
any legal right to continue in ofiBce beyond the age of superannuation and 
Government has the discretion to withdraw such retention at any time. 
Government is free to enter into a formal contract for the employment 
of a person which is not in contravention of any Constitutional provision and 
if the employee is discharged in terms of that contract. Article 311(2) is not 
attracted'". 
The above principles have been applied not only where there is a formal 
contract of employment or the conditions of termination of service are laid 
down in the order of appointment under which the Government servant 
entered into service, but also where the conditions are embodies in the 
departmental rules relating to the service in question which must be taken to 
be a part of the contract of employment. Some of the rules, for instance, 
provide that the service can be terminated on serving a notice"*. 
When a contract for a fixed term expires, it is open to Government to 
re-employ the officer on a fresh basis, and if the re-employment is made on 
different terms, the officer holds on the terms of such re-employment, even 
though the new terms were inferior. If however, after the expiry of the 
contractual period, no fresh engagement is made and officer continues to hold 
on without any period being fixed, he holds on as a 'temporary' Government 
servant, and Article 311(2) would be applicable to the termination of such 
197. Satish Chandra Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 250. 
198. Durga Das Basu, "Shorter Constitution of India" 971 (12th Edition 1996.Prentice-
Hali of India (P) Ltd., New Delhi). 
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temporary employment"'. 
It is, however, not permissible to contract out of the provisions of the 
Constitution, including the provisions of Article 311(2)^ *"'. 
Reduction in rank: Reduction in rank means the degradation in rank or status 
of the officer, directed by way of penalty. It thus involves two elements -
(a) reduction in the physical sense, relating to his classification as a 
Government servant, 
(b) such degradation or demotion must be by way of penalty. 
To constitute reduction in rank within the meaning of clause(2), there 
should be reduction relating to his classification as a Government servant, and 
such reduction or demotion must be by way of penalty. Thus, where he is 
reduced to a lower post or rank or to a lower stage in the pay scale it would 
be reduction in rank^"'. 
But, mere losing some places in seniority while remaining in the same 
cadre, would not be reduction in rank^° .^ So also, transfer fi"om a post 
designated as Head of Department to a post not so designated, in the same 
cadre, would not be reduction in rank^". 
Where a Government servant has a right to a particular rank, the very 
reduction from that rank will be deemed to be by way of penalty^ ""* and Article 
199. Hartwell Vs. Government of U.P., A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 886. 
200. Moti Ram Vs. N.E F. Rly, A.I.R. 1964. S.C. 600; Satish Chandra Vs. Union of 
India (1953) SCR. 655. 
201. Champak Lai Vs Union of India , A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1854. 
202. Baroda Vs. Orissa High Court. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1899. 
203. Gopal Vs. Union of India. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1864 
204. Union oflndia Vs. Parshottam, A.I.R. 1956 Punjab, 207. affirmed by Parshottam 
Vs. Union of India.A.I.R. 1958. S.C. 36. 
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311 (2) will be attracted, without more. Thus, an oflBcer who holds permanent 
post in a substantive capacity, can not be transferred to a lower post, without 
complying with Article 311(2). 
(f) Suspension : The basic idea underlying the word suspension is that a 
person while holding an office and performing its functions or holding a 
position or privilege, should be interrupted in doing so and debarred for the 
time being from further functioning in the office or holding the position or 
privilege. 
Suspension may be — 
(a) Pending departmental inquiry. 
(b) Pending criminal investigation or trial 
(c) As a substantive penalty. 
(a) Suspension of a Government servant pending departmental inquiry into 
allegations against his conduct is resorted to for facilitating inquiry. 
Suspension pending inquiry is something temporary and does not involve 
punishment^ *". It means a temporary deprivation of the officer's functions 
or the right to discharge his duties but does not amount to any lowering 
down or reduction of his rank or status^"*. Nor does he cease to be 
member of the Government service. The real effect is that though he 
continues to be a government servant, he is not permitted to work and 
is paid only a subsistence allowance', which is less than the salary and 
allowances to which he would have been entitled but for the suspension^". 
It fallows that the requirements of Article 311(2) need not be complied 
205. Badri Prasad Vs. Dt. Board, A.I.R. 1952 All. 681 at 683. 
206 Dandapani Vs. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 Orissa 329. 
207, Khem chand Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 687 at 690; State of M.P. Vs. 
State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1466 at 1473. 
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with before making an order of suspension of this nature. Suspension can 
be made if the authority concerned on getting a complaint, considers that 
the alleged charge does not appear to be groundless, that it requires 
enquiry and that it is necessary to suspend the Government servant 
pending inquiry^"*. 
(b) The Rules of some Department also authorise suspension pending 
criminal proceeding against a Government servant, as soon as an 
accusation or investigation connected with his position as Government 
servant is made or he is arrested. 
(c) Suspension may also be awarded as substantive punishment under Civil 
Service Regulations. It would then amount to removal within the 
meaning of Article 311, so that all the requirments of that Article must 
be complied with^ ***. 
(g) Natural Justice : The expression 'reasonable opportunity' in Article 
311(2) has been interpreted to mean natural justice. In Satyavir Vs. Union of 
India '^" the Supreme Court observed: 
"Clasue 2 of article 311 gives a Constitutional mandate to the 
principles of natural justice and the audi alteram partem rule by 
providing that a civil servant shall not be dismissed or removed from 
service or reduced in rank until after an inquiry in which he has been 
informed of the charges against him and has been given a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. 
208. Ghause Vs. State of Andhra, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 246 at 249 
209. Kapur Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 787. 
210. A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 555. 
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The nature of this inquiry has been elaborately set out by this court 
in Khemchand Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 300 and evenafter 
the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976, the inquiry 
required by clause (2) of article 311 would the same except that it 
would not be necessary — be imposed upon him. 
As held in — the penalty proposed to be imposed upon an employee. 
If an inquiry held against a civil servant under article 311(2) is unfair 
or biased or has been conducted in such a manner as not to give him 
a fair or reasonable opportunity to defend himself, the principles of 
natural justice would be violated; but in such a case the order or 
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank would be bad as contravening 
the express provisions of article 311(2) and there is no scope for 
having recourse to article 14 for the purpose of unvalidating it^"." 
Prior to 1976, apportunity to be heard or to make representation had 
to be offered to the delinquent at two stages — 
(i) At the inquiry into the charges; and 
(ii) at the conclusion of the charges, before imposing punishment on 
the basis of the findings at the inquiry. 
After the amendment of the Article 311in 1976 by the (Forty second 
Amendment) Act, 1976 of the Constitution, the procedural safeguards are— 
(i) that the person concerned should be informed of the charges against him 
and he should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in 
respect of those charges; and 
211. Id. at 560. 
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(ii) that the penalty imposed after the inquiry should be one based on the 
evidence adduced during the inquiry, and it is not necessary to give the 
person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty imposed. 
Accordingly, in case, governed by Article 311 an opportunity to defend 
has to be given to the civil servant at stage of inquiry of charges against him, 
and this is in accord with the rule of natural justice that no man should be 
condemned without hearing. 
In Union of India Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan^'^ the Supreme Court 
observed that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with 
recommendations, if any, in the matter of propose punishment to be inflicted 
would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, 
therefore, be entitled to the suply of a copy thereof. The Forty Second 
Amendment has not brought about any change in this position. 
Inquiry into charges must be in conformity with the requirements of 
natural justice, is ensured by the amended clause by using the words, 
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges. In Jagdish Vs. 
State of M.P.^", the court said that the charges must be specific, with a 
statement of allegations on which they are based with such particulars and 
details as are necessary to give a reasonable opportunity of defence . The 
charges must be intimated to the delinquent and the delinquent must be given 
reasonable time and opportunity of meeting the allegations contained in the 
charge sheet. Hence, a Government servant cannot be dismissed on the basis 
of an admission made by him in a proceeding directed against some other 
Government servant, without holding a firesh inquiry directed against himself*. 
212. (1991) I L.L.J. (S.C.) 29 at 34. 
213. A.I.R. 1961. S.C. 1070 at 1074; Surath Vs. State of W.B. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 752; 
State of U.P. Vs. Sharif, AIR. 1982 S.C. 937. 
214. State of Punjab Vs. Amar Singh, A.I.R. 1966. S.C. 1313. 
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The right of Government servant under clause (2), is to have a 
reasonable apportunity of being heard in respect of the charges. Once this 
apportunity is given, the obligation of the Government is discharged. If the 
delinquent admits his guilt, or does not avail of the opportunity, he cannot 
further complain that an elaborate inquiry has not been held. 
The prosecution witnesses must be examine in the presence of 
delinquent, andhe must be given a reasonable apportunity of cross-examining 
the witnesses who are examined for the prosecution for the departmental 
inquiry^". In State of Bombay Vs. Nurul Latif,^'*, the court observed that it 
is true that the delinquent has the right to cross-examine a prosecution 
witness, but the inquiry officer has the right to stop irrelevant cross-
examination, reccording his reason. In State of M.P. Vs. Chintaman^", it was 
held the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witness must be effective. 
Hence, if documents which are relevant for the purpose of cross-examination 
are withheld, there will be failure of natural justice. 
In regard to interrogation of the delinquent the general rule is that the 
delinquent should not be interrogated before some witness or witnesses have 
been examined in support of the charge. He must be given a fair chance to hear 
the evidence in suport of the charges and to put such relevant questions by way 
of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut 
the evidence led against him •^*. It would be a contravention of natural justice 
where the delinquent is asked to answer a questionnaire which includes 
questions which are perverse, or the examination of delinquent savours of an 
inquisition^". 
215. Khem Chand Vs. Union of Indian. AIR. 1966 S.C. 1313. 
216. (1965) 3S.C.R. 135. 
217. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1623. 
218. Meenglass Tea Estate Vs. workmen, A.I.R. 1963. S.C. 1719 at 1720. 
219. Associated Cement Co. Vs. Workman. (1964)3 SCR. 652 at 661. 
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Natural justice is denied where the delinquent is not allowed to call, or 
examine material defence witnesses or to examine himself. But the Inquiry 
Officer may refuse to call a witness whose evidence is irrelevant to the 
charges"**. 
In the following cases it was held that there is no compliance with the 
requirement of natural justice --
(1) where the inquiry is not directed against the alleged misconduct of the 
Government servant in question but in a general investigation to find 
out who is responsible for an accident or the like, without any charge 
against any p articular person, and the penalty is proposed on the basis 
of such investigation"'. 
(2) on the same principle, the proceedings are vitiated if the punishing or 
appellate authority makes a confusion and finds the petitioner guilty 
of the violation of a departmental Rule for which he was never 
charged"^. 
(3) No question of punishment arises until the charge is established and 
until then the competent authority must keep his mind open. Where 
the material on record, disclose that the disciplinary authority was ab 
initio determined to get the Government servant punished, the 
proceeding will be quashed"'. 
(4) If a public servant is held guilty of serveal charges and it is subsequently 
found that in respect of some of those charges the rules of natural 
220. State of Punjab Vs. Chutiilal, (1970)1 S.C.C. 479 at 486. 
221. Amalendu Vs. D.T.S., A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 992 
222. Lakshmi Sugar Mills Vs. Ram Sarup, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 916. 
223. Khem Chand Vs. Union of India, AIR. 1958 S.C. 300; R.B. Deb Vs. Collector 
of Central Excise (1971)2 S.C.C. 102. 
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justice were not complied with or the findings were based on no 
evidence, but there are other charges duly arrived at, the punishment 
would not be quashed by the Court "'*. 
Since the inquiry stage under Article 311(2) is a quasi-judicial 
proceeding, it fallows that the Inquiry Officer must write a report, giving his 
findings on the charges, with reasons. In Union of India Vs. Mohd. Ramzan"' 
the Supreme Court observed : 
"— Wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has 
furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the 
inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of charges with 
proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is 
entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a 
representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the 
report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make 
the final order liable of challenge hereafter""*. 
There had been some difference of opinion on the question of the 
consequences of non supply of the Inquiry Officer's report to the dilinquent 
employee. This controversy now settled by the Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar,"^ as follows: 
(1) An employee is entitled to a copy of the inquiry report even if the 
statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent 
on the subject. 
224. State of Orissa Vs. Bidyabushan (1963) Supp.l SCR. 648; Railway Board Vs. 
Niranjan (1969)11 L.L.J. 743 at 746. 
225. (1991)1 L.L.J. S.C. 29. 
226. Id. at 35. 
227. A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1074 at 1091-97. 
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(2) whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before 
a punishment is awarded and when the enquiry ofiBcer is not the 
disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to 
receive the enquiry officer's report whatever be the nature of 
punishment. 
(3) Failure to ask for the report can not be construed as waiver of the right. 
Report is to be furnished whether the employee asks for it or not. 
(4) The law laid down in Union of India Vs. Ramzan,^^* is applicable to 
all employees in all establishment- Government, public or private. 
(5) whether prejudice has been caused on account of denial of report has 
to be considered on the facts of a case. The relief to be granted to the 
employee would depend on the actual consequence of denial of the 
report. 
(6) The ratio of Ramzan's case is prospective and is to be applied only to 
those orders of punishment which are passed by the disciplinary 
authority after Nov. 20, 1990. 
(7) Orders of punishment passed before Nov. 20,1990 where inquiry 
report was not furnished should not be distrubed and the proceedings 
cannot be reopened on the account. 
Thus in this case the Supreme Court has held that when the Inquiry 
Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right 
to receive the copy of the Inquiry Officer's report so that he could effectively 
defend himself before the disciplinary authority. A denial of the Inquiry 
Officer's report before discilinary authority takes its decision on the charges, 
is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence 
and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. 
228. (1991)IS.C.C. 588. 
422 
If any document, not being a secret document, which is necessary to 
enable the person to put forwards his defence or to cross-examination the 
prosecution witness, is not supplied to person, there will be denial of natural 
justice"'. 
But non supply of document relating to one of serveral charges will not 
vitiate the proceedings if it does not prejudice the disposal of the rest of the 
charges^^". There is no right to a disclosure of confedential or secret documents, 
such as those of the Anti-corruption Department; it is sufficient compliance 
with the principles of natural justice if the substance of such reports is 
communicated to delinquent"'. But no disclosure of such report would be 
necessary if the report was made by the Government only to consider whether 
disciplinary proceedings should be initiated against the delinquent. Withholding 
of a document or report would not vitiate the proceeding if the finding against 
the delinquent does not rest upon it, or the delinquent never asked for it; there 
are charges which may sustain the punishment other than the charges in 
respect of which the documents have been withheld. 
The natural justice is violated where one man bears and decides. In 
Amulya Vs. Bakshi^", It was decided by the Calcutta High Court that a 
disciplinary proceeding would be vitiated if the inquiry ofiBcer acts upon 
evidence taken by some other person or if any of the members of the Inquiry 
Committee did not hear the evidence or part of it, owing to transfer or non-
availability of the member who heard the evidence. 
229 Sate of MP Vs Chmtaman Rao. A I.R 1961, S C 1623 at 1628 
230 D I G of Police Vs Amalanathan, A.I.R. 1966 Mad 203 at 216. 
231. Punit Vs State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 357 at 360 See also State of Assam Vs. 
Mahendra, A.I R. 1970 S C. 12i5 at 1261 
232. AIR. 1958 Cal. 470 
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The above findings were overruled by the Supreme Court in Gemal 
Manager Vs. Jawala Prasad"^ In this case the court held that the disciplinary 
proceedings held under rr. 1709-1715 of the Railway Establishment Code are 
not vitiated if no de novo hearing takes place after the transfer or absence of 
some member of the Inquiry Committee and the report of the inquiry is given 
by the Committee including some member or members who had heard the 
witness. 
One of the principles of natural justice is that no one should be a judge 
in his own cause. Hence, where the judge or tribunal has an interest in the 
cause or is biased against a party, the latter cannot be said to have been given 
a reasonable opportunity of defending himslef by holding the trial or inquiry 
by such a tribunal"". 
Applying the above principle, it has been held there is a contravention 
of Article 311(2)--
(i) where either the inquiry officer or a member of the inquiry committee 
or the authority making the ultimate order gives evidence in the 
proceeding to establish the guilt of the person charged; or the inquiry 
is held by a person against whom the person charged has made 
allegations and who is, accordingly, interested in taking action 
against the latter, at any cost. 
(ii) whre there is an allegation against a superior officer, he should not 
hold the inquiry himself nor direct it to be held by an officer who is 
subordinate to him. 
233. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1095. 
234. Durga Das Basu," Shorter Constitution of India," 999 (12th Edition, Prentice-
Hall of India (P) Ltd., New Delhi). 
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(iii) Where the inquiry is held by a person who has already pre-judged the 
person charged. 
(iv) where the Superior Officer, in ordering the inquiry, gives his adverse 
opinion against the accused, and the Inquiring Officer is influenced by 
such remarks of his superior, or the suprior officer directly influences 
the Inquiry Officer. 
Though the right to engage a lawyer is, as a rule, denied in a 
disciplinary proceeding, some of the departmental rules allow the delinquent 
to be assisted, at the departmental hearing, by a co-employee of his choice and 
in such cases, unless the Rules so provided expressly. Government can not 
refuse permission to delinquent's nominee to act as defence helper or require 
the delinquent to nominate more than one person out of which the Government 
can make a selection."'. 
There is no right to be represented by a lawyer and the same does not 
violate principle of natural justice. However, where the case involves technical 
questions or a complicated question of law, or where the department is 
represented by a lawyer, natural justice would require that the delinquent 
should be permitted to be represented by a lawyer, if he asks for such 
representation"*. 
No general principle regarding representation by a lawyer valid in all 
cases can be enunciated. A decision has to be reached on a case to case basis 
on the situation particularities and the special requirement of justice of the 
case. Where the presiding officer is stated to be a man of law, justice would 
235. Id. at 999-1000. 
236. Register of Co-operative Societies Vs. Dharamchand, A.I.R, 1961 S.C. 1743. 
See. also Champak Lai Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1854. 
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require that the other party who has no legal background is represented by a 
lawyer"'. 
The rules of evidenc are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, 
so that an inquiry officer at a departmental proceeding may obtain materials 
from any sources, provided only any material information or material so 
obtained must be disclosed to the delinquent Government servant if it is 
intended to be relied upon, so that the latter may have an opportunity of 
meeting the inferences arising from such material. 
It follows that the inquiry will be vitiated for violation of the rules of 
natural justice, if the materials collected at the back of the delinquent are 
either explicitly relied upon by the Inquiry Officer, or he is influenced by it in 
coming to his findings. In such a case, the fact that his finding is confirmed by 
an appellate authority can not validate the proceedings. The position becomes 
worse where the Inquiry officer is the Disciplinary Authority himself."* 
In State of U.P. Vs. Harish Chandra"' the Court held that service 
record can not be taken into consideration unless the person is given opportunity 
to explain them. 
The protection of Article 311(2) for giving, reasonable opportunity is 
not available in the follwing circumstances: 
(1) Proviso 2(a). Where a person is dismissed or reduced in rank on the 
ground of misconduct which has led to conviction or criminal charges. 
This exception make an officer who was convicted on a criminal charge, 
liable to dismissal without any further proceeding under Article 311(2). 
237. Aggarwal Vs. Haryana, S.D.C; A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1221. 
238. State of Assam. Vs. Mahendra, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1255 at 1259-60. 
239. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1020. 
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It includes conviction under any law which provides for punishment for 
a criminal offence, whether by fine or imprisonment. No distinction is 
made between crimes involving moral turpitude and other crimes or 
statutory offences. Thus conviction for drunkenness would attract this 
proviso^". 
(2) Proviso 2(b). Where it is impracticable to give the civil servant an 
opportunity to defend himself but the authority taking action against him 
shall record the reasons for such action. In order to apply this protection 
to the order of dismissal, etc., the following conditions must be satisfied-
(i) This Proviso is attracted when the authority is satisfied from the 
material placed before him that it is not reasonablypracticabletohold 
a departmental enquiry. It is incumbent on those who support the order 
to show that the satisfiction is based on certain objective facts and is 
not the outcome of whim or caprice. 
(ii) The satisfaction must be that of the authority who is empowered to 
dismiss, remove or reduce the officer in rank and he must apply his 
mind to it. Where he simply carries out the orders of some superior 
authority and dismisses a subordinate outright, the validity of the order 
cannot be sustained on the ground that the power under the present 
Proviso was exerised. 
(iii) The authority empowered to dismiss, etc., must record his reasons 
in writing for denying the opportunity under clause(2) of Article 311, 
before making the order dismissal etc. After an order in contravention 
of Article 311(2) is made and challenged, it cannot be contended that 
240. Sunil Vs. State of West Bengal. A.I.R. 1970 Cal. 384.; In re, A.I.R. 1966. A.P. 
72; Durga Singh Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1957 Punj. 97. 
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the order is valid by reason of this Proviso. 
(iv) The reasons recorded must show that it was not reasonably 
practicable to hold a disciplinary inquiry, and must not be vague or 
irrelevant. 
(v) The power must be exercised bonafide, having regard to relevant 
considerations. 
(3) Proviso 2 (c) : Where in the interest of the security of State, it is not 
expedient to give such an opportunity to the civil servant. In such cases 
the President or Governor might exempt the holding of an inquiry as 
required by Article 311(2). The satisfaction referred to in this clause 
of the Proviso is not circumscribed by any conditions. 
In Bakshi Vs. Union of India"' and Kapur Singh Vs. Union of 
India"^the court held that the satisfaction however, need not be the personal 
satisfaction of the President or the Government It is to be exercised in 
compliance with Article 166,"^ because the power to take disciplinary action 
against a Government servant is the 'executive power' of the Union or State, 
as the case may be. 
241 A I R 1987 S C 2106 
242 A I R 1960 S C 493 
243 Article 166 Provides (1) All executive actions of the Government of a State shal 
be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor 
(2) Orders and other instruments made and shall not be called in question on the 
ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor 
(3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business 
of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said 
business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by 
or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion 
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In a judgement of far reaching importance in Union of India Vs. 
Tulsiram PateP"* ,^ the Supreme Court has held that the dismissal, removal, 
reduction in rank of a Government servant under the second Proviso of Article 
311(2) without holding inquiry is in public interest and therefore, not violative 
of Articles 311(2) and 14 of the Constitution. The second Proviso to Article 
311 (2) expressly provides that the audi alteram partem rule of the natural 
justice shall not apply in the circumstances mentioned in the three clauses of 
the Proviso. This phrase leaves no scope for any kind of opportunity to be 
given to a Government servant. The object under-lying the second Proviso is 
public policy, public interest and public good. When the principles of the 
natural justice has been expressly excluded by the second Proviso it can not 
be imported by resorting to Article 14. 
In Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab"', the Court held that the 
respondents have failed to disclose to the court the material in support of the 
subjective satisfaction. The decision to dispense with the departmental inquiry 
can not be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When 
satisfaction is questioned in a court of law, it is the duty of the respondent to 
show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and not the 
autcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the absence of any 
independent material to justify the dispensing with the inquiry envisaged by 
Article 311 (2) the order of dismissal can not be sustained. Accordingly, the 
appellant was directed to be reinstated in service forthwith alongwith all 
monetary benefits as to say, allowances etc., available to him from the date of 
his dismissal. 
244. (1985)3 S.C.C. 398. See also Satyvir Singh Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986. S.C. 
555. 
245.(1991)1. S.C.C. 362. 
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Bothclauses(l)and(2)of Article311 are mandatary. They Constitute 
express provisions of the Constitution which qualify clause (1) of Article 310. 
Hence dismissal by an authority lower than the oppointing authority, and 
dismissal without giving reasonable opportunity of showing cause, are equally 
void and inoperative, and therefore, actionable. 
(3) Remedies available 
The remedies may be divided into two parts namely-(l) Remedies 
before the passing of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and (2) Remedies 
after the passing of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 
The position before the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was that in 
a case of a wrongful termination of service in contravention of the Constitutional 
requirements in clause (1) or (2) of Article 311, the aggrieved Government 
servant was entitled to relief in a court of law like any other person, under the 
ordinary law in as much as the doctrine o f service pleasure' has been subjected 
to Constitutional limitations in India. Such relief must be regulated by the 
Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, when a Government servant has been 
dismissed in contravention of either clause (1) or clause (2) of Article 311, or 
of a mandatary statutory rule, or of the principles of natural justice, he would 
be entitled to bring a suit against the Government for the relief 
Prior to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, an aggrieved 
Government servant could obtain relief from the High Court, in a proceeding 
under Article 226 on grounds appropriate to the writs available under that 
Article. For example-certiorari, prohibition. Mandamus, and Quo warranto. 
After coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, all 
judicial remedies save those of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and 136 
have been abolished and the pending proceedings before other courts, e.g., 
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suits before the Civil Court or proceedings before the High Court under 
Article 226 stand transferred before the regional Administrative Tribunals. 
In exercise of its powers under Article 323-A Parliament has enacted 
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; establishing Administrative Tribimals 
to decide service disputes of Central Government emloyees. The Administrative 
Tribunals with main Bench at Delhi and additional Benches of different places 
were established and started functioning with effect from November 1, 1985. 
The Central Tribunal will be headed by a chairman and Vice-Chairman for 
each of the Benches and two other members. All courts in the country except 
the Supreme Court under Article 136 and Article 32 will cease to have 
jurisdiction in regard to service matters of Government servant. 
The Act applies to all Central Government employees except-
(a) the members of naval, military, or air forces or any other armed 
forces of the union; 
(b) any oflBcer or servant of the Supreme Court or any High Court; 
(c)any person appointed to the secretariate staff of either House of the 
Parliament. 
In the case proceedings transferred to the Tribunal from Civil Court or 
a High Court, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exercise all the powers which 
the Civil Court could in a suit or the High Court in a writ proceeding could 
have respectively exercised, including the power to declare the 
unconstitutionality of a statute or a statutory rule. In a original petition the 
Tribunal may exercise any of the powers of a Civil Court, or a High Court 
under Article 226 in the same proceeding. 
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In Union of India Vs. Abbas"* the court observed tha the C.A.T. is 
subject to the same contraints and norms which the High Court observes while 
exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226. It is not an appellate authority 
siting in judgement over the order of transfer of an employee issued by the 
administrative authority. It cannot substitute its own judgement for that of the 
authority. The order of transfer can be questioned before a tribunal or court 
only where it is passed mala fide or in violation of the statutory provisions. 
Similarly, C.A.T. has no jurisdiction to direct the concerned authorities 
to pass orders to clear efficiency bars of employees. It can not assume the role 
of an employer."' 
On the other hand, a Tribunal not being a court, has larger powers to 
do justice to the party aggrieved. Thus a Tribunal is not barred by the 
provisions of the Evidence Act. In order to discover the truth, the Tribunal 
may resort to the inquisitional procedure, provided no principle of natural 
justice is violated. 
In coming to its decision, the Tribunal shall be guided solely by the 
principles of natural justice unfettered by any thing in the Civil Procedure 
Code and shall have the power to regulate its own procedure. 
Unless the Tribunal, having regard to the circumstances, of a particular 
case, choose to hear oral evidence, it shall ordinarily decide a case before it 
upon a perusal of documents and written representations and hearing oral 
arguments. 
A Tribunal can exercise powers of review, without being fettered by 
the provisons of order 47. rule 1 of the C.P.C., though ordinarily it would 
apply its principles. 
246. (1993)4 S.C.C. 357. 
247. Administrator Vs. Vora, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 2303. 
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In S.P. Sampat Kumar Vs. Union of India^*, the Constitutional validity 
of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 was challenged on the ground that 
impugned Act by excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 
226 and 227 in service matters had destroyed the judicial review which was 
an essential feature of the Constitution. 
A five Judges Constitution Bench of the court upheld the validity of the 
Act, except section 6( 1) (c). The court held that though the Act has excluded 
the judicial review exercised by the High Courts in service matters, but it has 
not excluded it wholly as the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 
32 and 136 has been kept intact. The judicial review which is an essential 
feature of the constitution can be taken away from the particular area only if 
an alternative effective institutional mechanism or authority is provided. 
However, section 6(1) (c) to the Act was held to be unconstitutional 
as it gave unfettered power of the Government to appoint the Chairman, Vice-
Chanirman and Administrative member of the tribunal. These appointments 
must be made by the Government only after Consultation with the Chief 
Justice of India and which must be meaningful and effective. 
In State of Orissa Vs. Bhagaban Sarangi^ "*', the Supreme Court has held 
that a Tribunal (Orissa State Administrative Tribunal) is bound by the decision 
of the High Court. 
Orders passed by the Tribunal can not be challenged before High Court 
under Article 226 or 227. 
248.(1987)1 S.C.C. 124. 
249.(1995)1 S.C.C. 399. 
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Appeal lies to the Supreme Court from orders of an Administrative 
Tribunal, by special leave under Article 136 on the grounds i.e., error of law, 
the order of Tribunal being ultra vires, the order of Tribunal being arbitrary 
or male fide. 
There are certain other cases decided under Administrative Tribunal 
Act. 
In Anand Kishore Vs. State of H.P. and others"" where two ex-
constable, namely, Shri Anand Kishore and Parshotam Lai, filed an application 
under section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 for quashing the 
orders dated September 8, 1987 passed by the Superintendent of Police, 
Shimla, whereby the applicant were discharged from service and also the 
appellate order dated Nov. 12,1987 passed by the Deputy Inspector General 
of Police and the order dated March 2,1988 passed by the Director General 
of Police, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla. 
In revision, the Director General of Police vide his order dated March 
2, 1988 found that the applicants had indulged in grave misconduct and had 
got mixed up with under trial of serious nature and later taken tea with the 
accused in restuarant. This act on part of the applicants amounts to have 
committed grave misconduct and these constables having less than three years 
service, the order passed under Punjab Police Rules 12.21 as applicable to 
Himachal Pradesh is legal and accordingly rejected the revision. 
In this case the Tribunal has held that the impugned order itself shows 
that the same has been passed by way of punishment when it emphasises that 
the applicants took tea with the accused at his desire which is a very serious 
lapse and dereliction of duty of grave nature and such an act on their part is 
250. (1994){3) S.L.J. (C.A.T.) 265 (Shimla). 
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unbecoming of good police officer and thereby they have proved inefficient 
and unfit for retaining in police service. But the order on the face of it attaches 
stigma on the applicant and as such they are entitled to show cause against the 
proposed action of discharge firom service which having not been done in the 
present case, the impungned order of discharge is violative of Article 311 (2) 
of the constitution of India and is liable to be quashed. 
In S.B. Ramesh Vs. Ministry of Finance, Government of India"* the 
applicant who joined service as Inspector of Income Tax on 18.3.1970 was 
promoted as Income Tax Officer on 24.3.1979. He was proceeded against, on 
the basis of a charge sheet dated 7.05.1987, alleging irregularties in the 
Income Tax assessment. However, the inquiry on that charge sheet has not 
progressed fi^om 10.5.1990. In the meanwhile, he was served with another 
charge sheet dated 25.3.1988. The article of charges ran as follows: 
"Shri S.B. Ramesh, Income Tax Officer, Group-B, Andhra Pradesh 
(now under suspension) has contracted a second marriage with Smt. 
K.R. Aruna, while his first wife, Smt. Anasuya is alive and the first 
marriage has not been dissolved. By this act, Shri S.B. Ramesh has 
violated Rule 21(2) of C C S . (conduct) Rules, 1964. In any case Shri 
S.B. Ramesh has been living with Smt. R.K. Aruna and has children by 
her. Thereby Shri S.B. Ramesh has exhibited a conduct unbecoming of 
a Government Servant and has accordingly violated Rule 3( 1) (iii) of the 
C C S . (conduct) Rules, 1964". 
It has been alleged in the application that the charge has been foisted 
on him, as a measure of revenge at the behest of directly recruited officers as 
the earlier charges could not be established. The applicant assailed the 
251. 1994 (3) S.L.J. (C.A.T.) 401 (Hyderabad) 
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impugned order mainly on the grounds that the enquiry has not been held in 
conformity with the principles of natural justice, as much as be has not been 
given adequate apportunity to defend himself and that the findings of the 
enquiry authority, which was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority that the 
applicant exhibited a conduct, unbecoming of a Government servant is 
absolutely perverse and based on no evidence or on evidence which can not 
be recieved on record, in accordence with law. 
The Tribunal observed: 
"We are convinced that the finding of the Disciplinary Authority that 
the applicant is guilty being based as no legal evidence is absolutely 
perverse and the impugned order is therefore liable to be set aside""^. 
In K.P. Agarwal Vs. Union of India^", a chargesheet under Rule 14 of 
the C.C. S. ( C C A ) Rules were issued to applicant in which the charge framed 
against him was that while working as Officer Assistant in the Office of S.D.O. 
Phones (Central) Jaipur, he had approached client and without any authroity 
had demanded an amount of Rs. 7,000/= as an illegal amount for installing a 
telephone at his shop and subsequently facilitated the wrongful shiiling 
telephone from the premises of another client after receiving Rs. 5000/= from 
him and thereby contravened provisions of rule 3 of CCS.(Conduct) Rules. 
On the applicant's denying the charge, an inquiry was held. The Inqtiiry Officer 
held the charge against the applicant as not proved. The Disciplinary Authority, 
Division Engineer Phones (J.P.), however, disagreed with the Inquiry Officer 
and holding the charge against the applicant as proved but taking a lenient 
view of the matter imposed upon the applicant the penalty of stoppage of next 
252. Id. at 409. 
253. 1995 (1) S.L.J. (C.A.T.) Jaipur 517. 
436 
increment for four years without cumulative effect. 
The applicant in his application under section 19 of the Administrative 
Tribunal Act, 1985, has prayed that the charge sheet be declared illegal and 
without jurisdiction and the penalty order may be quashed being illegal. 
The Tribunal observed: 
"No doubt, the Enquiry OfiBcer has held charge against the applicant 
as not established. However, the Disciplinary Authority had disagreed 
with the Enquiry Officer and has given detailed reasons for 
disagreement and for holding the charge against the applicant as 
proved. The reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority for 
disagreement with the Enquiry Officer are on the basis of evidence 
adduced during the enquiry. The findings of the Disciplinary Authroity 
are not in any way unrelated to the evidence led during the enquiry and 
therefore, these can not be said to be perverse. This Tribunal does not 
function as a Appellate Authority. Its function is that of judicial 
review under which it can examine whether the process of making a 
decision was correct and not the correctness of the decision itself-
~ Thus the charge has been held as proved against the applicant by 
the Disciplinary Authority on the basis of evidence with is relevant... 
The charge against the applicant was of accepting a sum of 
Rs.5000/= from a private party in an illegal manner which was held 
as proved. We do not understand how the Disciplinary Authority has 
taken a lenient view in the matter and has imposed upon the applicant 
a penalty which is merely a minor penalty. Any how, we do not see any 
reason to interfere with the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and 
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Appellate Authority""^ 
It is submitted that the elaborate provisions relating to services under 
the Union and the states indicate the great importance which the framers of 
our Constitution attached to the civil service. The success of the provisions 
made in Part XIV for the efficient working of a non-political Civil Service 
depends to a very large extent upon establishing a proper relationship between 
the Ministers and civil servants. Unless the Government is prepared to apply 
the carrective principles in the Minister-civil servant relationship effectively 
and with a determination to produce the desired results at different levels and 
within the sevral components of the Government, the agonising impact of the 
unfortunate malaise would be felt by the common man in the streets, in the 
villages, in the factories and in the far distant comers of this vast country. 
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel observed : 
"Have you read that history? (the history of safeguards for the Indian 
Civil Service). Or you do not care for recent history after you began 
to make history. If you do that, then I tell you we have a dark future. 
Learn to stand on your pledged word; and, also, as a man of 
experience I tell you do not quarrel with the instruments with which 
you want to work " ' . — Have morals no place in the new Parliament? 
— Today, my secretary can write a note apposed^© my views. I have 
given that freedom to all my secretaries. I have told them' If you do 
give your honest opinion for fear that it will displease your Minister, 
please then you had better go. I will bring another Secretary'. I wUl 
never be displeased over a frank expression of opinion. That is what 
254. Id. at 519. 
255. C.A.D. Vol. 10. P. 50. 
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the Britishers were doing with Britishers. We are now sharing the 
responsibility. You have agreed to share responsibility. Many of them 
with whom I have worked, I have no hesitation in saying that they are 
as patriotic, as loyal and as sincere as myself'^". 
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel spoke with the authority of great administrator, 
and with the experience of the Union Home Minister, who had first hand 
knowledge of the working of the Civil Service under the very trying 
circumstances which followed on the partition of India. 
With the independence of our country, the responsibilities of the 
services have become onerous. They may make or mark the efficiency of the 
machinery of administration, a machinery so vital for the peace and progress 
of the country. A country without an efficient civil service can not progress 
inspite of the earnestness of the people at the helm of afTairs in the country. 
Whatever, democratic institutions exist, experience has shown, that it is 
essential to protect the public service as far as possible from political or 
personal influence. 
In Roshan Lai Vs. Union of India"^, considering the status of 
Government Servant the Supreme Court has observed: 
"The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of 
rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement 
of the parties. The emolument of the Government servant and his 
terms of service are governed by statute or statutory rules which may 
be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent of the 
employee. It is true that Article 311 imposes Constitutional restrictions 
256. Ibid. 
257. A.I.R. 1967.S.C. 1889. 
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upon the power of removal granted to the President and the Governor 
under Article 310. But it obvious that the relationship between the 
Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service 
between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something 
entirely diffferent, something in the nature of status. It is much more 
than a purely contractual relationship votunlarily entered into between 
the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and in the 
enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language 
of jurisprudence status in a condition of membership of a group of 
which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not 
by agreement between the parties concerned".^'*. 
Under Articles 32 and 226, 227, the Courts enjoy a broad discretion in 
the matter of giving proper relief to any aggrieved person in case of infringement 
of Fundamental Rights and other legal rights. Within a few years of enactment 
of the Constitution this writ jurisdication become so popular that the High 
Courts were flooded with petitions which they were unable to cope with. 
Several expert committees consisting ofretired judges of the Supreme 
Court and of High Courts recommended that creation of tribunals for dealing 
with Certain classes of cases as an alternative to the High Courts. The 
Supreme Court in some of its judgements made the some suggestions. Acting 
on these suggestions. Parliament inserted Article 323-A and Article 323-B 
which provide for the establishment of Administrative Tribunals for resolving 
service disputes and other tribunals for variety of matter relating to industrial 
and labour disputes, tax, foreign exchange, elections, land reforms and the 
like. 
As the intention was to relieve the High Courts of the extra burden by 
258. Id. at 1894. 
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Transferring part of the jurisdiction to the tribunals, these Articles permitted 
exclusion of the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court in all 
matters dealt with by the tribunals. All cases which fell within the jurisdiction 
of the tribimals were transferred to them soon after the establishment of the 
tribunals. 
In a significant and for reaching judgement "^ the Supreme Court had 
come out with Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 section 28 and the power 
of exclusion of judicial review. A seven judge Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court held that the Parliament could not divest Constitutional courts 
of the power of judicial review amendment. The court clarified that tribunals 
created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution were competent 
to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. The court 
further held that section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the 
'exclusion of jurisdiction' clauses in all other legislations enacted under 
Articles 323-A and 323-B would be unconstitutional. 
The court made it clear that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High 
courts under Article 226 and 227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 
32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, 
constituting part of its basic structure. 
The net result of this latest decision is that the tribunals have lost their 
status, but not jurisdiction. The High Courts have not regained their jurisdiction 
fully inasmuch as they cannot entertain any writ petition in the first instance. 
Earlier, after losing in a tribunal, the aggrieved persons could immediately 
approach the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal. Now, it will not be 
possible to go to the Supreme Court directly fi^om a decision of a tribunal, 
259. L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India, 1997 (3) SCAL 40. 
441 
without first moving the High Court. In this respect the Supreme Court has 
curtailed its own jurisdiction under Article 136. Persons who are subject to 
the jurisdiction of tribunals have gained another remedy by way of a writ 
petition before the High Court concerned, but lost the opportunity of 
approaching the Supreme Court directly. What was earlier a two-tier litigation 
has now become a three-tier process"". 
The judges requested the Union Government to initiate action to set up 
a supervisory body after consulting all concerned, place all these tribunals 
under one single nodal Ministry preferably the Ministery of Law. 
Actual experience of functioning of tribunals, unfortunately, was far 
from satisfactory. They lacked in competence objectivity and judicial approach. 
The failed to inspire confidence in public mind and were not successful in 
creating an 'effective alternative institutional mechanism' as intended while 
inserted Article 323. A in the Constitution. 
The Arrears Committee observed: 
"The overall picture regarding tribunalisation of justice in our country 
is not satisfactory and encouraging. There is a need for a fresh look and review 
and a serious consideration before experiment is extended to now areas of the 
field, especially if the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is to be 
simultaneously ousted""'. 
260. P P Rao, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court," Pillar that holds basic 
structure". The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 31 March, 1997, Page 12. 
261. The Arreas Committee (1989-90), Report Vol. II, Chater IX, para 8.66. p. 111. 
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It is submitted that the decision in Chandra Kumar is a progressive step 
in the direction of independence of judiciary and must be welcomed by one and 
all as it seeks to restore jurisdiction and Constitutional status of High Courts 
and of the Supreme Court in the direction of re-enforcement of Rule of law. "^. 
It is further submitted that on the question of appointment to the 
tribunals, the central Government should initiate action on the basis of the 
recommendations of expert bodies like the Law Commission of India and 
Malimath Committee^*\ 
262. C.K. Thakkar. Judge, Gujrat High Court, L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India, 
A I.R 1997 S.C. 1125: Restoration of Jurisdiction of High Court", A.I.R. 1997, 
Journal, 178. 
263. Malimath Committee Report (1989-90). 
e'»/t7nsi^-^'f'j 
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CHAPTER-Vn 
RECAPITULATION 
For centuries, labour was regarded as commodity governed by law of 
demand and supply. Being privileged in economic, social and political 
position, the employers dictated the terms and conditions of employment. The 
governments of the day were merely like a spectator. They were guided by the 
doctrine of laissez-faire and thus the labourer was subjected to exploitation. 
In India, prior to independence, the Government's policy in regard to 
labour matters was also one of * laissez-faire and the Government was not 
interested to interfere in the matters of employers and employees. The idea 
was to leave labour and management alone to settle their afTairs as they liked. 
A major portion of Indian society consists of the depressed and 
deprived masses. The labour class have endeavoured the wrath and wrongs, 
physical and mental tortures of their employers. But they are the back bone 
of the Nation. India being an under developed country, can not survive and 
progress without them, it was evidently clear to the desiring freedom fighters 
and able Constitution makers. They framed several provisions in the Consti-
tution to raise the weaker section to the general level. 
The Preamble of Indian Constitution states that the people of India 
have solemnly resolved "to secure to all its citizens: Justice-Social, Economic 
and Political. Equality of status and of opportunity". 
Social justice is the harmonisation of the rival claims of the interests 
of different groups and sections in the social structure by means of which 
alone it is possible to build up a 'welfare State'. Thus, in the industrial sphere. 
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its object is to ensure industrial peace which is essential for the development 
and expansion of the national industry; and this is possible only if the labour 
force is contended on the one hand and a steady and progressive return is 
ensured on the other to attract the investing public to the industry. Instead, 
therefore, of leaving the matter to contract, social justice inspires a welfare 
State to secure to the workmen a minimum wage, having regard to the 
capacity of each industry as would establish harmony and co-operation 
between labour and capital in the task of production, and also enable the 
worker to achieve a decent standard of living. 
Recently, in Air India Statutory corporation's case' the Supreme Court 
considering the concept of social justice as provided in the Preamble of the 
consitution and in the Directive Principles of State Policy, observed: 
"The Preamble and Article 38 of the constitution envision social 
justice as the arch to ensure life to be meaningful and livable with 
human dignity... Social justice is dynamic devise to mitigate the 
sufferings of the poor, weak, dalits, tribal and deprived sections of 
the society..." 
Part IV of the Constitution contains Directive Principles of State 
Policy. These Principles specify the goals and values to be secured. Some of 
these Principles specify the goals and values to be secured by legislations for 
workmen. The Directive Principles now stands elevated to inalienable funda-
mental human rights. Even they are justiciable by themselves^. 
Economic justice means that there will be no distinction between man 
and man from the stand point of economic value. It means equality of reward 
for equal work. Every man should get his just due for his labour, irrespective 
of caste, sex, or social position. 
1. Air India Statutory Corporation Vs. United Labour Union, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 645 at 648. 
2. Ibid. 
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Political justice means the absence of any arbitrary distinction between 
man and man in the political sphere. This is secured under our Constitution 
by the adoption of universal adult suffrage and the abolition of communal 
reservation, and by throwing open employment under the State to all citizens 
without distinctions of race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth or relegion. 
The Preamble of our Constitution professes to offer to the citizens the 
equality of status and opportunity and the object is secured in the body of the 
Constitution by guaranteeing equality before the law and equal protection of 
laws (Article 14); by making illegal all discriminations by the State between 
citizen and citizen, on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth 
(Article 15); offering equality of opportunity in matters relating to employ-
ment under the State (Article 16). 
The Seventh Schedule of Indian Constitution deals with distribution 
of legal authority between the Centre and State. The Constitution makers 
having regard to the nature of the subject matter and different conditions 
prevailing in the various provinces thought it fit to provide a system whereby 
labour welfare legislation could provide adequate safeguards as against the 
strong capitalist class. They in their wisdom decided that labour matters 
should be placed in the Concurrent List so that the Centre and Provinces could 
play their respective role successfully. 
In regard to labour being on Concurrent List, there were three main 
points before the National Commission on Labour^ for consideration. 
(i) To discover the basis for Common Labour Code; or 
(ii) To transfer labour suject to the Union List or State List; or 
3. National Commission on Labour, 1969 at 315-316 
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(iii) to maintain Status-quo. 
The Commission recommended that labour should continue to be on 
the Concurrent List for the purpose of maintaining uniformity in definitions 
and standards. However, the peculiar position of labour being on Concurrent 
List, there should be a mechanism to deal with Centre State action and over 
reaction as both are given powers to play an effective roll within their own 
spheres. 
Finally, it is a good scheme based upon the division of labour which 
also provides the necessary powers to meet specific situations which may be 
peculiar to particular field of activity. 
It is quite natural that the repugnancy or inconsistency may arise in 
connection with the Concurrent List. Under Article 246 (2), both the Union 
and the State legislatures have powers to legislate with respect to the 
Concurrent List. Logically, therefore, an absurd situation would arise if two 
inconsistent laws, each of equal validity, could exist side by side within the 
same territory. Article 254 of the Constitution has been engrafted to obviate 
such an absurd situation. 
The Directive Principles of State Policy embody the philosophy of 
Indian Constitution and contain a system of values. 
The Directive Principles are placed in part IV of the Indian Constitution. 
Through these 'Directives' the fiamers of the Indian Constitution sought to 
incorporate certain basic principles which they considered essential to be 
followed by welfare State for its social and economic progress. Truly 
speaking, these Directives are guide lines to the Parliament, the State 
legislatures, the Union and the State executive governments as also to local 
bodies and other authorities to formulate their legislative and administrative 
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policies in such a manner that the social and economic interest of Indian 
people are well protected. Although these Directives are mostly in nature of 
moral precepts and economic maxims without any binding force, yet the State 
is directed to give effect to these principles through legislative measures. 
In Unikrishnan Vs state of A. P.*, the court has reiterated the principle 
that the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are supplementary and 
complementary to each other. 
The most important Article enshrined in the Constitution of India is 
Article 43 under Part IV relating to Directive Principles of State Policy which 
provides-
"The State shall endeavour to secure the suitable legislation or 
economic organisation or in any other way to all workers, agricultural, 
industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work 
ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and 
social and cultural opportunities —". 
The concept of living wage as highlighted in the Constitution under. 
Article 43(the emphasis is of the researcher) in a sense can be said to be the 
'Magna Cart;' of all workers. And this Constitutional provision directly or 
indirectly emphasises the need to improve the wages and living conditions of 
the workers through legislative and other State measures. 
Now the question arises whether we have achieved this Constitutional 
goal. The answer is in negative. Except in very few industries, this living wage 
concept does not exist anywhere in India. 
4. (1993)1. S.C.C. 625 
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The Supreme Court in workmen Vs. The Management of Reptakos 
Brett and Co. Ltd.' rightly observed : 
"A living wage has been promised to the workers under Constitution. 
A 'Socialist' frame work to enable to working people a decent 
standard of life, has further been promised by the 42nd Amendment. 
The workers are hopefully looking forward to achieve the said ideal. 
The promises are pilling-up but the day of fulfilment is nowhere in 
sight. Industrial wage- looking as a whole - has not yet risen higher 
then the level of minimum wage". 
Analysis of the concept of equality begins by confrontation with 
defence of inequality. Debate on merits and demerits of inequality is endless. 
It is a tussle between Haves and Have-nots and each side has its ablest 
advocates. The supporters of inequality say that inequality is ordained by 
nature itself. Civilization and culture depend upon it. The innate inequality 
between persons creates inequality of ranks, conditions and fortunes in 
society. 
The critique regarding inequality states that inequality creates a jungle 
of vested interests and hence is an eternal source of conflicts*. 
The Preamble to our Constitution promises 'equality of status and 
opportunity' to all citizens and that this ideal of equality embraces both social 
and political equality. 
So far as the ideal of social equality is concerned, it is concerned and 
embodied in a series of Articles, of which Article 14 is the genus and the 
succeediijg Articles 15-16 contain particular applications thereof 
5. A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 505. 
6. See Supra note 2 of Chapter IV of this work. 
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Article 14 being a general provision, is to be read subject to the special 
provisions which engraft exceptions to the general rule of equality as well as 
those Articles which explicitly override Article 14 to the specified extent. 
Thus the special provisons for women and children in Article 15(3) or for the 
backward classes in Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) can not be challenged on 
the ground that they violate the rule of equality enunciated in Article 14. 
In E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu^ the Supreme Court changed 
the traditional concept of equality which was based on reasonable classification 
and has laid down a new concept of equality. The Court observed: 
"Equality is dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and 
it cannot be cribbed, cabined and confined within traditional and 
doctrinaire limits. From a positive point of view, equality is antithetic 
to arbitrariness ...". 
In Maneka Gandhi's case* and International Airport Authority case', 
the Supreme Court reiterated the same principle. 
In Satya Deo Mishra Vs. State of U.P.'", the court observed: 
"In my opinion the concept that a temporary employee has no right 
to the post has to be modified in the light the new interpretation of 
Article 14 of the Constitution given by the Supreme Court in Maneka 
Gandhi's case, which is a seven Judges Constitution Bench decision 
followed by several subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. The 
concept that a temporary employee has no right to the post cannot be 
7 A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555. 
8. AIR. 1978 S.C. 597 
9. R.D. Shetty Vs. Airport Authority, A.I.R. 1979 S.C 1628. 
10. 1996 Lab. I.C. 443 at 444. 
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treated as an absolute concept. It has to be treated as subject to 
Article 14 of the Constitution. The Constition is the Supreme law of 
the land. If the Supreme Court gives a new interpretation to a 
Constitutional provision then it is necessary to revise the earlier 
concept in the light of the new interpretation given by the Supreme 
Court. To tell a person who has put in 18 years of service that his 
service is no longer required in my opinion is wholly arbitrary and 
unreasonable -—". 
Rightly viewed all these three Articles i.e. 14,15 and 16 are different 
facets of the same principle enunciated in Article 14. Therefore, the judicial 
decisions by the Supreme Court have generally agreed that all these three 
Articles are to be read together. But the view had developed in response to 
the changing conditions. In the very beginning when the Constitution was 
viewed as more democratic than socialist, merit or the liberty of the individual 
was given the pride of place. 
This attitude of the judiciary led to the amendment of Article 15 by 
insertion of clause (4) in 1951 stating that Article 29(2) shall not prevent the 
State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially 
and educationally backward classes or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes. 
The Constitution of India in its Article 16 provides that there shall be 
equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or 
appointment to any office under the State but at the same time, keeping in view 
the condition of the backward classes, it is provided in clause(4) of Article 16 
that nothing in this Article shall prevent the State for making any provision 
for the reservation of appointment or posts in favour of any backward class 
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of citizens which, in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in 
the services under the State. 
There are various judgements given by various High Courts and 
Supreme Court on Article 16, but one thing is very clear from these judgements 
that in deciding the scope and ambit of the Fundamental Right of equality of 
opportunity guaranteed by Article 16, it is necessary to bear in the mind that 
in Construing the relevant Article a technical or pedantic approach must be 
avoided. Thus construed it would be clear that matters relating to employment 
can not be confined only to initial matters prior to the act of employment. The 
narrow Construction would confine the application of Article 16(1) to the 
initial employment and nothing else; but that clearly is only one of the matters 
relating to employment. The other matters relating to employment would 
inevitably be the provision as to salary, and increments therein, terms as to 
leave, gratuity, pension, compulsory retirement, the age of superannuation, 
termination, promotion, abolitions of post, confirmation, seniority, transfer 
and reservation etc. These are all matters relating to employment and they are, 
and must be deemed to be included in the expression "matters relating to 
employment" in Article 16. 
This equality of opportunity need not be confused with absolute 
equality as such. What is guaranteed is the equality of opportunity and nothing 
more. Article 16 does not prohibit the prescription of reasonable rules for 
selection to any employment or appointment to any office. Any provision as 
to the qualification for the employment or appointment to office. Any 
provision as to the qualification for the employment or appointment to office 
reasonably fixed and applicable to all citizens would certainly be consistent 
with doctrine of equality of opportunity. 
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Article 16 is merely an incident of Article 14. Article 14 being the genus 
is of universal application where as Article 16 is the species and seeks to 
obtain equality of opportunity in services under the State. What Article 14 or 
16 forbid is hostile discrimination and not reasonable classification. Article 16 
represents one facet of the guarantee of equality. Articles 14, 15, and 16 
underline the importance which framers of our Constitution attached to 
ensuring equality of treatment. Such equality has special significance in the 
matter of public employment. It was with a view to prevent any discrimination 
in that field that an express provision was made to guarantee equality of 
opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment 
to any office under the State employing thereby that affirmative action by 
Government would be consistent with the Article if it is calculated to achieve 
it. 
The reservations for backward classes should not be unreasonable. It 
should be considered havmg regard to the employment opportunities of the 
general public. 
In Akhil Bhartiya Shoshit Karamshari Sangh's case" the Supreme 
Court upheld the 'carry-forward rule'. As a result of this rule the reservation 
quota came to about 64.4% but the court held that this was not excessive as 
mathematical precision could not be applied in dealing with human problems. 
This attitude of the judiciary creates a lot of resentment amongst 
people who are denied promotions and thereby affects efficiency in the 
administration. Besides, politicians can take undue advantage of the rulings 
in the above case and create disharmony and dissentions amongst members of 
different classes of society. 
11. Akhil Bhartiya Shoshit Karamchari Sangh Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 298. 
453 
The decision of Indra Sawhney's case" has laid down a workable and 
reasonable solution to the problem of reservation. In this case it was held that 
the maximum limit of reservation cannot exceed 50 percent and the reservation 
under Article 16(4) cannot be made in promotions. The reservation is 
confined to initial appointments. In this judgement the majority did not 
express any opinion on the correctness or adequacy of the Mandal Commission's 
report.'^ 
The majority judgement was welcomed by all sections of society as it 
was able to defuse the crisis which the Nation was facing since the 
implementation of Mandal Report reserving 27% Government's job for the 
socially and educationally backward classes. The most welcome aspect of this 
judgement is that reservation will not apply to promotion in services. 
But the Government has enacted the Constitution 77th Amendment 
Act, 1995 in order to bypass the court's ruling on this point. This amendment^ 
has added a new clause (4-A) to Article 16, which provides: 
"Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State fi"om making any 
provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes 
of posts in the services of the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes which in the opinion of the State, are not 
adequately represented in the services under the State". 
This means that reservation in promotion in government services may 
be continued in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes even after 
the Mandal case if the Government wants to do so. 
12. Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India. A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477. 
13. See Supra note 84 of Chapter IV of this work. 
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The Supreme Court has to intervene again. In Union of India Vs. Virpal 
Singh'" the Supreme Court held that seniority between reserved category 
candidates and general candidates shall continue to be governed by their panel 
position prepared at the time of selection. 
The ruling of the court puts a question mark on the validity of the 
recent Constitution amendment permitting reservations in promotions to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
In human society there can not be mathematical equality nor it is 
physically and humanly possible. There has been endeavour to reduce it to the 
minimum gap and efforts will continue till the survival of human beings. 
During last few years flood of litigation all over India has cropped up in 
Supreme Court, High Courts and Tribunals on the part of the workers to seek 
equal pay for equal work. The case lawhas been developed on the interpretation 
of Article 39(d) read with Article 14 of the Constitution. 
In order to implement the constitutional directive, the President of 
India promulgated on the 26th September, 1975, the Equal Remuneration 
Ordinance, 1975 so that the provisions of Article 39 of the constitution may 
be implemented in the year which is being celebrated as the International 
Women Year. The Ordinance provides for payment of equal remuneration to 
men and women workers for the same work or work of similar nature and for 
the prevention of discrimination on ground of sex. It also ensures that there 
will be no discrimination against recruitment of women and provides for the 
setting up of Advisary Commitees to promote employment opportunities for 
women. The Act recieved the assent of President on February 11, 1976 and 
published in Gazette of India. 
I4.(1995)6S.C.C. 684. See also Ajit Singh Januja Vs. State of Punjab (1996)2 S.C.C. 775. 
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In any democracy, workers must have the right to agitate to press their 
demands and grievances. The right to agitate empowers those without 
resources. We have many excellent rules and laws. But in practice, the 
workman is harassed and denied his rights at every stage. The oppressed must 
have the right to take his problem to the streets In fact, the working class of 
our country need both freedom and food. Neither freedom nor food be 
sacrificed at any cost. Freedom is unthinkable without free speech. Workers, 
man and woman who are free, should be in a position to exchange their ideas 
in order to manage their own affairs. The right to protest, and agitate has to 
be kept alive in any democratic polity. 
It is crystal clear from various judicial pronouncements" that during 
the last fifteen years the judiciary has given new dimensions to Article 19(a). 
These decisions have heralded a new revolution. But unfortunately the 
judiciary has given step motherly treatment to the working class in relation to 
their right of freedom of speech and expression. The recent judgement of the 
Supreme Court in Bharat Kumar's case,'* is the example of such step motherly 
treatment of the judiciary. In this case the Kerala High Court has declared 
bandh organised by any political party or trade union as unconstitutional and 
illegal. The Supreme Court on 12-11-1997 puts its stamp on the Kerala High 
Court judgement. 
It is submitted that bandhs (general strike) or hartals are necessary evil 
for the protection of rights of workers. The blanket ban on such activities will 
15 See Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India, A I R 1978 S C 597. Life Insurance 
Corporation of India Vs Manubhai, D Shah, (1992) 3 S C R 595, Secretary, 
Ministry of Information and Broad-Casting Vs Cricket Association of Bengal 
(1995)2SCC 461. Tata Press Ltd Vs Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd (1995)5 
s e c 13 9. People's Union for Civil Liberties Vs Union of India, A I R 1997SC 
568 
16 Bharat Kumar Vs State of kerala, 1997(2) K L T 287 
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frustrate the purpose of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the workers 
and their organisations. 
In an egalitarian society with its fast changing social norms, a concept 
like, collective bargaining, is not capable of precise definition. The content 
and scope of collective bargaining also varies from country to country. 
Collective bargaining is a method by which the employers and their workmen 
settle their disputes among themselves on the strength of the sanctions 
available to each side. By its very nature both parties want to yield less and 
get more. 
In All India Bank Employee Association's case, it was argued that 
Article 19(c) guarantees, as a concommitant to its right to form associations 
or unions, a right to effective collective bargaining and a right to strike. But 
the Supreme Court rejected the argument. 
But even so that right is one of social importance in India's industrial 
development. Now the Government and judicial apathy towards collective 
bargaining is undergoing a gradual modification and the necessity of collective 
bargaining for adjusting labour management relations is urgently felt. 
The liberalised industrial policy fascinated and encouraged a large 
number of private investors, both national and foreign, to invest in the Indian 
economy on a large scale. Globalization of Indian economy questions the 
existing position or model of collective bargaining. A futuristic model has to 
be developed to cope with the developments taking place in Indian economy. 
There are several definitions of strike which are found in various 
decisions'^ of the Courts, dictionaries'* and in the statutes". 
17. Supra notes 60 and 61 of Chapter V of this work. 
18. Supra notes 62 and 63 of Chapter V of this work. 
19. Supra note 64 of Chapter V of this work. 
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Ordinarily it is open to a trade Union to go on strike or with hold labour 
However in the constitution of India there is a Fundamental Right to form 
association or Trade Unions. In numerous cases the Supreme Court has 
however, held that the constitutional freedom of association does not include 
any Fundamental Right to strike. 
It is respectfully submitted that strike in a given situation is only a form 
of demonstration. There are different modes of demonstrations, e.g. go-slow; 
sit-in; tool down; work to rule; absentism etc. A strike is one such mode of 
demonstration. The right to demonstrate and therefore, the right to strike is 
an important weapon in the armoury of the workers. But the right of strike is 
not absolute under our industrial jurisprudence and restrictions have been 
placed on it. So it is fiirther submitted that the Supreme Court being a guardian 
and protector of the rights of citizen should also protect the rights of workers 
specially right of strike, picketing , and demonstration provided that these 
rights are exercised peaceably by the workers in contraction of reasonable 
restrictions engrafted in Article 19(2) or (4) of the Constitution. 
The freedom of the workers to form and participate in activities of an 
association is spelled out in the Constitutional provisions in its widest 
amplitudes, and is subject only to the appropriate reasonable restrictions 
clause. The reasonableness of restrictions is determined by a direct nexus 
between the demands of social control conducive to public interest and 
imposed restrictions. 
It is hard fact that without job security a worker cannot perform his 
duties fearlessly and efficiently. Certain legislative measures have been taken 
for the betterment and security of the job of the workers. True worth of 
legislative measures can only be realised by providing a meachinery for 
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deciding the dispute arising therefrom which is suitable in such areas. Thus the 
existence of an effective working of the enforcement machinery is to be 
ensured byproviding a suitable procedure and appropriate deciding authority. 
Parties in a dispute relating to legislative measures are the workers and 
the employer. The biggest employer is the State today as in almost in every 
area of human endeavour. We find public organisations which employ a very 
large number of people. 
The result is the capacity to fight a case is very unequal in case of an 
employer and the workers. The resources at the disposal of the worker are 
very limited. He has no money for making the payment of the fees of the 
advocates and other attendant expenditure. The nature of procedure where in 
adjournments are readily granted makes the dispute a very very long affairs. 
Capacity to wait of worker is very limited as compared to an employer 
particularly where a State run corporations or other organisations is a party 
to the dispute. 
The need for speedy inexpensive common sense justice is required. For 
this purpose our social welfare labour legislations should be amended so as 
to make it more effective system of the resolution of disputes in the field of 
welfare of workers. 
The civil services consist of the body of officials in the service of the 
Government of India. The civil servant is indispensable to the governance of 
the country in the modem administrative age. Ministers fi-ame policies and 
legislatures enact laws, but the task of efficiently and effectively implementing 
these policies and laws falls on the civil servants. 
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In contemporary India, the civil servants are facing anormous difficulties 
such as political transfers, demotions, suspensions and compulsary retirements 
etc. 
The job security is provided in Articles 309, 310, and 311 of the 
Constitution of India because a country without an efficient civil service can 
not progress inspite of the earnestness of the people at the helm of affairs in 
the country, whatever democratic institutions exist, experience has shown, 
that it is essential to protect the civil services as far as possible from political 
or personal influence. 
The remedies which are available to a civil servant maybe divided into 
two parts namely remedies before the passing of Administrative Tribunals 
Act, 1985 and remedies after the passing of Administrative Tribunals Act, 
1985. 
Prior to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 an aggrieved 
Government servant could obtain relief from the High Court, in a proceeding 
under Article 226 on grounds appropriate to the writs available under that 
Article. 
After coming into force of the Act all judicial remedies save those of 
the Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 136 have been abolished and the 
pending proceedings before other Courts, e.g., suits before that Civil Court 
or proceedings before High Court under Article 226 stand transferred before 
the regional Administrative Tribunals. 
Recently in L. Chandra Kumar's case^" the Supreme Court made it clear 
that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226 and 
227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the constitution is an 
20. L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India 1997 (3) SCALE. 40 
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integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic 
structure. 
Suggestions t 
Introduction of steam power and machines in production process 
which germinated the factory system in our Country, changed the nature and 
content of traditional labour- management relations. On the one hand, an 
employer came to engage workers in hundreds and thousands. On the other 
hand, the worker lost his individual status as significant factor in the production 
process. He became one of the several easily replaceable persons engaged 
m the factory. This caused the exploitation of labour. The employers being a 
private person had tried to earn more and more profit. No attention was paid 
towards the pitiable conditions of the workers. The Government had tried to 
check this evil of exploitation by passing various legislations i.e. Factories 
Act, 1948; Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923; Payment of Wages ACt, 
1936; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 etc. 
Further efforts continued but the object was not achieved. 
After Independence the Government changed the policy and decided 
to become the employer. Policy of Nationalisation was introduced which 
changed the existing scenario. Concept of Public Sector came to the light. The 
motive behind this change was not exclusively to earn the profit but was to 
serve the Nation. The main objective was the service to Nation and secondary 
object was to earn the profit. Unfortunately these objectives were frustrated 
and some new problems came in light in the public sectors i.e.-
(i) No proper working on the part of the workmen. 
(ii) Continuous losses. 
(iii) Over staffing. 
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After 44 years of Independence the Government realised that the 
privatisation is only the solution of above problems. So the Government 
decided to invite Non Resident Indians and multinational Companies to invest 
the money in India. The motive behind this policy of Privatisation is to-
(i) minimise over staffing 
(ii) provide effective control over multinational companies 
(iii) increase the quality or efiBciency of work. 
This is current scenario of our industrial system. 
The following suggestions should betaken into consideration in order 
to provide protection to the workers who have always been victim of 
exploitation and atrocities of the employer, who hold the reins of employment 
in their hands: 
(1) The Preamble of the Indian Constitution proclaimed "to secure to 
all its citizens, justice- social, economic and political — equality of status and 
opportunity". This Preambulatary message of socio-economic justice and 
equality of status and opportunity has been incorporated into several Articles 
dealing with its different facets in Part III and IV of the Constitution. 
The Governments, Union or States, which purport to act within the 
Constitutional frame work, is duty bound to strive to secure socio-economic 
justice and equality of status and opportunity for the citizens and the 
Government is free for any means to achieve this goal. The judiciary which is 
more active at present stage, and the judges who are called social engineers 
and are breathing new judicial life in letters of Constitution and statutes are 
also expected to breath the judicial life into this Constitutional goal. 
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Since the international human rights instruments and their developing 
jurisprudence enshrine values and principles of equality, freedom, rationality 
and fairness, like that of the Indian Constitution, they should be seen as 
complementary to domestic lavs' and could certainly be relied upon and 
enforced by courts to effectuate the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to labour 
class. It is submitted that so long as the international covenant was consistent 
with the provision of chapter III of the Constitution they should be enforced 
by Indian Courts^' in the field of labour laws. 
(2) The important labour subjects are placed in the Concurrent list of 
the Constitution of India. The Constitution makei s having regard to the nature 
of the subject matter and different conditions prevailing in various Provinces 
thought it fit to provide a system whereby labour welfare legislation could 
provide adequate safeguards as against the strong capitalist group. They in 
their wisdom decided that labour subjects should be placed in the Concurrent 
List so that both the Centre and State could play their respective role 
successfiiUy. 
But a rapid change in the circumstances, fast industrialization, creation 
of new means of communication, establishment of multinational companies in 
our country, a second thought becomes necessary about the change in division 
of subject matters mentioned in three list. There are some basic or common 
standards i.e. working hours, environmental protection, hazardous industry 
etc., which need a uniform and common legislation for all the States. Thus it 
is suggested that the important labour subjects in relation to above basic 
standards should be transferred to Union List to enable the Parliament to make 
an effective, uniform and suitable legislation in this regard leaving rest of the 
subjects in Concurrent List. 
21. Hindustan Times. New Delhi, February 10, 1997. P.9. 
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(3) All efforts should be made to provide the living wages to workers 
and all organs of State i.e.; Legislature, Executive and Judiciary must be 
active to provide living wage. 
It is further suggested that if the industries, mainly production units, 
are unable to provide living wage due to one reason or the other, then they 
should provide some additional amount to their permanent employees for 
their sincere efforts of increasing the production. In other words the additional 
amount should be linked with productivity. This additional amount must be 
made by way of an incentive. The said additional amount cannot called as 
over-time payment, because the practice of payment for over-time has become 
a false practice- a practice only on paper, mainly in public sectors. Thus in 
place of over-time payment, the said additional amount should be paid in 
addition to the wages which are fixed by the Government. The concept of 
additional amount will raise the standard of living of the labour class on the 
one hand and the addition in the national income on the other hand. 
(4) Under Article 15(4) the State is empowered to make special 
provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward 
classes of citizens. Under Article 16(4) the State is authorised to make 
provisions for the reservation of posts for backward classes or for the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
Originally, under Article 334 the reservation for these castes was made 
for ten years from the commencement of the Constitution. Since then this 
duration has been extended from time to time. 
The policy of reservation is creating a lot of resentment amongst 
persons who are denied the jobs, promotions and admissions in educational 
institutions. There is direct effect on the quality of work and efficiency in the 
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administration. Beside>, politicians can take undue advantage of this policy 
and create disharmony and dissenssions amongst members of different classes 
of society. This would not be in the interest of the Nation. The whole policy 
of reservation is, in fact, a politically motivated policy coming down from 
British day- the divide and rule policy. It has provoked a caste war which 
threatens to tear our social fabric. Fortunately this caste war is paying nothing 
to politicians who have provoked the caste war and divided the whole 
community into various groups. The best example of their defeat is that no 
single political party was able to win absolute majority to form the Government 
in the State or in the Centre in last elections. Thus legally, socially and 
politically the policy of reservation cannot be justified enblock on the basis of 
caste. It should be based upon social, educational and economic backwardness 
downtrodden have-nots who have been exploited by socially and economically 
advanced classes of society since time immemorial in India. However, the 
reservation must be made at the initial stage of employment not in the 
promotion from the lower rank to the higher rank. 
(5) Regarding the provision of Article 39 (d) of the Constitution it may 
be stated that there is no piece of legislation in India guaranteeing a citizen 
equal pay for equal Nvork. Moreover, there is no State machinery to protect 
the workers' right to get equal pay for equal work. However, there is Equal 
Remuneration Act, 1976 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in 
wages, recruitment and other matters relating to or incidental to employment. 
But, the Act is insufficient and inefl^ective. Firstly it seeks to provide for 
payment of equal remuneration to male and female workers, but it does not 
guarantee equal pay for equal work among men. The absence of this 
specification led to a judicial controversy. Secondly, it provides for equal 
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wages for men and women for the same or similar work. Similar work^^ is 
defined as one in which the skill, effort and responsibility are the same. But 
the Government on subjective satisfaction has the power to declare that 
difference in remuneration between men and women in a specific establishment 
is based on a factor other than sex". 
Therefore it is suggested that the defects discussed above should be 
removed either by suitable legislation or by a suitable amendament. 
(6) The definition of strike recognises concerted action under common 
understanding on the part of strikers as an essential element of strike. 
In the present circumstances and situations where a large number of 
worker are employed by an employer, this concerted action or action in 
combination may cause a great loss to the establishment by which the National 
growth will be aflfected. The best solution for this problem is the redressal of 
grievances of the workers as soon as possible. The grievance should be 
redressed at the initial stage and best method for this redressal is the 
conciliation. A conciliation can be more effective if it is freed from outside 
influence and conciliation machinery is adequately staffed. The independent 
character of the machinery will alone inspire greater cooperation from the 
parties. 
22. Section 2{h) of the Equal Remuneration Act. 1976 provides, "Same work or work 
of similar nature means work in respect of which the skill, effort and responsibility 
requiied are the same —, if any, between the skill effort and responsibility required 
of a man and those requiredof a womanare not of practical importance in relation 
to terms and conditions of employment. 
23. Section 16 of the Equal Remuneration Act 1976 says,"where the appropriate 
Government is, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied 
that the differences in regard to the remuneration, or a particular species of 
remuneration ... and any act of the employer attributable to such a difference shall 
not be deemed to be a contravention of any provision of this Act". 
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The overall picture regarding tribunalisation of justice in our country 
is not satisfactory and encouraging. There is a need for a fresh look and review 
and a serious consideration before experiment is extended to new areas of the 
fields. 
Unfortunately in the field of labour law the purpose for which the 
Administrative Tribunals were constituted is fi^strated by the functioning of 
the Tribunals. They are following the same procedure as prescribed under 
C.P.C., specially when they apply the principles of Natural Justice. They 
failed to inspire confidence in public mind and were not successfiil in creating 
an 'effective alternative institutional mechanism'. On the other hand the 
practicing lawyers are also playing the same role as in the civil courts when 
they are engaged by the concerned parties. 
In L. Chandra Kumar's case^ the Apex Court rightly requested the 
Union Government to initiate action to set-up a supervisory body after 
consulting all concerned, place all these tribunals under one single nodal 
Ministry preferably the Ministery of Law. 
The Government being a social welfare state, an employer and protector 
of the interest of the workers, has failed to materialize the expectations of the 
working class. Instead of providing common sense justice, the Government as 
an employer engaged itself in wrestling with the poor, weak, and depressed 
workers. In most of the cases the Government files the suits, and appeals, 
applies for revisions and reviews against the claims of the employees. 
Therefore it is suggested that the Government should avoid the 
litigation and provide the common sense justice to the aggrieved workers 
keeping in view the concept of social welfare state in India. 
24. L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India. A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125. 
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